Philosophical Foundations of the General Right to Equality „ It is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though ...
Overview <ul><li>The doctrinal background and the definition of the General Right to Equality (GRE) </li></ul><ul><li>Just...
The General Right to Equality <ul><li>Article 14 . Prohibition of discrimination </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The enjoyment of th...
The General Right to Equality <ul><li>The   structure of anti-discrimination (AD) rules : A  +  B  +  C + D , where  </li>...
The General Right of Equality <ul><li>An AD rule is  particularistic  if either C or D is specified.  </li></ul><ul><ul><l...
The General Right to Equality <ul><li>The   structure of anti-discrimination (AD) rules : A  +  B  +  C + D +  E , where  ...
Some Examples <ul><li>Article 14 of ECHR  </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A + B  + C  (&quot;the enjoyment of the rights and freedom...
Some Examples <ul><li>Article 14(1) US Constitution  „No State shall…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal ...
Some Examples <ul><li>Article 3(1) German Basic Law  „ Everyone is equal before the law. ”   </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A + D (...
The Simple Model: Discrimination as Injustice – a Preliminary Formulation <ul><li>Justice requires treating like cases ali...
An Example: <ul><li>„ The principle of equality is breached, when a persuasive and reasonable ground, arising from the nat...
The Central Thesis <ul><li>The simple model is deficient, because </li></ul><ul><ul><li>(1) it does not fit the actual pra...
The Justification of GRE: an Overview <ul><li>The simple model: discrimination as injustice </li></ul><ul><li>The first mo...
The Argument from Justice <ul><li>The Principle of Formal Justice requires treating like cases alike. </li></ul><ul><li>Ca...
Arbitrariness <ul><li>A regulation is not justified by the Correct Principles of Justice  </li></ul><ul><li>A regulation i...
Replacing Justice with Integrity <ul><li>First-order and second-order political values </li></ul><ul><ul><li>First-order v...
Replacing Justice with Integrity <ul><li>We need  fairness  to decide which conception of justice we, as a political commu...
Replacing Justice with Integrity <ul><li>(1) The Principle of Formal Justice requires treating like cases alike. </li></ul...
Comment No.1 <ul><li>„ The principle of equality is breached, when a persuasive and reasonable ground, arising from  the n...
Comment No.1 <ul><li>The subject-matter of a regulation contextualize s  the problem of justice, but does not single out t...
Comment No.2 <ul><li>It is not only a matter of degree, but a matter of perspective. </li></ul><ul><li>A  can consider a d...
Comment No.3 <ul><li>This analytical framework can account for both the unity and the difference of general and particular...
Accommodating Rule of Law Values <ul><li>An overinclusive rule ,  to the extent that it is overinclusive ,  cannot be just...
Accommodating Rule of Law Values <ul><li>(1) The Principle of Formal Justice requires treating like cases alike. </li></ul...
The Nature of Law <ul><li>Law is a rule-centred social practice </li></ul><ul><li>Law is an argumentative practice </li></...
The Nature of Law and GRE <ul><li>GRE subjects the legislature's reasoning to further scrutiny > law's  arguable character...
References <ul><li>Robert Alexy,  A Theory of Constitutional Rights  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  </li></ul><...
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equality.ppt

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the general right to equality

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equality.ppt

  1. 1. Philosophical Foundations of the General Right to Equality „ It is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though not for everybody but only for those who are equals; and it is thought that inequality is just, for so indeed it is, though not for everybody, but for those who are unequal.” Aristotle: Politics (1280a)
  2. 2. Overview <ul><li>The doctrinal background and the definition of the General Right to Equality (GRE) </li></ul><ul><li>Justification of GRE </li></ul><ul><li>Concluding remarks: the broader theoretical context </li></ul>
  3. 3. The General Right to Equality <ul><li>Article 14 . Prohibition of discrimination </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention (the scope of the prohibition) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>shall be secured without discrimination (the prohibition of discrimination) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. (the grounds of discrimination) </li></ul></ul>
  4. 4. The General Right to Equality <ul><li>The structure of anti-discrimination (AD) rules : A + B + C + D , where </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A = those to whom the rule applies; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>B = the prohibition of discrimination; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>C = the scope of prohibition; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>D = the grounds of prohibited discrimination. </li></ul></ul>
  5. 5. The General Right of Equality <ul><li>An AD rule is particularistic if either C or D is specified. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Usually followed by a proportionality test </li></ul></ul><ul><li>An AD rule is general if neither C nor D is specified. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Usually followed by a minimal rationality test </li></ul></ul>
  6. 6. The General Right to Equality <ul><li>The structure of anti-discrimination (AD) rules : A + B + C + D + E , where </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A = the addressee of the norm; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>B = the prohibition of discrimination; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>C = the scope of prohibition; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>D = the grounds of prohibited discrimination and </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>E = the standard of justification </li></ul></ul>
  7. 7. Some Examples <ul><li>Article 14 of ECHR </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A + B + C (&quot;the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention&quot;) + E (proportionality test) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>D does not make it particularistic: on any ground such as …. </li></ul></ul>
  8. 8. Some Examples <ul><li>Article 14(1) US Constitution „No State shall…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A + B (fundamental interest) or C (suspect classes: e.g. race) + E (strict scrutiny)  e.g. Korematsu v . United States , 323 U.S. 214 (1944) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>A + C ( gender ) + E (intermediate scrutiny) e.g. Reed v. Reed , 404 U.S. 71 (1971) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>A + E (minimal rationality test) e.g. Williamson v . Lee Optical , 348. U.S. 483 (1955) </li></ul></ul>
  9. 9. Some Examples <ul><li>Article 3(1) German Basic Law „ Everyone is equal before the law. ” </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A + D (arbitrariness test) e.g. BVerfGE 42, 64 (1976) </li></ul></ul>
  10. 10. The Simple Model: Discrimination as Injustice – a Preliminary Formulation <ul><li>Justice requires treating like cases alike. </li></ul><ul><li>GRE authorizes constitutional courts to assess whether the legislature treated like cases alike. </li></ul>
  11. 11. An Example: <ul><li>„ The principle of equality is breached, when a persuasive and reasonable ground, arising from the nature of the subject-matter or some other material circumstance, cannot be given for the differentiation or similarity of treatment, in short, when the provision can only be called arbitrary.&quot; BVerfGE 1, 14, 52 (1951) </li></ul>
  12. 12. The Central Thesis <ul><li>The simple model is deficient, because </li></ul><ul><ul><li>(1) it does not fit the actual practice of the courts. There is a crucial discrepancy between the strong requirement following from justice and the deferential test applied by the courts, </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>(2) it is morally unattractive. </li></ul></ul>
  13. 13. The Justification of GRE: an Overview <ul><li>The simple model: discrimination as injustice </li></ul><ul><li>The first modification: replacing justice with integrity </li></ul><ul><li>The second modification: accommodating Rule of Law values </li></ul>
  14. 14. The Argument from Justice <ul><li>The Principle of Formal Justice requires treating like cases alike. </li></ul><ul><li>Case A and case B are factually similar. </li></ul><ul><li>According to the Correct Theory of Justice, the factual similarity of A and B is morally relevant. </li></ul><ul><li>The differential treatment of A and B is, therefore, morally unjustified and, hence, arbitrary. </li></ul>
  15. 15. Arbitrariness <ul><li>A regulation is not justified by the Correct Principles of Justice </li></ul><ul><li>A regulation is without any justification </li></ul>
  16. 16. Replacing Justice with Integrity <ul><li>First-order and second-order political values </li></ul><ul><ul><li>First-order values: contribute to the substance of moral debates. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Second-order values: help us to cope with moral disagreement over first order values. </li></ul></ul>
  17. 17. Replacing Justice with Integrity <ul><li>We need fairness to decide which conception of justice we, as a political community, should pursue. </li></ul><ul><li>But, we also need integrity -- that is, the value that guarantees that whichever conception of justice we decide to pursue, we will pursue it coherently. </li></ul>
  18. 18. Replacing Justice with Integrity <ul><li>(1) The Principle of Formal Justice requires treating like cases alike. </li></ul><ul><li>(2) Case A and case B are factually similar. </li></ul><ul><li>(3) According to the Correct Theory of Justice, the factual similarity of A and B is morally relevant. </li></ul><ul><li>(3) According to the legislature's conception of justice, the factual similarity of A and B is morally relevant. </li></ul><ul><li>(4)The differential treatment of A and B is morally unjustified and, hence, arbitrary. </li></ul>
  19. 19. Comment No.1 <ul><li>„ The principle of equality is breached, when a persuasive and reasonable ground, arising from the nature of the subject-matter or some other material circumstance , cannot be given for the differentiation or similarity of treatment, in short, when the provision can only be called arbitrary.&quot; BVerfGE 1, 14, 52 (1951) </li></ul>
  20. 20. Comment No.1 <ul><li>The subject-matter of a regulation contextualize s the problem of justice, but does not single out the correct conception of justice, and hence the criterion of relevant similarity. </li></ul>
  21. 21. Comment No.2 <ul><li>It is not only a matter of degree, but a matter of perspective. </li></ul><ul><li>A can consider a decision arbitrary in this sense, if , and only if, the decision cannot be justified, even if she evaluates it from B 's point of view and assesses it through B 's conception of justice.  </li></ul>
  22. 22. Comment No.3 <ul><li>This analytical framework can account for both the unity and the difference of general and particularistic anti-discrimination rules. </li></ul><ul><li>The legislature’s conception of justice prevails over that of the judges > deferential test </li></ul><ul><li>The Constitution’s conception of justice prevails over that of the legislature > proportionality test </li></ul>
  23. 23. Accommodating Rule of Law Values <ul><li>An overinclusive rule , to the extent that it is overinclusive , cannot be justified by its substantive justification. To that extent , the rule necessarily favours or disfavours some of those to whom it applies . </li></ul><ul><li>Over and underinclusiveness are, however, not pathological features of rules, but they are the inevitable corollaries of rules-based decision-making. </li></ul>
  24. 24. Accommodating Rule of Law Values <ul><li>(1) The Principle of Formal Justice requires treating like cases alike. </li></ul><ul><li>(2) Case A and case B are factually similar. </li></ul><ul><li>(3) According to the legislature's conception of justice, the factual similarity of A and B is morally relevant. </li></ul><ul><li>(4) The differential treatment of A and B is morally unjustified. </li></ul><ul><li>(4) The differential treatment of A and B is presumably unjustified. </li></ul><ul><li>(5) This presumption can be rebutted if the advantages of rule-based decision - making outweigh the injustice stemming from similar treatment. </li></ul>
  25. 25. The Nature of Law <ul><li>Law is a rule-centred social practice </li></ul><ul><li>Law is an argumentative practice </li></ul><ul><li>Law is an authoritative social practice </li></ul>
  26. 26. The Nature of Law and GRE <ul><li>GRE subjects the legislature's reasoning to further scrutiny > law's arguable character </li></ul><ul><li>GRE gives a pre - eminent place to the conception of justice held by the legislature > law’s authoritative character </li></ul><ul><li>GRE accommodates Rule of Law values > law’s rule-based character </li></ul>
  27. 27. References <ul><li>Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). </li></ul><ul><li>Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1986). </li></ul><ul><li>Donald P Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany , 2nd ed., rev. and expanded (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1997). </li></ul><ul><li>Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). </li></ul><ul><li>Frederick F Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life , Clarendon law series (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1991). </li></ul><ul><li>Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). </li></ul>

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