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Nuclear Developments Across Europe Wk

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Nuclear Developments Across Europe Wk

  1. 1. Nuclear developments across Europe Weero Koster Partner 24 November 2009
  2. 2. Nuclear energy in Europe <ul><li>World’s largest producer of nuclear energy (131,623 MW(e)) </li></ul><ul><li>145 nuclear power plants in 15 EU Member States </li></ul><ul><li>Generating around a third of the electricity consumed in the EU </li></ul><ul><li>Many nuclear power plants under construction or announced </li></ul><ul><li>A growing majority of EU member states a choosing nuclear energy for power generation or reversing earlier opt-out decisions </li></ul>
  3. 3. Nuclear energy in Europe <ul><li>Recently completed and ongoing projects: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Romania (connected 07), Finland, France, Slovenia </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Announced new reactors: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Italy, UK, Poland, Romania, France, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Evolution in nuclear policies: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>New build decided: Italy, UK </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Phase-out reversed: Sweden, Germany, Belgium </li></ul></ul>
  4. 4. Reasons renewed interest “Nuclear Renaissance” <ul><li>Nuclear Renaissance vs nuclear decline? </li></ul><ul><li>Reasons for the decline: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Accidents/ public opposition </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Economics </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Reasons renaissance ? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Concerns about security of supply </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Climate change and emission reductions </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Availability of reliable base-load capacity </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Competitiveness of power prices </li></ul></ul>
  5. 5. Generation Gap <ul><li>Because of EU ambition of nuclear as low-carbon base-load power provider the choice is not between renewables OR nuclear, but for investment in renewables AND nuclear </li></ul><ul><li>Renewables can only do 60 % of the emission reduction targets; the remaining 40 % should come through CCS or nuclear generation </li></ul>
  6. 6. Increased Capacity <ul><li>Nuclear capacity increase can come through: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Lifetime extensions </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>New built </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Average age of EU nuclear park is 23 yrs </li></ul><ul><li>US: 50 % of reactors licensed for 60 yrs </li></ul><ul><li>Thus: lifetime extensions </li></ul><ul><ul><li>taken/ announced in Finland, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany and </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>prepared in Czech republic, Belgium and Slovakia </li></ul></ul>
  7. 7. Increased Capacity <ul><li>Flipside lifetime extensions: “windfall profits” </li></ul><ul><li>France: Report Commission Champsaur 24/04/09 </li></ul><ul><li>Belgium/ Germany: similar approach </li></ul><ul><li>Competitiveness of French nuclear plants not reflected in power prices: prices based on “merit order” </li></ul><ul><li>Two solutions: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Tax and reallocate (to consumers or regulated activities) and </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Regulated access to base-load nuclear production (October 09 Nome law project) </li></ul></ul>
  8. 8. Nuclear Renaissance? <ul><li>General concerns: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Windfall profits </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Public vs private funding </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Zoning, planning </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Grid connection, -management </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Decommissioning </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Security and safety (liability) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Waste </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Skills and the supply chain </li></ul></ul>
  9. 9. Divergence of approaches <ul><li>France </li></ul><ul><li>Largest EU generator of nuclear power/ production from nuclear power: 77% </li></ul><ul><li>Expand/innovate its nuclear power capacity and replace its current ‘fleet’ </li></ul><ul><li>EPR new build decisions in 2006 and 2009; prototypes III rd+ and IV th generation in 2012/2017 and 2035 </li></ul><ul><li>Current average life is 30 yrs and no regulatory life time, so: extend by at least 10 yrs and phase-in new fleet and windfall profits addressed </li></ul>
  10. 10. Divergence of approaches <ul><li>UK </li></ul><ul><li>First on nuclear energy in 1956: 48 reactors and 1 new build planned/ production from nuclear: 13% </li></ul><ul><li>All State owned until 1996; BE now part of EdF </li></ul><ul><li>2006 – go ahead from government for new generation reactors/ Infrastructure planning Commission now set up </li></ul><ul><li>Reasons: energy security/ legally binding targets on CO 2 emissions: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>34 % reduction by 2020/ 80% by 2050 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>5 year carbon budgets. </li></ul></ul>
  11. 11. Divergence of approaches <ul><li>Germany </li></ul><ul><li>Nuclear reactors: 17; production nuclear: 23% </li></ul><ul><li>1998 phase-out agreement; first 7 in 2010-2012 </li></ul><ul><li>2002 Nuclear Energy Act amended: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>ban on construction </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>fixed production amounts per reactor. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Coalition agreement 2009: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>nuclear needed to bridge generation gap </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>reverse phase-out/ additional operating times </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Windfall profits partly to RES, CCS, prices </li></ul></ul>
  12. 12. Divergence of approaches <ul><li>Belgium </li></ul><ul><li>7 reactors; production: 6000 MW/ 54% </li></ul><ul><li>In 2003 decided </li></ul><ul><ul><li>phase out use of nuclear reactors/ life time 40 yrs (not operating hrs) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>prohibit the new-build, </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>but deviation for “force majeure”, which may be insufficient generation capacity and dependency on imports </li></ul></ul>
  13. 13. Divergence of approaches <ul><li>Belgium </li></ul><ul><li>Also 2003: Law Decommissioning NPP’s </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Synatom to build up decommissioning reserves </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>reserves paid by nuclear operators, but 75 % can be reinvested in them </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>part of Suez group, but credit rating link, golden share and commission to control </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>excess reserves to be returned to operators </li></ul></ul>
  14. 14. Divergence of approaches <ul><li>The Netherlands </li></ul><ul><li>1 PWR at Borssele of 495 MW, production: 4%; much debate as JV between two operators and one recently privatised </li></ul><ul><li>1963 Nuclear Power Act and Decree on conditions </li></ul><ul><li>Life time extended to 2033 (60 yrs) by covenant with operators, with concessions: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>top 25 % quality requirement </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Investments in renewables (EUR 125 mio) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Coalition agreement: no decision on construction until 2011 </li></ul>
  15. 15. Divergence of approaches <ul><li>2009 technical revision Nuclear Power Act on de-commissioning security sparkled debate </li></ul><ul><li>MEA consulting and working on 3 scenario’s and 3 sites </li></ul><ul><li>One operator filed EIA for new build at Borssele </li></ul><ul><li>Dutch government has announced not to issue the licence before the end of its term (i.e. before 2011) </li></ul><ul><li>Other operator (Essent) acquired by RWE </li></ul><ul><li>Second covenant on public interests Borssele, which will apply to private owners and will set tone for new Act </li></ul>
  16. 16. Divergence of approaches <ul><li>Second covenant: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Public interests part of corporate decision-making </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Information and disclosure obligations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Sale only to parties non-proliferation treaty </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Hefty penalty clause </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Windfall profits addressed at the time of liberalisation and “stranded costs” </li></ul>
  17. 17. Public or private ownership <ul><li>Position Dutch government: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>No decision on construction, but need to cover “generation gap” by CCS or nuclear </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>public sector only facilitates and sets boundary conditions for investments and research in nuclear technology and new NPPs by private sector </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>economics dictate that private investors should invest and that exclusive public ownership of NPPs is not a viable option </li></ul></ul>

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