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A Pattern Language of Social Media in Public Security

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Sebastian Denef (Fraunhofer IAO),
Arnout de Vries (TNO), Hans van Vliet
(TNO), Mariano Cecowski (XLAB),
Jordi Diego (Local Police Valencia), Rubén
Fernández (Local Police Valencia), Kat
Hadjimatheou (University of Warwick),
Jon Coaffee (University of Warwick),
Emmanouil Kermitsis (KEMEA), Nikos
Moustakidis (KEMEA), Klaudia Tani (EOS),
Pilar de la Torre (EFUS), Fiona Williamson
(Police Service of Northern Ireland)

Published in: Social Media
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A Pattern Language of Social Media in Public Security

  1. 1. A PATTERN LANGUAGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN PUBLIC SECURITY
  2. 2. 3 Authors Sebastian Denef (Fraunhofer IAO), Arnout de Vries (TNO), Hans van Vliet (TNO), Mariano Cecowski (XLAB), Jordi Diego (Local Police Valencia), Rubén Fernández (Local Police Valencia), Kat Hadjimatheou (University of Warwick), Jon Coaffee (University of Warwick), Emmanouil Kermitsis (KEMEA), Nikos Moustakidis (KEMEA), Klaudia Tani (EOS), Pilar de la Torre (EFUS), Fiona Williamson (Police Service of Northern Ireland) © 2017 by MEDI@4SEC Project This research is partially funded by the European Commission as part of Horizon 2020 framework in the context of the MEDI@4SEC project under Grant Agree- ment no 700281. This report is a partial and updated draft of a public deliverable submitted to the European Commission. More information: àà www.media4sec.eu
  3. 3. 4
  4. 4. 5 Contents Executive Summary 9 Background 13 The Patterns 19 LEAS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA 21 INTELLIGENCE 23 SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYTICS 25 ENFORCING THE LAW 27 INTAKE 29 LISTING MISSING PEOPLE OR CASUALTIES 31 SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING 33 FILTER LOCAL SOURCES 35 INCIDENT MONITORING 37 CIVIL SERVANTS MONITORING 39 CROWD MANAGEMENT 41 SEEK CONNECT HELP 43 SOCIAL MEDIA FOUNDATION 45 SOCIAL MEDIA EDUCATION 47 MAIN ACCOUNT 49 SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY 51 SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES 53 MODERN IT INFRASTRUCTURE 55 MOBILE DEVICES 57 LOAD BALANCE 59 SOCIAL INTRANET 61 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 63 UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS 65 CROWDSOURCE CRIME TIPS 67 HOUSE TO HOUSE 69 REPORT CRIME ANONYMOUSLY 71 ANALYSING SOCIAL MEDIA 73 SUBPOENA DATA 75 ENGAGEMENT & COMMUNICATION 77 INFORMING CITIZENS 79 HUMAN SIDE STORIES 81 PREVENTION 83 CRIME MAPPING 85 ALERT TOOL 87 ANSWERING CITIZENS 89 EDUCATING CITIZENS 91 FACEBOOK ADS 93 TWEETATHON 95 BEING PREPARED 97 COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 99 TARGET GROUP ENGAGEMENT 101 TARGETED ACCOUNTS 103 ONLINE PATROL 105 PUBLIC VOTING 107 ORGANISE VOLUNTEERING 109 RECRUITMENT 111 WEBCARE 113 REFUTE RUMOURS 115 REPUTATION MANAGEMENT 117 REASSURANCE 119 CITIZENS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA 121 ORGANISE PROTESTS 123 DIY JUSTICE 125 DIY CITIZEN JOURNALISM 127 DIY ACCOUNTS 129 DIY INTELLIGENCE 131 DIY WATCH DOG 133 DIY INVESTIGATION 135 NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH 137 CRIMINALS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA 139 CYBERBULLYING AND MOBBING 141 ROMANCE SCAM 143 PLANNING 145 ILLEGAL MARKET PLACE 147 GANG RECRUITMENT 149 FACEBOOK THUGGING 151 STALKING 153 IDENTITY THEFT & FRAUD 155 THREATENING & RANSOM 157 REVENGE PORN 159 SEXTORTION 161 PROPAGANDA 163 HATE SPEECH 165 GROOMING 167 Discussion and Outlook 171 Bibliography 177
  5. 5. 6
  6. 6. 7 TL;DR
  7. 7. TL;DR
  8. 8. 9 Executive Summary This report summarizes practices of so- cial media use in public security. Our goal is to create an inventory of best practic- es, lessons-learned, and roles and re- sponsibilities, to analyse specifically how social media is being used by police and other public security planners, within and outside Europe. By providing an overall description, we aim to spark discussions and provide a common language for so- cial media use in the field of public secu- rity planning. Using data from academic literature review, the review of blogs, books, ex- isting best practice descriptions and expert knowledge this report compares social media practices. Inspired by Chris- topher Alexander’s work on ‘pattern lan- guages’ for urban spaces and buildings, we analysed the data and looked for pat- terns. To further refine our findings, we presented the practice patterns to social media and security experts and inter- viewed them about their perspective and current practices. As a result, we identified 74 practice patterns that describe and structure the use of social media for public se- curity. The patterns are structured in three groups, describing how (1) law en- forcement agencies (LEAs), such as the police, (2) citizens and (3) criminals are using social media and impact public se- curity. With 50 patterns, the focus of our work is on group (1), the LEAs. Each pattern has a unique name (writ- ten in capital letters) and describes a solution to a recurring problem or con- text. Following an image and a very con- cise summary of the pattern, this report provides links to online resources that detail the given practices. The patterns have been designed to be printed and shared as an input for workshops and strategic discussions of practitioners and public security planners. Patterns link to other patterns and thereby form groups. The main groups for LEAs are the use of social media for INTELLIGENCE, ENFORCING THE LAW, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS and ENGAGEMENT & COMMUNICATION. Additionally, we describe a range of SOCIAL MEDIA FOUNDATION practices that allow or- ganisations to prepare themselves and maintain the use of social media. Reflecting on this work, we show that typically LEAs start their social media ef- forts by implementing the INFORMING CITIZENS pattern, which has become a quasi standard. LEAs widely acknowl- edge the benefits of using social media for ENFORCING THE LAW, especial- ly in crisis situations. With regards to SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING and CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS the scope and technological depths of ad- aptation vary. While already common practice in selected countries, such as the Netherlands and the United King- dom, a more interactive COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT typically points to more experience in using social media, as it requires organisational change that empowers local officers to publicly post and interact digitally with citizens. Other practices such as ONLINE PATROL are still in their infancy and require LEAs to establish a visible pres- ence in online spaces. While selected patterns are widely used and feature many examples, oth- er practices have only been applied in selected contexts and are at the exper- imental stage. We thus do not consider this work a static theory. Instead, we understand our report as a snapshot of current practices that should and will evolve. Discussing our results with practition- ers showed that our descriptions cover their current practices. It also revealed the need for future research to provide more insights into how organisations can innovate and cope with the increasing speed of technological innovation be- yond social media.. This practice report is a compilation showing the great potential of social me- dia for public security. It does not take into account the current stage of social adaptation. Indeed, our work indicates that adoption greatly varies and most LEAs have yet to define their role and re- sponsibilities in digitised societies. We invite all practioners and research- ers to contribute to this work by submit- ting their own examples or comments.
  9. 9. 10
  10. 10. 11 BACKGROUND
  11. 11. BACKGROUND
  12. 12. 13 MEDI@4SEC Project The MEDI@4SEC project focuses on un- derstanding the opportunities, challeng- es and ethical considerations of enhanc- ing social media use for public security: the good, the bad and the ugly. The good comprises using social media for prob- lem solving, fighting crime, decreasing fear of crime and increasing the quality of life. The bad is the increase of digit- ised criminality and terrorism with new phenomena emerging through the use of social media. The ugly comprises the grey areas of phenomena to deal with during incidents, such as trolling, cyber bullying, threats, or live video sharing of tactical security operations. Making use of the possibilities that social media offer, including smart ‘workarounds’ is key, while respecting privacy, legislation, and ethics. This changing situation raises a series of challenges and possibilities for public security planners. MEDI@4SEC explores this through a series of communication and dissemi- nation activities that engage extensive- ly with a range of end-users to better understand the usage of social media for security activities. MEDI@4SEC will seek a better understanding of how so- cial media can and cannot be used for public security purposes and highlight ethical, legal and data-protection-related issues and implications. Activities centre around six relevant themes: DIY Policing; Everyday security; Riots and mass gath- erings: The dark web; Trolling; and Inno- vative market solutions. MEDI@4SEC will feed into, support and influence changes in policy-making and policy implementa- tion in public security that can be used by end-users to improve their decision making. In this project, social media are de- fined as “a group of internet-based appli- cations that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content” (Kaplan & Haenlein 2010: 61). Social media that we predominantly focus on are the more widely used social media apps, notably Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, YouTube, and Instagram, but also (new) emerging social media that are widely adopted and that we come across. Online chat groups, forums and market places are not our key focus, but will be touched upon where relevant. The ambition of the MEDI@4SEC is to establish a community around the topic of social media in public security and provide a better understanding to public security planners. That is why the project will organise a workshop series in which stakeholders can discuss and exchange knowledge in the field. Further, we have witnessed that in this relatively new and still experimental field, practitioners can benefit greatly from international knowledge exchange and learnings from the experiences of oth- ers. Such exchange can help to compare practices and empower early adopters with references and examples. In the long run, this exchange can help to harmonize security practices, espe- cially among European law enforcement agencies. The core motivation for this report, hence, is to spark and enable discus- sions among the various stakeholders in the field of social media and public security. Driven by this motivation, this report aims to provide an overview that shows a comprehensive map of social media practice in the field of public security. Our focus is on making social media practice easily accessible and deliver pointers to other sources for additional details. LITERATURE REVIEW We have conducted an extensive litera- ture review of 382 publications. The re- view provides an extensive overview of research and other publications in the field of public security and social media. The literature review focuses on the fol- lowing six themes: DIY policing: citizens employing social media for criminal investigation, crime prevention or ensuring public security independent of police. Citizens taking ini- tiative/taking over police tasks. Riots and mass gatherings: the role of social media (data) during riots and mass gatherings and ensuring public se- curity by monitoring, signalling and com- municating with the public. Everyday security: the everyday po- licing of public security, including co- operation with citizens via social media ‘community policing’ and social media/ big data intelligence. The Dark Web: organised (internation- al) crime and its high-tech use of the dark web, the influence on public security, and the counter policing activities. Trolling: all kinds of online bullying
  13. 13. 14 (cyber bullying), of which some activities are criminal offences and some are not. Innovative market solutions: new com- mercial products for including social me- dia in police work. For example apps for smartphones, social media monitoring tools etc. For the purpose of the deliverable at hand, we have scanned the literature review for best practices and lessons learned and included these examples in the description of practices. DATA SOURCES Our selection and description of best practices is grounded in a variety of dif- ferent data sources. First, as mentioned above, this re- port is based on an extensive litera- ture review of 382 publications. These publications include academic studies on social media topics and also other, non-academic publications on the topic. As part of the existing literature review we also reviewed existing best practice reports, such as the report of the FP7 COMPOSITE project on best practices in police social media adoption. We also re- viewed blogs, such as the Dutch website socialmediadna.nl that has a long history of reporting on the topic. Second, we leveraged the existing ex- pertise in the MEDI@4SEC project con- sortium. As the project partners were among the first to study social media for public security, we had several discus- sions and reviewed the knowledge and experience available in the project. Of great importance here was the expertise at the teams at Fraunhofer IAO and TNO, who conducted various studies in the field of police social media use. Third, to include the perspective of municipalities, we reviewed strategic security plans of cities for practice and social media adoption. The strategies were collected through a call launched by the European Forum for Urban Securi- ty (EFUS) among its members. 23 strate- gies from different European cities were collected and reviewed, including cities in France, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and Switzerland. Fourth, we presented our findings to 30 external experts and discussed the practice descriptions with them. The ex- perts included police officers, research- ers and city officials from Belgium, Ger- many, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the U.S. The ex- perts provided additional examples and pointed to missing aspects currently rel- evant in their work. Fifth, we organised a workshop through the network of our project part- ner, EFUS. At the workshop, we present- ed the results of the report and discussed its application in the work contexts of the cities of the workshop participants. METHODS & STRUCTURE Methodologically, this work is inspired by the pattern language concept of Christo- pher Alexander and the grounded theory method, proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). For presenting and making sense of the data, we apply the concept of a pat- tern language developed by Christopher Alexander. Christopher Alexander (1964, 1979, 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2009), as an architect and researcher, has studied the interaction between human activity and designed artefacts and spaces. To understand existing configurations, Alex- ander proposes the concept of pattern languages. He argued that “every place is given its character by certain pat- terns of events that keep on happening there” (1979, p. 55) and that these “pat- terns of events are always interlocked with certain geometric patterns in the space” (1979, p. 75). Each pattern “is a rule which describes a type of strong centre that is likely to be needed, on a recurring basis, throughout a particular environment” (2002b, p. 345). A pattern language is a collection of patterns that describes an overall configuration. In the field of computer science, Alex- ander’s work has been influential in shar- ing knowledge in software engineering (Gamma, et al, 1995). Erickson (2000a, 2000b) suggests pattern languages as a ‘Lingua Franca’ in design processes for computing systems, addressing the need to design systems in interdiscipli- nary teams that integrate well in existing workplaces. These patterns and their re- lationships “can be used as a language for discussing changes and reflecting on their possible impacts, both in terms of the activities of the organisation, and in terms of the qualities of work life which its members value.” (Erickson, 2000a, p. 366) As detailed in Denef, Oppermann, Keyson (2011), Alexander’s creation of a pattern language can be framed as an instance of research, where an initial in- terest, in this case the quality of life in designed spaces, leads to a theory in a bottom-up process. From this perspec-
  14. 14. 15 tive, we can link Alexander’s work to the methodological considerations by Glaser and Strauss work on grounded theory (1967). In grounded theory, the lens of research is not defined a priori; instead, it evolves in the course of the study, grounded in and targeted for the phenomenon at hand. Inspired by the concepts of grounded theory, our pattern language of social media practice in public security evolved in a grounded process and by a process of constant comparison of practical ex- amples found in our data. As a result, we present our findings in a pattern language. In a concise form, each pattern describes a problem or context, the solution and is visualized using an image. These descriptions are short in order to enable the reader to quickly grasp a general idea, before ex- ploring its details. The patterns are de- signed in a way that they can be directly printed from this report. Each pattern is detailed with examples that link to spe- cific cases or other online resources that provide more information. Patterns can also link to other pat- terns and thus describe groups and re- lations. We visualise these relations in the overall pattern language graph. It is important to notice that the hierarchy only visualises the main connections and dependencies. To improve clarity, we do not visualize all links that are mentioned in the text. LIMITATIONS Given the ambitious scope of the report, it has a number of limitations. Providing a worldwide mapping of social media practice in the field of public security is, by definition, an impossible task. Not only do we see the many law enforce- ment agencies around the world apply various practices, moreover, they evolve rapidly. That is why this report cannot list or group all practices and is certainly incomplete. While we have insights into many of the examples and practices that we describe, we also cannot always guarantee the quality of their implemen- tation and whether or not a particular im- plementation or example has delivered the results that it promised. We also have not developed a stand- ard or system that would allow us to specify the criteria that qualifies a prac- tice to be listed. In this report, we rely on the judgment of experts and practition- ers in the field. We have used the data that we gath- ered to create a structure that supports the presentation and communication about the subject matter. The grouping and the structure of the described prac- tice, however, do not follow a strict sys- tem and there are probably a number of others ways to structure and group our findings. We further would like to point out that we have not analysed the ethical or legal implications of each individual practice. Given these limitations, we do not consider this report as an end, but rath- er as a beginning and means to spark discussions in the field of social media and public security. We encourage prac- titioners and researchers alike to ques- tion our findings and contribute to our understanding of this diverse and highly dynamic field.
  15. 15. 16
  16. 16. 17 THE PATTERNS
  17. 17. THEPATTERNS
  18. 18. 19 The Patterns LEAS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA SOCIAL MEDIA FOUNDATION MAIN ACCOUNT SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES MODERN IT INFRASTRUCTURE MOBILE DEVICES SOCIAL INTRANET SOCIAL MEDIA EDUCATION CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS REPORT CRIME ANONYMOUSLYCROWDSOURCE CRIME TIPS HOUSE TO HOUSE ANALYSING SOCIAL MEDIA UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS SUBPOENA DATA ENGAGEMENT & COMMUNICATION INFORMING CITIZENS ALERT TOOL HUMAN SIDE STORIES EDUCATING CITIZENS BEING PREPARED TWEETATHON CRIMINALS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA PROPAGANDA IDENTITY THEFT & FRAUD THREATENING & RANSOM PLANNING CYBERBULLYING & MOBBING HATE SPEECH GANG RECRUITMENT FACEBOOK THUGGING CITIZENS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA DIY ACCOUNTS NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH DIY INVESTIGATION DIY JUSTICE ORGANISE PROTESTS DIY INTELLIGENCE DIY CITIZEN JOURNALISM DIY WATCH DOG STALKING GROOMING ROMANCE SCAM SEXTORTION ILLEGAL MARKET PLACE SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYTICS INTELLIGENCE PREVENTION ANSWERING CITIZENS CRIME MAPPING FACEBOOK ADS COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ONLINE PATROL TARGET GROUP ENGAGEMENT ORGANISE VOLUNTEERING PUBLIC VOTINGTARGETED ACCOUNTS RECRUITMENT ENFORCING THE LAW INTAKE SEEK CONNECT HELP FILTER LOCAL SOURCES SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING CROWD MANAGEMENT LISTING MISSING PEOPLE OR CASUALTIES CIVIL SERVANTS MONITORING INCIDENT MONITORING WEBCARE REPUTATION MANAGEMENT REASSURANCEREFUTE RUMOURS LOAD BALANCE REVENGE PORN
  19. 19. 20
  20. 20. 21 Image Source: PSNI LEAS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA Social media have changed many aspects of public and private lives and directly im- pact public security. Therefore, LEAs adopt social media and un- derstand their relevance for their work. We consider the adoption of social media by public security organisations in themselves a best practice.
  21. 21. 22 The use of social media such as Twitter, Facebook or YouTube is allowing the interaction between the citizens and the police as we detail in ENGAGEMENT & COMMUNICATION. Social media also provide a data source for investigations, as we detail in CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS. Social media can also support ENFORCING THE LAW and INTELLIGENCE activities of LEAs. In our interviews and in previous work, we did not find a single LEA that chose to adopt social media and later considered that a bad decision. Instead, we find that organisations that initially only used social media for a particular event or only for a special purpose, later kept using it and adopted in broader ways than originally planned. The police in Frankfurt, Germany, for exam- ple, only used Facebook temporarily, but now runs a permanent Facebook presence at: àà https://www.facebook.com/PolizeiFrankfurt A reason for LEAs for non-adoption of social media in inves- tigations is the restriction that do not allow to access social media from the workplace. According to Lexisnexis, access is the single biggest driver for non-use in investigations, a factor that has been increased from 2012 onwards: àà http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/insights/law-enforcement-social- media-infographic.aspx The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) introduced so- cial media around 2011 in a bid to engage more meaningfully with the community they serve. PSNI ran a pilot scheme with Facebook pages in a number of areas before rolling out Face- book and Twitter to all districts in Northern Ireland. There are currently 32 PSNI Facebook accounts and 35 PSNI Twitter ac- counts. As PSNI’s social media use has developed they have also introduced a corporate Instagram account and a corporate YouTube account. Engagement over the social media channels has grown steadily and PSNI currently have a social media fol- lowing of 612,805 people in a population of 1.8 million.
  22. 22. 23 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/ajc1/6357759479 INTELLIGENCE Social media contain a large amount of data that might be relevant to public security. Therefore, LEAs use social media to gather intelligence.
  23. 23. 24 Intelligence related practices: SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYTICS. Sometimes, UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS can be a part of INTELLIGENCE, too.
  24. 24. 25 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/makou0629/1145908929 SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYTICS High volumes of unstructured data and traf- fic are generated from various social me- dia before, during, and after an event or an emergency incident period. Therefore, LEAs use software tools for data analytics for unstructured data with machine learning that allows to search and analyse text, images, audio, and video from virtually any source uncovering trends, pat- terns, and relationships.
  25. 25. 26 UK’s Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) began a trial with HP during the summer of the London Olympics to deploy industry leading social media analytics tools (IDOL-Intelligent Data Op- erating Layer) to manage high volume of data traffic produced during the Olympic Games event period. àà http://www8.hp.com/us/en/software-solutions/information-data- analytics-idol HP proposed this trial to help better understanding and uti- lizing social media analysis (SMA) for community engagement. àà http://www8.hp.com/h20195/v2/GetPDF.aspx/4AA5-8755ENW.pdf The BRIDGE EU project conducted research on an information intelligence tool which aggregates, simulates, collects and anal- yses social media live data coming from the fields of emergency incidents. According to a techcrunch report, police are increasingly us- ing social media surveillance tools: àà https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/23/police-are-increasingly-using- social-media-surveillance-tools Example tools: ■■ Palantir: àà https://www.palantir.com/solutions/intelligence ■■ BlueJay: àà https://brightplanet.com/bluejay ■■ LexisNexis: àà http://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/newsevents/press-release. aspx?id=1381851197735305 ■■ Analyst Notebook: àà https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MfzJVY0wad8 Geotime and RiskMap are also used for analytics. Tools can also use other data, not only social media sources.
  26. 26. 27 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/perspective/7643017690 ENFORCING THE LAW Social media can support law enforcement activities. Therefore, LEAs use social media to dis- cover people who violate the law or seem to intend to do so.
  27. 27. 28 The practice is detailed in the following descriptions: ■■ INTAKE ■■ SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING ■■ FILTER LOCAL SOURCES ■■ INCIDENT MONITORING ■■ CIVIL SERVANTS MONITORING ■■ CROWD MANAGEMENT ■■ LISTING MISSING PEOPLE OR CASUALTIES ■■ SEEK CONNECT HELP
  28. 28. 29 Image Source: CC license by http://www.flickr.com/photos/quinnanya INTAKE People are accustomed to use social me- dia to communicate with each other and to contact and interact with organisations. Also they use it for reporting crime, crime tips or other relevant information. Therefore, LEAs use social media channels such as apps or Twitter (DMs) to have peo- ple submit information about incidents or crimes.
  29. 29. 30 Intake is most often done through websites, sometimes on a national level in the Netherlands. àà http://www.politie.nl Individual UK forces, e.g. the Metropolitan Police, also use online crime reporting. àà https://online.met.police.uk While not trusted by all forces, communication apps, e.g. WhatsApp, have been used for such purpose in the Netherlands, too. The forces also issue specific emergency apps: e.g. Alert- Cops (ES), Fress 112 (ES), Reporty (Isr) and other Police apps, such as the national Dutch police app. Use of WhatsApp for (non)emergency calls/reports in the Netherlands: àà https://www.politie.nl/nieuws/2016/maart/18/politie-zeeland-west- brabant-naast-0900-8844-ook-via-whatsapp-bereikbaar.html … and in India: àà http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/Jaipur-police-launch- WhatsApp-helpline-for-people/articleshow/51813427.cms Ushahidi, which translates to “testimony” in Swahili, was de- veloped to map reports of violence in Kenya after the post-elec- tion violence in 2008. àà https://www.ushahidi.com Dutch cities provide an application called Buiten Beter where residents report complaints to the municipality. Notifiers receive a message on how the complaint is dealt with. àà http://www.buitenbeter.nl àà http://www.rotterdam.nl/Clusters/BSD/Directie20Veiligheid/ Document202014/Veilig010ENG.pdf
  30. 30. 31 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/deltamike/567062831 LISTING MISSING PEOPLE OR CASUALTIES In crisis situations the whereabouts of peo- ple can be unknown. Therefore, LEAs use social media to list missing people or account for people.
  31. 31. 32 Social media websites offer people to post their whereabouts and look for people: ■■ Facebook Safety Check àà http://socialmediadna.nl/facebook-safety-check ■■ Google Person Finder àà http://socialmediadna.nl/google-person-finder ■■ The Netherlands Red Cross runs the site: ‘Ik ben veilig’ (I am safe) àà http://www.ikbenveilig.nl
  32. 32. 33 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/loozrboy/7311771718 SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING Social media provide a sense of what is go- ing on for public security planners (before, during, or after incidents for example). Therefore, LEAs monitor social media on various security topics.
  33. 33. 34 LEAs monitor social media for threats, incidents, rumours and other critical information. Monitoring is done at local, regional, national and international levels to improve situational awareness. See report: àà http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027/Social_Media_ Surveillance_and_Law_Enforcement.pdf Monitoring is done as an early warning mechanism, during incidents and for monitoring the effects of LEA actions. LEAs use (clusters of) keywords and/or geographic searches on open social media sources to understand what is happening and monitor them, as well as location- or event based threats. During events, LEAs use tools to analyse mood and senti- ments. The Police Service of Northern Ireland regularly moni- tors social media for large scale events. The PSNI use Hootsuite Insights, Facebook and Twitter. In the Netherlands, there is the Social Media Firework monitor: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/vuurwerk-monitoring-jacht-op-hinder LEAs also monitor social media memes that might become a threat on an ad hoc basis, such as Project X, FireChallenge, Planking, etc. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/category/memes-2 LEAs also monitor social media for death threats: àà http://www.doodsbedreiging.nl A special type of monitoring is INCIDENT MONITORING This practice is can be performed using real-time social me- dia monitoring and real-time contents. ■■ In the Netherlands, there is a Live Social Media Safety Mon- itor (wijkmonitor): àà http://socialmediadna.nl/vuurwerk-monitoring-jacht-op-hinder ■■ Live streaming video services, such as Periscope, also al- low for monitoring: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/periscope-impact-op-veiligheid The UK started an initiative to monitor social media for hate crime: àà https://t.co/D1FaurLO67 Monitoring is related to the following patterns: ■■ FILTER LOCAL SOURCES ■■ CIVIL SERVANTS MONITORING
  34. 34. 35 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/darkroomproductions/5410984464 FILTER LOCAL SOURCES In crisis situations, social media is used by local and remote people. In order to create situational awareness it is important to dis- tinguish between local and remote sources. Therefore, LEAs identify people posting from the ground or use algorithms that can identify this behaviour.
  35. 35. 36 A low-tech solution is to identify and list people who are known to post from the ground. Algorithms can help to identify and distinguish local sources from the overall social media conver- sation around a topic. Source: Learning from the Crowd: Col- laborative Filtering Techniques for Identifying On-the-Ground Twitterers during Mass Disruptions. Kate Starbird, Grace Muzny, Leysia Palen.
  36. 36. 37 Image Source: CC license by: https://www.flickr.com/photos/kecko/13984307012 INCIDENT MONITORING LEAs need to know the developments of an incident. Therefore, LEAs use social media to moni- tor ongoing incidents or events.
  37. 37. 38 LEAs are also creating hashtags for incidents as a way of chan- nelling information. Commercial offerings support incident monitoring ■■ Twitcident/PublicSonar àà http://publicsonar.com LEAs can create ‘dropboxes’ for incidents, such as LEEDIR or micromapping software, such as Ushahidi: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/leedir The Belgian Province of Walloon Brabant has sealed a partner- ship with VISOV, a French-speaking Virtual Operations Support Team #VOST, to provide them with support during a crisis in terms of: sorting and detection of relevant images, analysis of the general public’s crisis perception and behaviour, spatialisa- tion via geo-targeting and diffusion of official messages. àà http://www.visov.org
  38. 38. 39 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/thomashawk/61076493 CIVIL SERVANTS MONITORING Civil servants can use social media in ways that are illegal or do not follow policies. Therefore, LEAs monitor the social media activities of their own people.
  39. 39. 40 Police forces that run TARGETED ACCOUNTS are following and monitoring these accounts to check whether the content follows their policies and regulations. Websites such as Facebook Fired list people who got fired because of their social media postings (not only civil servants and not limited to professional accounts). àà http://www.thefacebookfired.com
  40. 40. 41 Image Source: CC licence by https://www.flickr.com/photos/amy_elizabeth_west/3876549126 CROWD MANAGEMENT Large events require organisers to manage crowds. Therefore, LEAs use social media to man- age crowds.
  41. 41. 42 Twitter is most often the medium of choice to manage crowds. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/social-media-for-social-order-crowd-control- bij-evenementen For many years, the Rotterdam police has been using social media during the Rotterdam Summer Carnival. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/zomer-carnaval-en-crowd-control Another Dutch event is Glazen Huis, where LEAs have been using social media for crowd control. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/glazen-huis-en-crowd-control Also city officials in Amsterdam use social media for crowd management. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/troonswisseling-veilig-door-feest Dutch TNO organisation reports on using social media to di- rect people. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/crowd-in-control There are also apps that measure crowd density based on social media and app usage. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/app-druktemeter There are apps supporting the kettling tactic. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/sukey The Police Service of Northern Ireland issue regular infor- mation, traffic advice and “get home safe” advice in relation to large events across their social media platforms. PSNI also is- sue relevant traffic advice while events are ongoing.
  42. 42. 43 Image Source: www.pexels.com SEEK CONNECT HELP In crisis situations there are people seeking resources and those who want to provide them. Therefore, LEAs use social media as a plat- form that connect seekers with people and organisations who can help with temporary housing, medical resources, etc.
  43. 43. 44 During the Haiti Earthquake 2010, Twitter became a tool for devdentralised coordination: ■■ In: Learning from on-the-ground medical twitterers during the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Aleksandra Sarcevic, Leysia Palen, Joanne White, Kate Starbird, Mossaab Bagdouri and Kenneth Anderson. During the 2016 Munich shooting, public transport was stopped and people from outside the city could not leave and needed a place to stay. Through Twitter, people offered their homes for temporary stays. There is a danger that such system can be abused by third parties who have other interests (terrorist seeking a place to hide).
  44. 44. 45 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/franziska/253254397 SOCIAL MEDIA FOUNDATION Social media adaptation requires a solid or- ganisational foundation. Therefore, LEAs prepare themselves by in- troducing social media strategy, infrastruc- ture, organisation, and education.
  45. 45. 46 Social media adaptation requires a set of practices and infra- structure that prepare the organisation and create an infrastruc- ture on which social media adaptation thrives. The following practice patterns provide details on this: ■■ SOCIAL MEDIA EDUCATION ■■ MAIN ACCOUNT ■■ SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY ■■ SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES ■■ MODERN IT INFRASTRUCTURE ■■ MOBILE DEVICES ■■ LOAD BALANCE ■■ SOCIAL INTRANET
  46. 46. 47 Image Source: www.pexels.com/photo/rear-view-of-man-working-in-office-256401/ SOCIAL MEDIA EDUCATION Using social media requires new knowl- edge and skills. Therefore, LEAs run trainings and have sim- ulated environments to make officers famil- iar with how to make best use of it.
  47. 47. 48 One way of training is the simulation of postings on social media by creating messages and contents that a LEA would post, e.g. for a TWEETATHON. This allows reviewing the created mes- sages in terms of content and style. Zurich police prepared their TWEETATHON in the same manner. Aside from internal training, there are Blab video conferences (search blab & police on Twitter): àà https://twitter.com/lawscomm/status/727519273938214912 The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) runs social media awareness and Hootsuite training for every social media user. Social media users only receive access to Hootsuite after the training is completed. At the time of writing, the PSNI Digital Hub were working with District Trainers to design and implement a refresher training package for established social media users. The Digital Hub also anticipate creating practice FB and Twitter pages for social media users to practice in during training ses- sions.
  48. 48. 49 Image Source: https://www.pexels.com/photo/lg-smartphone-instagram-social-media-35177/ MAIN ACCOUNT When using social media, the questions are not only how to create and organise social media accounts, but also how to develop a wide reach for the accounts. Therefore, LEAs set up one main account per social network for an organisation in- stead of departmental accounts.
  49. 49. 50 Setting up one main account per social network for an organisa- tion instead of departmental accounts allows building a shared follower base. Departmental accounts (e.g. for recruiting) often lack followers and therefore have a limited reach. Main accounts are then used as the central point of communication. As an exception, there are also forces that use two accounts, such as the Berlin police force that use an additional Twitter account for cases when it posts many messages of a special incident; this is, however, rare. Compare: àà https://twitter.com/PolizeiBerlin àà https://twitter.com/PolizeiBerlin_E To address specific local issues and create a more person- al social media presence, LEAs use a number of TARGETED ACCOUNTS.
  50. 50. 51 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/gabrielsaldana SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY Effective and efficient social media use re- quires goals and an action plan. Therefore, LEAs define a strategy that de- fines issues, goals, and action plans.
  51. 51. 52 Like any good strategy, a social media strategy should include the following aspects: ■■ Analysis of the status quo and identification of the issues to address with social media ■■ Describe goals that are “SMART” (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound) ■■ Policies and a concrete action plan of how to reach these goals While some forces define a strategy before they become ac- tive on social media, police forces at the forefront of adoption run experimental projects first, and derive strategy at a later stage. There are several social media police strategy documents, see Social Media DNA book Chapter 6 and Belgium (Gent): àà http://www.socialmediadna.nl/book àà http://www.slideshare.net/socialmediadna/sociale- mediastrategiepolitie Based on the strategy, it is possible to develop SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES.
  52. 52. 53 Image Source: PSNI SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES Social media usage must respect the legal framework of an organisation, it might re- quire official approval and is carried out by a larger group of people who might have different ideas of how to use it. Therefore, LEAs create social media pol- icies and guidelines that describe how to act on social media. Policies describe for example communication with citizens and legal aspects of investigations.
  53. 53. 54 The IACP Center for social media provides a guideline for policy making documents: àà http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/GettingStarted/PolicyDevelopment. aspx Model Policy developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP): àà http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Portals/1/documents/Social%20 Media%20Policy.pdf Guideline by NSW Police Force, Australia: àà http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/file/0010/261874/ Official_Use_of_Social_Media_Policy.pdf Not security specific EC guideline on social media policies: àà http://ec.europa.eu/ipg/docs/guidelines_social_media_en Belgian government policy: àà http://communicatie.vlaanderen.be/nlapps/docs/default.asp?fid=171 Tips: àà http://www.slideshare.net/socialmediadna/dos-and-donts-twitter àà http://www.slideshare.net/socialmediadna/twittertips201 àà http://www.slideshare.net/socialmediadna/twittertips202 àà http://www.slideshare.net/socialmediadna/twitterdosanddonts Dutch handbook for communication in crisis situations: àà http://www.ifv.nl/kennisplein/sociale-media/publicaties/handboek- communicatie-in-crisissituaties
  54. 54. 55 Image Source: Pixabay MODERN IT INFRASTRUCTURE Social media use often requires the integra- tion with existing LEA services, mobile com- puting, software and real-time information. Therefore, LEAs update their IT infrastruc- ture and toolbox to enable social media usage.
  55. 55. 56 German Bavarian Police are currently introducing SAP Hana, an in-memory database system. àà http://news.sap.com/germany/bayerische-polizei-nutzt-kunftig-sap- hana-als-plattform-fur-effektivere-polizeiarbeit The Guardia Civil in Spain implement a system named SIGO which has been developed by Accenture to provide for integrat- ed police info and operations management. àà https://www.accenture.com/t20160519T222108__w__/ie-en/_ acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/ PDF/Industries_9/Accenture-Interview-Antonio-Barragan-SIGO.pdf àà https://www.accenture.com/us-en/success-spanish-civil-guard- summary The infrastructure often enables the use of MOBILE DEVICES.
  56. 56. 57 Image Source: https://www.pexels.com/photo/apple-devices-cellphone-close-up-electronics-341523/ MOBILE DEVICES The use of social media during the day re- quires officers to have mobile Internet. Therefore, LEAs equip their officers with smartphones or tablets with mobile Internet access.
  57. 57. 58 Increasingly LEAs equip every officer with a mobile device. One concept is to make street cops effective on the street: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/meos The Guardia Civil in Spain, for example, has deployed 3,000 mobile units to allow officers to remotely access vital informa- tion at anytime. Some organisations hand out additional devices for social me- dia use. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) uses iPads and iPhones to post and engage on social media. PSNI officers and staff do not have access to social media on their common terminals or through their work issued Blackberry devices. Dis- tricts and Departments within PSNI have been responsible for purchasing devices for their own users. PSNI iPads are set up by PSNI ICS (Information Communication Systems) to prevent downloads of unapproved apps. Devices are also enrolled in Airwatch, a system which enables location, remote wiping and remote password reset. Recently, PSNI encountered an issue on non-compatibility of first and second generation devices with current apps resulting in the need to purchase new devices. Ide- ally PSNI would like to find a long term and cost efficient solution to replacing devices.
  58. 58. 59 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/atomictaco/7960716222 LOAD BALANCE In a crisis situation, the attention of the in- ternational public can easily exceed server capabilities of a local authority. Therefore, LEAs use social media channels as an extra communication infrastructure that can handle heavy server loads.
  59. 59. 60 During Christmas of 2010, the Avon and Somerset Constabulary had to deal with high peaks in demand because of the murder case of Joanna Yeates, who went missing and later was found dead. In that case, the public’s interest overwhelmed the rented infrastructure for the website making it inaccessible during peak times. The police therefore chose to use a set of social me- dia accounts to publish important information. YouTube served as the network to distribute CCTV footage and ask the public for information. The police also actively used Twitter and Face- book to communicate. After the first suspect turned out to be uninvolved, the police chose to publish a message on Twitter only after they had captured the second suspect and collected enough evidence to charge him with the murder. The carefully crafted tweet (“We have charged Vincent Tabak with the murder of Joanna Yeates #joyeates #yeates www.avonandsomerset.po- lice.uk jo”) went immediately viral and spread across the Inter- net. Using this set of social media accounts allowed the police to be the central voice and remain communicating even in cases when their own website was unreachable. (Source: COMPOSITE Project) In 2011, the Norwegian police used Flickr for image search in the Utoya case. Children on that Island could not get through to 112 and the only thing they could do was to use Twitter and oth- er means to express their need for help and provide information on the situation.
  60. 60. 61 Image Source: https://pixabay.com/ru/setevoi-rasem-svyas-487699/ SOCIAL INTRANET Social media offer the ability to im- prove internal knowledge exchange and communication. Therefore, LEAs introduce internal (enter- prise) social media solutions that help them share information/knowledge and collabo- rate internally.
  61. 61. 62 In the Netherland Politie+ (NL) is a social intranet based on an open source software platform. Others use commercial tool such as Yammer or BlueLine Grid (US). àà https://www.bluelinegrid.com For knowledge storage and sharing, LEAs also use internal police wikis.
  62. 62. 63 Image Source: CC license https://www.flickr.com/photos/bcemergencyphotos/6583466115 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS Social media can help solve crimes in var- ious ways. Therefore, LEAs make social media part of their investigation methods.
  63. 63. 64 We describe the various ways of supporting investigations in these related patterns: ■■ CROWDSOURCE CRIME TIPS ■■ REPORT CRIME ANONYMOUSLY ■■ HOUSE TO HOUSE ■■ ANALYSING SOCIAL MEDIA ■■ UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS ■■ SUBPOENA DATA
  64. 64. 65 Image Source: Pixabay UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS Investigations can require interacting with suspects in covert operations. Therefore, LEAs create fake online perso- na to impersonate people and befriend sus- pects under cover.
  65. 65. 66 This pattern requires a SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY that clarifies the legal aspects and procedures. The question of whom to im- personate and which photos and content to use needs to be answered within the legal framework. Usually, this requires a court order. During the 2011 UK riots police used Flickr for image search of offenders. See report: àà http://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2015-1027/Social_Media_ Surveillance_and_Law_Enforcement.pdf Example in ISIS Facebook case (jurisprudence for undercover operations in social media): àà http://socialmediadna.nl/politie-mag-middels-gefingeerde-accounts- rechercheren Dark Web FBI operation Silk Road and Silk Road 2.0 operation “Onymous”: àà https://www.wired.com/2015/01/silk-road-trial-undercover-dhs-fbi- trap-ross-ulbricht àà https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Onymous In DIY JUSTICE this is a common practice too: Anonymous and paedophile hunters: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/category/diydetectives Under cover operations in Facebook gangs: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/internet-banging Sometimes undercover operations are used as an INTELLI- GENCE gathering tool, prior to criminal investigations.
  66. 66. 67 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/kk/6863172432 CROWDSOURCE CRIME TIPS Bystanders and witnesses may have infor- mation that is relevant to crime investiga- tions or address security challenges. Therefore, LEAs use social media to ask the public for help, targeted or not.
  67. 67. 68 Equipped with smartphones, bystanders and witnesses may capture information that is relevant to crime investigations or address security challenges. LEAs use social media to ask the public for help, e.g. report of responsible officer (Boston Marathon Attack), identification of suspects (2011 UK riots), or create a special site to submit information (2016 Munich shooting). LEAs use police websites to ask citizens for their help in solv- ing cases (e.g. politie.nl in the Netherlands). The public can give tips or describe their understanding of the event (what the sce- nario was). People will be kept informed of new developments in the case. Another type of crowdsourcing crime tips is done by using the traditional media (TV) in conjunction with social media, like the second screen with the Dutch programme ‘Opsporing Verzocht’ (NL). Using social media for crime tips submission, is, however, not a practice that police forces encourage, as they do not want sensitive information to be submitted publicly or via corporate systems. The Police Service Nothern Ireland (PSNI) regularly is- sue appeals, updates on arrests and charges and crime preven- tion information on their social media channels. PSNI, however, do not accept reports of crime on their social media. The public are advised to contact police by phone to report crime. LEAs create podcasts to make crime cases public and ask citizens for help. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/podcast-serial-met-een-echte-moordzaak àà http://socialmediadna.nl/de-verslavende-werking-van-serial “Crowdsolve” is a platform designed to help solve crimes: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/crowdsolve LEAs use Pinterest to share wanted people lists: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/pinterest In the UK, an online portal, enabling police and communities to work together towards reducing crime, is provided through the Facewatch ID app. The police post images of the individuals they are seeking to identify. The individuals pictured are being sought as both persons of interest and witnesses to crimes. àà https://facewatchid.info The Dutch Burgernet provides a mobile service where peo- ple can register to receive police messages asking to be on the lookout. Burgernet is a national NL initiative; a cooperation between police, municipalities, and citizens. Participants of Burgernet (citizens that joined Burgernet as a member) receive a voice or text message with the request to look for a person or vehicle in their area. àà http://www.burgernet.nl àà http://socialmediadna.nl/burgernet The Spanish National Police official webpage has a section for citizen collaboration, to report allegedly criminal facts. This report is not equivalent to a formal report, and is confidential. àà http://www.policia.es/colabora.php
  68. 68. 69 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/nolagirl1969/12147810455 HOUSE TO HOUSE When doing house-to-house calls, most people are not home, and it takes a lot of effort. Therefore, LEAs perform house-to-house enquiries using social media.
  69. 69. 70 Sometimes people are already organised in a social media group such as Facebook or WhatsApp, but also they use other means to reach a local community, for example through cell broadcasted SMS or a police app where citizens have registered using their postal code. Email lists are also commonly used to reach out to local com- munities, and some Twittercops use lists of local community members to reach out to. Examples: ■■ From SMS bomb to Police app: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/digitaal-buurtonderzoek-van-sms-bom-tot- politie-app ■■ Whatsapp: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/whatsapp-buurtwacht ■■ Study on possibilities of implementing digital house to house (Dutch only): àà http://socialmediadna.nl/cocreatie-2-0/ ■■ “Digitaal buurtonderzoek” àà https://www.politieacademie.nl/onderwijs/overdescholen/ spl/opsporingscafes/opsporingscommunicatie/Paginas/ Opsporingscommunicatie.aspx
  70. 70. 71 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/carbonnyc/3209823136 REPORT CRIME ANONYMOUSLY Witnesses and victims might not want to be identified when reporting crimes. Therefore, LEAs offer channels or tools to report crimes anonymously.
  71. 71. 72 In the UK, there is the CrimeStoppers initiative: àà https://crimestoppers-uk.org In the Netherlands, there is MeldMisdaadAnoniem: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/bambuser àà http://socialmediadna.nl/m
  72. 72. 73 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/danielaguilar/2968034304 ANALYSING SOCIAL MEDIA Information on social media can help solve crimes. Therefore, LEAs monitor and analyse data on social media that is relevant for crime cases.
  73. 73. 74 Note: This practice is similar to MONITORING and SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYTICS, but in this case specific in the scope of a crime case. Possible uses are: ■■ Gathering of (digital forensic) evidence ■■ Finding perpetrators ■■ Finding acts of criminal offenses ■■ Profiling by using data of social media sources ■■ Social Network analysis (SNA) iRN, the internet Recherche or Research Network used open source tools investigations (other tools are available as well, but are mostly classified), see: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/irn-internet-research-netwerk Reference to usage figures: àà https://www.lexisnexis.com/risk/downloads/whitepaper/2014-social- media-use-in-law-enforcement.pdf Analysis is also done for non-criminal purposes. The city of Lausanne, in partnership with Addiction Suisse and the Idiap Research Institute, has developed a project of data mining in “Foursquare” to study the behaviour of people at night, to bet- ter target awareness actions, including the work of night corre- spondents, and to document the use of Lausanne night weekend nights. àà http://www.addictionsuisse.ch/recherche-scientifique/youthnight
  74. 74. 75 Image Source: EFF SUBPOENA DATA Sometimes it is necessary for law enforce- ment to gain access to private information stored on social networks. Therefore, following court orders, LEAs can request data from social network providers.
  75. 75. 76 This practice becomes visible in transparency reports from Ap- ple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/transparancy-reports
  76. 76. 77 Image Source: CC license by: https://www.flickr.com/photos/codeforamerica/25355387251 ENGAGEMENT & COMMUNICATION Social media offer the possibility to directly communicate with citizen bi-directionally. Therefore, LEAs use various ways of com- municating and directly engaging with citizens.
  77. 77. 78 Engagement and Communication is typically done via: ■■ WEBCARE ■■ RECRUITMENT ■■ COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ■■ INFORMING CITIZENS
  78. 78. 79 Image Source: Politie Eenheid Rotterdam INFORMING CITIZENS LEAs need to inform citizens. Therefore, LEAs use social media to spread information to citizens directly through so- cial media.
  79. 79. 80 Many police forces provide regular information to the public through their local and corporate social media channels about crime, policing successes, daily policing experiences, human experiences and local events. Informing citizens is detailed in the following patterns: ■■ TWEETATHON ■■ HUMAN SIDE STORIES ■■ CRIME MAPPING ■■ FACEBOOK ADS ■■ PREVENTION ■■ EDUCATING CITIZENS ■■ ANSWERING CITIZENS ■■ ALERT TOOL ■■ CROWDSOURCE CRIME TIPS
  80. 80. 81 Image Source: Hanover Police HUMAN SIDE STORIES Normally news media report different on law enforcement activities. LEAs would like to tell their own story. This can stimulate the (in)formal relation between citizens and your organisation and make it more humane. Therefore, LEAs communicate the human side of daily experiences and share a more personal picture of their work.
  81. 81. 82 Examples include behind-the-scenes photos, related aspects (e.g. stories of police dogs). Post human side stories on Facebook and Twitter: e.g. “Police officers in Rome cook dinner for an elderly couple”: àà https://www.facebook.com/questuradiroma/posts/1014697258638294 Copblogs: In blogs police officers tell stories about their daily work and how it effects them. These blogs show the person behind the police officer: ‘Politieverhalen’. Police stories on Youtube: àà https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLnk0uCZqeOMmUnZn6- Y4Nrt5SBS4yQaF6 PSNI Instagram highlights local radio presenters spending time with police: àà https://www.instagram.com/p/BJ0EiAsDkzF/?tagged=psni PSNI instagram highlights partnership work at a public event: àà https://www.instagram.com/p/BJ-Ll7ljqxU/?tagged=psni PSNI share human interest, behind the scenes and daily po- licing stories on an ongoing basis across all their social media channels.
  82. 82. 83 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/manel/15911277781 PREVENTION Spreading preventive information can im- prove public security. Therefore, LEAs use social media to share information to explain citizens how to in- crease their safety.
  83. 83. 84 YouTube prevention information, such as Modus operandi for burglaries: àà https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ubH8oViMFFk Get Home Safe Advice by the Police Service of Northern Ire- land àà https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ij6u5-pkU_E Dutch examples: ■■ Twitter and Facebook theme pages, such as the one on Human trafficking: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/mensenhandel àà http://kenjevrienden.nu àà http://www.digibewust.nl àà https://www.digivaardigdigiveilig.nl àà http://mijnkindonline.nl àà http://www.aardigdigivaardig.nl àà http://www.digitaalpesten.nl àà http://www.kennisnet.nl/themas/mediawijsheid/dont-worry-be- whatshappy Videos by the Zurich Police: àà https://www.facebook.com/StadtpolizeiZH/videos
  84. 84. 85 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/moonlightbulb/6936492978 CRIME MAPPING Seeing physical locations of crimes can help to understand safety issues. Therefore, LEAs provide digital maps and share these on social media to point to crimes.
  85. 85. 86 The website of the UK Police provides information on crime map- ping throughout the UK. àà www.police.uk Berlin police posts map of pick pocketing. àà https://www.facebook.com/PolizeiBerlin/posts/565257776991664 The RedZone map helps people to get around the city in a safe way, by preventing red zones where crime is happening most frequently. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/redzone-map Maps also communicate results of predictive policing maps such as the Kapo Aargau app (Switzerland). àà http://socialmediadna.nl/kapo-aargau
  86. 86. 87 Image Source: www.pexels.com/photo/2-soldier-with-guns-on-grey-pile-of-rocks-holding-smoke-stick-during-daytime-163489 ALERT TOOL In various cases, there is information that is time critical for citizens. Therefore, LEAs use tools to inform citi- zens about time critical information. This allows to inform citizens fast, even when there is no or only a slow response by pub- lic security organisations. It also allows to overcome linguistic problems and is availa- ble for citizens with disabilities.
  87. 87. 88 Amber Alert: Facebook Amber Alert àà http://socialmediadna.nl/amber-alert-op-facebook Burgernet is a plattform for Dutch citizens: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/burgernet Ads on Facebook to warn tourists for white drugs: àà http://www.socialmediadna.org/ads Weather alert: The official Twitter of the Cabinet of emergen- cy communication and security of the Valencian Community offers information and useful advice to face the problems of a climatic event: àà http://www.abc.es/espana/comunidad-valenciana/abci- cuatro-pequenos-incendios-alicante-y-valencia-jornada-calor- sofocante-201607311759_noticia.html àà http://www.europapress.es/comunitat-valenciana/noticia-lluvias- dejan-cerca-30-litros-metro-cuadrado-cortes-pallas-20160810133001. html Example after 2016 Munich shooting: àà https://twitter.com/PolizeiMuenchen/status/756535565223354370 (Text reads: +++ATTENTION+++ Avoid the area around the #OEZ [A shopping mall]. Stay in your apartments. Leave the streets!+++) The South Eastern Europe Disaster Risk Mitigation and Ad- aptation Programme (SEEDRMAP) was used for alerting during natural disasters in South Eastern Europe.
  88. 88. 89 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/belsim/4943227066 ANSWERING CITIZENS Citizens have questions for law enforce- ment agencies but typically do not ask, be- cause it is difficult to do so. Therefore, LEAs answer citizen’s questions in special (mostly chat) sessions and pro- vide answers to frequently asked questions online or through an app.
  89. 89. 90 Ask the Police (UK): Website and app information resource con- tain answers to a wide variety of the general public’s most fre- quently asked policing questions. “The website provides links to relevant national organisations plus the facility to rate the answer and email a specific question directly which will be an- swered within 24 working hours. Police forces are able to in- put additional local police information and advice for the ben- efit of their communities.” (Source: https://www.askthe.police.uk/ content/@1.htm). The Vraagdepolitie.nl website in the Netherlands includes cha- trooms and almost weekly theme sessions on certain crime types. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) run Twitter hours where the public can ask questions and seek advice from police. The most regular Twitter hour is with the Chief Constable @ChiefConPSNI, using the hashtag #AskChiefCon. These are run twice a year. Other command teams at District Level also run their own Twitter hours. The Belgian @CrisisCenterBE was replying to citizens during the Brussels bombing and at the same time would use Twitter and Facebook to spread valuable information for 2-4 weeks af- ter the attacks.
  90. 90. 91 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/thinkpublic/2900912993 EDUCATING CITIZENS People do not know the risks of social me- dia for their safety. Therefore, LEAs offer education, particu- larly to children and parents to use the in- ternet in a responsible way.
  91. 91. 92 The Spanish National Police and Google cooperate to offer talks to schoolchildren about the opportunities, risks and tools that the Internet presents in order to use it in a responsible way. Iden- tify theft and harassment are the most frequent cyber crimes suffered by teenagers. ■■ McGruff The Crime Dog is aimed at educating children: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/mcgruff ■■ Kash Dash: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/kash-dash ■■ Eye witness game: Hero or Zero: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/kroongetuige-game-hero-of-zero ■■ Tumnpas Terrorism Game trains you to detect deviant be- haviour: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/tumpas-teroris-game ■■ App Most Wanted helps you to train yourself to recognize faces: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/most-wanted As part of his many activities in the field, Thomas Gabriel Rüdiger of the Police Academy Brandenburg runs seminars in German schools on cyber GROOMING. The Valencia Local Police, in their task to protect the citizens, disseminate information about the risks resulting from an irre- sponsible use of the Internet and the social media through talks in the schools of Valencia. àà http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/2720930/0/tribunal-supremo-redes- sociales-escenario-inimaginable-abusos-sexuales-menores àà http://www.europapress.es/navarra/noticia-detenida-menor-difundir- redes-sociales-fotos-companera-semides-20160505104429.html The Police Service of Northern Ireland share information about internet and online safety on an ongoing basis across their social media channels. àà https://www.facebook.com/PSNI.Newry.Mourne In the City of Limoges, the local security and prevention of crime strategy includes actions to educate students about the danger of using social media and internet in general. In the City of Montreuil, the local security and prevention of crime strategy includes crime prevention among youth exposed to delinquency and violence, through a professional network to develop activities to educate about use of internet and inform about its consequences. The city of Blois, describes how young people are unaware of these risks by digital technology and internet practices most often unknown by parents. To raise awareness of the use of social media by young people, the city of Blois have developed a project to educate young people through the theatre.
  92. 92. 93 Image Source: license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/extranoise/125981126 FACEBOOK ADS In special cases LEAs need to interact with selected audiences. Therefore, LEAs use Facebook advertising to reach specific target audiences.
  93. 93. 94 This has been used by Dutch police forces to specifically ad- dress defined target groups. àà http://www.socialmediadna.org/ads
  94. 94. 95 Image Source: Sebastian Denef TWEETATHON Citizens have little insight into what govern- ment organisations are doing. Therefore, LEAs, for a defined time peri- od (usually 24 hours), post many updates about what they are doing on Twitter (that they typically would not report).
  95. 95. 96 This can also be used to draw attention to a specific topic (e.g. reporting on a certain type of theft). Typically, organisations post several hundred messages in this time period and run a press campaign. This also helps to promote novel social media channels. A SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY is very helpful. This has been done by e.g. the Manchester Police Force, Zurich Police Force, Berlin Police Force, PSNI There is also a global initiative: àà http://poltwt.net àà http://lawscommunications.com/category/global-police-tweet-a-thon
  96. 96. 97 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/robert_voors BEING PREPARED Crisis situations require LEAs to inform cit- izens promptly. Therefore, LEAs prepare for crises situa- tions by developing message templates they can use in crises situations.
  97. 97. 98 The city police in Zurich have prepared for sending messages in multiple languages in order to inform citizens and visitors of the city in case of an emergency situation. Police forces use the 2011 riots in Manchester and the 2016 shooting in Munich as examples of the messages they need to share in times of crisis. Before the 2011 riots, the police in Manchester had prepared contents that could be posted in case of backfires on social media.
  98. 98. 99 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/98323393@N08/13763095773 COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT For community organisers, it is important to build close and personal relationships with certain stakeholders and citizens. Therefore, LEAs use social media on a lo- cal or personal level (e.g. per district) and in combination with physical meetings, al- lowing officers to directly connect with the local community and local partners.
  99. 99. 100 One initiative is called CoffeeCop or Coffee with a Cop: àà http://coffeewithacop.com PopUp Police Station: pop-up police station in a mall, or some- where on the street: e.g. “local policeman Wilco Berenschot has office hours on the street in Rotterdam, tweets abundantly and skypes with citizens”. The following newspaper article shows how this is not suc- cessful in the UK: àà http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/new-pop-up-police-stations- fallen-3130329 Mobile Media Lab (NL): The Mobile Media Lab (mobile by us- ing a truck) is used to investigate the thoughts and experiences of citizens about the various means of communication which the police use. Think of the website politie.nl, Police app, folders or social media accounts (Facebook and Twitter). àà https://www.politie.nl/themas/mobile-media-lab.html E.g. Greater Manchester Police: àà http://www.gmp.police.uk/content/WebsitePages/6C386353FE565CCF 80257B48004ABAF5?OpenDocument Zurich police department has two community police officers who spend 50% of their time online and run personal accounts. àà http://www.persoenlich.com/prcorporate-communication/unsere- naivitat-und-kreativitat-sind-teil-des-erfolgs Nextdoor (US): àà https://nextdoor.com/agency PSNI use local Facebook and Twitter accounts to actively en- gage with local communities and and provide direct to audience accounts of daily policing. Eg: àà https://www.facebook.com/PSNI.Down àà https://www.facebook.com/PSNI.FoyleThe City of Rotterdam developed an application called Buurt Bestuurt to inform and involve residents in finding solutions for security problems of the neighbourhood. Residents can also use the app to send their suggestions, messages to the committee and also for NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH. àà http://www.buurtbestuurt.nl Safetipin is a very new free map-based mobile phone appli- cation, developed in Delhi, which collects and shares safety-re- lated information posted by users. It builds on the premise that community participation and engagement will make our cities safer. Safetipin is available globally and automatically provides a local map to smartphones using GPS. àà http://safetipin.com/about/whatIsSafetipin Talk London has been created by city hall as a place to dis- cuss London’s big issues. The city looks for public opinions to help steer the big policy decisions of the future: on housing, the environment, transport, safety, jobs and the economy. àà http://talklondon.london.gov.uk/topics/safety-0 The city of Paris has launched a platform to associate Par- is residents in major decisions concerning the development of their city including security. àà https://idee.paris.fr/co-construisons-paris This practice requires the creation of TARGETED ACCOUNTS. There are several countries in which this practice has not (yet) been introduced, as it is uncommon for officers to post publicly, if they are not press officers.
  100. 100. 101 Image Source: Pixabay TARGET GROUP ENGAGEMENT Sometimes LEAs need to interact with a special target group. Therefore, LEAs use social media and spe- cial applications to interact with groups like students or refugees.
  101. 101. 102 Informing refugees: Refugees need information and guidelines during their movement routes and settlement procedure for their own and overall public safety. Mercy Corps, in partnership with Google, The International Rescue Committee and other organisations, developed, a multilingual website for refugees moving through Europe. The website includes all relevant infor- mation and is the default landing web page on Wi-Fi hotspots in refugee camps. It uses current information and the geolocation of the person to provide relevant information. The site provides information about common milestones on the route, including registration and asylum processes, emergency contacts, cur- rency details and where to find water, lodging, medical care and other local services. The website is the first thing people see when they connect to the Wi-Fi hotspots many partners host throughout the region. It can detect the location of the person accessing the site, and it is updated daily to reflect constant shifts in conditions and laws, like restrictions on movements and refugee camp closures. àà https://refugeeinfo.eu StudentAlert: During the introduction week for new students in Groningen, the Netherlands (KEI-week) in 2016, the Dutch po- lice set up a WhatsApp number (StudentAlert) to provide the students during this period with information on security issues that are important to them. àà https://www.politie.nl/nieuws/2016/augustus/15/veilige-kei-week- whatsapp-met-de-politie.html Beach Alert: WhatsApp number for people that go to the beach and want to be informed or engage with police through WhatsApp. Pokemon Go neighbourhood watch: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/pokemon-go àà https://twitter.com/FrankSmilda/status/763786561267924993 Vraaghetdepolitie.nl is a website and YouTube channel specifi- cally aimed at youth. Well known vloggers (video bloggers) help launch the website on “Vloggers vragenvuur”: àà https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLHPZxlXruRwKCaoEm5HyTI 5XjWNU22zmn
  102. 102. 103 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/blondinrikard/14871682502 TARGETED ACCOUNTS Personal interaction requires a smaller community of people to address. Therefore, LEAs set up local accounts or specific channels/platforms to address a smaller community. Often, these accounts are related to a district of a city or a specif- ic group of people (e.g. students).
  103. 103. 104 The Greater Manchester Police has been an early adopter of using local accounts. You can find the list of their accounts here: àà http://www.gmp.police.uk/content/WebsitePages/6C386353FE565CCF 80257B48004ABAF5?OpenDocument In the Netherlands, there are these categories of accounts: ■■ Neighbourhood accounts: Twitter, Facebook, YouTube or Instagram. ■■ Twitcop accounts: from just one neighbourhood “twitcop” to 2000+ accounts per local unit. Research on community/ neighbourhood officers using Twitter can also be found in the MEDIA4SEC deliverables D1.2. àà http://wijkagent.twittergids.nl àà http://socialmediadna.nl/twittercops ■■ Theme accounts (on themes such as burglaries, etc). Those are just police accounts. ■■ Public prosecution also has accounts per region, some- times a public prosecutor has a personal account and there are some theme accounts (as for human trafficking): àà http://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/download/sSWg08So9wKUBBpKO WwnQ6j3qozOzl5OTlwwOLJt/bOLYjnTTlb5SOTe84hf5fwqCVLC49UyK dNnHfOI9 (Page 65) ■■ Account for special purposes: e.g. Twitter accounts of po- lice helicopters allow communication with people with aim to reduce complaints about the noise. Police forces in the UK and the U.S. also have special accounts, such as for a K9 unit. Sometimes police animals even have social media accounts to improve the image of the police. àà https://twitter.com/DePolitieheli àà https://twitter.com/PSNIAirSupport àà https://twitter.com/PolitiehondRdam àà https://twitter.com/pdteal Police Service of Northern Ireland have 32 Facebook accounts which include accounts for 30 local policing areas, a Roads Po- licing account and a corporate PSNI Facebook account. There are 35 Twitter accounts which include accounts for 30 local policing areas, a corporate account, a Roads Policing account, an Air Support account and accounts for the Chief Constable and one of the Assistant Chief Constables. Initially Facebook accounts for each of the areas were set up as pages and ‘ghost’ Facebook profiles that enabled users to post to pages, however, an issue was identified when the PSNI could not discern which user was posting to the page. Facebook also actively seek out ghost profiles and delete them, meaning that access to the pages was constantly at risk. This led to the introduction of social media management tool, Hootsuite. Hoot- suite allows PSNI social media to be managed centrally. PSNI officers and staff have no access to social media through their common terminals so can only use their PSNI-issued mobile de- vices (iPads or iPhones). Social media is not accessible to users through their work mobile phones (Blackberrys) and they are not allowed to use their personal devices. Hootsuite is available as an app and in a desktop version. The two versions feature different functions so PSNI social media users have to switch be- tween the applications to get full functionality. Complaints from officers who previously had access to the native FB and Twitter apps are frequent. PSNI conducted a survey on Facebook and Twitter last year to ask the public in Northern Ireland what they wanted from PSNI social media. The majority of people surveyed indicated that they preferred a local police social media presence which pro- vided local information about crime and police activities in the area they lived in. Local police officers and staff are trained to post on their local social media sites, ensuring that the commu- nity are engaging with their local police. The Zurich city police has introduced two social media cops in 2016, the first German-posting online community policing cops: àà https://www.facebook.com/eli.stapo àà https://www.facebook.com/stapojean
  104. 104. 105 Image Source: Sebastian Denef / Boudewijn Mayeur ONLINE PATROL Citizens spend more and more of their time in various online spaces. Therefore, LEAs understand social media as a public space in which they need to pa- trol to have visible presences that ensure that the online space is not free of laws.
  105. 105. 106 Boudewijn Mayeur of the Politie Limburg-Zuid in the Netherlands has been running a virtual police station in Habbo Hotel, a social game network, frequented by children. Finnish police forces were one of the first to have police forc- es that are dedicated to patrol the online space. The Zurich police force, starting in 2016, has two officers who spend 50% of their time in online networks. This practice is emerging and is not yet widely practiced by police forces yet.
  106. 106. 107 Image Source: Flickr PUBLIC VOTING LEAs need to focus their resources in ac- cordance with needs of local communities. Therefore, LEAs initiate polls on social media to let citizens take part in deci- sion-making processes. This helps to gath- er citizens’ ideas, influence authorities, and refine strategies.
  107. 107. 108 Dutch Police launch a campaign “You Ask, We’ll Drive” to let cit- izens indicate their suggestions via text or plotting pins on a streetmap: àà https://www.facebook.com/PolitieStichtseVecht/ posts/1028409320627567 Dutch Police collaborate with neighbourhoods and ask them in a Twitter poll to mark places where drivers should be checked for speed: àà http://www.telstar-online.nl/nieuws/actueel/82865/politie-pakt- samen-met-buurt-hardrijders-aan Liverpool police start catching speeding drivers in areas that citizens indicated in a Twitter poll: àà http://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/police-looking- catch-speeding-drivers-12910986
  108. 108. 109 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/danielthornton/8618932799 ORGANISE VOLUNTEERING Places and properties affected by the pub- lic disorder caused by riots need cleaning, recovery, and restoration. Therefore, LEAs use social media to organ- ise volunteers in to help clean help and to make contributions to public safety.
  109. 109. 110 UK Riots 2011: Campaign supported by over 60,000 people with #RiotCleanup becoming one of the most popular hashtags on Twitter during the days of the riots plus crowdfunding & char- ity campaigns: àà http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S0740624X14000847/pdfft?md5=2b47f21b4f212237972407b0d30703e 2&pid=1-s2.0-S0740624X14000847-main.pdf Cleanup for the 2013 floods in Germany: àà http://www.flurfunk-dresden.de/2013/06/22/hochwasser-2013-und- die-sozialen-medien-was-bleibt Project CleanX project (similar to London and Vancouver): àà http://socialmediadna.nl/reconstructie-2-2 Vancouver CleanUp project after the riots: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/vancouver-riots
  110. 110. 111 Image Source: CC License NYPD RECRUITMENT Public security organisations need to at- tract young talent. Therefore, LEAs use social media to reach and attract young applicants.
  111. 111. 112 Recruitment can be very effective with a comprehensive SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY and part of normal social com- munications. German police forces report how communication, not even related to recruitment, helps making people aware of the police and recognize them as a modern organisation. Even though the German police force was critized for this un- usual rap video, it helped recruitment: àà https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F3Doswuy_xQ a second version: àà https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htTVAXMQYoE #Crimediggers: As part of a recruitment campaign to recruit digital detectives, the Dutch police built an online challenge. Through the “Crime Diggers” challenge, participants can get ac- quainted with both digital and financial investigations: àà https://www.crimediggers.nl In Northern Ireland PSNI also actively advertise job vacancies for all positions within PSNI on social media. àà https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IpJS5RgnWBo àà https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9rmkUoGTSPE
  112. 112. 113 Image Source: www.pexels.com/photo/internet-screen-security-protection-60504/ WEBCARE Given the influence that social media have on public safety, it is important to take care of the state of social media in terms of pub- lic safety and to react on remarks and com- plaints of citizens. Therefore, LEAs set up a special team to monitor social media to provide service to citizens and influence the online space (and sentiment).
  113. 113. 114 Related Patterns: ■■ REFUTE RUMOURS ■■ REASSURANCE The city of The Hague uses information posted about city issues on social media to understand and resolve these issues. They worked with people who had been involved in WEBCARE at airline companies. This is was has used in controversial ways, where LEAs, to- gether with volunteer citizens, generate online narrative themes related to a transnational protest in order to frame or silence oppositional claims of protest activists and police collective ac- tions. ■■ The 2010 Seoul G20 Summit: When Big Brother Uses Twit- ter, Too: Productive Forms of Policing and the Role of Media in the Seoul G20 Protests in South Korea Lee, K.,2015 àà http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cccr.12087/pdf
  114. 114. 115 Image Source: CC license https://www.flickr.com/photos/foilman REFUTE RUMOURS On social media, especially in crisis situa- tions, rumors spread easily. Therefore, LEAs use social media to refute rumors, as they have a strong voice in so- cial media that others refer to as a trusted source.
  115. 115. 116 During the UK Riots in 2011 a large part of the communication has been to refute rumours. ■■ In: Sebastian Denef, Petra Saskia Bayerl, and Nico Kaptein (2013): Social Media and the Police—Tweeting Practices of British Police Forces during the August 2011 Riots. In Pro- ceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (Paris, France, April 27–May 2, 2013). CHI’13. New York, NY: ACM Press. Boston Marathon: Looking for the wrong persons. See: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/category/cases/boston-bombings and specifically: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/boston-bombings-burgeropsporing-en- zelfcorrigerend-vermogen Shooting Munich 2016: Police clarified several misleading and wrong information about additional attacks. A rumour annotation tool with tweets, developed for the Fer- guson, Missouri, U.S. unrest in August 2014, enabling annota- tors to read through the tweets and annotate them as being rumours or norumours. ■■ In: Best practice referred in academic literature : ‘Zubia- ga, A., Liakata, M., Procter, R., Bontcheva, K. & Tolmie, P., 2015-Towards detecting rumors in social media’ Hoaxmap (Germany): àà http://socialmediadna.nl/hoaxmap Social Media Verification handbook àà https://www.slideshare.net/socialmediadna/verification-handbook FEMA rumour control center: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/hoax The West Midlands Police Force use social media, primarily Twitter, to counter rumours. They for instance tweeted officers standing outside the station to fight a rumour of an attack on their police station. ■■ In: Bartlett J., Miller C. (2013), @metpoliceuk How Twitter is changing modern policing the case of the Woolwich After- math. London: Demos.
  116. 116. 117 Image Source: CC license https://www.flickr.com/photos/phantomfies/4660024771 REPUTATION MANAGEMENT Trust and credibility are key to the work of law enforcement agencies. Therefore, LEAs use social media to influ- ence and manage the reputation of their organisation.
  117. 117. 118 Reputation management is often done using HUMAN SIDE STORIES and part of WEBCARE. Young Ukrainian female police stirs social media: àà http://europe.newsweek.com/young-kiev-police-recruits-cause-stir- social-media-330060 Police in Iceland (and around the world) use cute and funny moves on social media: àà http://www.adweek.com/adfreak/icelands-police-have-one-worlds- cutest-instagrams-160284 The Shake It Off Cop: àà https://twitter.com/ShakeItOffCop àà https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XFBUM8dMqw There are also cases, where reputation management does not work as planned and brings up citizen criticism. “My NYPD” campaign: àà http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27126041
  118. 118. 119 Image Source: CC0 freegreatpicture.com REASSURANCE In the event of crisis, people might worry about the situation. Therefore, LEAs use social media to com- municate actions that have been taken to restore public safety and respond to social media sentiments.
  119. 119. 120 UK Riots 2011: A large part of the communication was aimed at providing reassurance. ■■ In: Sebastian Denef, Petra Saskia Bayerl, and Nico Kaptein (2013): Social Media and the Police—Tweeting Practices of British Police Forces during the August 2011 Riots. In Pro- ceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (Paris, France, April 27–May 2, 2013). CHI’13. New York, NY: ACM Press. Munich Shooting 2016: The police used Twitter to clarify the situation and reassure citizens: àà https://twitter.com/polizeimuenchen
  120. 120. 121 Image Source: CC license by: https://www.flickr.com/photos/ter-burg/17315216959 CITIZENS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA Social media provide various ways of em- powering citizens. Therefore, citizens use social media to ad- dress issues of their concern.
  121. 121. 122 Taking things into their own hands, citizens use social media to address public security issues. The following pattern list de- scribes a number of practices: ■■ ORGANISE PROTESTS ■■ DIY JUSTICE ■■ DIY CITIZEN JOURNALISM ■■ DIY ACCOUNTS ■■ DIY INTELLIGENCE ■■ DIY WATCH DOG ■■ DIY INVESTIGATION ■■ NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH
  122. 122. 123 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/cesarastudillo/267809308 ORGANISE PROTESTS Citizens may oppose actions of govern- ment or issues in society. Therefore, citizens use social media to or- ganise protests or mass gatherings.
  123. 123. 124 Hashtags have become a simple yet effective tool in organising protest groups. Public Facebook pages allow “invitations to all” and thus have a wide reach. ■■ Project X àà http://socialmediadna.nl/analyse-2/ ■■ Harlem Shake àà http://socialmediadna.nl/harlem-shake-in-nederland As governments sometimes try to control social media, Fire- chat is used as a tool for ad-hoc local networks. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/firechat The BlackLivesMatter movement uses social media to protest against police violence: àà https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Lives_Matter During the Arabic Spring, social media was the core organiz- ing tool: àà https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring In Brazil, “Rolezinho” is a form of protest where black youth occupy malls`; àà http://socialmediadna.nl/rolezinho Following terrorist attacks in Paris, people organised the “Je Suis Charlie” movement: àà https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Je_suis_Charlie The “Platforme Citoyen” is a group of citizens formed to help with the inflow of refugees in Belgium. During 2015, they con- ducted two large marches which were organised through their Facebook groups. During the Hong Kong protests, the protesting crowds used Firechat, a peer-to-peer social media app to circumvent the gov- ernmental surveillance: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/firechat The Sukey app helps protesters to avoid police kettles: àà http://www.wired.co.uk/article/sukey-protest-app
  124. 124. 125 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/126919879@N03/14926645375 DIY JUSTICE Citizens offended by other citizens, com- panies or government activity and want to correct the wrong. Therefore, citizens respond through coordi- nated retaliation on digital media, including mobile devices and social media platforms.
  125. 125. 126 Vigilantism can include citizens playing judge and “naming and shaming” individuals, where users publish someone’s personal details on a public site. ■■ Examples: Vancouver Riots, ‘Kopschoppers’ incident the Netherlands Source: Research by Daniel Trottier There are several groups of paedophile hunters. Anonymous, the activist group, has conducted various online actions (doxing, trolling). Following shootings in the U.S., people began to publicly map gun owners. àà http://mediashift.org/2013/02/where-the-journal-news-went-wrong-in- mapping-gun-owners053 In Italy, a group of students started to create “Mafiamaps” to fight organised crime. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/mafiamaps Other examples of online groups using social media: ■■ Anonymous deatheaters: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/anonymous-deatheaters ■■ Dark Justice: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/dark-justice ■■ The Punisher Squad: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/the-punisher-squad ■■ The Internet Interceptors: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/the-internet-interceptors ■■ The Creep Catchers: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/creep-catchers
  126. 126. 127 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/esthervargasc/10948923353 DIY CITIZEN JOURNALISM Social media allow each individual to broad- cast and share a situation that otherwise nobody would report about. Therefore, citizens report news them- selves, e.g. by using live streaming video applications to create situational aware- ness for other citizens and for other gov- ernmental agencies.
  127. 127. 128 Several real-time social media are used to report on crimes as they unfold: ■■ Twitter has become a core medium for live reporting Example of a knife wielding man in New York City: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/knifeman-new-york ■■ Citizens also report with life streaming apps: Cameraad / NULive and real-time video platform Periscope and Vine (Example during Boston Bombings) àà http://socialmediadna.nl/periscope-impact-op-veiligheid àà http://socialmediadna.nl/vine ■■ Reddit was been frequently used to report on unfolding in- cidents: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/reddit Additionally, blogs are used to report about public safety is- sues. To inform citizens report, they use apps that scan police radio communication from around the world: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/app-police-scanners
  128. 128. 129 Image Source: https://static.pexels.com/photos/6518/man-person-hands-coffee.jpg DIY ACCOUNTS Authorities can be slow in adopting social media. Therefore, citizens provide security- relevant information to other citizens delete themselves.
  129. 129. 130 A number of forums allow citizens to help other citizens (sharing prevention tips, missing persons, caring for victims, discussing problems, etc.) via different forums, newsgroups, Facebook groups, etc. Others offer help for victims, such as the Dutch initiative: àà https://www.slachtofferhulp.nl Unofficial news of police and firefighters: àà https://de.nepoli.eu In the Netherlands, the P2000 network is used on various social media channels for incident reports, based on the official C2000 network for police, firemen and ambulance profession- als: àà http://www.p2000-online.net Citizens also use smartphone apps to inform of different re- al-time road incidents (e.g. Waze, Socialdrive). While these apps can be used to share useful information in a very immediate form, they also can create security breaches, according to some LEAs, and therefore are considered controversial. àà http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/rightsandfreedoms/a/DUI-Checkpoint- Apps.htm àà https://www.engadget.com/2015/01/26/police-see-waze-as-threat àà https://www.duidefensematters.com/resources/blog/using-waze-to- avoid-dui-checkpoints-you-probably-shouldn-t-here-s-why
  130. 130. 131 Image Source: https://static.pexels.com/photos/497295/pexels-photo-497295.jpeg DIY INTELLIGENCE Open data allows citizens to make sense of information for their own purposes. Therefore, citizens collect and store data, sometimes map it, and distribute and share it to make it useful for a specific context.
  131. 131. 132 Wikileaks collects data from leaks (e.g. Panama papers) Bellingcat collects intelligence and provides reports (e.g. Ukraine conflict vehicle tracking project) àà https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/2015/02/03/ukraine-conflict- vehicle-tracking-launch Politwoops shows deleted tweets from politicians and other government leaders: àà http://www.politwoops.eu iAWACS is a software that automatically analyses signals from social media: àà https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/07/10/ how-artificial-intelligence-could-help-warn-us-of-another-dallas Using CRIME MAPPING, mafia maps highlight crime areas: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/mafiamaps
  132. 132. 133 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/lourencoparente/8961453394 DIY WATCH DOG Authorities can act outside the law. Therefore, citizens use social media to watch und publicly share LEAs actions.
  133. 133. 134 There are several cases in which citizens act as a watchdog for the police: ■■ Copwatchers àà http://socialmediadna.nl/copwatchers ■■ HandsUp 4 Justice àà http://socialmediadna.nl/hands-up-4-justice ■■ LegalEqualizer àà http://socialmediadna.nl/legal-equalizer ■■ Five-O àà http://socialmediadna.nl/five-o ■■ Ferguson àà http://socialmediadna.nl/social-media-bemoeienis-in-ferguson
  134. 134. 135 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/text100/12177502223 DIY INVESTIGATION Authorities can be slow, limited, or unwill- ing to make investigations. Therefore, citizens use public sources to investigate and put together the pieces of information that is (publicly) available.
  135. 135. 136 Apps, such as “Self Evident” support DIY investigations. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/self-evident-app Bellingcat investigated the shooting down of flight Malaysian Airlines MH17 in the Ukraine. ■■ See report: àà https://www.bellingcat.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/53rd-report- public.pdf Web sleuth networks work on identifying corpses (e.g. the Doe Network). àà http://www.doenetwork.org Other work on searching the missing Malaysian Airlines air- plane using a microtask platform for satellite images: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/digital-humanitarians-modern-sherlocks- deel-2 Massive online and offline search of for the missing brothers Ruben and Julian: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/category/cases/rubenjulian A Netflix TV series, “Making a murderer”, investigated a mur- der case that had been closed many years before and sparked a public debat on the verdict. àà http://socialmediadna.nl/amateur-speurder-in-making-a-murderer
  136. 136. 137 Image Source: Twitter NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH Citizens might not feel safe or well-protect- ed in their neighbourhood. Therefore, citizens organise their own neighbourhood watch, supported by social media use, e.g. WhatsApp groups and spe- cific apps.
  137. 137. 138 In the Netherlands, neighbourhood watch groups use WhatsApp to organise themselves. In the U.S. and recently also in European Countries, Nextdoor is a private social network for neighborhood watch. àà https://nextdoor.com Pokemon Go is also used for neighbourhood watch: àà http://socialmediadna.nl/pokemon-go and àà https://twitter.com/FrankSmilda/status/763786561267924993
  138. 138. 139 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/ahmad_ridhwan/4897260561 CRIMINALS ADOPT SOCIAL MEDIA Social media can be used for various crim- inal activities. Therefore, criminals use social media be- fore, during, or after crimes.
  139. 139. 140 People adopt social media for criminal activities in many ways: ■■ PLANNING ■■ ILLEGAL MARKET PLACE ■■ GANG RECRUITMENT ■■ FACEBOOK THUGGING ■■ STALKING ■■ IDENTITY THEFT & FRAUD ■■ THREATENING & RANSOM ■■ REVENGE PORN ■■ PROPAGANDA ■■ GROOMING
  140. 140. 141 Image Source: CC License by https://www.flickr.com/photos/macrj/5430812027 CYBERBULLYING AND MOBBING In educational institutions, as well as at workplaces, cases of tensions between people are very common. Therefore, offenders can attack the dignity of the victim through intense forms of re- curring insults, harassment, and abuse on the social media.
  141. 141. 142 Cybermobbing can take two forms – either attacks on digital media become an exceeded form of physical insults, or the vic- tims are attacked because of their own publications in social media. The latter is based on the concept of digital narcissism, according to which people gain recognition and self-confidence through self-presentation in digital space. Some cases of cyberbullying were fatal for victims and gar- nered global attention: ■■ The Ryan Halligan Case: àà http://www.ryanpatrickhalligan.org ■■ The Megan Meier Case: àà https://www.meganmeierfoundation.org/megans-story.html ■■ The Amanda Todd Case: àà https://nobullying.com/amanda-todd-story As this problem is urgent in many countries, various associa- tions initiate projects to prevent cyberbullying and mobbing and protect users of all ages from aggressive behaviour and online attacks: àà http://endcyberbullying.net àà http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/index2.html àà http://reword.it
  142. 142. 143 Image Source: https://www.pexels.com/photo/adult-affection-close-up-couple-235966/ ROMANCE SCAM People are more likely to help with money those whom they trust. Dating platforms and social media are frequently used with this aim. Therefore, criminals can use a victim’s trust to make them transfer high amounts of money to perpetrators.
  143. 143. 144 Criminals set up special scenarios which require immediate ac- tion with the aim to receive money from victims. Thus, offenders can pretend to be seriously ill, apprehended or threatened. The procedures are essentially similar to cybergrooming pro- cesses with children. Cases of romance scams have occurred all over the world: àà https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/romance-scams àà http://www.dailyherald.com/news/20170505/how-a-suburban-man- fell-victim-to-online-romance-scam
  144. 144. 145 Image Source: CC license by https://www.flickr.com/photos/jrjamesarchive/9305591191 PLANNING Social media offers information to plan a crime, but also a platform to discuss the planning of a crime. Therefore, criminals use social media to plan attacks and crimes.

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