Lecture notes week_3


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Lecture notes week_3

  1. 1. February 5 & 7|Explaining Cooperation and Conflict Theoretical Foundations  Major theoretical paradigms  From premises to theory Major theories relevant to U.S. foreign policy  Rationalist explanations for war  Security dilemma and offense-defense theory  Alliances and polarity  Societal-level theories  Theories of decision-making
  2. 2. Othe Realism Liberalism Constructivism rCore concepts & cooperation, interdep ideals, ideology, lang power, conflictbeliefs endence uageKey actors / states, institutions, states states, IGOs, NGOsorganizations IGOs military power, int’l institutions & law,Main tools ideas, values diplomacy commerceReality largely objective largely objective largely subjectiveBargaining zero-sum non-zero-sum non-zero-sumcontextInternational largely anarchic, anarchic insofar as anarchicsystem growing order assumed to beMain cause of state pursuit of self- lack of processes to assumptions ofconflict interest regulate competition conflict and hostilityMain approach to interdependence, communication and balance of powerpeace cooperation, int’l law cooperation shape ideas + normsPolicy cooperate for mutual pursue self-interest to promote desiredprescriptions interests outcome transnational networks,Explanatory state aggression, globalization, cultural conflict,power weakness of institutions democracy-promotion terrorism
  3. 3. Realist theories Theories of rivalry and territory Decision-making theories• Spiral Models • International Rivalries (Diehl/Goertz; • Individual Level• Offensive /Defensive Realism Thompson/Rasler/Colaresi) • Popular Beliefs and Images• Offensive/Defensive Balance • Territory and War • Images of the Enemy• Balance of Power Theories • “Steps to War” Model (Vasquez) • Misperception and War • Threat perception and strategic failure • Balancing vs. Bandwagoning • Learning and War • Soft Balancing Society-level theories • Risk theory – • Regional balancing • Democratic Peace Theories • Prospect theory • Game-Theoretic Models of BoP • Quantitative Empirical Studies • Poliheuristic Theory (Mintz) • Theories of polarity & capability • Informational Model (Schultz) • Crisis Decision-making theories distribution • Theories of Regime Type • Psychoanalytic Approaches• Alliances and War • Dictatorial Peace? • Organizational Level • Lateral Pressure Theory (Choucri & • Domestic institutions & political • Bureaucratic Politics / Organizational North) survival Processes• Theories of Hegemony / • Diversionary War • Military Doctrine and Innovation Hegemonic theories • Democracy and war outcome • Civil-Military Relations • Militarism & strategic culture • Power Transition Theory • Democratization & regime change (Organski/Kugler) • Small Group Level • Social Identity Theory • Arms races and war • Hegemonic Transition Theory (Gilpin) • Richardson model Economic Theories • Theories of crisis-escalation • Shifting Power and Preventive War • Long Cycle Theory (Thompson, et al) • Gen. Marxist-Leninist Theories • Entrapment models • interdependence and trade • Audience costs and domestic politics • Loss of control and inadvertent warInstitutionalist Theories • Globalization & militarized conflict• Institutions and Peace • Militarization & commercial rivalry Other / General• Theories of Collective Security & • Coalitional politics models • Theories of civil war and “new wars” Security Regimes • Ethno-nationalism and War• Regional Security Systems Ideational and Cultural Theories • Intervention in Civil Wars • Ideological sources of conflict and • Termination and Settlement of Civil WarsRational Choice Theories cooperation • Alternative theories of causation• Prisoners Dilemma Models • Ideas and norms (Schroeder) • Strategic theories • Cultural differences and war • Nuclear weapons and conflict• Single-Play and Iterated Games • War duration and termination • “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington)• Bargaining Model of War • Consequences of war: Winners & • Strategic Culture• Expected-Utility Models losers, economic costs, diffusion of war • Attitudinal theories• Commitment Strategies • New Conceptions of Security • Religion and War Environmental Scarcity & Conflict• Selectorate theory (Bueno de • Mesquita, et al. ) • Feminist theories of peace and war • Demography, Security, &Conflict • Refugees and Conflict
  4. 4. From premises to theory:Realist framework  Anarchic system  State as primary unit /“unitary rational actors”  Interest defined as power  Problems  Concern for relative gains  Collective action problems
  5. 5. From premises to theory:Realist framework  Anarchic system  State as primary unit /“unitary rational actors”  Decisions based on rational, strategic analysis  Cost/benefit analysis, preference-maximizing  Policy driven by national interest  Interest defined as power  Is war ever RATIONAL?
  6. 6. Rationalist explanations (Fearon) Is it ever rational to go to war?  Observations  states often have incentives to compete.  certain modes of competition (e.g., war) are more costly than other methods (negotiation, bargaining).  Why don’t states reach prewar bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting? “war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all would prefer to the gamble of war.”
  7. 7. Rationalist explanations (Fearon) Why don’t states reach prewar bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting?  Possible explanations  Anarchy (“there’s nothing to stop it”)  expected benefits exceed expected costs  rational preventive war  miscalculation due to lack of information  miscalculation or disagreement about relative power
  8. 8. Rationalist explanations (Fearon) Why don’t states reach prewar bargains that would avoid the costs and risks of fighting?  Plausible explanations  miscalculation due to lack of information  miscalculation or disagreement about relative power Key factors  Bluffing and information asymmetries  Commitment problems  Issue indivisibility
  9. 9. Security Dilemma andOffense-Defense Theory (Robert Jervis) “Security dilemma”: An increase in one state’s security results in relative decrease in security of others Offense-defense theory (two variants)  Threat variant: the greater security threat states face, the more aggressive they become.  "States seek security, and clash because their efforts to secure themselves threaten others security."  States fear conquest and violence against their citizens and will aggress to avert them.  Opportunity variant: The more easily states can conquer, the more aggressive they become.  Capacity and imperial cycles
  10. 10. Theories of Alliances:  Alliance  In/formal arrangement for cooperation between 2+ states  Mutual commitment and exchange of benefits  Costs for defection / failing to honor agreement  Questions  When and why do alliances form?  How do leaders choose among potential states or threats when seeking external support?  How do great powers choose which states to protect?  How do weak powers decide whose protection to accept?
  11. 11. Theories of Alliances:Balance of Power (Waltz; Walt)  Description of existing power distribution  Conscious policy to achieve BoP and stability  States will balance threat, rather than power  Distance, interdependence and ideology are important  Balancing: External (alliances); internal (increase capacity)  System characteristics determine behavior  System is anarchic, self-help  States = unitary actors that seek@ minimum, self- preservation; @ maximum: world domination  Seek goals through balancing (internal + external)
  12. 12. Theories of Alliances:Balance of Power (Waltz; Walt)  Description of existing power distribution  Conscious policy to achieve BoP and stability  System characteristics determine behavior  System is anarchic, self-help  States seek goals through balancing (internal + external) Balance of Threat  States will balance threat, rather than power  Threat as a function of  Aggregate power or strength  Geographic proximity  Offensive capability  Aggressive intentions
  13. 13. Theories of Alliances:Ideological Alliances  Birds of a feather . . .  Fly together: common ideology → alliance  Fly apart: common ideology → conflict
  14. 14. Theories of Alliances:Ideological Alliances  Birds of a feather . . .  Fly together: common ideology → alliance Ideological solidarity:  States lacking domestic legitimacy likely to seek ideological alliances to increase internal and external support.  More pronounced between superpowers and regional allies  More common in bipolar system  Greater impact of ideology when defensive advantage is clear  Fly apart: common ideology → conflict Ideological division:  Modest association, but it’s exaggerated as general pattern  Less powerful motive than threat balancing  Certain ideologies can be more source for division than unity
  15. 15. Theories of Alliances:Ideological Alliances  Birds of a feather . . .  Fly together: common ideology → alliance  Fly apart: common ideology → conflict  General patterns  Ideologically-driven alliances most common when  states are fairly secure  the ideology does not require sovereignty be sacrificed  a rival movement creates a powerful threat to legitimacy  impact of ideology on choice of partners will be exaggerated  leaders will overestimate degree of ideological agreement among both allies and adversaries
  16. 16. Theories of Alliances:Balancing & Bandwagoning (Waltz; Walt) Definitions  Balancing: states align against prevailing power/threat  Bandwagoning: states align with stronger powers /threats Patterns  Balancing far more common  More common: in peacetime; during early stages of war; among stronger states  Bandwagoning more common when:  Weak state can’t secure protection through balancing  State cannot find others to ally with  Join apparent winner to avoid being on losing side
  17. 17. Polarity  Number of poles  Unipolar  Bipolar  Multipolar  Degree of polarization  Tightness / density  Discreteness / degree of interaction  Level of animosity  Relationship to war  Unipolar: major war less frequent  War likely during transitions in balance
  18. 18. Polarity and Balancing Bipolar v. multipolar balancing  Bipolar balancing occurs internally  Multipolar balancing tends to occur externally
  19. 19. Polarity and BalancingMultipolar systems Bipolar systems characterized by complexity,  Internal balancing is easier uncertainty and more precise Making & maintaining  Unequal burden-sharing alliances requires expert between partners strategy, cooperation  major constraints arise from States seek alliance partners main adversary, not partners by adapting to them  Major powers don’t need to Weaker partner determines make themselves attractive policy in moment of crisis to alliance partners Flexibility in alliances leads to  Rigidity of bipolar alliances rigidity in strategy allows more flexible strategy Miscalculation is the greatest  Overreaction is the greatest danger. danger
  20. 20. Economic theories Marxist & dependency theories  Primacy of economics – shaping politics + society  Clash of private interests & economic classes  Structure as by-product of imperialism  Capitalist states build empires to secure markets for excess production (Luxemburg)  Capitalist states intervene abroad to protect economic interests, corporations (Magdoff)  Dependency / dependencia theory  MNCs & banks exercise control over developing countries
  21. 21. Economic theories Economic interdependence (variants)  Liberals: interdependence lowers likelihood of war by increasing value of trading over aggression  “better to trade than invade”  Realists: interdependence increases probability of war by increasing mutual dependence & vulnerability  Incentives to initiate war, if only for continued access to necessary materials and goods
  22. 22. Societal-level theories  Diversionary war  To secure support, leaders make bellicose promises, take dangerous FP positions, or seek “rally” effects that are difficult to abandon later (Beschloss)  Democratic Peace  Democracies seldom fight each other  consolidated democracies have never fought one another  Explanations  prudent diplomacy, similar social structures, regional attributes, historical alliances.  democratic self-interest
  23. 23. Societal-level theories:Democratic Peace (Kant, Doyle) Why don’t liberal-democracies fight one another?  Doyle: four basic institutions / constitutional features  citizens are all equal and enjoy equal rights  representative government  private property rights  economics governed by supply and demand.  Kant: three key factors  states must be republics  states will gradually establish a “pacific union”  all states must respect "cosmopolitan law“
  24. 24. Democratic peace (Doyle, Kant)Why don’t liberal-democracies fight one another?  Combining Doyle & Kant  Constitutional law & democratic self interest  Democratic-republican structures reinforce caution about high costs of war  International law – and mutual respect – for other states  Complements constitutional guarantee of caution, helps engender future cooperation  States respect “cosmopolitan law” & “spirit of commerce”  Adds material incentives to moral commitments  Together, these conditions create foundation for the establishment and expansion of a “pacific union”
  25. 25. Democratic peace (Doyle, Kant)Why don’t liberal-democracies fight one another?  “pacific union” formed by  Constitutional law & democratic self interest  International law – and mutual respect – for other states  States respect “cosmopolitan law” & “spirit of commerce” Why do they fight other states? Why not push for world-wide democratization?
  26. 26. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane)  Institution  “general pattern or categorization of activity” – or – “particular human-constructed arrangement”  “involve persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”  How/why do institutions form?
  27. 27. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane)  Puzzle of formation  rational choice predicts cooperation & institutions  prisoners dilemma not applicable: iterated and multi- issue PD encourages cooperation  collective action problems less severe when relatively small number of parties  selective incentives  “rational anticipation” and functionalism  Actors form institutions based on functions they expect the institution to serve  Property rights & legal liability  Reducing transaction costs  Reducing uncertainty & providing information  Adverse selection effects
  28. 28. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane) Puzzle of compliance  Why comply if regimes cant enforce their rules?  Continuity and formation costs  States value institution enough to cooperate even when they prefer not to (in a single instance) in order to maintain the institution.  "Networks of issues and regimes"  states know that failure to comply may result in tit-for-tat retaliation.  states involved in iterated interactions worry about reputation and affects on future cooperation.
  29. 29. Other major theories Nationalism (Hayes, Snyder)  Nationalism complicates imperial rule & support Collective action (Hardin, Olson)  "tragedy of the commons“ & "free rider" problems  Collective goods are under-provided; collective costs are over-provided. Gender theories  Foreign policy & state behavior reflects male attributes found in leaders Domino theory  Conquest of a given state will ease subsequent conquest of nearby states
  30. 30. Theories of decision-making:Cognitive theories (Jervis)  Attribution theory: states attribute own behavior to circumstances; attribute others behavior to character  Behavioral corollary: states tend to ascribe others good behavior to their own efforts; blame others bad conduct on the others innate character.  Belief perseverance: states are slow to absorb new facts and realities that clash with existing beliefs  Common misperceptions:  States will exaggerate shared character of information, often unaware when others‘ perceptions diverge from their own  States tend to exaggerate the centralized, disciplined, and coordinated character of others behavior.