Oracle UCM Security: Challenges and Best PracticesBrian Huff
Information on how to "harden" your content server to make it less susceptible to security attacks. Covers risks, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures.
Patent Risk and Countermeasures Related to Open Management in Interaction DesignYosuke Sakai
2012 10th International Conference of Asia Digital Art and Design Association & 6th International Conference of Taiwan Association of Digital Media Design
Antivirus Evasion Techniques and Countermeasuressecurityxploded
This presentation throws light on innovative techniques for bypassing antivirus detection. This will be useful for researchers and pen testers to develop successful post exploitation techniques.
Skyjacking A Cisco Wlan Attack Analysis And CountermeasuresAirTight Networks
This presentation will deconstruct the skyjacking vulnerability - explaining why the vulnerability occurs in Cisco WLANs, which Cisco access points are affected, how skyjacking can be exploited to launch potent attacks, and what are the best practices to proactively protect your enterprise network against such zero-day vulnerabilities and attacks.
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...Jeremiah Grossman
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerprinting
Jeremiah Grossman, Founder & Chairman of WhiteHat Security, Inc.
Many diligent security professionals take active steps to limit the amount of system specific information a publicly available system may yield to a remote user. These preventative measures may take the form of modifying service banners, firewalls, web site information, etc.
Software utilities such as NMap have given the security community an excellent resource to discover what type of Operating System and version is listening on a particular IP. This process is achieved by mapping subtle, yet, distinguishable nuances unique to each OS. But, this is normally where the fun ends, as NMap does not enable we user's to determine what version of services are listening. This is up to us to guess or to find out through other various exploits.
This is where we start our talk, fingerprinting Web Servers. These incredibly diverse and useful widespread services notoriously found listening on port 80 and 443 just waiting to be explored. Many web servers by default will readily give up the type and version of the web server via the "Server" HTTP response header. However, many administrators aware of this fact have become increasingly clever in recent months by removing or altering any and all traces of this telltale information.
These countermeasures lead us to the obvious question; could it STILL possible to determine a web servers platform and version even after all known methods of information leakage prevention have been exhausted (either by hack or configuration)?
The simple answer is "yes"; it is VERY possible to still identify the web server. But, the even more interesting question is; just how much specific information can we obtain remotely?
Are we able to determine?
* Supported HTTP Request Methods.
* Current Service Pack.
* Patch Levels.
* Configuarations.
* If an Apache Server suffers from a "chunked" vulnerability.
Is really possible to determine this specific information using a few simple HTTP requests? Again, the simple answer is yes, the possibility exists.
Proof of concept tools and command line examples will be demonstrated throughout the talk to illustrate these new ideas and techniques. Various countermeasures will also be explored to protect your IIS or Apache web server from various fingerprinting techniques.
Prerequisites:
General understanding of Web Server technology and HTTP.
VoIP: Attacks & Countermeasures in the Corporate WorldJason Edelstein
Discusses VoIP security threats and countermeasures with a specific focus on the Cisco Call Manager implementations.
Additional information can be found at: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au
This short seminar presentation discusses the basic idea of my dissertation. It uncovers the main ideas of a three players conflict in missile guidance with bounded controls.
Thomas Lang, University of California San Francisco: "Bone Loss in Long-Duration Spaceflight: Measurements and Countermeasures." Presented at the 2013 International Space Station Research and Development Conference, http://www.astronautical.org/issrdc/2013.
Digital Astroturfing: Definition, typology, and countermeasures.Marko Kovic
Note: This presentation was given at the 69th annual conference of the World Association of Public Opinion Research in Austin, Texas, on May 11, 2016.
---
In recent years, several instances of political actors creating fake grassroots activity on the Internet have been uncovered. We propose to call such fake online grassroots activity digital astroturfing. In this paper, we lay out a conceptual map of the phenomenon of digital astroturfing. To that end, we first define digital astroturfing as a form of manufactured, deceptive and strategic top-down activity on the Internet initiated by political actors that mimics bottom-up activity by autonomous individuals. Next, we explore a typology of digital astroturfing according to the dimensions of the target of digital astroturfing, the political actors who engage in digital astroturfing and the goals of the digital astroturfing activity. Following the discussion of our proposed typology, we introduce the concept of digital astroturfing repertoires, the possible combinations of tools, venues and actions used for digital astroturfing efforts. Finally, we discuss how to prevent or curb digital astroturfing by implementing certain restrictive or incentivizing countermeasures. The main use of this conceptual study is to serve as a basis for future empirical work. Even though empirical research on digital astroturfing is inherently difficult since digital astroturfing is a clandestine activity, it is not impossible. We suggest some possible research strategies.
**Return-oriented programming** bezeichnet eine gewiefte IT-Angriffstechnik, die im Prinzip eine Verallgemeinerung von *return-to-libc*-Attacken ist, welche wiederum zu den *stack buffer overflow exploits* gehören.
Wem das alles nichts sagt - keine Angst: Im Vortrag werden zunächst die Grundlagen von Puffer-Überläufen und deren Angriffspotential erläutert und einige historische Beispiele aufgezeigt, bevor schrittweise die Brücke zu **ROP** geschlagen wird. Zum Abschluss werden kurz einige Abwehrmaßnahmen vorgestellt und im Hinblick auf Umsetzbarkeit und Wirkungsgrad bewertet.
So die Demo-Götter es wollen, wird live u.A. ein Beispiel-Programm mithilfe von **ROP**-Tools gecrackt.
Designing Countermeasures For Tomorrows ThreatsDarwish Ahmad
Abstract:
Internet and network security is the most important and top priority issues for almost all types of organizations, for instance, military divisions, ministries, banks, other public and private sectors, and even to everyone who concerns it.
These organizations may use security mechanisms to protect their assets safe against evil and attackers, but most of the security countermeasures that they use are based on known attacks, threats and vulnerabilities. They hardly pay attention to protect their assets against unknown and new types of attacks, threats and vulnerabilities. Most of the organizations faced to challenges the new types of unknown attacks and threats.
This research paper's main aim is to focus and study approaches and solutions against the unknown attacks and threats, and therefore, titled Designing Countermeasures for Tomorrows Threats to make the organizations enable to detect new types attacks, threats or vulnerabilities before they damage their assets or systems.
In addition, the outcome of this research paper will give the chance to the organizations to learn who is attacking their systems, how they are being attacked, and what the attackers are trying to achieve. The concepts that this research paper (thesis) used for Designing Countermeasures for Tomorrows Threats are Honeypot and Honeynet systems.
Honeypot and Honeynet Systems are one of the most interesting and well-known concepts for all the security professionals to know their enemies and identify their weakness. Worth mentioning that most of the countries i.e. Iran, Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, Germany and Polish are using these concepts to protect their internal networks and assets against the attackers. Besides, there are a great number of security organizations and communities that use these concepts for research to learn and educate public about new types of attacks, threats and vulnerabilities naming Honeynet Project, Norse, FireEye, WorldMap and Global Botnet Threat Activity.
This thesis implemented most of the existed-based technologies on the concept of Honeypot and Honeynet systems both open source and close source. Finally suggest and recommend the best solution for Afghanistan to protect its internal networks especially important organizations like Ministry of Interior and other ministries and sectors.
The term Massively Parallel BigData Processor names a recent advance in bigdata processing technology which has advanced from the traditional distributed processing represented by Hadoop to modern parallel processing represented by various multicore and manycore architectures. The problem in massively parallel systems is the irregularity which is when a single item -- can be referred to as a blackswan -- incurs much more processing cost than the majority of items. This paper discusses the respective countermeasures divided into (1) distribution and (2) runtime models and optimizations. The differences between multicore and manycore cases is also discussed, where the latter is represented by the currently default design with tiles and n-neighbor switching.
[CB16] Air-Gap security: State-of-the-art Attacks, Analysis, and Mitigation b...CODE BLUE
Air-gapped networks are isolated, separated both logically and physically from public networks. For example, military, industrial, and financial networks. Although the feasibility of invading such systems has been demonstrated in recent years, communication of data to/from air-gapped networks is a challenging task to attackers to perpetrate, an even more difficult threat to defend against.
New methods of communicating with air gapped networks are currently being exposed, some advanced and difficult to mitigate. These new found vulnerabilities have wide reaching implications on what we considered to be a foolproof solution to network security –the placement of a physical air gap.
But it doesn’t stop there – new techniques of covertly getting information in and out of air gapped networks are being exposed. Thus it is important not only to publicize these vectors of attack, but their countermeasures and feasibility as well.
In this talk, we will outline the steps an attacker must take in order to bridge an air gapped network. We will review the state-of-the-art techniques over thermal, radio, and acoustic channels, and discuss each one’s countermeasures and feasibility. Most of techniques in this talk were discovered in our labs by researcher Mordichai Guri under the supervision of Prof. Yuval Elovici.
--- Mordechai Guri
Mordechai Guri is an accomplished computer scientist and security expert with over 20 years of practical research experience. He earned his Bsc and Msc Suma Cum Laude, from the computer science department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
--- Yisroel Mirsky
Yisroel Mirsky is a Ph.D. candidate supervised by Prof. Bracha Shapira and Prof. Yuval Elovici, in the department of Information Systems Engineering in Ben-Gurion University.
--- Yuval Elovici
Yuval Elovici is the director of the Telekom Innovation Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU), head of BGU Cyber Security Research Center, and a Professor in the Department of Information Systems Engineering at BGU.
Oracle UCM Security: Challenges and Best PracticesBrian Huff
Information on how to "harden" your content server to make it less susceptible to security attacks. Covers risks, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures.
Patent Risk and Countermeasures Related to Open Management in Interaction DesignYosuke Sakai
2012 10th International Conference of Asia Digital Art and Design Association & 6th International Conference of Taiwan Association of Digital Media Design
Antivirus Evasion Techniques and Countermeasuressecurityxploded
This presentation throws light on innovative techniques for bypassing antivirus detection. This will be useful for researchers and pen testers to develop successful post exploitation techniques.
Skyjacking A Cisco Wlan Attack Analysis And CountermeasuresAirTight Networks
This presentation will deconstruct the skyjacking vulnerability - explaining why the vulnerability occurs in Cisco WLANs, which Cisco access points are affected, how skyjacking can be exploited to launch potent attacks, and what are the best practices to proactively protect your enterprise network against such zero-day vulnerabilities and attacks.
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerpri...Jeremiah Grossman
Identifying Web Servers: A First-look Into the Future of Web Server Fingerprinting
Jeremiah Grossman, Founder & Chairman of WhiteHat Security, Inc.
Many diligent security professionals take active steps to limit the amount of system specific information a publicly available system may yield to a remote user. These preventative measures may take the form of modifying service banners, firewalls, web site information, etc.
Software utilities such as NMap have given the security community an excellent resource to discover what type of Operating System and version is listening on a particular IP. This process is achieved by mapping subtle, yet, distinguishable nuances unique to each OS. But, this is normally where the fun ends, as NMap does not enable we user's to determine what version of services are listening. This is up to us to guess or to find out through other various exploits.
This is where we start our talk, fingerprinting Web Servers. These incredibly diverse and useful widespread services notoriously found listening on port 80 and 443 just waiting to be explored. Many web servers by default will readily give up the type and version of the web server via the "Server" HTTP response header. However, many administrators aware of this fact have become increasingly clever in recent months by removing or altering any and all traces of this telltale information.
These countermeasures lead us to the obvious question; could it STILL possible to determine a web servers platform and version even after all known methods of information leakage prevention have been exhausted (either by hack or configuration)?
The simple answer is "yes"; it is VERY possible to still identify the web server. But, the even more interesting question is; just how much specific information can we obtain remotely?
Are we able to determine?
* Supported HTTP Request Methods.
* Current Service Pack.
* Patch Levels.
* Configuarations.
* If an Apache Server suffers from a "chunked" vulnerability.
Is really possible to determine this specific information using a few simple HTTP requests? Again, the simple answer is yes, the possibility exists.
Proof of concept tools and command line examples will be demonstrated throughout the talk to illustrate these new ideas and techniques. Various countermeasures will also be explored to protect your IIS or Apache web server from various fingerprinting techniques.
Prerequisites:
General understanding of Web Server technology and HTTP.
VoIP: Attacks & Countermeasures in the Corporate WorldJason Edelstein
Discusses VoIP security threats and countermeasures with a specific focus on the Cisco Call Manager implementations.
Additional information can be found at: http://www.senseofsecurity.com.au
This short seminar presentation discusses the basic idea of my dissertation. It uncovers the main ideas of a three players conflict in missile guidance with bounded controls.
Thomas Lang, University of California San Francisco: "Bone Loss in Long-Duration Spaceflight: Measurements and Countermeasures." Presented at the 2013 International Space Station Research and Development Conference, http://www.astronautical.org/issrdc/2013.
Digital Astroturfing: Definition, typology, and countermeasures.Marko Kovic
Note: This presentation was given at the 69th annual conference of the World Association of Public Opinion Research in Austin, Texas, on May 11, 2016.
---
In recent years, several instances of political actors creating fake grassroots activity on the Internet have been uncovered. We propose to call such fake online grassroots activity digital astroturfing. In this paper, we lay out a conceptual map of the phenomenon of digital astroturfing. To that end, we first define digital astroturfing as a form of manufactured, deceptive and strategic top-down activity on the Internet initiated by political actors that mimics bottom-up activity by autonomous individuals. Next, we explore a typology of digital astroturfing according to the dimensions of the target of digital astroturfing, the political actors who engage in digital astroturfing and the goals of the digital astroturfing activity. Following the discussion of our proposed typology, we introduce the concept of digital astroturfing repertoires, the possible combinations of tools, venues and actions used for digital astroturfing efforts. Finally, we discuss how to prevent or curb digital astroturfing by implementing certain restrictive or incentivizing countermeasures. The main use of this conceptual study is to serve as a basis for future empirical work. Even though empirical research on digital astroturfing is inherently difficult since digital astroturfing is a clandestine activity, it is not impossible. We suggest some possible research strategies.
**Return-oriented programming** bezeichnet eine gewiefte IT-Angriffstechnik, die im Prinzip eine Verallgemeinerung von *return-to-libc*-Attacken ist, welche wiederum zu den *stack buffer overflow exploits* gehören.
Wem das alles nichts sagt - keine Angst: Im Vortrag werden zunächst die Grundlagen von Puffer-Überläufen und deren Angriffspotential erläutert und einige historische Beispiele aufgezeigt, bevor schrittweise die Brücke zu **ROP** geschlagen wird. Zum Abschluss werden kurz einige Abwehrmaßnahmen vorgestellt und im Hinblick auf Umsetzbarkeit und Wirkungsgrad bewertet.
So die Demo-Götter es wollen, wird live u.A. ein Beispiel-Programm mithilfe von **ROP**-Tools gecrackt.
Designing Countermeasures For Tomorrows ThreatsDarwish Ahmad
Abstract:
Internet and network security is the most important and top priority issues for almost all types of organizations, for instance, military divisions, ministries, banks, other public and private sectors, and even to everyone who concerns it.
These organizations may use security mechanisms to protect their assets safe against evil and attackers, but most of the security countermeasures that they use are based on known attacks, threats and vulnerabilities. They hardly pay attention to protect their assets against unknown and new types of attacks, threats and vulnerabilities. Most of the organizations faced to challenges the new types of unknown attacks and threats.
This research paper's main aim is to focus and study approaches and solutions against the unknown attacks and threats, and therefore, titled Designing Countermeasures for Tomorrows Threats to make the organizations enable to detect new types attacks, threats or vulnerabilities before they damage their assets or systems.
In addition, the outcome of this research paper will give the chance to the organizations to learn who is attacking their systems, how they are being attacked, and what the attackers are trying to achieve. The concepts that this research paper (thesis) used for Designing Countermeasures for Tomorrows Threats are Honeypot and Honeynet systems.
Honeypot and Honeynet Systems are one of the most interesting and well-known concepts for all the security professionals to know their enemies and identify their weakness. Worth mentioning that most of the countries i.e. Iran, Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, Germany and Polish are using these concepts to protect their internal networks and assets against the attackers. Besides, there are a great number of security organizations and communities that use these concepts for research to learn and educate public about new types of attacks, threats and vulnerabilities naming Honeynet Project, Norse, FireEye, WorldMap and Global Botnet Threat Activity.
This thesis implemented most of the existed-based technologies on the concept of Honeypot and Honeynet systems both open source and close source. Finally suggest and recommend the best solution for Afghanistan to protect its internal networks especially important organizations like Ministry of Interior and other ministries and sectors.
The term Massively Parallel BigData Processor names a recent advance in bigdata processing technology which has advanced from the traditional distributed processing represented by Hadoop to modern parallel processing represented by various multicore and manycore architectures. The problem in massively parallel systems is the irregularity which is when a single item -- can be referred to as a blackswan -- incurs much more processing cost than the majority of items. This paper discusses the respective countermeasures divided into (1) distribution and (2) runtime models and optimizations. The differences between multicore and manycore cases is also discussed, where the latter is represented by the currently default design with tiles and n-neighbor switching.
[CB16] Air-Gap security: State-of-the-art Attacks, Analysis, and Mitigation b...CODE BLUE
Air-gapped networks are isolated, separated both logically and physically from public networks. For example, military, industrial, and financial networks. Although the feasibility of invading such systems has been demonstrated in recent years, communication of data to/from air-gapped networks is a challenging task to attackers to perpetrate, an even more difficult threat to defend against.
New methods of communicating with air gapped networks are currently being exposed, some advanced and difficult to mitigate. These new found vulnerabilities have wide reaching implications on what we considered to be a foolproof solution to network security –the placement of a physical air gap.
But it doesn’t stop there – new techniques of covertly getting information in and out of air gapped networks are being exposed. Thus it is important not only to publicize these vectors of attack, but their countermeasures and feasibility as well.
In this talk, we will outline the steps an attacker must take in order to bridge an air gapped network. We will review the state-of-the-art techniques over thermal, radio, and acoustic channels, and discuss each one’s countermeasures and feasibility. Most of techniques in this talk were discovered in our labs by researcher Mordichai Guri under the supervision of Prof. Yuval Elovici.
--- Mordechai Guri
Mordechai Guri is an accomplished computer scientist and security expert with over 20 years of practical research experience. He earned his Bsc and Msc Suma Cum Laude, from the computer science department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
--- Yisroel Mirsky
Yisroel Mirsky is a Ph.D. candidate supervised by Prof. Bracha Shapira and Prof. Yuval Elovici, in the department of Information Systems Engineering in Ben-Gurion University.
--- Yuval Elovici
Yuval Elovici is the director of the Telekom Innovation Laboratories at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (BGU), head of BGU Cyber Security Research Center, and a Professor in the Department of Information Systems Engineering at BGU.
Fukushima Marine Environment Monitoring - 12 April 2011
Table 4: Unit 4 Reactor: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant - 18 May 2011
1. TABLE 4. UNIT 4 REACTOR, SPENT FUEL POOL: FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: 18 MAY 2011
ASSESSMENT OF STATUS IN TERMS OF FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS FOR ACHIEVING A SAFE STATE
Necessary safety function and TEPCO Roadmap
Observation Evaluation of state
conditions countermeasures
Spent fuel pool shall be subcritical - According to TEPCO statement and to its PARTIALLY ACHIEVED: Maintaining the geometry of spent
Keff < 0.95 (design value), and sub- assessment from the water sampling of the spent CAUTION fuel pool (including aftershocks)
criticality shall be demonstrated fuel pool, TEPCO assumes that the fuel - Risk of criticality a priori excluded reinforce by countermeasure 20,
Control of reactivity
and maintained assemblies are ‘intact’ (sampling 26 April 2011) by TEPCO (provided that 21, 26
- New sampling performed (280 mL on 7 May). geometrically safe configuration is Make-up/cooling of spent fuel pool
The activity concentrations (Cs-134/Cs-137) are maintained, etc.) by external water injection
increasing compared with previous - Further assessment needed (countermeasures 18, 22, 28)
measurements. Analysis by TEPCO is - In order to avoid any potential No borated water injected
continuing problem due to further aftershocks, No countermeasure explicitly
- Only fresh (non-borated) water is being sprayed make-up with borated water to avoid mentioned
into the spent fuel pool (120 tonnes on 11 May) any risk of criticality is advised
- Hydrazine is being continuously injected - Monitoring of neutrons and short
- No neutron flux measured reported lived isotopes to be considered
Stable cooling shall be assured Latest temperature reported: 81 °C after spraying PARTIALLY ACHIEVED: Cooling of spent fuel pool by
- Spent fuel pool temperature on 9 May (no updated data available) CAUTION external water injection
should be similar to the spent (countermeasures 18, 22, 28)
fuel pond design values Sampling of steam/pool water and
Residual heal removal
Make-up (with borated water) to be
(approx. 30 °C) continued measurement of radioactive
- To recover the spent fuel pool Spent fuel pool temperature is not materials (countermeasure 19)
water level adequately with reported on May 16 Circulation cooling of spent fuel
(borated) water to about 7 m pool
above the top of active fuel. (countermeasures 23, 24, 25, 27)
- To restore spent fuel cooling
[Type text]
2. Necessary safety function and TEPCO Roadmap
Observation Evaluation of state
conditions countermeasures
- To recover the spent fuel pool - Fuel assemblies are covered by water ACHIEVED: - Cooling of spent fuel pool by
Confining radioactive material
water level adequately to CAUTION external water injection
ensure some form of shielding - to continue spraying and/or make (countermeasures 18, 22, 28)
above the top of active fuel. up - Circulation cooling of spent
- to continue monitoring of major fuel pool (countermeasures 23,
spent fuel pool parameters 24, 25, 27)
(temperature, water level) - Sampling of steam/pool water
- to improve radiation protection and measurement of radioactive
materials (countermeasure 19)
- Reactor building cover
(countermeasures 5, 50, 54,
55)
- Releases shall be only within - Uncontrolled release are not expected so far PARTIALLY ACHIEVED: - Nos 10, 12, 29–46 cooling of
the agreed allowed legal limits - Radiation monitoring positions are available CAUTION spent fuel pool by external
- Radiation monitoring - According to a TEPCO statement, fuel - Radioactive releases to be prevented water injection
Limiting effects of releases
measurements shall be assemblies are assumed to be ‘intact’. by sufficient water make-up (countermeasures 18, 22, 28)
available However, further assessment by TEPCO of - Reactor building cover to be pursued - Circulation cooling of spent
- Leakages from the spent fuel the latest sampling should confirm this fuel pool (countermeasures 23,
pool should prevented or statement 24, 25, 27)
controlled, or if not shall be - Sampling of steam/pool water
confined and measurement of radioactive
material (countermeasure 19)
- Reactor building cover
(countermeasures 5, 50, 54, 55)