WiFi Security Explained

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This is my understanding on WiFi Security Protocols

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WiFi Security Explained

  1. 1. <ul><ul><li>WiFi Security Standard </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Somenath Mukhopadhyay </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>[email_address] </li></ul></ul>
  2. 2. Why WiFi Security is needed <ul><ul><li>802.11 wireless network has no clothes </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Wireless LANs are broadcasting secrets of enterprises that have spent millions on internet security </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The insecurity of WLAN has given rise to War-Driving </li></ul></ul>
  3. 3. 802.11 Security <ul><ul><li>Two Phases - Authentication & Encryption </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Open System Authentication(OSA)‏ </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li> NIL protection </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Shared Key Authentication – WEP Authentication </li></ul></ul>
  4. 4. OSA and Shared Key Authentication
  5. 5. WEP Authentication Frame Format <ul><ul><li>Algorithm Number – 0 OSA, 1 WEP </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Transaction Sequence – First Message 0, Second Message 1, etc </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Status Code – Sent in the Final Message – SUCCESS/FAILURE </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Challenge Text – 128 bit random number sent by the AP </li></ul></ul>
  6. 6. WEP Encryption <ul><ul><li>Stream Ciphering – byte wise ciphering </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>RC4 encryption technology </li></ul></ul>
  7. 7. RC4 Encryption Technology <ul><ul><li>Two Phases – Initialization and Encryption </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>IV – Initialization Vector – 24 bit value </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Secret Key - 104 bit value </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>IV changes for every data packet </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>IV is sent along with the packet </li></ul></ul>
  8. 8. WEP Checksumming
  9. 9. WEP Encryption
  10. 10. WEP Decryption
  11. 11. RC4 algorithm in details <ul><li>Key scheduling algorithm generation using RC4 </li></ul><ul><li>First step – generating an array with 256 8 bit values </li></ul><ul><li>Second step – scrambling the array </li></ul><ul><li>Initialization: </li></ul><ul><li>For i = 0 ... N - 1 </li></ul><ul><li>S[i] = i </li></ul><ul><li>j = 0 </li></ul><ul><li>Scrambling: </li></ul><ul><li>For i = 0 ... N - 1 </li></ul><ul><li>j = j + S[i] + K[i mod l] </li></ul><ul><li>Swap(S[i], S[j]) </li></ul>
  12. 12. RC4 algorithm in details <ul><li>Generating the streaming key </li></ul><ul><li>This part of the algorithm is responsible for creating the streaming values used to encrypt the plaintext </li></ul><ul><li>Initialization: </li></ul><ul><li>i = 0 </li></ul><ul><li>j = 0 </li></ul><ul><li>Generation Loop: i = i + 1 </li></ul><ul><li>j = (j + S[i]) mod l </li></ul><ul><li>Swap(S[i], S[j]) </li></ul><ul><li>Output z = S[S[i] + S[j]] </li></ul>
  13. 13. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><ul><li>Assumptions </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>I = 0 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>J = 0 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Pass = “6152” </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Pass length = 4 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Index N = 4 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Initialization Logic: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>For i = 0 .... N-1 </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>S[i] = i </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Next </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>S[0] = 0, S[1] = 1, S[2] = 2, S[3] = 3 </li></ul></ul>
  14. 14. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>Scrambling </li></ul><ul><li>Logic: For i = 0 ... N - 1 </li></ul><ul><li>j = j + S[i] + K[i mod l] </li></ul><ul><li>Swap(S[i], S[j])‏ </li></ul><ul><li>Initial values </li></ul><ul><li>S[0] = 0, S[1] = 1, S[2] = 2, S[3] = 3 </li></ul><ul><li>K[0] = 6, K[1] = 1, K[2] = 5, K[3] = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>i = 0, j = 0, pass(K) = “6152”, </li></ul><ul><li>pass length(l) = 4, Index(N) = 4 </li></ul>
  15. 15. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>Equations: </li></ul><ul><li>j = j + S[i] + K[i mod l] </li></ul><ul><li>Swap(S[i], S[j]) </li></ul><ul><li>j=(0 + S[0] + K[0]) mod 4 </li></ul><ul><li>j=(0+0+6) mod 4 </li></ul><ul><li>j=6 mod 4 </li></ul><ul><li>j=2 </li></ul><ul><li>Swap (S[0] , S[2]) S[0]=0 , S[2]=2 => S[0]=2 , S[2]=0 </li></ul>
  16. 16. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>Calculation for the second loop </li></ul><ul><li>Initial values before the iteration </li></ul><ul><li>S[0] = 2, S[1] = 1, S[2] = 0, S[3] = 3 </li></ul><ul><li>K[0] = 6, K[1] = 1, K[2] = 5, K[3] = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>pass length (l) = 4, Index(N) = 4, i = 1, j = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>Equations: </li></ul><ul><li>j = j + S[i] + K[i mod l] =>j = (2+S[1]+k[1]) mod 4 </li></ul><ul><li>= (2+1+1)mod 4 = 0 </li></ul><ul><li>Swap(S[i], S[j]) =>Swap(S[1],S[0]) =>S[0] =1 </li></ul><ul><li>& S[1] = 2 </li></ul>
  17. 17. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>After second loop the values are </li></ul><ul><li>S[0] = 1, s[1] = 2, S[2] = 0, S[3] = 3 </li></ul><ul><li>K[0] = 6, K[1] = 1, K[2] = 5, K[3] = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>pass length (l) = 4, Index(N) = 4, i = 2 , j = 0 </li></ul>
  18. 18. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>Calculation for the third loop </li></ul><ul><li>Initial values before the loop starts </li></ul><ul><li>S[0] = 1, s[1] = 2, S[2] = 0, S[3] = 3 </li></ul><ul><li>K[0] = 6, K[1] = 1, K[2] = 5, K[3] = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>pass length (l) = 4, Index(N) = 4, i = 2 , j = 0 </li></ul><ul><li>Equation </li></ul><ul><li>j = j + S[i] + K[i mod l] =>j = (0+S[2]+k[2]) mod 4 </li></ul><ul><li>= (0+0+5)mod 4 = 1 </li></ul><ul><li>Swap(S[i], S[j]) =>Swap(S[2],S[1]) =>S[1] =0 </li></ul><ul><li>& S[2] = 2 </li></ul>
  19. 19. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>Final values after third loop </li></ul><ul><li>S[0] = 1, s[1] = 0, S[2] =2, S[3] = 3 </li></ul><ul><li>K[0] = 6, K[1] = 1, K[2] = 5, K[3] = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>pass length (l) = 4, Index(N) = 4, i = 3 , j = 1 </li></ul>
  20. 20. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>Calculation for the fourth loop </li></ul><ul><li>Initial values before the loop starts </li></ul><ul><li>S[0] = 1, s[1] = 0, S[2] =2, S[3] = 3 </li></ul><ul><li>K[0] = 6, K[1] = 1, K[2] = 5, K[3] = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>pass length (l) = 4, Index(N) = 4, i = 3 , j = 1 </li></ul><ul><li>Equation </li></ul><ul><li>j = j + S[i] + K[i mod l] =>j = (1+S[3]+k[3]) mod 4 </li></ul><ul><li>= (1+3+2)mod 4 = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>Swap(S[i], S[j]) =>Swap(S[3],S[2]) =>S[2] =3 </li></ul><ul><li>& S[3] = 2 </li></ul>
  21. 21. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>Final values after fourth loop (final loop)‏ </li></ul><ul><li>S[0] = 1, s[1] = 0, S[2] =3, S[3] = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>K[0] = 6, K[1] = 1, K[2] = 5, K[3] = 2 </li></ul><ul><li>pass length (l) = 4, Index(N) = 4, i = 4 , j = 2 </li></ul>
  22. 22. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>Logic of PRGA </li></ul><ul><li>i = 0 </li></ul><ul><li>j = 0 </li></ul><ul><li>Generation Loop: i = i + 1 </li></ul><ul><li>j = (j + S[i]) mod l </li></ul><ul><li>Swap(S[i], S[j]) </li></ul><ul><li>Output z = S[S[i] + S[j]] </li></ul><ul><li>After first loop </li></ul><ul><li>i=0+1=1 </li></ul><ul><li>j=(0+S[1])mod 4=(0+0)mod 4=0 </li></ul><ul><li>Swap (S[1] , S[0]) S[1]=0 , S[0]=1 ==> S[1]=1 , S[0]=0 </li></ul><ul><li>z1=S[S[1]+S[0]]=S[0+1]=S[1]=1 </li></ul><ul><li>Z1=0000 0001 </li></ul>
  23. 23. Example of a simple RC4 using 2 bits RC4 <ul><li>Similarly z2 = 0000 0001 </li></ul><ul><li>Assume the plaintext to be “HI” </li></ul><ul><li>After Xoring the plaintext with the RC4 keystream we get </li></ul><ul><li>H(0100 1000) XOR Z1(0000 0001) = 0100 1001 ==> I </li></ul><ul><li>and </li></ul><ul><li>I(0100 1001) XOR Z2(0000 0001) = 0100 1000 ==>H </li></ul><ul><li>After RC4 “HI” becomes “IH” </li></ul>
  24. 24. RC4 Encryption Technology <ul><ul><li>Integrity Checksum – Calculated on the message M to yield the plaintext P = <M,c(M)> </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Encryption - </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>RC4 stream cipher with secret key k </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Initialization vector iv </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Keystrem is generated based on iv & k (RC4(iv,k))‏ </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Ciphertext C = P XOR RC4(iv,k)‏ </li></ul></ul>
  25. 25. Weakness of WEP <ul><li>Key should not be reused </li></ul><ul><li>One Way Authentication </li></ul><ul><li>No key management protocol </li></ul>
  26. 26. Weakness of WEP <ul><ul><li>Key should not at all be reused </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>C = KI XOR P </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Intruder can get C and if he knows part of P he can obtain KI (as KI = P XOR C)‏ </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Next time any packet encrypted with this KI can easily be decrypted. </li></ul></ul>
  27. 27. Weakness of WEP <ul><ul><li>For a 11 mbps base station the key has to be reused in approximately 5 hrs. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>There is 50% chance that a key will be reused after every 4823 packets </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Moreover, the specification has made the changing of IV value with each packet as optional </li></ul></ul>
  28. 28. Weakness of WEP <ul><ul><li>Pre-Shared Key – the absence of any key management protocol </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>It requires manual key configuration in all the mobile devices that want to communicate with the AP </li></ul></ul>
  29. 29. Weakness of WEP <ul><ul><li>One way authentication </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The AP does not authenticate itself to the mobile device </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>A rouge node imitating as the AP can have access to everything the mobile device sends </li></ul></ul>
  30. 30. 802.11i <ul><li>Goals </li></ul><ul><li>Develop 802.11i through a process open to all </li></ul><ul><li>Anyone must be able to implement the entire standard or any part of it – no secret algorithm </li></ul><ul><li>Market driven feature development </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Addresses all perceived security problems of WEP </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Deliver as rapidly as possible </li></ul></ul></ul>
  31. 31. 802.11i Facilities <ul><li>Authentication </li></ul><ul><li>TKIP </li></ul><ul><li>AES-CCMP </li></ul><ul><li>Discovery & Negotiation </li></ul><ul><li>Key Management </li></ul>
  32. 32. External components used by 802.11i <ul><li>802.1x – an external standard used to provide an authentication framework, coordinate authentication and key management </li></ul><ul><li>802.1x Authenticator/Supplicant – local protocol entity to coordinate authentication and and key management with remote entity </li></ul><ul><li>Authentication server(AS) – a logical construction that centralizes authentication and access control decision making </li></ul>
  33. 33. Operating an 802.11i Link Data protection: TKIP and CCMP Authentication 802.11i key management Session Key distribution Security capabilities discovery Authentication Server Access Point Station Security negotiation
  34. 34. 802.1X
  35. 35. TKIP Identification and Goals <ul><li>TKIP: T emporal K ey I ntegrity P rotocol </li></ul><ul><li>Deploy as a software patch in already deployed equipment </li></ul><ul><li>Short term only, to permit migration from existing equipment to more capable equipment without violating security constraints </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Patch old equipment from WEP to TKIP first </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Interoperate between patched and unpatched first generation equipment until all have been patched </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Finally deploy new equipment </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Security Goals: Address all known WEP problems </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Prevent Frame Forgeries </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Prevent Replay </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Correct WEP’s mis-use of encryption </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Never reuse keys </li></ul></ul>
  36. 36. TKIP Overview <ul><li>TKIP: T emporal K ey I ntegrity P rotocol </li></ul><ul><li>Features </li></ul><ul><ul><li>New Message Integrity Code (MIC) called Michael to prevent tampering that can be implemented on a low-power microprocessor </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Supplement Michael with Counter-measures, to increase forgery deterrence </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Increase the size of IV to avoid ever reusing the same IV </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Change the encryption key for every frame </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Under WEP it was infeasible to detect when you were under attack </li></ul></ul>
  37. 37. Message Integrity <ul><li>The simplest method is to create a “checksum” by adding all the bytes of the message together </li></ul><ul><li>Send this checksum along with the message </li></ul><ul><li>The receiver will recalculate this checksum from the received msg and then test it against the checksum value sent with the message. </li></ul>
  38. 38. Message Integrity <ul><li>Attacker can recompute the checksum after he makes any changes in the message </li></ul><ul><li>Idea is to generate a checksum after combining together all the bytes and producing MIC </li></ul><ul><li>MIC is produced using a special nonreversible process and combining a secret key </li></ul><ul><li>Attacker cannot produce the MIC unless he knows the secret key </li></ul>
  39. 39. Message Integrity <ul><li>There are several well tested methods to produce the MIC </li></ul><ul><li>However, for a small microprocessor these methods are not feasible </li></ul><ul><li>One solution for TKIP is Michael </li></ul>
  40. 40. IV Length <ul><li>WEP uses 24 bit IV </li></ul><ul><li>TKIP has added 32 more bits </li></ul><ul><li>Total = 24 + 32 = 56 </li></ul><ul><li>Practically 48 bits are used </li></ul>
  41. 41. Per Packet Key Mixing <ul><li>It solves few things </li></ul><ul><li>The value of the key used for RC4 encryption is different for every IV value </li></ul><ul><li>24 bit “old” IV value and 104 bit secret key </li></ul>
  42. 42. WPA2-AES-CCMP <ul><li>AES- CCMP is the strongest security in 802.11i </li></ul><ul><li>AES stands for Advanced Encryption Standard </li></ul><ul><li>CCMP stands for Counter Mode – CBC MAC Protocol </li></ul><ul><li>TKIP was designed to accommodate the older hardware </li></ul><ul><li>AES-CCMP was designed from ground up. Requires new hardware </li></ul>
  43. 43. WPA2-AES-CCMP <ul><li>Security goals – addresses all known WEP </li></ul><ul><li>problems </li></ul><ul><li>Prevent frame forgeries </li></ul><ul><li>Prevent Replay </li></ul><ul><li>No key reuse </li></ul>
  44. 44. AES Encryption process <ul><li>The encryption process uses a set of </li></ul><ul><li>specially derived keys called round keys </li></ul><ul><li>These are applied, along with other operations, </li></ul><ul><li>on an array of data, that exactly holds one block </li></ul><ul><li>of data, called state array </li></ul>
  45. 45. AES Encryption process <ul><li>Following are the steps to encrypt a block of data </li></ul><ul><li>Derive the set of round keys from cipher key </li></ul><ul><li>Initialize the state array with block data </li></ul><ul><li>(plaintext)‏ </li></ul><ul><li>Add the initial round key to the starting state array </li></ul><ul><li>Perform nine rounds of state manipulation </li></ul><ul><li>Perform the 10 th /final round of state manipulation </li></ul><ul><li>Copy the final state array out as the encrypted </li></ul><ul><li>data </li></ul>
  46. 46. AES Encryption Process <ul><li>The 128 bit block of data is stored in a two </li></ul><ul><li>dimensional (4 x 4) array as shown below </li></ul><ul><li>D0 D4 D8 D12 </li></ul><ul><li>D1 D5 D9 D13 </li></ul><ul><li>D2 D6 D10 D14 </li></ul><ul><li>D3 D7 D11 D15 </li></ul>
  47. 47. Derivation of the Round Keys <ul><li>Cipher key is 128 bit long </li></ul><ul><li>We derive eleven 128 bit round keys ( Rkey0 to </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey10) from this cipher key </li></ul><ul><li>These keys can be represented as follows </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>32 bits 32 bits 32 bits 32 bits </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Rkey0 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey1 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey2 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey3 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey4 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey5 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey6 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey7 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey8 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey9 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey10 W0 W1 W2 W3 </li></ul>
  48. 48. Derivation of the Round keys <ul><li>To start with the Round keys Rkey0 is simply </li></ul><ul><li>the cipher key </li></ul><ul><li>For each of the round keys Rkey1 to Rkey10 </li></ul><ul><li>words W1, W2 and W3 are computed as the </li></ul><ul><li>XOR of the previous word in the same row and </li></ul><ul><li>the same word of the previous row </li></ul><ul><li>For example: </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey5:W1 = Rkey5:W0 XOR Rkey4:W1 </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey8:W3 = Rkey8:W2 XOR Rkey7:W3 </li></ul>
  49. 49. Derivation of the Round Keys <ul><li>The calculation of W0 for each key is the Xor of </li></ul><ul><li>three 32 bit values </li></ul><ul><li>The value of W0 from the previous row </li></ul><ul><li>The value of W3 from the previous row rotated </li></ul><ul><li>by 8 bits </li></ul><ul><li>A special value from a table called Rcon </li></ul><ul><li>Thus we write </li></ul><ul><li>Rkey(i):W0 = Rkey(i-1):W0 XOR Rkey(i- </li></ul><ul><li>1):W3>>>8 XOR RCon(i)‏ </li></ul>
  50. 50. Derivation of the Round Keys <ul><li>The values of Rcon(i) are as follows: </li></ul><ul><li>i Rcon(i)‏ </li></ul><ul><li>1 2 </li></ul><ul><li>2 4 </li></ul><ul><li>3 8 </li></ul><ul><li>4 16 </li></ul><ul><li>5 32 </li></ul><ul><li>6 64 </li></ul><ul><li>7 128 </li></ul><ul><li>8 27 </li></ul><ul><li>9 54 </li></ul><ul><li>10 108 </li></ul>
  51. 51. AES Encryption Process <ul><li>Total 10 rounds of operation are performed to </li></ul><ul><li>alter the state array </li></ul><ul><li>These rounds involve four types of operations </li></ul><ul><li>SubBytes </li></ul><ul><li>ShiftRows </li></ul><ul><li>MixColumns </li></ul><ul><li>XorRoundKeys </li></ul>
  52. 52. AES Encryption Process <ul><li>All of these four operations are applied in the </li></ul><ul><li>order mentioned in the first nine rounds </li></ul><ul><li>In the 10 th round Mix Columns round is mot </li></ul><ul><li>performed </li></ul>
  53. 53. AES Encryption Process- SubBytes <ul><li>SubBytes Operation </li></ul><ul><li>Create a substitution table of total 16 bytes </li></ul><ul><li>using a mathematical formula </li></ul><ul><li>Substitute each byte from the state table by the </li></ul><ul><li>value from the substitution table </li></ul><ul><li>Original values can be restored in the reverse </li></ul><ul><li>operation </li></ul><ul><li>Substitution table is stored in memory as part of </li></ul><ul><li>the design </li></ul>
  54. 54. AES Encryption Process-ShiftRows <ul><li>Each row is rotated to right by a certain number </li></ul><ul><li>of bytes </li></ul><ul><li>1 st Row is rotated by 0 bytes </li></ul><ul><li>2 nd Row is rotated by 1 byte </li></ul><ul><li>3 rd Row is rotated by 2 bytes </li></ul><ul><li>4 th Row is rotated by 3 bytes </li></ul>
  55. 55. AES Encryption Process - MixColumn <ul><li>The columns are changed according to the </li></ul><ul><li>following formula </li></ul><ul><li>Left hand side is the new column produced </li></ul>
  56. 56. AES Encryption Process - XOrRoundKey <ul><li>In this operation the round keys are Xor-ed with </li></ul><ul><li>the existing state array </li></ul><ul><li>This is done once before the beginning of the </li></ul><ul><li>rounds and then once for each round </li></ul>
  57. 57. AES Decryption Process <ul><li>Initial decryption round </li></ul><ul><li>XorRoundKey </li></ul><ul><li>InvShiftRows </li></ul><ul><li>InvSubBytes </li></ul><ul><li>Nine Full Decryption rounds </li></ul><ul><li>XorRoundKey </li></ul><ul><li>InvMixColumn </li></ul><ul><li>InvShiftRows </li></ul><ul><li>InvSubBytes </li></ul><ul><li>Perform final XorRoundKey </li></ul>
  58. 58. CCMP <ul><li>CCMP works on MPDU </li></ul><ul><li>MPDU consists of MAC header and unencrypted data </li></ul><ul><li>First we construct the CCMP header </li></ul><ul><li>Then MIC is calculated </li></ul><ul><li>The combination of Data and MIC is encrypted using AES </li></ul><ul><li>The MAC header and the CCMP header are added in the beginning of the encrypted data </li></ul><ul><li>The block is then transmitted </li></ul>
  59. 59. Conclusion <ul><li>Large number of Wi-Fi systems have been deployed using RC4 algorithm </li></ul><ul><li>WPA-TKIP was introduced to upgrade the existing system without changing the hardware </li></ul><ul><li>However, for better security implemented from ground up, we need AES-CCMP </li></ul>
  60. 60. Not Covered <ul><li>This presentation has not covered the different authentication methods used in Wi-Fi. </li></ul><ul><li>These include EAP, PEAP, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and EAP-SIM </li></ul>
  61. 61. <ul><li>Thank You </li></ul>

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