The document discusses Germany's role in Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and German reunification. It examines four factors that transformed Germany's role, including EU eastern expansion, Germany's stability, France's decline, and the UK's withdrawal from the EU. It also analyzes different interpretations of German power and the features of Germany's new positive power, including realism through EU institutions and a potential "Core Europe." The document debates whether the EU needs strong political leadership as exemplified by Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel.

1. Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli
(University of Salento / Rub-Europadialog)
The New German Power and
the Future of the European
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

2. ❖ 1989 and the new Germany;
❖ Four factors that have determined the transformation of
Germany’s role in Europe;
❖ The Features of German power;
❖ Does the EU need political leadership?
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

3. Helmut Kohl, 22.11.1989
“Die Teilung Deutschlands war seit jeher sichtbarer und
besonders schmerzlicher Ausdruck der Teilung Europas.
Umgekehrt wird sich auch die Einheit Deutschlands nur
vollenden können, wenn die Einigung unseres alten
Kontinents voranschreitet. Deutschlandpolitik und
Europapolitik lassen sich in keiner weise voneinander
trennen: sie sind wie zwei Seiten derselben Medaille.”
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

4. Seminar on Germany, March 1990
“We could not expect a United Germany to think and act in exactly the
same way as the Federal Republic which we had known for the last
forty-five years - and this would be true even though a united Germany
would almost certainly inherit the Federal German Republic’s
institutions. The Germans would not necessarily think more
dangerously, but they would think differently. […] The weight of the
evidence and the argument favoured those who were optimistic about
life with a united Germany […] the overall message was
unmistakeable: we should be nice to the Germans. But even the
optimists had some unease, not for the present and the immediate
future, but for what might lie further down the road than we can [not]
yet see.”
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

5. 1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

6. Four factors in the transformation of Germany’s role in Europe
1. The European Union’s Eastern Enlargement (2004
and 2007);
2. Germany’s political and economic stability and
soundness;
3. The economic and political decline of France;
4. The United Kingdom’s gradual withdrawal from the
European Union (not only Brexit).
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

7. Nicholas Ridley, The Spectator, 14.07.1990
“We’ve [the United
Kingdom] always played
the balance of power in
Europe. It has always been
Britain’s role to keep these
various powers balanced,
and never has it been more
necessary than now, with
Germany so uppity.”
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

8. Which German Power?
Three main interpretations of German power:
1. The reluctance of the German Federal Republic to
assume a leadership role (Paterson, Bullmer,
Schweiger, Krönig);
2. Germany as hegemonic (or semi-hegemonic) power
(Beck, Kundnani, Rusconi);
3. German Positive Power (Crawford, Bolaffi, Münkler).
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

9. The features of the new German Power
❖ Realism:
1) EU-Institutions;
2) Kerneuropa.
❖ Global strategy:
1) The refugee crisis;
2) Foreign policy and the engagement to re-enforce multilateral
international cooperation (e.g.: Crimea’s crisis);
3) Investments in military defence (2 per cent of GNP by 2024).
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

10. Angela Merkel, Die Zeit, 20.10.2016
“I am convinced that our safety depends on situations geographically
far removed from us. For this reason we sign climate agreements, for
this reason we set targets for world development like Agenda 2030. I
will give you an example. In the Lake Chad area there are enormous
problems with drought which contributes to its considerable political
instability. This does not mean that anyone who finds themselves in
difficulty there can come to Europe as a refugee, but it does mean that
we should be interested in whether or not the 11 million people there
have hope in life. If Lake Chad should go down still further, in the end
the only option for these people is Boko Haram or some other local
terrorist. For me it is a question of operating a policy of prevention.”
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

11. Does EU need a political leadership?
“the emergence of charismatic strong men (and women) is
a sign of the disruption of old norms and beliefs and of a
crisis in the status quo […]
[…] today we see a leaderless EU coordinated to a limited
degree by Germany’s Angela Merkel, a transactional
leader if ever there was one”.
(Stephen Szabo, Europe’s Leadership Deficit, in: The
International Spectator, 2016, vol. 51, n. 4, p. 21)
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

12. Does EU need political leadership?
TIS: One of the more ‘courageous’ parts of the Strategy is the one
dedicated to security and defence, in particular European
defence. Th e fi rst question is: what exactly do you mean by
strategic autonomy?
Tocci: Th e ability of the Union to decide autonomously and have
the means to act upon its decisions. While it ought not be confi
ned to the military domain, it is evident that it is in this area that
the EU’s strategic autonomy has not yet been realised.
(Interview to Nathalie Tocci, The International Spectator, 2016,
Vol. 51, n. 3, pp. 1-8)
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017

13. thank you very much for your attention!
ubaldo.villanilubelli@unisalento.it
twitter@uvillanilubelli
1989 and the West / Utrecht, 20.-21.04.2017