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the Many-Faced Threats
to the serverless world
Yan Cui
http://theburningmonk.com
@theburningmonk
Principal Engineer @
“Netflix for sports”
offices in London, Leeds, Katowice and Tokyo
We’re hiring ;-)
http://engineering.dazn.com
AWS user since 2009
recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s4L5wjFlFzA
slides: http://bit.ly/2tHYFAM
blog posts: http://theburningmonk.com...
Shared Responsibility Model
Shared Responsibility Model
protection from OS attacks
Amazon automatically apply latest patches to host VMs
still have to patch your code
vulnerable code, 3rd party dependencies, etc.
https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches
https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches
Known Vulnerable Components cause 24% of the top
50 data breaches in 2016
https://snyk.io/blog/77-percent-of-sites-use-vulnerable-js-libraries
http://bit.ly/2topw5I
sanitise inputs & outputs
(standardise and encapsulate into shared lib)
http://bit.ly/2gSHtay
Broken Access Control
Insecure Direct Object Reference
Information Leakage
GraphQL Injection
http://bit.ly/2uKhGXF
http://bit.ly/2uKhGXF
app dependency is a
large attack surface
further compounded by
transient dependencies
https://david-dm.org/request/request?view=tree
https://snyk.io
security updates are often
bundled with unrelated
feature and API changes
your security is as strong
as its weakest link
OS
Application
Dependencies
physical
infrastructure
NPM Authors
Container
runs in
runs in
runs in
has
hosted by published ...
OS
Application
Dependencies
physical
infrastructure
NPM Authors
Container
runs in
runs in
runs in
has
hosted by published ...
OS
Dependencies
physical
infrastructure
NPM Authors
Container
runs in
runs in
runs in
has
hosted by published by
pushes to...
people are often the WEAKEST link
in the security chain
OS
Dependencies
physical
infrastructure
NPM Authors
Container
runs in
runs in
runs in
has
hosted by published by
pushes to...
OS
Dependencies
physical
infrastructure
NPM Authors
Container
runs in
runs in
runs in
has
hosted by published by
pushes to...
OS
Dependencies
physical
infrastructure
NPM Authors
Container
runs in
runs in
runs in
has
hosted by published by
pushes to...
http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX
…obtained publish access to 14% of npm packages…
http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX
debug, request, react, co, express, moment, gulp, mongoose, mysql, bower,
browserify, electron, jasm...
http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX
total downloads/month of the unique packages
which I got myself publish access to was 1 972 421
945,...
20% of all monthly NPM downloads…
brute force
known account leaks from other sources
leaked NPM credentials (github, etc.)
http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX
http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX
662 users had password “123456”
172 — “123”
124 — “password”
WTF!?!?
oh god, that was too easy…
compromised package is a
transient dependency
sigh…
still “works”…
npmjs.com/~hacktask
rm -rf / !!!
NPM default - get latest
“compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
clean install (eg. on CI server) will
download the latest, compromised
package without any code change…
NPM default - get ...
use npm shrinkwrap
or upgrade to NPM 5
imagine…
not specific to Node.js or NPM
Shared Responsibility Model
who can invoke the function?
what can the function access?
Least Privilege Principle
everything here
is trusted
always public
implement authentication with
API keys, Cognito, or custom
authorizer functions
compromised servers
allow attacker to access all
of your sensitive data!
implement authentication
for internal APIs
use AWS_IAM
authentication for
internal APIs
minimise function’s access
requires developer discipline
IAM policies not versioned
with Lambda functions
better in Serverless 1.X
AWS Lambda
docs
Write your Lambda function
code in a stateless style, and
ensure there is no affinity
between your code an...
S3
AWS IoT
DynamoDB
RDS
EventStore
Elasticsearch Couchbase
Redshift
Neo4j
Google BigQuery
secure sensitive data both
at rest and in-transit
leverage server-side encryption
http://amzn.to/1N3Twb8
http://amzn.to/1xF41eX
http://amzn.to/2tgvFR2
Least Privilege Principle
Disposability is a virtue
AWS Lambda
docs
Delete old Lambda functions that
you are no longer using.
http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
easier said than done…
identifying component
ownership in a big IT
organization is challenging
identifying ownership of
individual functions is
much harder
source: http://www.digitalattackmap.com
more likely to scale through
DoS attacks
DoS + per exec billing =
Denial of Wallet problem
have to choose between a
DoS and a DoW problem…
AWS Shield Advanced also gives you access to the AWS
DDoS Response Team (DRT) and protection against DDoS
related spikes i...
async sync
S3
SNS
SES
CloudFormation
CloudWatch Logs
CloudWatch Events
Scheduled Events
CodeCommit
AWS Config
http://amzn.t...
http://bit.ly/2v7F2E4
DoS attack
2+ Retries+
?
DoS attack
Regex DoS attack
long Lambda timeout
2+ Retries+
?
Day 1
Day 2
no long-lived
compromised servers
containers are reused, avoid
sensitive data in /tmp
no accidentally exposed
directories
http://bit.ly/2tlGTbc
monitor activities in
unused regions using
CloudWatch Events
set up billing alarms in
unused regions
watertight compartments that can contain water in
the case of hull breach or other leaks
Michael Nygard
least privilege principle
per function policies
account level isolation
Recap
App dependencies is a much BIGGER attack
surface than you probably realise
sanitise inputs and outputs
Least Privilege Principle
here’s your per function policy
NEXT!
S3
AWS IoT
DynamoDB
RDS
EventStore
Elasticsearch Couchbase
Redshift
Neo4j
Google BigQuery
encrypt data at rest
S3
AWS IoT
DynamoDB
RDS
EventStore
Elasticsearch Couchbase
Redshift
Neo4j
Google BigQuery
and in-transit
delete unused functions.
DoS DoW*
* Denial of Wallet
no server*
no OS attacks
no long lived compromised servers
* I know I know, there’s still a server somewhere, but it’s man...
don’t be an unwilling bit miner
don’t be an unwilling bit miner
safeguard your credentials…
prod dev
compartmentalise breaches
people are often the WEAKEST link
in the security chain
@theburningmonk
theburningmonk.com
github.com/theburningmonk
Security in Serverless world
Security in Serverless world
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Security in Serverless world

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AWS has taken over the responsibilities of patching the OS and securing the underlying physical infrastructure that runs your serverless application, so what's left for you to secure? Quite a bit it turns out.

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Security in Serverless world

  1. 1. the Many-Faced Threats to the serverless world
  2. 2. Yan Cui http://theburningmonk.com @theburningmonk Principal Engineer @
  3. 3. “Netflix for sports” offices in London, Leeds, Katowice and Tokyo
  4. 4. We’re hiring ;-) http://engineering.dazn.com
  5. 5. AWS user since 2009
  6. 6. recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s4L5wjFlFzA slides: http://bit.ly/2tHYFAM blog posts: http://theburningmonk.com/yubls-road-to-serverless-architecture
  7. 7. Shared Responsibility Model
  8. 8. Shared Responsibility Model
  9. 9. protection from OS attacks Amazon automatically apply latest patches to host VMs
  10. 10. still have to patch your code vulnerable code, 3rd party dependencies, etc.
  11. 11. https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches
  12. 12. https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches Known Vulnerable Components cause 24% of the top 50 data breaches in 2016
  13. 13. https://snyk.io/blog/77-percent-of-sites-use-vulnerable-js-libraries
  14. 14. http://bit.ly/2topw5I
  15. 15. sanitise inputs & outputs (standardise and encapsulate into shared lib)
  16. 16. http://bit.ly/2gSHtay Broken Access Control Insecure Direct Object Reference Information Leakage GraphQL Injection
  17. 17. http://bit.ly/2uKhGXF
  18. 18. http://bit.ly/2uKhGXF
  19. 19. app dependency is a large attack surface
  20. 20. further compounded by transient dependencies
  21. 21. https://david-dm.org/request/request?view=tree
  22. 22. https://snyk.io
  23. 23. security updates are often bundled with unrelated feature and API changes
  24. 24. your security is as strong as its weakest link
  25. 25. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  26. 26. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking needs runs on this is where an attacker will target in a movie Source Code has maintains
  27. 27. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application A9 Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains A1, A3, …
  28. 28. people are often the WEAKEST link in the security chain
  29. 29. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application phishing… Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  30. 30. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  31. 31. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  32. 32. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX …obtained publish access to 14% of npm packages…
  33. 33. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX debug, request, react, co, express, moment, gulp, mongoose, mysql, bower, browserify, electron, jasmine, cheerio, modernizr, redux, …
  34. 34. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX total downloads/month of the unique packages which I got myself publish access to was 1 972 421 945, that's 20% of the total number of d/m directly.
  35. 35. 20% of all monthly NPM downloads…
  36. 36. brute force known account leaks from other sources leaked NPM credentials (github, etc.)
  37. 37. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX
  38. 38. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX 662 users had password “123456” 172 — “123” 124 — “password”
  39. 39. WTF!?!?
  40. 40. oh god, that was too easy…
  41. 41. compromised package is a transient dependency sigh…
  42. 42. still “works”…
  43. 43. npmjs.com/~hacktask
  44. 44. rm -rf / !!!
  45. 45. NPM default - get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
  46. 46. clean install (eg. on CI server) will download the latest, compromised package without any code change… NPM default - get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
  47. 47. use npm shrinkwrap or upgrade to NPM 5
  48. 48. imagine…
  49. 49. not specific to Node.js or NPM
  50. 50. Shared Responsibility Model
  51. 51. who can invoke the function?
  52. 52. what can the function access?
  53. 53. Least Privilege Principle
  54. 54. everything here is trusted
  55. 55. always public implement authentication with API keys, Cognito, or custom authorizer functions
  56. 56. compromised servers allow attacker to access all of your sensitive data!
  57. 57. implement authentication for internal APIs
  58. 58. use AWS_IAM authentication for internal APIs
  59. 59. minimise function’s access
  60. 60. requires developer discipline
  61. 61. IAM policies not versioned with Lambda functions
  62. 62. better in Serverless 1.X
  63. 63. AWS Lambda docs Write your Lambda function code in a stateless style, and ensure there is no affinity between your code and the underlying compute infrastructure. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
  64. 64. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery
  65. 65. secure sensitive data both at rest and in-transit
  66. 66. leverage server-side encryption
  67. 67. http://amzn.to/1N3Twb8
  68. 68. http://amzn.to/1xF41eX
  69. 69. http://amzn.to/2tgvFR2
  70. 70. Least Privilege Principle
  71. 71. Disposability is a virtue
  72. 72. AWS Lambda docs Delete old Lambda functions that you are no longer using. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
  73. 73. easier said than done…
  74. 74. identifying component ownership in a big IT organization is challenging
  75. 75. identifying ownership of individual functions is much harder
  76. 76. source: http://www.digitalattackmap.com
  77. 77. more likely to scale through DoS attacks
  78. 78. DoS + per exec billing = Denial of Wallet problem
  79. 79. have to choose between a DoS and a DoW problem…
  80. 80. AWS Shield Advanced also gives you access to the AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT) and protection against DDoS related spikes in your ELB, CloudFront or Route 53 charges.
  81. 81. async sync S3 SNS SES CloudFormation CloudWatch Logs CloudWatch Events Scheduled Events CodeCommit AWS Config http://amzn.to/2vs2lIg Cognito Alexa Lex API Gateway streams DynamoDB Stream Kinesis Stream Lambda handles retries (twice, then DLQ)
  82. 82. http://bit.ly/2v7F2E4
  83. 83. DoS attack 2+ Retries+ ?
  84. 84. DoS attack Regex DoS attack long Lambda timeout 2+ Retries+ ?
  85. 85. Day 1
  86. 86. Day 2
  87. 87. no long-lived compromised servers
  88. 88. containers are reused, avoid sensitive data in /tmp
  89. 89. no accidentally exposed directories
  90. 90. http://bit.ly/2tlGTbc
  91. 91. monitor activities in unused regions using CloudWatch Events
  92. 92. set up billing alarms in unused regions
  93. 93. watertight compartments that can contain water in the case of hull breach or other leaks
  94. 94. Michael Nygard
  95. 95. least privilege principle
  96. 96. per function policies
  97. 97. account level isolation
  98. 98. Recap
  99. 99. App dependencies is a much BIGGER attack surface than you probably realise
  100. 100. sanitise inputs and outputs
  101. 101. Least Privilege Principle
  102. 102. here’s your per function policy NEXT!
  103. 103. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery encrypt data at rest
  104. 104. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery and in-transit
  105. 105. delete unused functions.
  106. 106. DoS DoW* * Denial of Wallet
  107. 107. no server* no OS attacks no long lived compromised servers * I know I know, there’s still a server somewhere, but it’s managed and secured by AWS engineers who can do a much better job of it than most of us can; and the servers are ephemeral and short-lived
  108. 108. don’t be an unwilling bit miner
  109. 109. don’t be an unwilling bit miner safeguard your credentials…
  110. 110. prod dev compartmentalise breaches
  111. 111. people are often the WEAKEST link in the security chain
  112. 112. @theburningmonk theburningmonk.com github.com/theburningmonk

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