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Security in serverless world

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AWS has taken over the responsibilities of patching the OS and securing the underlying physical infrastructure that runs your serverless application, so what’s left for you to secure? Quite a bit it turns out.

The OWASP top 10 is as relevant to you as ever; DOS attacks are still a threat even if you can probably brute force your way through it as AWS auto-scales Lambda functions automatically; and did you know attackers can easily steal your AWS credentials via your application dependencies?

In addition to the traditional threats, serverless applications have more granular deployment units and therefore there are more things to configure and secure, and the tools and practices are still catching up with this fast changing world.

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Security in serverless world

  1. 1. LONDON 18-19 OCT 2018 Security in the Serverless World YAN CUI
  2. 2. Yan Cui http://theburningmonk.com @theburningmonk Principal Engineer @
  3. 3. We’re hiring! Visit engineering.dazn.com to learn more. follow @dazneng for updates about the engineering team
  4. 4. follow @dazneng for updates about the engineering team We’re hiring! Visit engineering.dazn.com to learn more. WE’RE HIRING!
  5. 5. AWS user since 2009
  6. 6. http://bit.ly/yubl-serverless
  7. 7. Shared Responsibility Model
  8. 8. Shared Responsibility Model
  9. 9. protection from OS attacks Amazon automatically apply latest patches to host VMs
  10. 10. still have to patch your code vulnerable code, 3rd party dependencies, etc.
  11. 11. https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches
  12. 12. https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches Known Vulnerable Components cause 24% of the top 50 data breaches
  13. 13. https://snyk.io/blog/77-percent-of-sites-use-vulnerable-js-libraries
  14. 14. http://bit.ly/2topw5I
  15. 15. sanitise inputs & outputs (standardise and encapsulate into shared lib)
  16. 16. http://bit.ly/2gSHtay Broken Access Control Insecure Direct Object Reference Information Leakage GraphQL Injection
  17. 17. http://bit.ly/2uKhGXF
  18. 18. http://bit.ly/2uKhGXF
  19. 19. app dependencies is a attack surface BIGGER than you think
  20. 20. your dependencies
  21. 21. your dependencies transient dependencies
  22. 22. https://david-dm.org/request/request?view=tree
  23. 23. https://snyk.io
  24. 24. security updates are often bundled with unrelated feature and API changes
  25. 25. your security is as strong as its weakest link
  26. 26. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  27. 27. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking needs runs on this is where an attacker will target in a movie Source Code has maintains
  28. 28. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application A9 Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains A1, A3, …
  29. 29. people are often the WEAKEST link in the security chain
  30. 30. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application phishing… Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  31. 31. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  32. 32. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runs in runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
  33. 33. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX …obtained publish access to 14% of npm packages…
  34. 34. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX debug, request, react, co, express, moment, gulp, mongoose, mysql, bower, browserify, electron, jasmine, cheerio, modernizr, redux, …
  35. 35. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX total downloads/month of the unique packages which I got myself publish access to was 1 972 421 945, that’s 20% of the total number of d/m directly.
  36. 36. 20% of all monthly NPM downloads…
  37. 37. brute force known account leaks from other sources leaked NPM credentials (github, etc.)
  38. 38. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX
  39. 39. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX 662 users had password “123456” 172 — “123” 124 — “password”
  40. 40. WTF!?!?
  41. 41. oh god, that was too easy…
  42. 42. compromised package is a transient dependency sigh…
  43. 43. still “works”…
  44. 44. npmjs.com/~hacktask
  45. 45. rm -rf /!!!
  46. 46. NPM default - get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
  47. 47. clean install (eg. on CI server) will download the latest, compromised package without any code change… NPM default - get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
  48. 48. use npm shrinkwrap or upgrade to NPM 5 or above
  49. 49. not specific to Node.js or NPM
  50. 50. the attackers are in…
  51. 51. the attackers are in… what now?
  52. 52. Shared Responsibility Model
  53. 53. who can invoke the function?
  54. 54. what can the function access?
  55. 55. Least Privilege Principle
  56. 56. everything here is trusted
  57. 57. sensitive data
  58. 58. http://bit.ly/2zHvbcB
  59. 59. always public access is controlled via IAM
  60. 60. http://bit.ly/2lNInES
  61. 61. adds up to 10s to cold start!! http://bit.ly/2lNInES
  62. 62. compromised servers allow attacker to access all of your sensitive data!
  63. 63. implement authentication for internal APIs
  64. 64. always public implement authentication with API keys, Cognito, or custom authorizer functions
  65. 65. use AWS_IAM authentication for internal APIs
  66. 66. minimise function’s access
  67. 67. requires developer discipline
  68. 68. AWS Lambda docs Write your Lambda function code in a stateless style, and ensure there is no affinity between your code and the underlying compute infrastructure. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
  69. 69. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery
  70. 70. secure sensitive data both at rest and in-transit
  71. 71. leverage server-side encryption
  72. 72. http://amzn.to/1N3Twb8
  73. 73. http://amzn.to/1xF41eX
  74. 74. http://amzn.to/2tgvFR2
  75. 75. Least Privilege Principle
  76. 76. Disposability is a virtue
  77. 77. AWS Lambda docs Delete old Lambda functions that you are no longer using. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
  78. 78. easier said than done…
  79. 79. identifying component ownership in a big IT organization is challenging
  80. 80. identifying ownership of individual functions is much harder
  81. 81. source: http://www.digitalattackmap.com
  82. 82. more likely to scale through DoS attacks
  83. 83. DoS + per exec billing = Denial of Wallet problem
  84. 84. have to choose between a DoS and a DoW problem…
  85. 85. AWS Shield Advanced also gives you access to the AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT) and protection against DDoS related spikes in your ELB, CloudFront or Route 53 charges.
  86. 86. async sync S3 SNS SES CloudFormation CloudWatch Logs CloudWatch Events Scheduled Events CodeCommit AWS Config http://amzn.to/2vs2lIg Cognito Alexa Lex API Gateway streams DynamoDB Stream Kinesis Stream Lambda handles retries (twice, then DLQ)
  87. 87. http://bit.ly/2v7F2E4
  88. 88. DoS attack 2+ Retries+ ?
  89. 89. DoS attack Regex DoS attack long Lambda timeout 2+ Retries+ ?
  90. 90. Day 1
  91. 91. Day 2
  92. 92. no long-lived compromised servers
  93. 93. containers are reused, avoid sensitive data in /tmp
  94. 94. https://www.puresec.io/function-shield
  95. 95. no accidentally exposed directories
  96. 96. http://bit.ly/2tlGTbc
  97. 97. monitor activities in unused regions using CloudWatch Events
  98. 98. set up billing alarms in unused regions
  99. 99. watertight compartments that can contain water in the case of hull breach or other leaks
  100. 100. Michael Nygard
  101. 101. least privilege principle
  102. 102. per function policies
  103. 103. account level isolation
  104. 104. Recap
  105. 105. app dependencies is a attack surface BIGGER than you think
  106. 106. sanitise inputs and outputs
  107. 107. Least Privilege Principle
  108. 108. here’s your per function policy NEXT!
  109. 109. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery encrypt data at rest
  110. 110. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j Google BigQuery and in-transit
  111. 111. delete unused functions.
  112. 112. DoS DoW* * Denial of Wallet
  113. 113. no server* no OS attacks no long lived compromised servers * I know I know, there’s still a server somewhere, but it’s managed and secured by AWS engineers who can do a much better job of it than most of us can; and the servers are ephemeral and short-lived
  114. 114. don’t be an unwilling bit miner
  115. 115. don’t be an unwilling bit miner safeguard your credentials…
  116. 116. prod dev compartmentalise breaches
  117. 117. people are often the WEAKEST link in the security chain
  118. 118. LONDON 18-19 OCT 2018 [ Thank You! @theburningmonk theburningmonk.com ]

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