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1
DIY POLICING
3
Authors
Sebastian Denef (Fraunhofer IAO),
Arnout de Vries (TNO), Kat Hadjimatheou
(University of Warwick), Arnold
Roosen...
4
5
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	 7
BACKGROUND	11
STATE OF THE ART	 17
DIY PATTERNS	 23
ETHICS & LEGAL ISSUES	 43
SWOT	63
NEW ...
6
7
TL;DR
8
TL;DR
9
Executive
Summary
The internet, smartphones and social
media have become tools for citizens
to perform activities that f...
10
DIY IS THE NEW REALITY
Our SWOT analysis details, among oth-
ers, how policing experience and trusted
citizen relations...
11
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
13
MEDI@4SEC
Project
The MEDI@4SEC project focuses on un-
derstanding the opportunities, challeng-
es and ethical consider...
14
Methods
LITERATURE REVIEW
We have conducted an extensive litera-
ture review of 382 publications. The re-
view provides...
15
collaboratively prepared for by the entire
MEDI@4SEC consortium.
Participation was limited and interest-
ed parties nee...
16
17
STATE OF THE ART
STATEOFTHEART
19
Forms of
DIY Policing
DIY Policing occurs in three main forms.
(1) Citizens sometimes act entirely on
their own and ind...
20
tablishing a link between the themes of
DIY Policing and Trolling. DIY Policing
can also produce wrong and mislead-
ing...
21
can have a negative effect on social
cohesion. Turning every citizen into a
would-be police officer poses the risk of
d...
22
23
DIY PATTERNS
DIYPATTERNS
25
Image Source: CC license by: https://www.flickr.com/photos/ter-burg/17315216959
CITIZENS ADOPT
SOCIAL MEDIA
Social medi...
26
Taking things into their own hands, citizens use social media
to address public security issues. The following pattern ...
27
Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/cesarastudillo/267809308
ORGANISE
PROTESTS
Citizens may oppos...
28
Hashtags have become a simple yet effective tool in organising
protest groups.
Public Facebook pages allow “invitations...
29
Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/126919879@N03/14926645375
DIY
JUSTICE
Citizens offended by ot...
30
Vigilantism can include citizens playing judge and “naming and
shaming” individuals, where users publish someone’s pers...
31
Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/esthervargasc/10948923353
DIY CITIZEN
JOURNALISM
Social media...
32
Several real-time social media are used to report on crimes as
they unfold:
■■ Twitter has become a core medium for liv...
33
Image Source: https://static.pexels.com/photos/6518/man-person-hands-coffee.jpg
DIY
ACCOUNTS
Authorities can be slow in...
34
A number of forums allow citizens to help other citizens (sharing
prevention tips, missing persons, caring for victims,...
35
Image Source: https://static.pexels.com/photos/497295/pexels-photo-497295.jpeg
DIY
INTELLIGENCE
Open data allows citize...
36
Wikileaks collects data from leaks (e.g. Panama papers)
Bellingcat collects intelligence and provides reports (e.g.
Ukr...
37
Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/lourencoparente/8961453394
DIY
WATCH
DOG
Authorities can act ...
38
There are several cases in which citizens act as a watchdog for
the police:
■■ Copwatchers
àà http://socialmediadna.nl/...
39
Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/text100/12177502223
DIY
INVESTIGATION
Authorities can be slow...
40
Apps, such as “Self Evident” support DIY investigations.
àà http://socialmediadna.nl/self-evident-app
Bellingcat invest...
41
mage Source: Twitter
NEIGHBOURHOOD
WATCH
Citizens might not feel safe or well-protect-
ed in their neighbourhood.
There...
42
In the Netherlands, neighbourhood watch groups use WhatsApp
to organise themselves.
In the U.S. and recently also in Eu...
43
ETHICS & LEGAL ISSUES
ETHICS&LEGALISSUES
45
Ethics and
Legal Issues
THE RISKS AND POTENTIAL
BENEFITS OF A REINVIGORATED
‘ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP’
In discussions at the ...
46
OVERBURDENING OF
POLICE WITH DATA
DIY platforms can help relieve some the
work burden of LEAs by a) crowdsourc-
ing int...
47
share the necessary information. They
indicated that the problems are more
related to education and knowing what
is all...
48
processing, data minimization, purpose
specification (which can be an issue in
individual cases), and storage limitatio...
49
Vigilante/Citizen,
Open 112
àà http://www.citizen.com
Apps enabling live location-traceable
emergency calls to be sent ...
50
Self Evident
àà https://www.witnessconfident.org/self-
evident-app
An app enabling users to record, store,
and share ev...
51
Traffic Droid/
Private Dashcams
Some road users are proactively record-
ing behaviour on the roads via cameras
and othe...
52
Digital Pillories
This term refers to measures to “name-
and-shame” lawbreakers online or on so-
cial media, as a means...
53
Mafia Mapping
MafiaMaps was a crowdfunded applica-
tion enabling anonymous sharing of infor-
mation about mafia locatio...
54
Neighbourhood
Watch
In neighbourhood watch applications,
people living in a neighbourhood are en-
couraged to be alert ...
55
Bellingcat
àà https://www.bellingcat.com
This is a private crowdfunded initiative
performing citizen journalist investi...
56
Reddit
A platform for user-generated content,
where people can chat and share videos
and images.
Ethical Risks
■■ Can l...
57
Opit, Stinson,
Websleuths
These platforms are used to catch child
sex offenders online, usually via the use
of “honeypo...
58
Doxing
This is the sharing of usually identifiable
information on the Internet. The aim is to
find individuals who have...
59
Crowdsourced
Missing Persons
Identification
Platforms
These initiatives recruit volunteers to
help identify missing per...
60
Prey, Find My
Smartphone
àà https://www.preyproject.com
These are pieces of software that help
people find a lost lapto...
61
Policing the Police
Apps
These apps enable citizens to record in-
teractions with police. Examples include
the American...
62
63
SWOT
SWOT
65
DIY Policing for
Law Enforcement
Agencies
In the following, we describe the inter-
nal Strengths and Weaknesses, as wel...
66
■■ W2: LACK OF HARMONISATION: While
from the LEAs perspectives it would
be beneficiary to use unified end-us-
er and se...
67
STRENGTHS
S1	 TRUSTED, EXPERIENCED SECURITY PROVIDERS
S2	 LEGAL FRAMEWORK EXPERTISE
S3	 EDUCATION AND PREVENTION SKILLS...
68
Citizens may trust other citizens more
than the police or other authorities.
Talented individuals can help relieve
some...
69
THREATS
■■ T1: LACK OF CITIZEN KNOWLEDGE:
Citizens are not well educated about
the legal systems and laws. Citizens’
la...
70
71
NEW ROLES
NEWROLES
73
Tomorrow’s
Responsibilities
and Roles
In many ways, digital DIY Policing is a
new phenomenon and the future roles
and r...
74
Stakeholder As Is To Be
LEAs Mainly respond and react to citizens’ re-
quests with traditional means. Often do
not have...
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DIY Policing

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Sebastian Denef (Fraunhofer IAO),
Arnout de Vries (TNO), Kat Hadjimatheou
(University of Warwick), Arnold
Roosendaal (TNO), Hans van Vliet
(TNO), Mariano Cecowski (XLAB),
Jordi Diego (Local Police Valencia), Rubén
Fernández (Local Police Valencia), Kat
Hadjimatheou (University of Warwick),
Jon Coaffee (University of Warwick),
Emmanouil Kermitsis (KEMEA), Nikos
Moustakidis (KEMEA), Klaudia Tani (EOS),
Pilar de la Torre (EFUS), Fiona Williamson
(Police Service of Northern Ireland)

Published in: Social Media
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DIY Policing

  1. 1. 1 DIY POLICING
  2. 2. 3 Authors Sebastian Denef (Fraunhofer IAO), Arnout de Vries (TNO), Kat Hadjimatheou (University of Warwick), Arnold Roosendaal (TNO), Hans van Vliet (TNO), Mariano Cecowski (XLAB), Jordi Diego (Local Police Valencia), Rubén Fernández (Local Police Valencia), Kat Hadjimatheou (University of Warwick), Jon Coaffee (University of Warwick), Emmanouil Kermitsis (KEMEA), Nikos Moustakidis (KEMEA), Klaudia Tani (EOS), Pilar de la Torre (EFUS), Fiona Williamson (Police Service of Northern Ireland) © 2017 by MEDI@4SEC Project This research is partially funded by the European Comission as part of Horizon 2020 Framework Programme of the European Union in the context of the MEDI@4SEC project under Grant Agree- ment no 700281. This report is a partial and updated draft of public deliverables submitted to the European Commission. More information: àà www.media4sec.eu
  3. 3. 4
  4. 4. 5 Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 BACKGROUND 11 STATE OF THE ART 17 DIY PATTERNS 23 ETHICS & LEGAL ISSUES 43 SWOT 63 NEW ROLES 71 RECOMMENDATIONS 77 CONCLUSION 83 BIBLIOGRAPHY 87
  5. 5. 6
  6. 6. 7 TL;DR
  7. 7. 8 TL;DR
  8. 8. 9 Executive Summary The internet, smartphones and social media have become tools for citizens to perform activities that fall within the range of police work and the work of other organisations dealing with public security. Like modern Sherlock Holmes citizens assist the police and go beyond. They report on crimes, investigate, iden- tify suspects and form vigilante groups. Citizens employ social media for criminal investigation, for crime prevention or for ensuring public security independent of police and to watch and publicly share actions with law enforcement agencies (LEAs). Open data sources have proved to be valuable for gathering intelligence and solving crimes and open up profes- sional work to citizens. The information, tools and expert knowledge have spread through the web. Social media-DIY (do-it- yourself) Policing by citizens puts pres- sure on professional security workers that now have people and organisations from all over the world on the sidelines or at the centre, doing some or all of their work. Citizens, however, have neither the authority nor the same legal framework for their actions as police forces do. DIY Policing is an opportunity as it makes the resources of citizens available for public security organizations. Citizen interaction with police forces can have a positive effect on police legitimacy. DIY Policing is a threat as vigilantes carry out retributive actions that can en- danger fairness, respect and democratic values. Evidence posted by citizens lacks context and remains unclear, raising the chance for citizens to be wrongfully accused. Undefined legal frameworks threaten police-citizen collaboration. Furthermore, the involvement of citizens can produce an overwhelming amount of data that is difficult to handle for law en- forcement agencies. The key questions for many security planners when advancing a social media strategy therefore relate to the conse- quences of where and how to cooperate with citizens, when to take control and how to avoid negative ethical and legal effects. DUTCH LEADERSHIP Our state-of-the-art analysis shows re- lated research that describes different forms of DIY Policing and the identified impact on law enforcement practice. DIY Policing is in many ways a phenomenon of growing relevance for public security planners. On the one hand, researchers see citizens taking coordinated action in places where public security falls short or fails. Citizens often investigate when the police have given up, do not have enough resources, or cannot respond at a speed that the public expects. Thus the question arises as to whether DIY Polic- ing can become an indicator for public security organizations to find the hot spots in which to increase their efforts or to reduce them and allow citizens to take over. On the other hand, it appears that (especially Dutch) police forces are making a concerted effort in co-creating security jointly with citizens. The many platforms and initiatives that are emerg- ing underline the Dutch forerunner role in making best use of and, to a certain degree, encouraging DIY activities. DIY IN MANY WAYS We describe patterns of DIY Policing practices that we identified as part of our studies of best practices and les- sons learned. Citizens use social media to address public security issues. They ORGANISE PROTESTS, correct what they think is wrong in DIY JUSTICE, perform DIY CITIZEN JOURNALISM, establish their own DIY ACCOUNTS social media accounts. Citizens conduct DIY INTELLIGENCE, oversee law en- forcement as DIY WATCH DOG or con- duct their own DIY INVESTIGATION. They organize NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH communities. A WIDE RANGE OF ETHICAL ISSUES The main ethical risks of DIY Policing platforms include unjustified citizen in- terventions (vigilantism); overburdening of police with data; overburdening police with data whose utility is burdensome to verify; and disproportionate visitation of suspicion on individuals from certain social/ethnic groups. Benefits include the creation of a new model of ‘active citizenship’ and social responsibility; greater security for the public via pre- ventive measures and better identifica- tion of criminals; and increased trust in police generated through co-creation of security. Key legal risks of DIY Policing platforms include disproportionate priva- cy intrusions; data protection violations; and vigilantism leading to illegal acts.
  9. 9. 10 DIY IS THE NEW REALITY Our SWOT analysis details, among oth- ers, how policing experience and trusted citizen relations are internal strengths of LEAs. Also, when existing, experience in social media supports citizen inter- action for DIY Policing. Lack of digital experience, equipment, authorised appli- cations as well as incompatible judicial frameworks can hinder DIY Policing. Ex- ternally, DIY Policing provides many op- portunities to increase security by using available citizen resources. At the same time, DIY Policing poses serious threats of vigilantism and includes new citizen activities that question existing roles in maintaining public security. NEW ROLES Our stakeholder map shows the sub- stantial impact that DIY Policing has on existing roles and responsibilities of LEAs and citizens. DIY Policing disrupts public security as roles and models are re-organized and newly distributed. DIY Policing is not only about changing or outsourcing tasks but requires LEAs to change organisational culture in order to include digitally empowered citizens. DIY Policing also puts more responsibility on citizens and requires them to understand and abide the laws in the digital space. Other stakeholders, such as social media companies, schools, local governments and politicians are affected as well and need to provide technology, education, support and policies for DIY Policing. RECOMMENDATIONS In our recommendations, we describe the need for LEAs to innovate their prac- tice with digital tools in order to cope with DIY Policing. LEAs need to become knowledgeable and well-prepared to do policing in a world that increasingly is im- pacted by digital technologies and where citizens use these technologies in ways that directly impact police work. Beyond simply adopting or implementing digital tools into daily work, DIY Policing re- quires LEAs and citizens alike to rethink their role and responsibilities in public security.
  10. 10. 11 BACKGROUND
  11. 11. BACKGROUND
  12. 12. 13 MEDI@4SEC Project The MEDI@4SEC project focuses on un- derstanding the opportunities, challeng- es and ethical considerations of enhanc- ing social media use for public security: the good, the bad and the ugly. The good comprises using social media for prob- lem solving, fighting crime, decreasing fear of crime and increasing the quality of life. The bad is the increase of digit- ised criminality and terrorism with new phenomena emerging through the use of social media. The ugly comprises the grey areas where trolling, cyber bullying, threats, or live video sharing of tactical security operations are phenomena to deal with during incidents. Making use of the possibilities that social media offer, including smart “workarounds” is key, while respecting privacy, legislation, and ethics. This changing situation raises a series of challenges and possibilities for public security planners. MEDI@4SEC will explore this through a series of com- munication and dissemination activities that engage extensively with a range of end-users to better understand the usage of social media for security ac- tivities. MEDI@4SEC will seek a better understanding of how social media can, and how social media cannot be used for public security purposes and high-light ethical, legal and data-protection-related issues and implications. Activities centre around six relevant themes: DIY Policing; Everyday security; Riots and mass gath- erings: The dark web; Trolling; and In- novative market solutions. MEDI@4SEC will feed into, support and influence changes in policy-making and policy im- plementation in public security that can be used by end-users to improve their decision making. By structuring our understanding of the impact of social media on public security approaches in a user-friendly way MEDI@4SEC will pro- vide an evidence-base and roadmap for better policymaking including: best prac- tice reports; a catalogue of social media technologies; recommendations for EU standards; future training options; and, ethical awareness raising. In this project, social media are de- fined as “a group of internet based appli- cations that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content” (Kaplan & Haenlein 2010: 61). Social media that we predominantly focus on are the more widely used social media apps, notably Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Youtube, and Instagram, but also (new) emerging social media that are widely adopted and that we come across. Online chat groups, forum and marketplaces our not our key focus, but will be touched upon where relevant. The ambition of the MEDI@4SEC is to establish a community around the topic of social media in public security and provide a better understanding to public security planners. That is why the project will organize a workshop series in which stakeholders can discuss and exchange knowledge in the field. To provide input for these workshops, we have already conducted an extensive literature review and with this report go a second step by analysing existing practices, approaches and modes of social media communica- tion between citizens and security oper- ators, as well as strategies on engage- ment and participation of citizens. Further, we have witnessed that in this relatively new and still experimental field, practitioners can benefit greatly from international knowledge exchange and the learning from the experiences of others. Such exchange can help to compare practices and empower early adopters with references and examples. In the long run, this exchange can help to harmonize security practices, espe- cially among law enforcement agencies across Europe. The core motivation for this report, hence, is to spark and enable discus- sions among the various stakeholders in the field of social media and public security. For these discussions, we pro- vide an comprehensive overview of DIY Policing. àà www.media4sec.eu
  13. 13. 14 Methods LITERATURE REVIEW We have conducted an extensive litera- ture review of 382 publications. The re- view provides an extensive overview of research and other publications in the field of public security and social media. The literature review focused on the fol- lowing six themes: Riots and mass gatherings: the role of social media (data) during riots and mass gatherings and ensuring public se- curity by monitoring, signalling and com- municating with the public. Everyday security: the everyday po- licing of public security, including co- operation with citizens via social media ‘community policing’ and social media/ big data intelligence. The Dark Web: organised (internation- al) crime and their high-tech use of the dark web, the influence on public secu- rity, and the counter policing activities. Trolling: all kinds of online bullying (cyber bullying), of which some activities are criminal offences and some are not. Innovative market solutions: new com- mercial products for including social me- dia in police work. For example, apps for smartphones, social media monitoring tools etc. Finally, the theme that is covered in this report, we also analyzed literature in the field of DIY Policing: citizens employ- ing social media for criminal investiga- tion, crime prevention or ensuring public security independent of police. Citizens taking initiative and sometimes taking over police tasks. PRACTICES PATTERNS Our practice patterns are inspired by the pattern language concept of Christo- pher Alexander and the grounded theory method, proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). In the field of computer science, Alex- ander’s work has been influential in shar- ing knowledge in software engineering (Gamma, et al, 1995). Erickson (2000a, 2000b) suggests pattern languages as a ‘Lingua Franca’ in design processes, ad- dressing the need to design systems in interdisciplinary teams that integrate well in existing workplaces. These patterns and their relationships “can be used as a language for discussing changes and reflecting on their possible impacts, both in terms of the activities of the organiza- tion, and in terms of the qualities of work life which its members value.” (Erickson, 2000a, p. 366) Inspired by the concepts of grounded theory, our pattern language of social media practice in public security evolved in a grounded process and by a constant comparison of practice examples found in our data. As a result, we present here selected patterns that describe DIY Policing. In a concise form, each pattern describes a problem or context, the solution and is visualized using an image. These de- scriptions are short in order to enable the reader to quickly grasp a general idea, before exploring its details. The shortness also allows for easy provision of translations and for making the pat- terns a tool in workshops on the topic. That is also why the patterns are de- signed in a way that they can be directly printed from this report. Each pattern is detailed with examples that link to spe- cific cases or other online resources that provide more information. Patterns can also link to other pat- terns and thus describe groups and re- lations. We visu-alise these relations in the overall pattern language graph. It is important to notice that the hierarchy only visualises the main connections and dependencies. To improve clarity, we do not visualize all links that are mentioned in the text. Our selection and description of best practices is grounded in a variety of dif- ferent data sources. First, as mentioned above, this re- port is based on an extensive literature review. Second, we leveraged the exist- ing expertise in the MEDI@4SEC project consortium. Third, to include the per- spective of municipalities, we reviewed strategic security plans of cities for prac- tice and social media adoption. Fourth, we presented our findings to 30 external experts and discussed the practice de- scriptions with them. Fifth, we organized a workshop through the network of our project partner, the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS). At the workshop, we presented the results of the report and discussed its application in the work contexts of the cities of the workshop participants. EXPERT WORKSHOP The other findings presented in the re- port stem from a separate workshop on DIY Policing. The workshop took place on January 10, 2017 in Berlin, Germa- ny. The workshop was hosted by the MEDI@4SEC partner Fraunhofer IAO and
  14. 14. 15 collaboratively prepared for by the entire MEDI@4SEC consortium. Participation was limited and interest- ed parties needed to apply with an email explaining their background and motiva- tion for their participation. In total, 58 people participated in the workshop, of which 36 were external participants who are not part of the MEDI@4SEC project. Participants came from France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK and the U.S. with background as police officers, city officials, from NGOs and research organisations. With the aim to think beyond the sta- tus quo and to design the future of po- licing, we combined the “5-D method”, based on appreciative inquiry theory, that took participants through the steps of Defining, Discovering, Dreaming, De- signing and Developing the topic of DIY Policing. To allow for an interactive ex- change and to build a community, we ad- ditionally used the World Café group dis- cussion style, for the Dreaming phase. In this way, participants, in teams of five, discussed the various issues of DIY Po- licing. In total, we had 40 group sessions, comprising 30 sessions and 30 minutes and 10 longer sessions of 75 minutes. Members of the MEDI@4SEC consorti- um facilitated each group sessions, they were responsible for reporting on the sessions. A Twitter wall made the discus- sions visible to the outside world. Based on a structured reporting template, facil- itators provided structured results from the group discussions. Additionally, the sessions developed sketches of the out- comes.
  15. 15. 16
  16. 16. 17 STATE OF THE ART
  17. 17. STATEOFTHEART
  18. 18. 19 Forms of DIY Policing DIY Policing occurs in three main forms. (1) Citizens sometimes act entirely on their own and independently of any pub- lic security organization to investigate crimes and punish suspects and of- fenders. (2) Citizens limit themselves to connecting and finding or checking facts and act as information providers for pub- lic security organizations or (3) citizens combine aspects of the two (Huey et al., 2012). As detailed below, beyond such citizen-driven initiatives, there are few examples when DIY Policing is actively taken up by public security organisa- tions. DIY Policing is often stimulated by emotive ‘local issues and often brings to the fore concerns over how and when citizens should engage with, and be responsible for, public security. For ex- ample, motivated by emotional media reports about cyber grooming, online groups have formed where members pose as child victims in cyber grooming and meet suspects. While these groups publicly offer their free services to law enforcement agencies, they also act independently (Huey et al., 2012). Like- wise, a phenomenon named “digital vig- ilantism” describes how citizens engage in offensive acts to counteract actions of other citizens that they do not agree with. This has included extreme terrorist acts and participation in riots as well as “mild breaches of social protocol” (Trottier, 2014). For example, after the riots in Vancouver in 2011, people used Facebook to publicly “name and shame” rioters with the photos they had taken using mobile phones (ibid.). While this information supported police investiga- tions, it also constituted an overwhelm- ing amount of data that often lacked the required contextual information. The citi- zen action in this case was characterized as an “unintended” DIY-society (Rizza, 2014). Another form of DIY Policing is the use of open data sources to solve ‘cold’ cas- es that are no longer actively investigat- ed by the police. For example, in the U.S., where more than 10,000 corpses remain unidentified several online communities, such as the Doe Network (named after John Doe’s), have formed to match peo- ple from missing lists with unidentified corpses (Halber, 2015). Citizens also investigate international incidents that go well beyond the scope of a single police force, such as the in- vestigation undertaken by Bellingcat into the airplane crash of MH17. Here, citizen action provided useful insights by col- lecting information from various sourc- es, including many social media channels (Romein, 2016). Instead of supporting the police, citi- zens can also use social media to high- light misconduct of the police (Trottier 2014). As a counter action against recent shootings of black people by U.S. police forces, social media have served as a strong platform for citizens to discuss police actions (Jackson, 2016). DIY Po- licing also takes place in crisis situations or at large events, such as in situations of earthquakes, where citizens’ social media use support crowd management and emergency relief (Meier, 2015). Beyond citizen-driven DIY Policing and in an attempt to increase the engage- ment of citizens in public security, some police forces are actively seeking to mo- bilise citizen investigators. For example, the Dutch police have created citizen net- works (e.g. BUGERNET, Politieonderzoe- ken.nl) where citizens can register as po- tential volunteers in police investigations (Meijer, 2014). In a further example, a Neighbourhood watch-style WhatsApp project, the police are cooperating with citizens to exchange information and prevent burglaries (Akkermans, et al. 2015). This includes citizens actively patrolling the streets to prevent crimes and burglaries (Lub, 2016). These pro- jects decrease the boundaries between what can be considered DIY Policing and regular policing, but are relatively unique to the Dutch context. In other countries, such as the U.S. and South Africa, vol- unteer groups have been tested on a much smaller scale involving only a small group of social media volunteers (St. Denis, 2011; Omanga, 2015) INFLUENCE AND IMPACT Actions by citizens and the collaboration between citizens and police forces im- pact public security and policing in many ways. Citizens’ actions can be effective yet controversial. When citizens publish names of offenders and personal details, they can reach hundreds of thousands or millions of people (Trottier, 2014). In the case of a woman who was raped and murdered, civilians on social media advocated for people to “publicly hang” the suspect and included a photo and name of the person who had confessed to crimes (Milivojevic, et al., 2014), es-
  19. 19. 20 tablishing a link between the themes of DIY Policing and Trolling. DIY Policing can also produce wrong and mislead- ing information. In the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, citi- zen investigations led to misinformation on suspects and rumours being widely circulated on social media, endangering people that got incorrectly identified as suspects. (Starbird, et al., 2014) Social media and citizen action have, however, also shown to be an effective tool supporting the actions of law en- forcement agencies. The above-men- tioned online communities on cold cases successfully identified corpses (Halber, 2015). In “clean-up” initiatives online activists tracked down sexual offenders and reported their sites to social media providers and, in one project alone, got 13,000 accounts deleted (Huey, et al., 2012). Dutch Police initiatives in the area of DIY Policing are notable in their success; even though the police only consider 9% of cases belonging to the BURGERNET network (a citizen network run by the po- lice), is reported to account for 50% of successful police actions (Meijer, 2014). They allow the police forces and local governments to reduce their efforts while increasing social control and de- creasing social problems. (Bervoets, et al, 2016). The active involvement of res- idents in preventing burglaries, by start- ing WhatsApp groups, has resulted in a sharp decrease of the number of burgla- ries. The number of burglaries per 1000 inhabitants decreased by approximately 40% with no evidence of burglaries mov- ing to adjacent or adjoining neighbour- hoods where no such WhatsApp group was set up (Akkermans, et al. 2015). Such initiatives also increase the chance of an arrest, as a result of receiving in- formation from citizens (directly or in- directly) (Hoeven, 2011). Citizens also feel safer (Land, et al, 2014). In general, police forces have data available that, when opened to the public, can support DIY Policing (Halber, 2015). Several citizen-driven DIY activities are motivated by weaknesses of police forc- es to respond or operate in a way that citizens consider appropriate. They fall into two categories. The first weakness is the limited resources of police forces, especially in the case of crime happen- ing online. The structure of the forces and the variety of crimes committed on- line have left police forces in a situation where crime online goes often unnoticed (Huey, et al., 2012). The second weak- ness of public security organizations are their limited responsibilities and organi- zational boundaries that cannot address the structure of crimes that cross state or country lines (Halber, 2015). DIY Policing makes available the re- sources of citizens for public security organization. The police benefits from a networked society, where citizens can join and provide new intelligence or even a ‘theory’ on an ongoing case. To secure the cyberspace, motivated citizen groups can become a significant partner adding additional manpower to public law enforcement. Citizens provide additional eyes and ears and often also professional expertise from other relat- ed fields, e.g. in IT (Huey, et al., 2012). The cooperation of citizens can play an important role in the detection of of- fenders, since solving a crime largely depends on the quality and quantity of the information that citizens provide to the police immediately after the relevant incident (Sollie, et al, 2013). In kidnap- ping cases, the extra value for investiga- tive reporting is mainly in the speed and combined intelligence with which a large group can be reached, or a very specific audience can be targeted (Schoenmak- ers, et al., 2014). Beyond these opportunities in polic- ing efficiency and effectiveness, citizen interaction with police forces can have a positive effect on police legitimacy (Mei- jer, 2014). A serious threat of DIY Policing is vig- ilantes carrying our retributive actions, often anonymously and therefore with relative impunity. Citizen action taking over the rights are normally transferred to organizations like the police and can endanger fairness, respect and demo- cratic values (Rizza, 2012). DIY Policing on social media empowers citizens to bypass existing public security organiza- tions (Trottier, 2014). Moreover, quality is an issue: evidence posted by citizens lacks context and re- mains unclear, raising the chance for cit- izens to be wrongfully accused (Penter- man, 2012). Misinformation can spread fast and is difficult to identify. (Starbird, et al., 2014) Even when information is correct, social media can increase public awareness and, in consequence, the risk of unfair trials (Milivojevic, et al., 2014). The distribution of volunteers in DIY policing is also a potential concern. Us- ers in such DIY police support networks commonly underrepresent women and young people. There have been warn- ings that initiatives such as BURGERNET
  20. 20. 21 can have a negative effect on social cohesion. Turning every citizen into a would-be police officer poses the risk of decreasing trust among citizens; citizens are not properly trained to act on behalf of other citizens, nor is it possible to hold them accountable for their actions (Mei- jer, 2014). Undefined legal frameworks also threaten police-citizen collaboration and for some DIY Policing is described as an activity that is not desired by law enforcement, as the missing authority of citizens and legal consequences remain unclear (Huey, et al., 2012). Additionally, when acting as DIY police officers, citi- zens on social media often become per- sonally involved and then, too, might end up linked to a crime (Trottier, 2012). DIY Policing on social media also creates a strong dependence on corporate social media platforms (Trottier, 2014). Another threat from DIY Policing is that it reveals the limitations and inability of police forces to solve crimes them- selves and thus threatens their legitima- cy. Journalists covering successful DIY Policing in their reports have been rais- ing the question why police forces were not able to do what citizens managed to accomplish. (Halber, 2015). Finally, there are also practical threats with DIY Policing. The involvement of citizens can produce an overwhelming amount of data that is difficult to handle for law enforcement agencies (Trottier, 2012). CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS Researchers reflecting upon success factors for the Dutch initiatives highlight that for the neighbourhood watch pro- grams it is important to take the local context into account (Lub, 2016) in or- der to better understand how social me- dia use for public security can enhance the degree of collective resilience in a neighbourhood. For the police organi- zation operating in this novel context it is important to have organizational free- dom to act differently and and to tailor the initiative having developed a local understanding (Land, et al., 2014). For police-citizens platforms it is also im- portant to set up a central control point for the deployment of social media (Bo- gaard, 2012). CONCLUSION Overall though, DIY Policing raises a num- ber of delicate ethical questions. Whilst empowered citizens can be enabled to assist the public security effort, they can also cause harm, if they act irresponsi- bly. The emergence of DIY Policing also questions the general division of respon- sibilities and power between citizens and LEAs. The following key questions have emerged from this topic: ■■ Can we understand DIY Policing activi- ties as signals for missing activities in law enforcement? ■■ In which areas can DIY Policing be a meaningful addition to traditional po- lice work? ■■ What tools can best manage police-cit- izen interaction? ■■ What are the means to contain DIY Po- licing and prevent the negative effects and risks of DIY Policing? ■■ How does and will DIY Policing impact the relative roles of citizens and LEAs?
  21. 21. 22
  22. 22. 23 DIY PATTERNS
  23. 23. DIYPATTERNS
  24. 24. 25 Image Source: CC license by: https://www.flickr.com/photos/ter-burg/17315216959 CITIZENS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA Social media provide various ways of em- powering citizens. Therefore, citizens use social media to ad- dress issues of their concern.
  25. 25. 26 Taking things into their own hands, citizens use social media to address public security issues. The following pattern list de- scribes a number of practices: ■■ ORGANISE PROTESTS ■■ DIY JUSTICE ■■ DIY CITIZEN JOURNALISM ■■ DIY ACCOUNTS ■■ DIY INTELLIGENCE ■■ DIY WATCH DOG ■■ DIY INVESTIGATION ■■ NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH
  26. 26. 27 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/cesarastudillo/267809308 ORGANISE PROTESTS Citizens may oppose actions of govern- ment or issues in society. Therefore, citizens use social media to or- ganise protests or mass gatherings.
  27. 27. 28 Hashtags have become a simple yet effective tool in organising protest groups. Public Facebook pages allow “invitations to all” and thus have a wide reach. ■■ Project X àà http://socialmediadna.nl/analyse-2/ ■■ Harlem Shake àà http://socialmediadna.nl/harlem-shake-in-nederland As governments sometimes try to control social media, Fire- chat is used as a tool for ad-hoc local networks. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/firechat The BlackLivesMatter movement uses social media to protest against police violence: àà https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Lives_Matter During the Arabic Spring, social media was the core organiz- ing tool: àà https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring In Brazil, “Rolezinho” is a form of protest where black youth occupy malls`; àà http://socialmediadna.nl/rolezinho Following terrorist attacks in Paris, people organised the “Je Suis Charlie” movement: àà https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Je_suis_Charlie The “Platforme Citoyen” is a group of citizens formed to help with the inflow of refugees in Belgium. During 2015, they con- ducted two large marches which were organised through their Facebook groups. During the Hong Kong protests, the protesting crowds used Firechat, a peer-to-peer social media app to circumvent the gov- ernmental surveillance: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/firechat The Sukey app helps protesters to avoid police kettles: àà http://www.wired.co.uk/article/sukey-protest-app
  28. 28. 29 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/126919879@N03/14926645375 DIY JUSTICE Citizens offended by other citizens, com- panies or government activity and want to correct the wrong. Therefore, citizens respond through coordi- nated retaliation on digital media, including mobile devices and social media platforms.
  29. 29. 30 Vigilantism can include citizens playing judge and “naming and shaming” individuals, where users publish someone’s personal details on a public site. ■■ Examples: Vancouver Riots, ‘Kopschoppers’ incident the Netherlands Source: Research by Daniel Trottier There are several groups of paedophile hunters. Anonymous, the activist group, has conducted various online actions (doxing, trolling). Following shootings in the U.S., people began to publicly map gun owners. àà http://mediashift.org/2013/02/where-the-journal-news-went-wrong-in- mapping-gun-owners053 In Italy, a group of students started to create “Mafiamaps” to fight organised crime. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/mafiamaps Other examples of online groups using social media: ■■ Anonymous deatheaters: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/anonymous-deatheaters ■■ Dark Justice: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/dark-justice ■■ The Punisher Squad: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/the-punisher-squad ■■ The Internet Interceptors: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/the-internet-interceptors ■■ The Creep Catchers: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/creep-catchers
  30. 30. 31 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/esthervargasc/10948923353 DIY CITIZEN JOURNALISM Social media allow each individual to broad- cast and share a situation that otherwise nobody would report about. Therefore, citizens report news them- selves, e.g. by using live streaming video applications to create situational aware- ness for other citizens and for other gov- ernmental agencies.
  31. 31. 32 Several real-time social media are used to report on crimes as they unfold: ■■ Twitter has become a core medium for live reporting Example of a knife wielding man in New York City: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/knifeman-new-york ■■ Citizens also report with life streaming apps: Cameraad / NULive and real-time video platform Periscope and Vine (Example during Boston Bombings) àà http://socialmediadna.nl/periscope-impact-op-veiligheid àà http://socialmediadna.nl/vine ■■ Reddit was been frequently used to report on unfolding in- cidents: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/reddit Additionally, blogs are used to report about public safety is- sues. To inform citizens report, they use apps that scan police radio communication from around the world: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/app-police-scanners
  32. 32. 33 Image Source: https://static.pexels.com/photos/6518/man-person-hands-coffee.jpg DIY ACCOUNTS Authorities can be slow in adopting social media. Therefore, citizens provide security- relevant information to other citizens delete themselves.
  33. 33. 34 A number of forums allow citizens to help other citizens (sharing prevention tips, missing persons, caring for victims, discussing problems, etc.) via different forums, newsgroups, Facebook groups, etc. Others offer help for victims, such as the Dutch initiative: àà https://www.slachtofferhulp.nl Unofficial news of police and firefighters: àà https://de.nepoli.eu In the Netherlands, the P2000 network is used on various social media channels for incident reports, based on the official C2000 network for police, firemen and ambulance profession- als: àà http://www.p2000-online.net Citizens also use smartphone apps to inform of different re- al-time road incidents (e.g. Waze, Socialdrive). While these apps can be used to share useful information in a very immediate form, they also can create security breaches, according to some LEAs, and therefore are considered controversial. àà http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/rightsandfreedoms/a/DUI-Checkpoint- Apps.htm àà https://www.engadget.com/2015/01/26/police-see-waze-as-threat àà https://www.duidefensematters.com/resources/blog/using-waze-to- avoid-dui-checkpoints-you-probably-shouldn-t-here-s-why
  34. 34. 35 Image Source: https://static.pexels.com/photos/497295/pexels-photo-497295.jpeg DIY INTELLIGENCE Open data allows citizens to make sense of information for their own purposes. Therefore, citizens collect and store data, sometimes map it, and distribute and share it to make it useful for a specific context.
  35. 35. 36 Wikileaks collects data from leaks (e.g. Panama papers) Bellingcat collects intelligence and provides reports (e.g. Ukraine conflict vehicle tracking project) àà https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2015/02/03/ukraine-conflict- vehicle-tracking-launch Politwoops shows deleted tweets from politicians and other government leaders: àà http://www.politwoops.eu iAWACS is a software that automatically analyses signals from social media: àà https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/07/10/ how-artificial-intelligence-could-help-warn-us-of-another-dallas Using CRIME MAPPING, mafia maps highlight crime areas: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/mafiamaps
  36. 36. 37 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/lourencoparente/8961453394 DIY WATCH DOG Authorities can act outside the law. Therefore, citizens use social media to watch und publicly share LEAs actions.
  37. 37. 38 There are several cases in which citizens act as a watchdog for the police: ■■ Copwatchers àà http://socialmediadna.nl/copwatchers ■■ HandsUp 4 Justice àà http://socialmediadna.nl/hands-up-4-justice ■■ LegalEqualizer àà http://socialmediadna.nl/legal-equalizer ■■ Five-O àà http://socialmediadna.nl/five-o ■■ Ferguson àà http://socialmediadna.nl/social-media-bemoeienis-in-ferguson
  38. 38. 39 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/text100/12177502223 DIY INVESTIGATION Authorities can be slow, limited, or unwill- ing to make investigations. Therefore, citizens use public sources to investigate and put together the pieces of information that is (publicly) available.
  39. 39. 40 Apps, such as “Self Evident” support DIY investigations. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/self-evident-app Bellingcat investigated the shooting down of flight Malaysian Airlines MH17 in the Ukraine. ■■ See report: àà https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/53rd-report- public.pdf Web sleuth networks work on identifying corpses (e.g. the Doe Network). àà http://www.doenetwork.org Other work on searching the missing Malaysian Airlines air- plane using a microtask platform for satellite images: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/digital-humanitarians-modern-sherlocks- deel-2 Massive online and offline search of for the missing brothers Ruben and Julian: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/category/cases/rubenjulian A Netflix TV series, “Making a murderer”, investigated a mur- der case that had been closed many years before and sparked a public debat on the verdict. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/amateur-speurder-in-making-a-murderer
  40. 40. 41 mage Source: Twitter NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH Citizens might not feel safe or well-protect- ed in their neighbourhood. Therefore, citizens organise their own neighbourhood watch, supported by social media use, e.g. WhatsApp groups and spe- cific apps.
  41. 41. 42 In the Netherlands, neighbourhood watch groups use WhatsApp to organise themselves. In the U.S. and recently also in European Countries, Nextdoor is a private social network for neighborhood watch. àà https://nextdoor.com Pokemon Go is also used for neighbourhood watch: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/pokemon-go and àà https://twitter.com/FrankSmilda/status/763786561267924993
  42. 42. 43 ETHICS & LEGAL ISSUES
  43. 43. ETHICS&LEGALISSUES
  44. 44. 45 Ethics and Legal Issues THE RISKS AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF A REINVIGORATED ‘ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP’ In discussions at the Berlin workshop DIY Policing initiatives were recognised as encouraging and enabling citizens to par- ticipate more actively in the maintenance of public security and that this is, on the whole, a positive development. For exam- ple, in some jurisdictions citizens are re- luctant to engage in any way with police, mainly due to a lack of trust in policing. In such places, in which reporting rates are very low, DIY platforms can give citizens the option of reporting crimes quickly and anonymously, thus encouraging in- creased cooperation with police. Similar- ly, on social media platforms, initiatives such as codes of conduct, reporting buttons, blocking features and ‘coun- ter-speak’ can help discourage what was referred to in discussion as ‘voyeuristic participation’—a type of participation where citizens observe certain forms of undesirable behaviour but they do not act. DIY Policing platforms can help to encourage—but also rely for their effec- tiveness on—a cultural change among platforms and their users. Some of our workshop participants argued that liber- tarian Internet culture should be replaced by a culture of active but responsible citi- zenship. DIY initiatives have the potential to strengthen trust in fellow citizens and the intrinsic drive to act that appears to exist in groups of citizens at a local level. In doing so, they can harness the (often detailed) knowledge citizens have of their local situation for public security ends. More active citizen participation in policing was felt likely to lead to citizen empowerment and eventually to a sense of improved security amongst citizens. Further expected benefits include the development of a sense of responsibil- ity among citizens to abide by the law, along with a sense of value and con- nectedness among individuals within a society, adding to social capital. Greater education and awareness of as well as active involvement in generating ethical standards with respect to such initiatives are vital to their effectiveness and their legitimacy. On the other hand, enabling and even encouraging citizens to intervene in matters of crime and security via DIY platforms can risk fostering the notion that privacy is something that can be bypassed in the fight for criminal jus- tice—for example, while searching for people involved in illegality, paedophile hunters “phish” sensitive information about people who are not doing any- thing illegal. Concerns are also that widespread use of DIY platforms may increase suspiciousness and harm trust relations among citizens as people worry they are being mistakenly suspected of crimes or even maliciously identified as criminal suspects by other citizens. An increased risk of litigiousness among citizens is also a concern. Finally, risks arising from target selection based on social prejudice in discrimination-driven crime reporting were cited as an area of concern, especially if platforms are used more frequently by members of certain social groups. Specific social groups may be overrepresented in interactions through social media while others may not take part at all or need further en- couragement. City government and po- lices should promote participation of minorities on their platforms. RISKS AND BENEFITS TO THE LEGITIMACY OF POLICE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES By enabling citizens to make a social con- tribution to policing, DIY platforms can bridge the gap between the police and the citizens and help provide more “legiti- mation” of police activities and practices in society. This may be especially benefi- cial in jurisdictions in which there is mis- trust towards authorities. The promise of improved transparency of government and police services offered by some platforms could also contribute to im- provements in trust. Platforms designed to enable citizens to police the police are controversial, especially amongst LEAs, but are likely to lead to improved quality of policing and a more legitimate police force overall. For example, instead of pushing out their own story of a debat- able police intervention, the police could proactively ask the public to upload their videos of the intervention, and make use of body cameras to find out facts and support their own story.
  45. 45. 46 OVERBURDENING OF POLICE WITH DATA DIY platforms can help relieve some the work burden of LEAs by a) crowdsourc- ing intelligence and evidence from indi- viduals, b) raising overall awareness on relevant issues (safety, privacy, etc.) among citizens and c) enabling citizens to deal with public security issues before they escalate to the extent that they re- quire police intervention. However, worries about the potential for overburdening of police with data and demands for intervention both at a local and a national level were expressed, especially by police participants. Lo- cal police work currently comprises a large variety of activities and multiplic- ity of tasks related to the maintenance of public order. In jurisdictions in which trust in police is high, civilians turn to them for support regarding all kinds of issues and incidents happening in the public space, many of them unrelated to crime, because of the great visibility and popularity of the police forces. This is unfortunate, as it burdens police forc- es with petty incidents and a multiplici- ty of requests that could often be dealt with better by other public services. By making crime reporting easier and fast- er, DIY platforms might encourage even more over-reporting, or over-sharing of data with police. At the same time, they may encourage an expectation that re- ports will be dealt with by police; when that expectation is not fulfilled, this may undermine trust in and discourage from the use of the platform. The design of DIY platforms should be created to the fullest possible extend with the need for information triage in mind. A further source of burden for police arises from the difficulty of validating some kinds of citizen-generated data. NEED FOR EDUCATION AND NEW CROSS-SECTOR FORUMS IN WHICH ETHICAL ISSUES CAN BE DISCUSSED AND NEW STANDARDS ACCEPTED There is a need for education on ethics online in order to develop the kind of culture in which DIY Policing initiatives can pursue security effectively without undermining rights and values. Propos- als range from education in schools and police recruitment colleges to the es- tablishment of committees, roundtables and other kinds of forums involving local elected officials, police representatives, researchers, NGOs, community leaders, etc. to discuss ethical and legal challeng- es pertaining to the use of social media in policing activities. ABILITY OF THE LAW TO KEEP UP WITH TECHNICAL CHANGE One of the main issues in relation to the interplay between law and technology is that lawmaking is behind the facts. Technology moves fast and it would be of great benefit to all stakeholders if laws were able to keep up, both domestically and across jurisdictions. This does not mean that laws and regulations need to change every time a new app comes out. It does mean that they need to be able to recognize the common cultures and features across apps and regulate those. For example, all apps harvest massive amounts of data (features); all apps that involve text boxes invite the same kind of communication (cultures). Police should recognize this too, and should be trained not to become confused by each new bit of technology. There is a need for more tech-savvy staff at LEAs, who are able to keep up with technological develop- ments and can create a bridge between LEAs and DIY Policing initiatives. LEAs presence and participation in social me- dia platforms dedicated to DIY Policing is essential for good collaboration. And only with good collaboration can police ensure that DIY Policing initiatives en- hance usual police work. LEGAL CLARITY AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW There is a need for proper knowledge of the laws related to policing and the use of social media in general. It is not always clear what exactly is allowed with regard to, for instance, the processing of personal data. The lack of knowledge or proper understanding has a few differ- ent undesirable effects. For example, in some cases, people working at LEAs are hesitant to share information, because they are afraid that it is not permitted by the law. This results in less effective use by DIY Policing initiatives of LEAs. Strikingly, during the workshop there were different viewpoints on this. Some argued that privacy laws make it very dif- ficult to share information and these laws should be changed, i.e. privacy concerns should be set aside in cases of informa- tion sharing about criminals or crimes. Others, however, argued that current laws are very well-suited to protect the fundamental rights of everyone involved and still allow for enough options to
  46. 46. 47 share the necessary information. They indicated that the problems are more related to education and knowing what is allowed and what is possible, and not that the laws as such are too strict. Many app developers or providers are unaware of the legal requirements for legitimate data processing. In addition, many of the users of apps are unaware of it as well, and in some cases it is easy and even encouraged to share as much information as possible. The lack of legal safeguards and professional oversight becomes problematic here. Since the professionals involved are not trained in the requirements for legitimate data pro- cessing, there is a risk that more infor- mation will be shared than is legally per- mitted. Data about people’s suspected involvement in crime is categorized as sensitive data and their processing is es- sentially prohibited. Only under specific circumstances, such as a legal provision allowing an entity to process these data, or with the consent of the data subject, is processing allowed. Because of the applications, it cannot always be expect- ed that the consent of the data subject will be obtained, and non-professionals will not usually have another legal basis for the processing. With regard to privacy, there is, in fact, a great opportunity at hand with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which will be effective from May 25, 2017 on. In the GDPR, present rights with regard to the protection of personal data are strengthened, and some new requirements are added. Par- ticularly relevant in the context of social media use is the mandatory application of Data Protection by Design (DPbD) and Data Protection by Default. This means that all new forms of personal data pro- cessing activities have to be designed in a way that ensures the protection of privacy rights. New apps or information exchange systems that are developed have to take account of this principle. If DPbD is implemented properly, the risks of unlawful personal data processing are reduced. There is a need for legal clarity on the admissibility of digital evidence in court. In particular, there should be greater clarity on how to collect and store digi- tal evidence. If evidence is collected and shared, but cannot be used as legal evi- dence due to poor processing, e.g. with respect to the way it is stored, the benefit disappears. Some of the apps described below can help with this issue, but still it is very difficult to have a clear trail to verify the origins of digital evidence. LAX APPROACHES TO DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY BY VIGILANTES AND CITIZEN GROUPS Vigilantes tend to overlook or be una- ware of legal provisions in place (they tend to know what is illegal but also tend to ignore the rights of the perpetrators, or they can have personal biases or in- terests). DIY Policing can lead to intru- sions in the privacy of suspected crim- inals, but also victims of crime. From a legal perspective, the correct balance between privacy and security must be maintained. So, there might be a need for education on legal aspects, perhaps by integrating legal and ethical training in school curricula. Other methods of training and educa- tion include public campaigns, and in- volving influential people who are peers of social media users, such as vloggers. End User License Agreements (EULAs) can also help in obtaining consent and providing the right information to partic- ipants in DIY Policing platforms. Letting people know how to use the platform and what is allowed and what is not can be a major improvement. Without proper ed- ucation and a good communication and interaction strategy, DIY paradigms can be a step back in the legal standards and how the law is applied with regard to eth- ical and legal issues. The providers of DIY Policing apps have access to a great deal of content and personal data, and may be respon- sible as data controllers, in which case they must be compliant with data pro- tection laws. Yet it may be difficult for them to monitor effectively and guide the way users process personal data when using the app. The processing of personal data by users includes process- ing of data about themselves, such as information on user profiles and account details, as well as data about (alleged) criminals. Currently, the processing of these personal data is not always ar- ranged properly and in accordance with the law. For the processing of data of the users, there is often no proper in- formed consent. And for the processing of personal data about others, such as (alleged) criminals, there may be no legit- imate ground as required in Article 6 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) at all. In a similar way, it is not evident that the basic principles from Ar- ticle 5 GDPR are reliably or even typically respected. These include fair and lawful
  47. 47. 48 processing, data minimization, purpose specification (which can be an issue in individual cases), and storage limitation. Participants/users of social media applications for DIY Policing do some- times expose other individuals, such as (alleged) criminals. This exposure involves the sharing of personal data about these people. This can fall foul of data protection laws, which are intend- ed to protect the fundamental rights of natural persons, notably their right to privacy (cf. Preamble paragraph 1 and 2 of the GDPR), by providing control over information being disclosed or otherwise processed. The impact can be severe. Not only can the amount of informa- tion sharing result in manhunts where people take the law in their own hands, and someone’s identity being made pub- lic, regardless of whether the person in question is really a criminal. Even if someone appears to be innocent after- wards, the damage to their reputation is very hard to undo or even limit, given the persistence of accusations online. It is still not clear whether “the right to be forgotten” (Article 17 of the GDPR) can be helpful in these cases, but it might provide the individual with the means to have online materials at least removed from search results at least (See the Google v. Costeja case of the ECJ). Legal safeguards, such as limited disclosure and verified quality and integrity of infor- mation, as applied by professionals such as police are not in place. Besides, even if the person whose privacy is infringed upon is indeed a criminal, this does not imply that the individual has forfeited all privacy rights. Information shared online remains in the digital archives forever and this is an issue worthy of attention. Once posted online, information can be copied and shared and spread over the Internet. This is particularly likely in the case of information about (alleged) criminals. As a result, the privacy rights of people are infringed over a long time period and it is extremely difficult to get information re- moved to start with a clean sheet, even after someone has, for instance, been in jail after a conviction. CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL BARRIERS Next to the general problems surround- ing the collection and use of digital ev- idence, cross-jurisdictional barriers are a real challenge to the pursuit of cyber criminals. Evidence procedures are barriers to using open source and oth- er digital data to prosecute criminals. Moreover, it can be problematic if the police and DIY Policing actors across jurisdictions try to capture the same dig- ital evidence and end up interfering with each other. The fact that someone is try- ing to collect digital evidence may also be detected by criminals, who may then block its collection. It is, however, also possible that evidence becomes less re- liable if different policing actors have ac- cessed it and the logs indicate that it has been interfered with. Even though these problems are more of a technical nature, the result can be that judges consider materials unreliable because of this tam- pering (even if this is ultimately attribut- ed to a lack of technical knowledge). The pursuit of criminal justice may in this way be undermined. ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH SPECIFIC DIY POLICING PLATFORMS In the following we identify ethical and legal issues arising in connection with the specific platforms presented to the group at the start of the meeting. These are presented in the form of bullets in a table to enable easy reference for inter- ested readers.
  48. 48. 49 Vigilante/Citizen, Open 112 àà http://www.citizen.com Apps enabling live location-traceable emergency calls to be sent to members of the public as well as police and fol- lowed up on social media. The Vigilante app was met with controversy1 and was removed from the Apple App Store. àà 1 https://www.theguardian.com/ technology/2016/nov/01/vigilante-app- removed-apple-store Ethical Risks ■■ Can prompt dangerous interventions (ones that multiply victims); ■■ Leaves it to possibly attention-seek- ing, excitement seeking users to de- cide what is a significant incident; ■■ Can encourage voyeurism compound- ing victimization; ■■ Could encourage people to cut out police; ■■ Licenses for filming that might not be useful/admissible evidence; ■■ Can overburden police communica- tions channels, making triage harder; ■■ May be used in ways that reflect preconceptions about who is suspi- cious and has criminal intent, causing wrongful suspicion to fall more fre- quently on certain groups. Legal Risks ■■ The most obvious legal issue with these kind of technologies is people taking the law in their own hands without being professionally trained. There is a need for clear rules of en- gagement for such situations. How- ever, these rules of engagement are not legally binding. The lack of legal rules might seem problematic, but workshop participants indicated that there is usually a clear mechanism of self-correction in social media groups where members correct misbehavior of others. So misbehavior will be cor- rected or punished by the group mem- bers themselves. If members insist in not abiding the rules of engagement or implicit socially acceptable norms, they will be excluded from the group. ■■ There is the broader legal perspec- tive. Apps like Vigilante encourage people to make videos of crimes or threats happening. The risks that oc- cur relate to (incidentally) filming inno- cent people and the unlawful stream- ing and sharing of video footage. This may violate the privacy rights of the people who are filmed, either as a criminal or supposed criminal, or as a victim or witness. Sharing of pictures or videos of (alleged) criminals is not simply legally allowed. The mere fact that something is happening in a pub- lic place does not imply that sharing is allowed either. Ethical Benefits ■■ Can rescue people; ■■ Can provide evidentially useful film. Legal Benefits
  49. 49. 50 Self Evident àà https://www.witnessconfident.org/self- evident-app An app enabling users to record, store, and share evidence and statements reliably and to file a police report from their smartphone. Self Evident has been developed in collaboration with London’s Mayor’s Office for Police and Crime and the Sussex police force. Ethical Risks ■■ Needs training to be used effective- ly and proportionately, which users may not be willing or able to get (e.g. someone could wrongly believe they are collecting court-submissible evi- dence) ■■ Could create unrealistic expectations of police intervention; ■■ Could encourage some people to re- port instead of intervening, to the det- riment of victims; ■■ Could indirectly encourage the as- sumption that if a crime exists, there will be a video of it—and, conversely, that no video footage of a crime is ev- idence of its non-occurrence. Legal Risks ■■ In order to be admissible as legal ev- idence, the footage has to meet cer- tain criteria, such as a timestamp to indicate the moment of recording and an editing log. In practice it seems difficult for judges to determine the reliability of video. Technological tools allow for manipulation of the video it- self. Moreover, it is entirely possible to only record specific scenes of an event, which can lead to erroneous interpretation of the facts. Ethical Benefits ■■ With built-in training, could be used ef- fectively and proportionately ■■ Can in principle provide admissible evidence; ■■ If reporting is anonymous, can en- courage people to report the crimes they would not report otherwise, es- pecially in countries or communities where trust in police and criminal jus- tice system is low; ■■ Can encourage interaction with police from young tech-savvy people. Legal Benefits ■■ Video and audio recordings can help in reconstructing what has happened; ■■ Can help in identifying the criminals or victims.
  50. 50. 51 Traffic Droid/ Private Dashcams Some road users are proactively record- ing behaviour on the roads via cameras and other recording equipment, in order to deter and capture evidence of traffic infringements. This article describes an extreme example of a London cyclist ‘droid’: àà http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/ active/10851988/Traffic-Droid-the-cyclist- fighting-for-justice-on-our-roads.html Ethical Risks ■■ Can generate more info than is usable by police; ■■ More justifiably used by profession- al drivers, for whom accusations of illegal driving may be a professional hazard; ■■ During the workshop it was stated that with the use of dashcams, the public is contributing to building a police state (i.e. a kind of society in which ordinary citizens take on a proactive role as informers to the authorities, thus potentially creating an atmos- phere of mistrust between citizens). Legal Risks ■■ There is a privacy risk in the perma- nent recording by these applications, regardless of whether there is a crimi- nal act taking place or not, since many individuals can be filmed and have their data processed without them knowing it. Ethical Benefits ■■ Alternative to road rage; ■■ Can incentivize drivers to be more aware of cyclists and thus drive less dangerously. Legal Benefits ■■ Reduction of hit-and-run accidents where the perpetrator could alterna- tively escape punishment or compen- sation to the victim.
  51. 51. 52 Digital Pillories This term refers to measures to “name- and-shame” lawbreakers online or on so- cial media, as a means to deterring and punishing crimes felt to be insufficiently well addressed by police. For example, the owner of a petrol station uses CCTV, Facebook, and warning signs to name- and-shame and, thereby, discourage petrol thieves, who appeared to be tar- geting his station due to its proximity to a national border, over which they can escape: àà http://www.dichtbij.nl/den-bosch/112/ artikel/4024142/eigenaar-pompstation- shell-nagelt-opnieuw-een-brandstofdief- publiekelijk-aan-de-schandpaal-.aspx àà https://tweakers.net/nieuws/75941/cbp- digitale-schandpaal-wordt-in-de-toekomst- zwaar-beboet.html Ethical Risks ■■ Punishes (by shaming) rather than de- tects. Legal Risks ■■ Courts usually consider a digital pillo- ry disproportionate to its goals. For in- stance, the Dutch Data Protection Au- thority has prohibited the publication of photos of thieves and gives fines if the publication still takes place2 ; ■■ Since the infringement on privacy rights is significant, these kind of ap- plications are often prohibited by data protection authorities; ■■ Could prejudice trials, e.g. by prompt- ing mistaken identity. Ethical Benefits ■■ Apparently effective deterrent to crime (according to reports from the specific case presented at the work- shop, see the link on the left); ■■ Potentially justifiable if police are too busy with more serious crime to act on evidence. Legal Benefits ■■ Can aid investigations if CCTV mate- rial is simply passed to police rather than being posted.
  52. 52. 53 Mafia Mapping MafiaMaps was a crowdfunded applica- tion enabling anonymous sharing of infor- mation about mafia locations in a city. Its development is currently on hold due to a dispute with the software developers. Ethical Risks ■■ There is a risk of erroneous reporting of locations. Since anyone can indi- cate locations of the mafia, it is fairly easy to indicate wrong locations. In- deed, the suspicions may be wrong, but the use of an app for reporting removes the natural barrier of taking action and going to the police. Thus, reporting is made easier, but this may also result in a too easy reporting of suspicious aspects without further care and responsibility. The anony- mous feature contributes to this and to malicious, inaccurate reporting. ■■ Might attract infiltration and/or inves- tigations by mafia. Legal Risks ■■ Mistaken or malicious reporting may lead to false accusations if people are clearly connected to indicated loca- tions; ■■ Can be infiltrated by mafia participat- ing in the app themselves. The tar- gets are able to see whether they are targeted. They may also intentionally report their rivals, leading to poten- tially more risks for public security, if violence increases as a result of these provocative actions. Innocent people or locations can be reported to blur real locations and to make the tool less valuable, because the data is polluted; ■■ The lawfulness of the data processing by the providers of the app is ques- tionable; ■■ IMEI numbers or other phone iden- tifiers can easily be used to identify individuals who used the app, so even though the data might appear anon- ymous, it still qualifies as personal data and is therefore subject to data protection laws. Ethical Benefits ■■ Gives up-to-date location information to police; ■■ Anonymity of the app allows people to communicate what ‘everyone knows but cannot say’, thus providing some forum for community solidarity and resistance. Legal Benefits ■■ The anonymity within the application (or at least the visible maps generat- ed) protects those who share informa- tion and, in addition to that, provides safeguards for their fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy and the right to be protected against violence.
  53. 53. 54 Neighbourhood Watch In neighbourhood watch applications, people living in a neighbourhood are en- couraged to be alert to criminal or suspi- cious activity and report it to others on the network. Ethical Risks ■■ Can lead to information sharing way beyond security purposes; ■■ Possible pressure for people to join. People do not join become suspects; ■■ Can lead to putting under suspicion being visited on people of certain so- cial or ethnic backgrounds, reflecting local prejudices and preconceptions; ■■ Can be used to further personal ven- dettas. Legal Risks ■■ Surveillance of people who are not suspects, but merely happen to be in the vicinity of recording, infringes on the privacy and data protection rights of those people in ways that might be illegal (this is known as ‘collateral in- trusion’ in the UK); ■■ People who are not trained profession- ally in recognizing crime can misinter- pret situations in their neighbourhood, thereby unintentionally leading to wrongful accusations. The challenge lies in determining whether a situation is suspect or not. People have to be aware of what to pay attention to. Ethical Benefits ■■ Proven to reduce certain kinds of crimes (e.g. burglaries in the Neth- erlands, see àà http://nltimes.nl/2015/10/06/burglars- avoid-areas-whatsapp-neighbourhood- watch Legal Benefits ■■ More (social) resources are made available for crime prevention.
  54. 54. 55 Bellingcat àà https://www.bellingcat.com This is a private crowdfunded initiative performing citizen journalist investiga- tions in parallel with LEAs. It employs the services of a large network of people in- volved and crowdsourcing to solve parts of the ‘puzzle’. Ethical Risks ■■ If investigations are chosen by news-worthiness rather than harm, then the benefits to security might be lesser; ■■ Public nature of investigations can lead to evasion by criminals; ■■ Can provoke misleading or undermin- ing counter-speech (e.g. by Russia in the Malaysia Airlines shoot-down, see an example from Russia Today: àà https://www.rt.com/news/360056-mh17- crash-bellingcat-bloggers ■■ Can lead to misidentifications and in- formal punishment rather than police apprehension. Legal Risks ■■ Possible reduction of trust in police if Bellingcat publishes their results, while LEAs are still searching or in- tentionally do not share their results, because they have reasons to withold information for the benefit of the case. For instance, they can have indica- tions for further investigations, and the sharing of results might alarm criminals that they are in sight. In sum, while the work may not be unlawful it may have unintended side effects that can have a negative impact on the ca- pacity of LEAs to enforce the law. Ethical Benefits ■■ Can provide reliable scrutiny of the ac- curacy of claims made by the states and other agents in the media, identi- fying and exposing fake news; ■■ Transparent methods enable coun- ter-scrutiny and thereby legitimacy. Legal Benefits ■■ There is cooperation with LEAs and evidence and materials are handed over to LEAs, helping investigations.
  55. 55. 56 Reddit A platform for user-generated content, where people can chat and share videos and images. Ethical Risks ■■ Can lead to misidentifications and in- formal punishment rather than police apprehension. Legal Risks ■■ Privacy of people being exposed in the content; ■■ There may be a risk of people taking the law in their own hands when trig- gered by the content that has been uploaded. Ethical Benefits Legal Benefits
  56. 56. 57 Opit, Stinson, Websleuths These platforms are used to catch child sex offenders online, usually via the use of “honeypots” or other techniques of entrapment. Ethical Risks ■■ “Naming and shaming” is too limited a goal of security interventions, given the seriousness of grooming for child abuse; ■■ Instead of direct “naming and sham- ing”, it would be better to cooperate with the police, share relevant in- formation and identifying details of groomers, and have the police catch them. However, this would require more trust in the police and cases be- ing taken up seriously, with the crim- inals eventually being brought before the court; ■■ Publicity causes an unwanted conse- quence of educating groomers/alert- ing them to methods of detection; ■■ Regardless of whether the ‘target’ is indeed the criminal, the impact on pri- vacy rights can be severe. Moreover, it has to be taken into account that once there is an impact on privacy because defamatory content is post- ed online, there are hardly any options to repair the damage occurring from this. Online content remains online for- ever, can be copied and shared, and will be spread over the internet and stored in several locations. Legal Risks ■■ When erroneous accusations are made online it may be very difficult to retrospectively ‘correct’ the reputa- tional damage, which brings a barrier to proper protection of privacy rights. From a legal perspective, these risks have been recognized and are to be mitigated by the newly introduced “right to be forgotten” in Article 17 of the GDPR; ■■ Online techniques can lead to entrap- ment; ■■ Can compromise prosecutions. Ethical Benefits ■■ May deter child abusers. Legal Benefits ■■ Can lead to prosecutions where re- lying on police would not investigate (because, for example, police lack re- sources or because reasonable suspi- cion has not yet been demonstrated).
  57. 57. 58 Doxing This is the sharing of usually identifiable information on the Internet. The aim is to find individuals who have been accused of something unlawful. Ethical Risks ■■ Efficient intrusion for the aggressive hacker. Legal Risks ■■ Raises significant risks for those who have been accused, since it is not rare that they become the victims of vio- lence and manhunts; ■■ People attracted to these kind of initi- atives are often thrill seekers; ■■ Legal safeguards, such as balancing of interests and opportunities to ob- ject to data processing, are usually absent. Ethical Benefits ■■ Can be used as a form of self-protec- tion for the cyberstalked. Legal Benefits
  58. 58. 59 Crowdsourced Missing Persons Identification Platforms These initiatives recruit volunteers to help identify missing persons or solve cold cases. An example is the Doe Net- work—a U.S.-based initiative to identify historic and recent missing persons cas- es via crowdsourced information: àà http://www.doenetwork.org Ethical Risks ■■ If volunteers do not receive the guid- ance and training that is needed to re- duce risks both to themselves and to the criminal justice process, it might result in harm; ■■ It may not always be clear who is in charge, and this may affect the ac- countability of measures taken—from minor issues such as trespassing to more serious ones such as arrest of citizens; ■■ The need for coordination of activities might conflict with the self-organising elements in a way that makes it diffi- cult for such initiatives to be success- ful on a wide scale. Legal Risks Ethical Benefits ■■ Reduces costs and adds manpower to investigations; ■■ Very low-risk if run by police in a liber- al jurisdiction (i.e. police whose role is to protect the human rights of citi- zens rather than enforce the will of the state). Legal Benefits ■■ These kind of applications can be used in a proper manner without too many legal issues. If used or coordinated by LEAs, they can give information and hints according to professional guidelines and ask the public for help. This help of the public may be useful in coming to a prosecution of perpe- trators, for instance when victims are found and brought together.
  59. 59. 60 Prey, Find My Smartphone àà https://www.preyproject.com These are pieces of software that help people find a lost laptop or smartphone. The app shows the location of the stolen or lost device. Ethical Risks ■■ Invites dangerous interventions. Legal Risks ■■ The risk is that people go after their devices themselves, which can be dangerous. Either they can be con- fronted with criminals who are violent, or they take the law in their own hands and expose suspected criminals to violent behavior or illegal naming and shaming. Ethical Benefits ■■ Efficient stolen phone recovery if used for notifying police; ■■ Can be a means of retrieving stolen goods (and therefore addressing a crime) that police may not pursue; ■■ If used widely enough may deter crim- inals. Legal Benefits ■■ Prosecution of individuals or groups of petty criminals that so far evaded capture due to lack of evidence.
  60. 60. 61 Policing the Police Apps These apps enable citizens to record in- teractions with police. Examples include the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Police Tape: àà https://www.aclu.org/feature/aclu-apps- record-police-conduct Ethical Risks ■■ Has the potential to alienate the police from the public and vice versa, further entrenching insidious mutual assump- tions on either side; ■■ May create unrealistically negative impression of policing, harming citi- zen-police trust. Legal Risks ■■ Can infringe privacy rights of those being filmed. Ethical Benefits ■■ Can deter police misconduct; ■■ Can enhance accountability; ■■ Can improve access to justice by re- cording wrongdoing for purposes of litigation. Legal Benefits
  61. 61. 62
  62. 62. 63 SWOT
  63. 63. SWOT
  64. 64. 65 DIY Policing for Law Enforcement Agencies In the following, we describe the inter- nal Strengths and Weaknesses, as well as external Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) for DIY Policing and law en- forcement agencies (LEAs). The SWOT analysis is an instrument developed for structured situational assessment and planning and is a tool that is commonly used in various organizational settings. The core idea of SWOT is to look at an issue from internal and external perspec- tives, to understand internal strength and weaknesses, based on the organisations’ capacity, as well as external opportuni- ties and strengths, posed by the context or environment of the organisation. The goal then is to benefit from strength and opportunities while mitigating weakness- es and threats. As this analysis is created for mul- tiple LEAs that have a great individual variance in their handling of DIY Policing and social media technology adaptation, we find cases where certain aspects are seemingly ambiguous and are listed both as a strength and a weakness, de- pending on the state of implementation. Therefore, we also do not claim that all our findings apply to all LEAs. The points that we make, nevertheless, should help LEAs to assess their situation. The table on the next page summaris- es the SWOT analysis, all aspects are detailed in the following. STRENGTHS ■■ S1: TRUSTED, EXPERIENCED SECURI- TY PROVIDERS: LEAs have extensive experience in policing. LEAs have es- tablished close, trusted relationships with other agencies, city governments and citizens. Through increased social participation and ‘eyes on the street’, LEAs thoroughly understand public se- curity. This existing trust, experience and authority are key assets for DIY Policing. ■■ S2: LEGAL FRAMEWORK EXPERTISE: Public security organisations have sol- id legal frameworks in place that pro- vide guidelines of what to do and what not to do. As DIY Policing brings about many legal challenges, this knowledge is of key importance to bring about clarity. ■■ S3: EDUCATION AND PREVENTION SKILLS: LEAs have experience to raise overall awareness on relevant issues such as safety and privacy among citizens. As prevention is a core component of LEAs’ daily work, LEAs can transfer that understanding to DIY Policing. Police can educate and empower citizens to protect them- selves and take an active part in their own cases by gathering evidence. ■■ S4: WILL TO INNOVATE: LEAs see themselves confronted with the will to innovate in relation to digital media. Most forces understand the need to innovate and have gained first experi- ence in social media projects. There is a will to collaborate with citizens and make more use of DIY Policing initia- tives. ■■ S5: SOCIAL MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE: For those LEAs that al- ready have introduced social media into their work, social media have im- proved situational awareness of LEAs in the physical and digital space. LEAs that provide social platforms and end-user applications, improve the incoming and outgoing flows of infor- mation in order to reach the right re- cipients such as LEAs other divisions or departments, officers or citizens. Young police officers educate older officers and help to increase their ap- preciation of the value of citizen-driv- en technological solutions. ■■ S6: INCREASED TRANSPARENCY, IM- PROVED DATA: LEAs have provided people, also via social media, with bet- ter, geo-referenced data on crime and risks. In data-driven initiatives such as predictive policing, LEAs have im- proved transparency and the accuracy of perceptions of threat. WEAKNESSES ■■ W1: LACK OF SOCIAL MEDIA KNOWL- EDGE AND EXPERIENCE: Not all LEAs are aware of social media technolo- gies, not all of them have the back- ground, knowledge and experience to use social media in DIY Policing, es- pecially in criminal investigation. Even new recruits are not trained to use so- cial media and fail to take advantage of opportunities. Local governments are also not yet using social media much to promote their urban security strategies.
  65. 65. 66 ■■ W2: LACK OF HARMONISATION: While from the LEAs perspectives it would be beneficiary to use unified end-us- er and server-based applications and tools, organizational needs, proce- dures and regulations vary from LEA to LEA and from country to country, also due to varying legal frameworks. Local governments’ competencies also differ between and within coun- tries. In some countries cities have an important role on the local security strategy, in others their field activities are limited to crime prevention. Citi- zens, therefore, have to learn and use many different applications. There is no uniform way of communication and interactivity. ■■ W3: UNWILLINGNESS TO CHANGE AND RISK-AVERSE CULTURE: Back- ward-looking decision makers, com- bined with hierarchical organisational structures create systematic failure to value technologically driven chang- es and take advantage of them. A risk-averse policing culture can stifle police readiness to embrace new technologies, DIY approaches, and forms of communication that could otherwise improve policing outcomes as well as relationships with the public. In many cases, DIY Policing will be dif- ficult to implement without significant cultural change. ■■ W4: UNFIT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISION: DIY Polic- ing faces many legal and bureaucratic barriers. The geographical division in the physical world in combination with jurisdictional limits poses sovereignty issues for DIY Policing whereas crime easily can take place regardless of ge- ographical and judicial borders. ■■ W5: SILO CULTURE: There is a lack of coordination between police forces on national and regional levels with local governments. This also leaves open responsibilities of who will promote and oversee new platforms and how information can and will be analysed and shared. ■■ W6: TECHNOLOGICAL GAP: LEAs lack proper tools and knowledge for online collaboration. Digital devices are not standard equipment for LEA officers. Additionally, there is no common plat- form for sharing information across agencies and cross border. Most of the current DIY Policing applications and tools used on mobile devices are either connected or dedicated to be used between citizens and only are used by certain LEAs in very few coun- tries and regions. ■■ W7: INCOMPATIBLE JUDICIAL PRO- CEDURES: The current custody chain, such as the procedure for submit- ting evidence, is too restrictive and bureaucratic and leads to strong ev- idence being deemed inadmissible if, for example, a citizen has collected it. This blocks opportunities for valuable DIY Policing. OPPORTUNITIES ■■ O1: IMPROVING SECURITY: DIY Polic- ing allows obtaining new information and an increased information sharing. Citizens’ participating in policing can lead to citizen empowerment and eventually to an improved perceived security. It can also support the spon- taneous involvement of citizens in the response to and recovery from an incident. Thereby DIY Policing would improve the quality of policing and create a more legitimate police force. ■■ O2: DIGITAL PRIMED CITIZENS: The majority of citizens, especially the young ones, are very familiar with the web and social media technology and make full use of various devices, appli- cations and platforms. Thus, they are ready to very easily adopt the use of any new tools and apps. ■■ O3: MOTIVATED CITIZENS: Citizens, either as individuals or as groups that have previously been victims of crimi- nal cases are determined to work with zeal in investigation cases in order to take revenge, find the guilty and pre- vent other citizens from fallling in sim- ilar situations. Local citizens have an intrinsic drive to act and have detailed information of the local situation, and sometimes also equipment valuable in a response. ■■ O4: SELF-ORGANIZED CITIZENS: Through DIY Policing, citizens educate and inform one another about crime prevention. Examples like neighbour- hood watch enable crime prevention without active participation of LEAs.
  66. 66. 67 STRENGTHS S1 TRUSTED, EXPERIENCED SECURITY PROVIDERS S2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK EXPERTISE S3 EDUCATION AND PREVENTION SKILLS S4 WILL TO INNOVATE S5 SOCIAL MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE S6 INCREASED TRANSPARENCY, IMPROVED DATA WEAKNESSES W1 LACK OF SOCIAL MEDIA KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE W2 LACK OF HARMONISATION W3 UNWILLINGNESS TO CHANGE, RISK-AVERSE CULTURE W4 UNFIT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND GEO DIVISION W5 SILO CULTURE W6 TECHNOLOGICAL GAP W7 INCOMPATIBLE JUDICIAL PROCEDURES OPPORTUNITIES O1 IMPROVING SECURITY O2 DIGITAL PRIMED CITIZENS O3 MOTIVATED CITIZENS O4 SELF-ORGANIZED CITIZENS O5 ANONYMITY OF TECHNOLOGY O6 KNOWLEDGE OF THE CROWD O7 FREE RESOURCES FOR EFFICIENT POLICING O8 MISSING JOBS O9 PREVENTION THROUGH VISIBILITY O10 HARMONISATION OF LAWS & REGULATIONS O11 CITIZEN SKILLS O12 GETTING AHEAD O13 TRUSTED CITIZEN CONNECTION O14 TRUSTED SOLUTIONS THREATS T1 LACK OF CITIZEN KNOWLEDGE T2 LACK OF JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE T3 NEGATIVE INTERFERENCE T4 CITIZEN EXCLUSION T5 INVALID, BIASED INFORMATION T6 POWER OF SOCIAL NETWORKS T7 DECREASING TRUST T8 INFORMATION OVERLOAD T9 DECREASING PRIVACY T10 SELF JUSTICE
  67. 67. 68 Citizens may trust other citizens more than the police or other authorities. Talented individuals can help relieve some the work burden of LEAs. ■■ O5: ANONYMITY OF TECHNOLOGY: Technologies permitting anonymous uploading of digital evidence and intel- ligence can increase citizens’ motiva- tion to report crimes without implicat- ing themselves. ■■ O6: KNOWLEDGE OF THE CROWD: The wisdom of the larger community is an important and powerful asset for the police and can be leveraged through crowd sourcing. The crowd can provide real-time information for prevention and intelligence gathering. ■■ O7: FREE RESOURCES FOR EFFICIENT POLICING: DIY Policing can help LEAs to do more with fewer resources, es- pecially in situations of fiscal retrench- ment. Additionally, citizen involvement in policing activities through social media may render services and their use more effective and avoid mis- allocations, thus permitting local governments to save on staff time and, eventually, cut down on costs. Local governments could oversee non-crime tasks that citizens usually turn to police about, such as noise, insufficient lighting in the streets and other problems that touch local gov- ernments’ competencies rather than those of police. In consequence, LEAs can focus on policing tasks. In gen- eral, citizen involvement can lead to volunteer support for the provision of common goods and thus to additional support for government agencies. ■■ O8: MISSING JOBS: Investigation-re- lated services, in a form of paid out- sourcing, provide the chance of cre- ating new job opportunities. Formal outsourcing of investigation-related services could take place not only to individual citizens but also to more organized inspector teams, both with either profit or non-profit professional legal entities. Outsourcing is an op- portunity to support these DIY Polic- ing entities in evolving their current volunteer level of action to a more professional level. ■■ O9: PREVENTION THROUGH VISIBILI- TY: Increased visibility of LEAs in the digital space subconsciously enforces lawful behaviour. Rogue police pres- ences on social media can, despite their use of pseudonyms and critical views, actually increase trust in po- licing by providing an authentic voice. DIY Policing can evoke and develop a sense of responsibility among citizens to abide the law. ■■ O10: HARMONISATION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS: As DIY Policing calls for unified standards, international digital policies would provide clear rules for all and could help legislators to create more resilient and durable laws and regulations that are compati- ble with the digital space. ■■ O11: CITIZEN SKILLS: Diverse citizens skills, such as with language and tech- nology, can become a resource for LEAs by engaging volunteers, for in- stance to translate materials on social media. ■■ O12: GETTING AHEAD: Technology use cases and features are often uniform across cultures and organisa- tional boundaries. There is the oppor- tunity to learn from best practices and stimulate innovation. Recognising and using this opportunity can make LEAs more confident about keeping up with the pace of change. ■■ O13: TRUSTED CITIZEN CONNECTION: DIY Policing allows local governments and LEAs to be more approachable for and in closer contact with their citizens. The close connection allows the identification of priorities and an improved adaptation of services to citizens’ needs and priorities. It also improves the transparency of govern- ment and police services and builds trust and enhances engagement. DIY Policing can inspire a sense of value and connectedness among individuals within a society and allows establish- ing contacts with groups that are diffi- cult to reach. ■■ O14: TRUSTED SOLUTIONS: Using specific applications and platforms that are officially recommended and certified by LEAs and not getting out of the box any commercial tools in the industry currently available, adds credibility to the use of social media by the citizens for investigative pur- poses. Crowdsourcing with authorita- tive trust and absence of fear is es- sential for the development of citizens’ safe feeling in DIY Policing
  68. 68. 69 THREATS ■■ T1: LACK OF CITIZEN KNOWLEDGE: Citizens are not well educated about the legal systems and laws. Citizens’ lack knowledge about responsibilities and competencies: ‘Who does what in a city?’ ‘When is the police, or when a different government agency my point of contact?’ As citizens are not pro- fessionally trained, they may do harm with their intervention to the case of the police and, for instance, destroy proof, harm themselves or increase the risk of becoming a victim them- selves, for instance, when suspects take revenge. ■■ T2: LACK OF JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE: Poor understanding of technologies amongst judges and prosecutors can mean that the police are prevented from accessing valuable digital evi- dence. ■■ T3: NEGATIVE INTERFERENCE: In DIY Policing, there is a fine line between assisting and hindering. DIY Policing can interfere negatively with police work, especially when there is a lack of communication between citizens and local authorities through social media. Improper DIY Policing might therefore lead to negative investiga- tion results and harm the image for police authorities. ■■ T4: CITIZEN EXCLUSION: DIY Policing can leave out certain groups in socie- ty. Questions about the inclusiveness of DIY Policing and DIY Policing in weak communities may create a mis- balance between citizens that do DIY Policing and those that do not. DIY Po- licing can lead to discrimination-driv- en prosecutions and target selection based on social prejudice and thus negatively impact minority groups. ■■ T5: INVALID, BIASED INFORMATION: DIY Policing poses many questions about the reliability of information, leaving leaving open the question of how the information provided by cit- izens can be validated. Citizens may not be unbiased, and anonymity, fake identities and the sheer amounts of in- formation may mislead the process of an investigation. Misinformation and rumours cannot be mistaken for reli- able proof and evidence. Citizens can also get involved in investigations of cases that they might be accused of. ■■ T6: POWER OF SOCIAL NETWORKS: In many cases, LEAs and citizens use social media platforms provided by in- ternational commercial entities. These organisations often do not follow local legal frameworks. They can directly influence DIY Policing with little power on LEAs side. ■■ T7: DECREASING TRUST: Increased but unbalanced visibility of LEAs in the virtual world may make citizens feel manipulated or controlled. The inca- pacity of police or local governments to respond to the citizens’ require- ments or expectations might have an inverse effect. Coordination problems between local governments and po- lice might confuse civilians. A lack of trust in police can fuel vigilante-style DIY Policing and discourage the public to engage with new platforms adopt- ed by police. DIY Policing may also in- crease suspicion, harm trust relations and increase in litigiousness among citizens. ■■ T8: INFORMATION OVERLOAD: The new data provided by DIY Policing activities can become an overload for LEAs. On the other side, too much in- formation provided by LEAs online can make data irrelevant. ■■ T9: DECREASING PRIVACY: DIY Polic- ing raises serious concerns regarding the protection of personal data and right for informational self-determina- tion. DIY Policing also produces issues with citizen driven surveillance. ■■ T10: ABUSE OF ONLINE TOOLS: When introducing new platforms or tools for DIY Policing, there is the risk of abuse by citizens that can engage in trolling. ■■ T11: SELF-JUSTICE: DIY Policing may encourage vigilantism and make citi- zens take the law in their own hands and hunt suspects who may or may not be actual perpetrators. DIY Polic- ing also might support LEA criticism thet the police do not do enough to fight crime.
  69. 69. 70
  70. 70. 71 NEW ROLES
  71. 71. NEWROLES
  72. 72. 73 Tomorrow’s Responsibilities and Roles In many ways, digital DIY Policing is a new phenomenon and the future roles and responsibilities are yet to be defined. In the following, we summarize the main trends, concepts and ideas discussed at the workshop. The following table contrasts the current situation with the potential future situa- tion and extrapolates current develop- ments. While we cannot and do not want to proclaim a future, the results should serve as input for future debate. Overall, digital tools empower citizens to become much more active players in public security and, in return, require LEAs to open up and work with citizens in a much more direct and interactive way. DIY Policing calls LEAs to revise their role. Instead of being a “monopolist” in providing public security, public secu- rity becomes a matter of cooperation, requiring LEAs to open up, share and cooperate with citizens while doing their work. DIY Policing allows citizens to hold more responsibility in public security. Public security is no longer provided by the government, it becomes an achieve- ment of the community. Other stakeholders can support DIY Policing through technologies that sup- port responsible DIY Policing, education on how to properly conduct DIY Policing and the legal framework provided by gov- ernment institutions. Stakeholder As Is To Be LEAs Protect citizens. Co-create security with citizens, and government. Enforce the law. Investigate crime on their own. Devolve responsibilities and maybe also power. Investigate crime, share informa- tion with citizens and make use of DIY Policing initiatives. Do not currently assign investigation tasks to citizens. Consider these tasks their responsibility, not citizens’. Can distribute part of their investigative work to volunteer citizens engaging the community. Show a varying degree of visibility in the virtual space. Increase visibility and presence in the virtual space and pro-actively ask the public for information. Ask for support and involve citizens in response to crisis situations. Join online neighbourhood watch-groups. Disseminate information. Receive information.
  73. 73. 74 Stakeholder As Is To Be LEAs Mainly respond and react to citizens’ re- quests with traditional means. Often do not have social media tools for end-us- ers and central platforms to give citizens the chance to communicate and interact online. Have various specific social media tools and roles. Authority and responsibility will be assigned to LEAs’ personnel for the management and administration of the communication platforms and appli- cations. Although having a social media pres- ence, have an unclear or no social media policy at all, nor the appropriate organi- zational structure and resources to face and respond to DIY Policing needs. Have new roles and associated jobs defined under a specific social media policy and communication strategy plan, which is developed with and issued to the public for disseminating LEAs activi- ties and platform’s features. Gather evidence of crime with traditional means. Have systems that support sorting and screening data given to them by citizens to find evidence of crime. Provide solutions to citizens’ requests. More rapidly respond to citizens’ actual demands and have more resources to focus on solving crimes. Refute rumours in most cases. Refute invalid information, share appro- priate messages and gather information about those spreading rumours. Citizens Use traditional communication and con- tact means with the police. Make limited use of digital media for reporting inci- dents and very rarely for investigation cases as an ongoing process. Become members of an online social networking community developed within a platform to communicate with the po- lice. As members of their national/local social media DIY community, can be enti- tled to use certain certified end-user ap- plications in order to interact with their local authorities. Passive participation. Read online news about crime. Active participation. Participate in polic- ing and crime reporting. Assist police by providing information and keep an eye on perpetrators.

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