Vlad Tarko - Policentricitatea: Structura ordinii spontane in sistemele sociale complexe

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Pe baza articolului: D.P. Aligica & V. Tarko, 2011, “Policentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom and Beyond”, Governance, in curs de aparitie

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Vlad Tarko - Policentricitatea: Structura ordinii spontane in sistemele sociale complexe

  1. 1. Policentricitatea<br />Structuraordiniispontane in sistemelesocialecomplexe<br />Pebazaarticolului: D.P. Aligica & V. Tarko, 2011, “Policentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom and Beyond”, Governance, in curs de aparitie<br />
  2. 2. Ordineaspontana<br />Caracteristici:<br />Mai multi centri de decizie<br />Mecanism de agregare al alegerilorindividuale<br />Opusulplanificariicentralizate<br />Un singurcentru de decizie<br />Structuraierarhica de subordonare<br />
  3. 3. Ordineasocialareala<br />O combinatie de ordinespontanasi management central<br />Ordineacentralizata e o idealizareteoretica – nu exista de fapt – nicimacar in comunism<br />Multevariante de sistemesociale cu organizarede tip bottom-up: la modul general le numimsisteme “sistemepolicentrice”<br />
  4. 4. Istoriaconceptului de policentricitate<br />Michael Polanyi (1951): filosofiastiintei; analogiestiinta-piata<br />Lon Fuller (1957-9): drept, limiteleadjudecarii<br />V. & E. Ostrom et al. (1960s-70s): reformaadministratieimetropolitane<br />E. Ostrom (1980s-2000s): managementul common-pool resources<br />V. Ostrom (1970s-90s): federalism<br />
  5. 5. Michael Polanyi<br />Cum functioneazacomunitateastiintifica<br />Multecentre de cercetare<br />Au un scop abstract (“adevarul”) darimposibil de operationalizat (nu exista o “metodastiintifica” unica)<br />Evolutiastiintifica: prinincercaresieroare; multiplicitateacentrelorsilibertatea de cercetaresuntesentialepentru a aveaprogresstiintific<br />Analogie cu altesistemesociale:<br />Sistemuldreptuluicutumiar<br />Cultura in general<br />Piata -> argument original despreimposibilitateacalcului socialist<br />
  6. 6. Lon Fuller, limiteleadjudecarii<br />Candtrebuie un judecatorsa se abtinasaemita o deciziesisa lase problema in seamapieteisauprocesului democratic?<br />Cazuri in care deciziaaraveaefectesecundaremarisinumeroase, iarterteleparti nu suntreprezentate in sala de judecata.<br />Existaesecuri ale pietei, democratieisisistemuluijuridic – cheiaeste de a compensaesecuriledintr-o arie cu functionareauneialtearii.<br />Cu cat crestegradul de policentricitate al uneiprobleme (ordinea emerge din activitatilemultorcentre de decizie) cu atatcresteprobalitateaeseculuijustitiei (care adjudeca un conflict intredoardouaparti).<br />
  7. 7. V. & E. Ostrom et al.reformaadministratieimetropolitane<br />Zonelemetropolitane au aparut din crestereasisuprapunereaoraselor => nu au o administrarecentrala => aparenteineficiente<br />SuspiciuneaOstromiana: argumentele pro-centralizare ale administratieimetropolitanesunaufoarte similar cu argumenteledesprepretinsafezabilitatea a calculului socialist<br />Studiiempirice care au demonstratcaaparentulhaosadministrativ era de fapteficient => ideeacapoateexista un fel de piata a furnizorilor de serviciipublice, “antreprenoriat public”<br />Conceptul de “policentricitate” preluat de la Polanyi pentru a explicafunctionareaadministratieimetropolitane<br />
  8. 8. Managementul CPR<br />Ideeaesteapoiutilizatasipentru a explicasuccesul/insuccesulmanagementuluiCommon-Pool Resources<br />Paradoxulorganizariiierarhice:<br />Comportamentul la un nivelesteguvernat de regulistabilite de autoritatea de la nivelul superior<br />Pentruca o regulasa se respectetrebuiesa fie monitorizatarespectareaeisipedepsitaincalcariiei<br />Ceasiguracamonitorizatoriiisifactreaba? Cine-i monitorizeazapecei care monitorizeaza? => regresieinfinita<br />Sistemulierarhic are o problema: nivelul superior ramanediscretionar<br />Solutia paradoxului: <br />Introducereasi a unui control de jos in sus.<br />Participarelocala in monitorizaresistabilirearegulilor => cointeresareamonitorizatorilor de a-si face treaba cum trebuie<br />Rezulta un sistempolicentricpemaimultenivele de organizare: autoritati locale cu un anumit grad de independenta<br />
  9. 9. Federalism<br />Nivelurile de organizarecapata o anumitaindependenta: federalism (V. Ostrom).<br />Market-preserving federalism (Weingast):<br />Hierarchy of governments (central and local) with delineated scope of authority;<br />Each government’s autonomy is institutionalized in a self-enforcing manner;<br />Economic regulations are conducted at local level;<br />Common market (local governments are prevented by central government to engage in protectionism);<br />Local governments face hard budget constraints (can’t print money and don’t have indefinite access to credit).<br />
  10. 10. Ostrom: accent pus pelaturaempirica<br />Identificareaconditiilor in care diferitesisteme de management policentricfunctioneazaeficient.<br />Rezulta o conturareincipienta a atributelordefinitorii ale policentricitatii:<br />Multiplicitateacentrilor de decizie<br />Cum functioneazasi cum interactioneazaei<br />Sistem de reguli general<br />Caracteristici ale juristictieisistemului de reguli<br />Cum suntimplicatiagentii in determinarearegulilor<br />Competitieintremodurile de organizare<br />Libertatea de intrare/iesire<br />Managementulinformatieirelevantepentrudecizii<br />
  11. 11. Lista de sistemepolicentrice<br />Exemple:<br />Comunitateastiintifica<br />Piata<br />Dreptulcutumiar<br />Administratiametropolitana<br />Democratiareprezentativa<br />Federalismul<br />Market-based management<br />Exempleinrudite:<br />Dreptul international<br />Anarhia<br />
  12. 12. MetodologiaGerring-Goertz<br />Varianteclasice de conturare a unui concept:<br />Definitia de tip “gen proximdiferentaspecifica”<br />Asemanari de familie<br />Formalizarealogica a celordoua:<br />Un set de proprietati, {X, Y, Z, ...} , cu diverse valoriposibile {{x1, x2,...}, {y1, y2,...}, {z1, z2,...}, ...}<br />Folosestedoarconjunctii: <br />Conceptulspecificacevaloritrebuiesaaibaproprietatile: e.g. x1 & y2 & z5& …<br />Folosesteoriceoperatiilogice:<br />E.g. (x1sau x3) & y2 & (z1sauz5)<br />
  13. 13. Aplicatia la policentricitate<br />Luatediferiteexemple de policentricitatesimapatevalorileatributeloridentificate de Ostromcaimportante:<br />Multiplicitateacentrilor de decizie<br />Cum functioneazasi cum interactioneazaei<br />Sistem de reguli general<br />Caracteristici ale juristictieisistemului de reguli<br />Cum suntimplicatiagentii in determinarearegulilor<br />Competitieintremodurile de organizare<br />Libertatea de intrare/iesire<br />Managementulinformatieirelevantepentrudecizii<br />
  14. 14.
  15. 15. Intr-o singura formula<br />𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = <br />= 𝑃1 & 𝑃2 & 𝑃3 & (𝐴1#𝐴2) & (𝐵1#𝐵2) & (𝐶1#𝐶2)&<br /> & (𝐷1#𝐷2#𝐷3) & (𝐸1#𝐸2#𝐸3) & (𝐹1#𝐹2) & (𝐺1#𝐺2)<br />where “&” denotes the logical “and”, while “#” denotes the logical “exclusive or”.<br />288 de cazuridiferiteposibile<br /> <br />
  16. 16. Posibilitati de disparitie a policentricitatii (1/3)<br /> Multiplicity of decision centers break-down:<br />non-P1: active exercise of diverse opinions eliminated (monopoly)<br />non-P2: the system becomes hierarchical<br />non-(A1 or A2): the activity becomes considered meaningless (the goals disappear, the polycentric system disappears because it no longer serves a function)<br />
  17. 17. Posibilitati de disparitie a policentricitatii (2/3)<br />Overarching system of rules break-down:<br />non-P3: rules no longer considered useful by agents<br />non-(B1 or B2): agreement about territoriality disappears (decision centers fight over territorial authority)<br />non-(C1 or C2): no agreement about rule design (rules are no longer considered legitimate and their enforcement becomes difficult to impossible)<br /> non-(D1 or D2 or D3): the rule of law breaks down - power-based decisions (authority rule)<br />
  18. 18. Posibilitati de disparitie a policentricitatii (3/3)<br />Spontaneous order break-down:<br />non-(E1 or E2 or E3): no entry (monopoly)<br />non-(F1 or F2): the constituency of the system is unclear (some decision centers accept X as part of the system while others do not)<br /> non-(G1 or G2): no available information relevant to decision making (random decisions, relation between consequences and rules unclear, spontaneous order turns into drift) <br />
  19. 19. Care sistemepolicentricesuntcelemaivulnerabile?<br />A1: common/shared goals <br />B1: territorial<br />C2: rules designed by outsider <br />D3: majority rule <br />E2: merit-based entry <br />F2: constrained exit<br />G2: private information<br />
  20. 20. Design institutional<br />Conceptul de policentricitateasa cum l-am definit face posibilaexistenta a 288 de sistemepolicentricediferite – in teorie.<br />Analizasidezvoltareainstitutionala a unuisistempolicentricpresupuneintrebarea: <br />Ce s-arintampladaca am schimbavaloareaatributului X din ceaactualaintr-unadintrecelelaltevarianteposibile?<br />Posibilecriterii normative:<br />Rezilienta, eficienta, echitabilitatea etc.<br />
  21. 21. Exemple<br />Social-democratii: Educatie & sanatate: 𝐷2->𝐷3 (individual decision replaced by majority rule)<br />Libertarienii: sistemulbancar: 𝐷3->𝐷2 (interest rates determined by the Central Bank should be freed and left entirely at the decision of individual banks) <br />Licenteocupationale: 𝐸1->𝐸2(free entry should be replaced by merit-based entry)<br />Drepturileomului: 𝐵1->𝐵2 (certain rights should be territory independent)<br /> <br />
  22. 22. Nu exista o regulagenerala a cum e un sistempolicentricoptim<br />Exemple legate de “rules designed by outsider”:<br />Sistemuljuridic optimal: 𝐶1->𝐶2 (the separation between the juridical power and the legislative and executive powers, i.e. ideally, the rules that constrain the executive power are no longer designed by the executive power itself) <br />Sistemul de piata optimal: 𝐶1->𝐶2 (it is usually considered undesirable when firms and corporations get involved, mainly via lobbying, in the design of market regulations; transition from mercantilism to modern capitalism)<br />Sistemul democratic ideal: 𝐶2->𝐶1 (citizens are no longer completely separated from the process of rule design) <br /> <br />

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