1.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security
features
George Dunlap
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013

2.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Intro
Xen is an enterprise-grade Type I hypervisor
Built for the Cloud before it was called the Cloud
A number of advanced security features
Driver domains, stub domains, FLASK, &c
Most of them aren’t or can’t be turned on by default
Although simple to use, sometimes seem complicated
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 2 / 28

3.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Goal
Tools to think about security in Xen
Know some key security features of Xen
Equipped with the knowledge to get them working
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 3 / 28

4.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Outline
Overview of the Xen architecture
Brief introduction to principles of security analysis
Consider some attack surfaces and Xen features we can use to
mitigate them
Driver domains
pvgrub
stub domains
PV vs HVM
FLASK example policy
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 4 / 28

5.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Xen Architecture
dom 0 device model
(qemu)
toolstack
Paravirtualized Fully
(PV)
Virtualized
Domain (HVM)
Hardware netback netfront Domain
Drivers blkback blkfront
Xen Hypervisor
I/O Devices CPU Memory Hardware
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 5 / 28

6.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Security Overview
Threat Model
Attacker can access network
Attacker controls one guest OS
Security considerations
How much code is accessible?
What is the interface like? (e.g., pointers vs scalars)
Defense-in-depth
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 6 / 28

7.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Example System
Hardware setup
Two networks: control network, guest network
IOMMU with interrupt remapping (AMD or Intel VT-d v2)
Default configuration
Network drivers in dom0
PV guests with pygrub
HVM guests with qemu running in domain 0
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 7 / 28

8.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Attack surface: Network path
dom 0 toolstack Domain
netfront
iptables bridge
Rogue
Domain
NIC netback netfront
Driver
Xen Hypervisor
Control NIC Guest NIC Hardware
How to break in?
Bugs in hardware driver
Bugs in bridging / filtering
Bugs in netback via the ring protocol
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 8 / 28

9.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Attack surface: Network path
dom 0 toolstack Domain
netfront
iptables bridge
Rogue
Domain
NIC netback netfront
Driver
Xen Hypervisor
Control NIC Guest NIC Hardware
What does it buy you?
Control of domain 0 kernel
Pretty much control of the whole system
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 9 / 28

10.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Security feature: Driver Domains
dom 0
Domain
toolstack
netfront
Driver Domain
iptables bridge
Rogue
Domain
NIC netfront
NIC netback
Driver Driver
Xen Hypervisor
Control NIC Guest NIC Hardware
What is it?
Unprivileged VM which drives hardware, provides access to
guests
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 10 / 28

11.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Security feature: Driver Domains
dom 0
Domain
toolstack
netfront
Driver Domain
iptables bridge
Rogue
Domain
NIC netfront
NIC netback
Driver Driver
Xen Hypervisor
Control NIC Guest NIC Hardware
Now an exploit buys you:
Control of a PV VM (PV hypercall interface)
Guest network traffic
Control of NIC
Opportunity to attack netfront of other guests
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 11 / 28

12.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
HowTo: Driver Domains
Create a VM with appropriate drivers
Any distro supporting dom0 should do
Install the xen-related hotplug scripts
Just installing the xen tools in the VM is usually good enough
Give the VM access to the physical NIC with PCI pass-through
Configure the network topology in the driver domain
Just like you would for dom0
Configure the guest vif to use the new domain ID
Add backend=domnet to vif declaration
vif = [ ’type=pv, bridge=xenbr0, backend=domnet’ ]
http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Driver Domain
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 12 / 28

13.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Attack surface: Pygrub
dom 0 toolstack
domain
builder
Paravirtualized
pygrub (PV)
Domain
guest
disk
Xen Hypervisor
What is it?
grub implementation for PV guests
Python program running in domain 0
Reads guest FS, parses grub.conf, presents menu
Passes resulting kernel image to domain builder
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 13 / 28

14.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Attack surface: Pygrub
dom 0 toolstack
domain
builder
Paravirtualized
pygrub (PV)
Domain
guest
disk
Xen Hypervisor
How to break in?
Bugs in file system parser
Bugs in menu parser
Bugs in domain builder
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 14 / 28

15.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Attack surface: Pygrub
dom 0 toolstack
domain
builder
Paravirtualized
pygrub (PV)
Domain
kernel guest
disk
Xen Hypervisor
What does it buy you?
Control of domain 0 user space
Pretty much control of the whole system
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 15 / 28

16.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Security practice: Fixed kernels
dom 0 toolstack
kernel domain
image builder
Paravirtualized
(PV)
Domain
guest
disk
Xen Hypervisor
What is it?
Passing a known-good kernel from domain 0
Removes attacker avenue to domain builder
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 16 / 28

17.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Security practice: Fixed kernels
dom 0 toolstack
kernel domain
image builder
Paravirtualized
(PV)
Domain
guest
disk
Xen Hypervisor
Disadvantages
Host admin must keep up with kernel updates
Guest admin can’t pass kernel parameters, custom kernels,
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 17 / 28

18.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Security feature: pvgrub
dom 0 toolstack
domain
builder
pvgrub
MiniOS
guest
disk
Xen Hypervisor
What is it?
MiniOS + pv port of grub running in a guest context
PV equivalent of HVM “BIOS + grub”
Now an exploit buys you:
Control of your own VM
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 18 / 28

19.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
HowTo: pvgrub
Make sure that you have the pvgrub image
pvgrub-$ARCH.gz
Normally lives in /usr/lib/xen/boot
Included in Fedora Xen packages
Debian-based: need to build yourself
Use appropriate pvgrub as bootloader in guest config
kernel="/usr/lib/xen/boot/pvgrub-x86_32.gz"
http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Pvgrub
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 19 / 28

20.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Attack surface: Device model (qemu)
How to break in?
Bugs in NIC emulator parsing packets
Bugs in emulation of virtual devices
What does it buy you?
Domain 0 privileged userspace
Pretty much control of the whole system
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 20 / 28

21.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Security feature: qemu stub domains
What is it?
Stub domain: a small “service” domain running just one
application
qemu stub domain: run each qemu in its own domain
Now an exploit buys you:
Control of the stubom VM
...which we assume you control
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 21 / 28

22.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
HowTo: qemu stub domains
Make sure that you have the pvgrub image:
ioemu-$ARCH.gz
Normally lives in /usr/lib/xen/boot
Included in Fedora Xen packages
Debian-based: need to build yourself
Specify stub domains in your guest config
device_model_stubdomain_override = 1
http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Device Model Stub Domains
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 22 / 28

23.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Attack Surface: Xen
PV guests
PV Hypercalls
HVM guests
HVM hypercalls (Subset of PV hypercalls)
Instruction emulation (MMIO, shadow pagetables)
Emulated platform devices: APIC, HPET, PIT
Nested virtualization
Security practice: Use PV VMs
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 23 / 28

24.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Security feature: FLASK example policy
What is FLASK?
Xen Security Module (XSM): Xen equivalent of LSM
FLASK: Framework for XSM developed by NSA
Xen Equivalent of SELinux
Uses same concepts, tools as SELinux
Allows a policy to restrict hypercalls
What can FLASK do?
Basic: Restricts hypercalls to those needed by a particular
guest
Advanced: Allows more fine-grained granting of privileges
FLASK example policy
This contains example roles for dom0, domU, stub domains,
driver domains, &c
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 24 / 28

25.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
HowTo: Use the example FLASK policy
Build Xen with XSM enabled
Build the example policy
Add the appropriate label to guest config files
seclabel=[foo]
stubdom label=[foo]
WARNING: In 4.2, the example policy not extensively tested.
Use with care!
http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Xen Security Modules : XSM-
FLASK
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 25 / 28

26.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Outline
Overview of the Xen architecture
Brief introduction to principles of security analysis
Consider some attack surfaces and Xen features we can use to
mitigate them
Driver domains
pvgrub
stub domains
PV vs HVM
Experimental: Example policy for FLASK
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 26 / 28

27.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Goal
Tools to think about security in Xen
Know some key security features of Xen
Equipped with the knowledge to get them working
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 27 / 28

28.
Intro Network path Bootloader Device model Xen Conclusion
Questions
Questions?
More info at http://wiki.xen.org/wiki/Securing Xen
Check out our blog: http://blog.xen.org/
Brussels – February 2-3, 2013 Securing your cloud with Xen’s advanced security features 28 / 28