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Security in serverless world

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AWS has taken over the responsibilities of patching the OS and securing the underlying physical infrastructure that runs your serverless application, so what’s left for you to secure? Quite a bit it turns out.

The OWASP top 10 is as relevant to you as ever; DOS attacks are still a threat even if you can probably brute force your way through it as AWS auto-scales Lambda functions automatically; and did you know attackers can easily steal your AWS credentials via your application dependencies?

In addition to the traditional threats, serverless applications have more granular deployment units and therefore there are more things to configure and secure, and the tools and practices are still catching up with this fast-changing world.

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Security in serverless world

  1. 1. Security in the Serverless World
  2. 2. Yan Cui http://theburningmonk.com @theburningmonk Principal Engineer @ Independent Consultant
  3. 3. We’re hiring! Visit engineering.dazn.com to learn more. follow @dazneng for updates about the engineering team
  4. 4. follow @dazneng for updates about the engineering team We’re hiring! Visit engineering.dazn.com to learn more. WE’RE HIRING!
  5. 5. AWS user since 2009
  6. 6. http://bit.ly/yubl-serverless
  7. 7. Shared Responsibility Model
  8. 8. Shared Responsibility Model
  9. 9. protection from OS attacks Amazon automatically apply latest patches to host VMs
  10. 10. still have to patch your code vulnerable code, 3rd party dependencies, etc.
  11. 11. https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches
  12. 12. https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches Known Vulnerable Components cause 24% of the top 50 data breaches
  13. 13. https://snyk.io/blog/77-percent-of-sites-use-vulnerable-js-libraries
  14. 14. http://bit.ly/2topw5I
  15. 15. sanitise inputs & outputs (standardise and encapsulate into shared lib)
  16. 16. http://bit.ly/2gSHtay Broken Access Control Insecure Direct Object Reference Information Leakage GraphQL Injection
  17. 17. http://bit.ly/2uKhGXF
  18. 18. app dependencies is a attack surface BIGGER than you think
  19. 19. your dependencies
  20. 20. your dependencies transient dependencies
  21. 21. https://david-dm.org/request/request?view=tree
  22. 22. https://snyk.io
  23. 23. security updates are often bundled with unrelated feature and API changes
  24. 24. your security is as strong as its weakest link
  25. 25. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  26. 26. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking needs runs on this is where an attacker will target in a movie Source Code has maintains
  27. 27. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application A9 Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains A1, A3, …
  28. 28. people are often the WEAKEST link in the security chain
  29. 29. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application phishing… Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  30. 30. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  31. 31. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  32. 32. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX …obtained publish access to 14% of npm packages…
  33. 33. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX debug, request, react, co, express, moment, gulp, mongoose, mysql, bower, browserify, electron, jasmine, cheerio, modernizr, redux, …
  34. 34. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX total downloads/month of the unique packages which I got myself publish access to was 1 972 421 945, that’s 20% of the total number of d/m directly.
  35. 35. 20% of all monthly NPM downloads…
  36. 36. brute force known account leaks from other sources leaked NPM credentials (github, etc.)
  37. 37. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX
  38. 38. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX 662 users had password “123456” 172 — “123” 124 — “password”
  39. 39. WTF!?!?
  40. 40. oh god, that was too easy…
  41. 41. compromised package is a transient dependency sigh…
  42. 42. still “works”…
  43. 43. npmjs.com/~hacktask
  44. 44. rm -rf /!!!
  45. 45. NPM default - get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
  46. 46. clean install (eg. on CI server) will download the latest, compromised package without any code change… NPM default - get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
  47. 47. use npm shrinkwrap or upgrade to NPM 5 or above
  48. 48. not specific to Node.js or NPM
  49. 49. the attackers are in…
  50. 50. the attackers are in… what now?
  51. 51. Shared Responsibility Model
  52. 52. who can invoke the function?
  53. 53. what can the function access?
  54. 54. Least Privilege Principle
  55. 55. everything here is trusted
  56. 56. sensitive data
  57. 57. http://bit.ly/2zHvbcB
  58. 58. always public access is controlled via IAM
  59. 59. http://bit.ly/2lNInES
  60. 60. adds up to 10s to cold start!! http://bit.ly/2lNInES
  61. 61. compromised servers allow attacker to access all of your sensitive data!
  62. 62. implement authentication for internal APIs
  63. 63. use AWS_IAM authentication for internal APIs
  64. 64. minimise function’s access
  65. 65. requires developer discipline
  66. 66. AWS Lambda docs Write your Lambda function code in a stateless style, and ensure there is no affinity between your code and the underlying compute infrastructure. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
  67. 67. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery
  68. 68. secure sensitive data both at rest and in-transit
  69. 69. leverage server-side encryption
  70. 70. http://amzn.to/1N3Twb8
  71. 71. http://amzn.to/1xF41eX
  72. 72. http://amzn.to/2tgvFR2
  73. 73. https://amzn.to/2DaXFwA
  74. 74. Least Privilege Principle
  75. 75. Disposability is a virtue
  76. 76. AWS Lambda docs Delete old Lambda functions that you are no longer using. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
  77. 77. easier said than done…
  78. 78. identifying component ownership in a big IT organization is challenging
  79. 79. identifying ownership of individual functions is much harder
  80. 80. source: http://www.digitalattackmap.com
  81. 81. more likely to scale through DoS attacks
  82. 82. DoS + per exec billing = Denial of Wallet problem
  83. 83. have to choose between a DoS and a DoW problem…
  84. 84. AWS Shield Advanced also gives you access to the AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT) and protection against DDoS related spikes in your ELB, CloudFront or Route 53 charges.
  85. 85. async sync S3 SNS SES CloudFormation CloudWatch Logs CloudWatch Events Scheduled Events CodeCommit AWS Config http://amzn.to/2vs2lIg Cognito Alexa Lex API Gateway pulling DynamoDB Stream Kinesis Stream SQS Lambda handles retries (twice, then DLQ)
  86. 86. http://bit.ly/2v7F2E4
  87. 87. DoS attack 2+ Retries+ ?
  88. 88. DoS attack Regex DoS attack long Lambda timeout 2+ Retries+ ?
  89. 89. Day 1
  90. 90. Day 2
  91. 91. no long-lived compromised servers
  92. 92. containers are reused, avoid sensitive data in /tmp
  93. 93. https://www.puresec.io/function-shield
  94. 94. no accidentally exposed directories
  95. 95. http://bit.ly/2tlGTbc
  96. 96. monitor activities in unused regions using CloudWatch Events
  97. 97. set up billing alarms in unused regions
  98. 98. watertight compartments that can contain water in the case of hull breach or other leaks
  99. 99. Michael Nygard
  100. 100. least privilege principle
  101. 101. per function policies
  102. 102. account level isolation
  103. 103. Recap
  104. 104. app dependencies is a attack surface BIGGER than you think
  105. 105. sanitise inputs and outputs
  106. 106. Least Privilege Principle
  107. 107. here’s your per function policy NEXT!
  108. 108. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery encrypt data at rest
  109. 109. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery and in-transit
  110. 110. delete unused functions.
  111. 111. DoS DoW* * Denial of Wallet
  112. 112. no server* no OS attacks no long lived compromised servers * I know I know, there’s still a server somewhere, but it’s managed and secured by AWS engineers who can do a much better job of it than most of us can; and the servers are ephemeral and short-lived
  113. 113. don’t be an unwilling bit miner
  114. 114. don’t be an unwilling bit miner safeguard your credentials…
  115. 115. prod dev compartmentalise breaches
  116. 116. people are often the WEAKEST link in the security chain
  117. 117. @theburningmonk theburningmonk.com github.com/theburningmonk

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