Russian Disinformation Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security.pdf

Russian Disinformation Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security.pdf

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  RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION: TACTICS, IMPACT,AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security CONTENTS: 1. Introduction 2. Common Algorithms and Tactics of Russian Disinformation Leveraging social media platforms and mainstream media Supporting alternative news agencies to legitimize false narratives Coordinating efforts between state-sponsored and unofficial actors Key Tactics of Russian Disinformation: Misinformation and distortion of facts Exploiting emotionally charged topics to manipulate public opinion Promoting conspiracy theories Fostering internal divisions within target countries to undermine political stability 3. Russian Disinformation and Religious Freedoms Violations of Religious Freedoms in Russia Violations in Occupied Territories of Ukraine ROC as a Tool of Russian Disinformation in Ukraine Russia’s violation of religious freedoms in the EU and U.S. 4. Russian Disinformation in Conflicts Disinformation in Active Conflicts Disinformation Targeting International Peacekeeping Efforts Economic Consequences of Disinformation During Conflicts 5. Russian Disinformation and Elections Influence on Elections in Eastern Europe and the European Union Influence on U.S. Elections. 6. General Threats to National Security from Russian Disinformation Impact on National Companies and Critical Infrastructure. Cybersecurity and Information Attacks. Impact on Public Opinion and Social Stability. Expanding Russian Geopolitical Influence through Disinformation. 7. Conclusion 8. Editorial Board.
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS SDA - the Social Design Agency ROC - the Russian Orthodox Church RACIRS - the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religions and Sects
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security INTRODUCTION Purpose of the Report: The report aims to examine the impact of Russian disinformation in today’s geopolitical landscape, focusing on its effects on global conflicts, religious freedoms, elections, and national security. Importance of Studying Russian Disinformation: Understanding the mechanisms and goals of Russian disinformation is critical in mitigating its influence on political processes, social stability, and international relations. Objectives of the Report: To analyze the common algorithms and tactics of Russian disinformation, its role in shaping conflicts, its impact on elections and religious freedoms, and the broader threats it poses to national security and corporate integrity.
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security COMMON ALGORITHMS AND TACTICS OF RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION
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  Disinformation is farfrom a rare or mysterious phenomenon, and it is not confined to specific circumstances. On the contrary, it permeates everyday life—whether through news outlets, official government channels, or social media posts by influencers. Russian disinformation, in particular, has become a key factor influencing political decisions and shaping the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This form of disinformation is deeply rooted in state propaganda and is actively disseminated through official channels, creating an environment where false narratives are legitimized, especially for Russian citizens. The structure of Russian information campaigns reveals a sophisticated system of cascading narratives. This system is capable of exploiting multiple platforms within a society, with narratives evolving in intensity and variation depending on the media environment. Countries with more media platforms are inherently more vulnerable due to the broader range of narratives that can be introduced to reach diverse audiences. These cascading narratives can be classified into several categories: the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir), Slavic unity, nostalgia for the Soviet era, "anti" rhetoric, and alternative information narratives. Each of these categories is intricately connected—once a society is susceptible to one, other narratives can follow [1]. COMMON ALGORITHMS AND TACTICS OF RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION Source: Boksa, 2019 Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  The "Russian World"narrative, for instance, focuses on countries with significant Russian-speaking populations, such as Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine, encouraging these communities to self-identify with Russia. Unity narratives exploit shared ethnic and linguistic ties to promote a pan-Slavic identity. At the same time, Ostalgia stirs nostalgia for the Soviet past and seeks to challenge Western-dominated global systems. The “anti” rhetoric targets entities like the EU, NATO, and liberalism, positioning Russia as a defender of conservative values, often in alignment with far-right movements in Europe. Lastly, alternative-information narratives aim to undermine the concept of objective truth by presenting multiple versions of events, fostering confusion and mistrust of reliable sources [1]. A key characteristic of Russian disinformation is its systematic nature involving state institutions and private actors. The Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Historical Society, FSB, and state-controlled media are all part of the extensive apparatus that sustains these campaigns. Notable figures like Vladimir Solovyov and Dmitry Kiselev regularly appear in primetime television slots to propagate these narratives, serving as prominent faces of state-driven disinformation. Additionally, private actors such as the "Troll Factory," linked to the long-dead Yevgeny Prigozhin—the founder of the Wagner Group—play a crucial role in conducting online influence operations, further amplifying the reach of these narratives. Although a less obvious participant, the Russian Orthodox Church also serves as a vehicle for propaganda. It engages Russian-speaking diaspora communities abroad and reinforces state narratives under the guise of religious or cultural outreach, expanding the influence of Russian disinformation beyond its borders. Outside of Russia, the dissemination of disinformation operates through a multifaceted approach, spanning state-run media, commercial broadcasters, social media, and official government channels. Domestic programs like “Duel” and “60 Minutes” are key tools for reinforcing false narratives within Russia, employing overt ideological language tailored for local audiences. For international audiences, Russian disinformation becomes more subtle and context-specific, adjusting its messaging to suit different cultural and political environments. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  A major driverof the international spread of Russian disinformation is social media. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter (X), and YouTube play a pivotal role in the rapid dissemination of these misleading narratives. Russian disinformation campaigns typically follow a predictable pattern: content is first published on a small, obscure website or social media account, after which it is picked up by smaller Telegram channels, and finally amplified by larger channels with significant followings. In some cases, the disinformation is translated into English and disseminated widely, enabling it to quickly spread through international networks. By leveraging targeted advertising, bots, and troll networks, Russian disinformation actors can manipulate public opinion and amplify divisive narratives. This tactic has proven effective in reaching vast audiences. For example, a report from the Oxford Internet Institute highlighted that between 2015 and 2017, the Internet Research Agency (IRA)—a notorious Russian troll farm—managed to reach over 100 million Americans on Facebook alone. Such data underscores the global reach and impact of Russian disinformation, illustrating how it exploits modern social media ecosystems to influence public opinion on a large scale [2]. 2.1 DISINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION ALGORITHMS: Leveraging social media platforms and mainstream media to propagate disinformation. Russian-language Twitter bot accounts sharing disinformation about Ukrainian media faking reports of civilian casualties. Source: https://www.propublica.org/article/infamous-russian-troll-farm-appears- to-be-source-of-anti-ukraine-propaganda Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Russia extensively utilizesbots to amplify the spread of disinformation, with these automated accounts playing a crucial role in promoting pro-Russian narratives. Bots are particularly effective in increasing the volume and reach of misleading messages, enabling them to quickly disseminate across social media platforms. A noticeable pattern emerges when examining the timing of bot activity—many of these accounts tend to be newly created, often coinciding with major geopolitical events, such as the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Incorporating bots into disinformation strategies reflects the evolving and sophisticated nature of Russian influence operations. This method not only amplifies the scale of the campaigns but also ensures a continuous, steady flow of disinformation that can adapt in real-time to current events. Russia's disinformation campaigns on social media, particularly on platforms like Facebook, leverage sophisticated advertising tools to reach and influence targeted audiences. Facebook’s advertising service allows users to define their target demographics, with algorithms segmenting large populations into specific subgroups based on various characteristics. This segmentation enables disinformation actors to craft tailored messages designed to resonate with particular demographics, making their disinformation efforts more effective. By using these algorithms, propagandists—whether human operatives or automated bots—can identify individuals most likely to be susceptible to their content and ensure that their messages reach these audiences. One key aspect of this strategy involves the use of emotionally charged content rather than straightforward falsehoods. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, for example, Russian disinformation campaigns deployed ads that, while occasionally misleading, primarily aimed to provoke emotional responses. These ads promoted divisive topics such as race, police brutality, nationalism, immigration, and gun rights—issues that were among the most contentious in the 2016 election cycle and remain central to ongoing social tensions. By centering their campaigns around these topics, Russian actors were able to exploit existing societal divisions, further polarizing the public and intensifying cultural and political discord [3]. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  The use ofFacebook groups, invited through these ads, also played a key role in deepening engagement with disinformation. These groups acted as echo chambers, reinforcing divisive narratives and fostering community among like-minded individuals. This approach not only amplified the reach of Russian disinformation but also helped to build long-term influence networks that could continue to spread propaganda beyond the initial advertisement campaigns. Example of Russian disinformation ad during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign. Source: https://www.washingtonpost.c om/graphics/2017/business/ru ssian-ads-facebook-targeting/ Russia's disinformation campaigns heavily rely on troll networks and organized efforts to manipulate online discourse and sway public opinion. These troll networks are not just isolated groups of individuals but are often orchestrated by state-backed entities or organizations with close ties to the Russian government. Leaked documents from the Strategic Digital Agency (SDA) reveal a sophisticated infrastructure of psychological warfare, where disinformation is mass-produced and strategically deployed across various online platforms. This system highlights how Russia weaponizes social media and online commentary to achieve geopolitical goals, particularly in Europe and the United States [4]. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  The Social DesignAgency (SDA), as outlined in the leaks, operates as a hub for the creation and dissemination of false narratives, using a coordinated army of meme creators, internet trolls, and bot operators. These actors work together to flood online spaces with misleading content, ranging from memes and videos to carefully crafted comments designed to incite division and undermine political stability in targeted nations. By generating millions of comments and content units in just a few months, Russia’s disinformation apparatus demonstrates the sheer scale of its operations. One of the core strategies behind these campaigns is the use of fake personas to mimic local voices. These fabricated comments often portray supposed citizens voicing concerns about domestic issues, such as economic instability or immigration, but with a focus on advancing pro-Russian narratives. For example, in Germany, bots and trolls were instructed to spread narratives that the country’s economic struggles could be resolved by returning to cheap Russian energy, while in the U.S., messages targeted military aid to Ukraine and Israel, playing on themes of wasted taxpayer money. The timing of these troll network activities often coincides with key political events, such as elections. The leaks show how Russian disinformation is calibrated to influence electoral outcomes, as seen in preparations for the 2024 European Parliament elections and national elections in Germany and France. Far-right parties, particularly those with isolationist or anti-immigration platforms, are viewed by Russian operatives as natural allies. These parties are often promoted through troll network activity, with narratives that align with Russian geopolitical interests, such as reducing support for Ukraine or opposing sanctions on Russia. Moreover, Russia’s troll networks aim to exploit societal divisions by amplifying existing tensions. They tap into issues that evoke strong emotional reactions, such as family values, LGBTQ rights, and economic uncertainty, to deepen polarization and weaken the democratic process. By positioning themselves as defenders of traditional values or economic stability, Russian trolls seek to undermine liberal or centrist political forces that support Ukraine and are critical of Russia. In addition to human-operated troll accounts, the integration of bots further enhances the effectiveness of these operations. Bots play a critical role in amplifying messages, creating the illusion of widespread support for certain viewpoints. According to analyses of these networks, a significant percentage of the accounts involved in spreading pro- Russian narratives are automated. These bots are often created in large numbers, coinciding with major geopolitical events like the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, where the creation of bot accounts spiked significantly. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  The analysis revealsthat Russian disinformation campaigns operate through a sophisticated network involving state institutions, private actors, and organized troll networks, effectively leveraging social media and mainstream media to propagate false narratives. Key strategies include the use of cascading narratives—such as the “Russian World,” Slavic unity, and anti-Western rhetoric—which are tailored to exploit local concerns and deepen societal divisions. The Strategic Digital Agency (SDA) exemplifies this approach, coordinating a vast operation that produces millions of misleading content units, including memes and bot-generated comments, particularly around crucial political events like elections. Russian disinformation exploits social media algorithms and targeted advertising, allowing it to reach diverse audiences and amplify pro-Russian sentiments. Bots play a critical role in these campaigns, creating an illusion of widespread support for specific narratives, while the timing of their activities aligns with geopolitical events to maximize impact. Overall, these operations aim to undermine democratic processes, influence public opinion, and promote far-right parties aligned with Russian interests in Europe and the United States. Russia's strategic use of alternative agencies and platforms to promote its narratives reflects a well-coordinated influence campaign aimed at shaping public opinion and political outcomes both domestically and internationally. This approach often involves funding and establishing media outlets that masquerade as independent news sources, thereby legitimizing false narratives and undermining traditional media. One prominent example is the recent scandal involving the website Voice of Europe, which has been sanctioned by the Czech government for its role in a pro-Russian influence operation. As noted by European Commission Vice President Věra Jourová, this case exemplifies how the Kremlin utilizes dubious media outlets to exert covert influence. The Czech Republic stated that Voice of Europe was financed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro- Kremlin businessman and former Ukrainian lawmaker who was exiled to Russia in 2022 in exchange for Ukrainian prisoners of war. Medvedchuk, who was stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship, allegedly directed the operations of Voice of Europe through Ukrainian and Israeli citizen Artem Marchevskyi. The Czech ministry asserted, "Viktor Volodymyrovych Medvedchuk uses the Voice of Europe media platform to run a Russian influence operation," aimed at undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and freedom of Ukraine. The Czech government has also imposed sanctions on the company running the news website, citing its role in spreading Russian influence ahead of the June European Parliament elections, including providing financial support to European politicians [5,6]. Supporting alternative news agencies to legitimize false narratives. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Source: https://24tv.ua/ru/kak-dejstvuet-rossijskaja-propaganda-i-media-medvedchuka-voice- of-europe-v-evrope-kak-protivodejstvovat-24-kanal_n2542943 Russia hasmade substantial investments in media outlets like RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik News, which position themselves as alternative news sources. These outlets frequently feature sensationalist content that promotes divisive narratives and conspiracy theories, particularly targeting audiences skeptical of mainstream media. For instance, RT has been accused of spreading false information about various geopolitical events, including the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, while framing Russia as a victim of Western aggression. Both RT and Sputnik exemplify a broader strategy in which the Russian government utilizes state-controlled media to disseminate disinformation. Unlike independent journalism, these organizations do not conduct independent reporting; rather, they operate under the aegis of the state, serving as instruments of propaganda. The regulatory bodies overseeing media activities in Russia, along with the judicial system, do not facilitate independent editorial operations. Instead, these outlets often exploit existing falsehoods and unreliable information, amplifying their reach through social media platforms. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  The creation ofthe Sputnik website in 2014 followed the Russian government’s successes in international propaganda during the Ukraine crisis. While older state- controlled news agencies like RT and TASS primarily target satellite TV audiences, Sputnik focuses on engaging social media users. Marketed as a “provider of alternative news,” Sputnik publishes foreign news stories produced either by its own editorial team or sourced from Western news agencies in over 30 languages [7]. RT and Sputnik serve as flagship foreign-language platforms in Russia's campaign to influence international public opinion, claiming to offer alternative perspectives to mainstream narratives. However, these outlets lack independence, as Sputnik was established by presidential decree to report on Russian state policy abroad, and RT is fully funded by the government and classified as a core organization of strategic importance. Furthermore, they abandon impartiality; Dmitry Kiselyov, CEO and editor-in-chief of both outlets, has stated that “the period of impartial journalism is over. Objectivity is a myth.” This intention is further reflected in the regular directives received from the Kremlin that dictate political narratives and coverage topics. The production of misinformation for political ends is another hallmark of these outlets. The UK's independent media watchdog, Ofcom, has criticized RT on numerous occasions for producing "materially misleading" content, while RT has played a pivotal role in crafting disinformation smoke screens, such as the narratives surrounding the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine. Example of article published on the RT’s website speading disinformation about MH17 incidence. Source: https://www.rt.com/news/360946-mh17-ukraine-fabricate-evidence/ Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  In the contextof Russian disinformation, the coordination between state-sponsored and unofficial actors plays a pivotal role in amplifying propaganda campaigns. This tactic involves using a combination of official state channels, such as RT and Sputnik, alongside a broader network of unofficial actors, which may include social media influencers, fringe websites, and grassroots organizations. Together, they create a multi-layered dissemination strategy that increases the reach and believability of disinformation efforts. The Russian government often recruits unofficial actors to spread its narratives, aiming to craft an appearance of organic, grassroots support [8]. This not only bolsters the credibility of their messaging but also allows the disinformation to influence public discourse without overt state involvement. For instance, prominent figures on platforms like Twitter, Facebook, or Telegram may promote conspiracy theories or other forms of disinformation that align with Kremlin interests. These influencers, with large and devoted followings, are often more effective than bots or trolls at spreading misleading information because they are perceived as trustworthy by their audiences. As one expert noted, these individuals are idolized by their followers and serve as powerful hubs for the distribution of pro- Kremlin narratives. A striking example of this phenomenon is Tucker Carlson, a former Fox News host, whose trip to Russia earlier in the year produced a series of highly favorable videos about the country. His podcast, now one of the top-ranking in the U.S., continues to reach millions. Similarly, influencers like Lauren Southern, while not overtly linked to Russian state media, have shared content that aligns with Russian narratives. For instance, Southern has posted videos criticizing Ukraine and mocking the media’s coverage of the war, while joking about receiving "Rubles" in her account—a veiled reference to potential Russian influence [9] Coordinating efforts between state-sponsored and unofficial actors. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Another key disinformationtactic used by Russia is what researchers call "Doppelganger." This involves creating websites that closely resemble legitimate media outlets but are subtly altered to propagate pro-Russian narratives. These websites, often with URLs like cnn.com.net or similar variations, appear trustworthy but in reality, serve as vehicles for propaganda [10]. The Russian influence network known as "Doppelganger" has been particularly active in Europe. Russian operatives purchased ads through fake accounts on Facebook to promote content aimed at deepening societal divisions, especially ahead of the European Union elections. These campaigns targeted countries like Germany and France, but the content reached over 16 EU member states, focusing on divisive issues such as Ukraine aid packages, farmer protests, and the Israel-Gaza conflict. From August 2023 to March 2024, the ads reached 130,000 French and 37,000 German Facebook users daily. By May, the campaign expanded to other countries, including Italy and Poland. As a result, the European Commission launched an investigation into Meta (parent company of Facebook and Instagram) for its role in facilitating the spread of disinformation ahead of the EU elections. Russian campaigns targeting the 2024 Olympics Games in France. Source: https://cdn-dynmedia- 1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/final/en-us/microsoft- brand/documents/MTAC_Report_Russian_Influence_and_Paris_2024.pdf Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Doppelganger used cybersquatteddomains like washingtonpost[.]pm and fox- news[.]top to host sites that mirrored legitimate news outlets but featured articles designed to shape sentiment in favor of Russian positions. These articles often portrayed U.S. support for Ukraine negatively or attempted to stir opposition to particular American political figures or parties, illustrating the broad reach and sophisticated coordination behind Russia’s disinformation strategy. This blending of state and non-state actors, combined with the strategic use of cybersquatted websites, underscores the complexity and danger of Russian disinformation efforts, which continue to evolve and expand their reach. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security In a similar operation, the French government's disinformation watchdog, Viginum, exposed a vast Russian network in early 2024. This operation, known as Portal Kombat, involved 193 websites across 19 EU countries spreading Russian propaganda about the war in Ukraine [11]. Doppelganger, active since at least 2022, is tied to individuals working directly under the Russian Presidential Administration, including Sergei Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff. Kiriyenko and other sanctioned individuals were found to be violating U.S. law by using U.S.-based domains, which is prohibited under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Several of these domains were seized for trademark infringement, as they mimicked legitimate news outlets such as The Washington Post and Fox News.
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  Russian propaganda usesvarious methods to spread misinformation and distorts the facts. The "40 to 60" or "60 to 40" propaganda technique is a strategic method where 60% of the information is factual, while the remaining 40% is distorted or manipulative. This blend of truth and falsehood allows propagandists to create media that seem objective or independent, encouraging the audience to trust the content. By building credibility through accurate information, these outlets slip in manipulative content, which is often framed as hidden truths or conspiracy theories. This mix weakens critical thinking and makes the audience more susceptible to misinformation. The ratio between truth and falsehood may vary depending on the outlet or the specific narrative being pushed [12]. This tactic is particularly effective when used by media outlets that claim to be independent, but occasionally propagate Russian narratives. One example is Meduza, a Russian-language publication registered in Latvia that is often seen as reliable and independent, especially for its criticism of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, a 2022 analysis by the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy found that over 55% of Meduza's content reflected pro-Russian narratives, despite its outwardly anti-war stance. For instance, the publication spread claims such as "Ukraine betrayed the residents of Donbas," "the Ukrainian army is shelling civilians in Donetsk and Luhansk," and "the 2.2 KEY TACTICS OF RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION: Misinformation and distortion of facts. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Screenshot of Maxit Katz’s post about Crimea. Source: https://uacris is.org/en/ma xim-katz-the- other-type- of-russian- propaganda RussianDisinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Mariupol Drama Theater was destroyed from within." These claims were mixed with truthful reporting, blurring the lines between fact and fiction. This tactic fosters a perception that the situation is more complex than it actually is, leading readers to question established facts and become more receptive to Russian disinformation [12]. Beyond media outlets, Russian opposition bloggers and politicians also pose a threat, even when their content is popular among Ukrainians. Figures like Maxim Katz, a Russian politician and YouTube blogger who fled Russia after the 2022 invasion, appear to offer counter-propaganda but still disseminate harmful narratives. Katz has argued that "the Russian opposition owes nothing to Ukrainians" and that "those who did not overthrow Putin should not be blamed." Another influential figure, Ilya Varlamov, has denied Russia's 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine, traveled to occupied Crimea, and created content that distorts historical facts. These bloggers, while critical of Putin, often broadcast subtle pro-Russian narratives. By positioning themselves as victims of the regime, they appeal to emotions and create the illusion that they support Ukraine, while occasionally spreading Russian disinformation. One of the most pervasive tactics used in Russian disinformation campaigns is the manipulation of data. This involves altering, falsifying, or exaggerating statistics to fit a particular narrative. In the context of the war in Ukraine, Russia has frequently misrepresented data on a variety of topics, such as the performance of its military, the situation of Ukrainian refugees, and Ukraine’s demographic changes. By distorting these figures, Russia aims to influence public perception both domestically and internationally.
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  Another layer ofdata manipulation involves the selective interpretation of statistics. Politicians, media figures, and so-called experts often cherry-pick data points that support their argument while ignoring contradictory evidence. This selective presentation, coupled with a lack of proper context, can distort reality and reinforce cognitive biases among audiences. Even truthful statistics can be weaponized to mislead if they are presented in a way that promotes a false narrative. In conclusion, the blending of fact and falsehood, strategic data manipulation, and emotional appeals are key tools in Russia’s disinformation arsenal. These tactics are designed to confuse audiences, erode trust in legitimate sources of information, and create an environment where Russian narratives gain traction. By mixing truth with lies, Russian disinformation campaigns create a distorted reality that serves the Kremlin’s geopolitical aims. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Exploiting emotionally charged topics to manipulate public opinion. Russia has strategically exploited emotionally charged content as a powerful tool to manipulate public opinion, both domestically and internationally. By tapping into deeply rooted emotions—such as fear, anger, and pride—Russia amplifies its propaganda, often bypassing rational scrutiny and encouraging the public to accept distorted narratives without critical evaluation. These emotionally charged materials aim to evoke immediate reactions, solidify public support, and deflect dissent, making them an essential component of Russia's disinformation campaigns.
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security One key tactic involves the dissemination of pro-Russian military content designed to boost national morale and create a unified front within Russia. For example, videos showing women supporting Russian soldiers or clips of Ukrainian soldiers surrendering are intended to evoke sympathy and reinforce the idea of Russian military strength and righteousness. Such content stirs nationalistic sentiment, fostering a sense of pride and competence in Russia's military endeavors, while simultaneously stifling domestic opposition by presenting the war as both justified and successful. The emotional appeal works to consolidate public consensus, making it difficult for dissenting voices to gain traction [13]. Simultaneously, Russia produces emotionally manipulative content aimed at discrediting Ukraine and the West. By framing Ukraine as a nation riddled with neo-Nazi elements, Russia seeks to draw historical parallels with the Soviet Union’s fight against Nazi Germany, thereby justifying its invasion. For instance, Russian officials and media consistently refer to the Ukrainian government as a "neo-Nazi force," evoking fear and moral outrage, particularly among older generations who remember the horrors of World War II. This tactic plays on deep-seated fears, transforming the invasion into a moral crusade in the eyes of many Russians. One striking example of emotionally manipulative content is a viral 30-second video showing a woman angrily discarding an EU flag with the caption, "The French will not die for Ukraine." This video falsely implies that French citizens are protesting against their government's support for Ukraine, suggesting that Western nations are paying a heavy toll for their involvement. The post stirs immediate emotional reactions—frustration, fear, and skepticism—prompting viewers to share, comment, or further spread the misinformation. Only later, and perhaps through fact-checking, might viewers learn that the video was taken out of context and had nothing to do with Ukraine. However, by that time, the emotional response has already been triggered, and the misinformation has reached a wide audience [13]. Platforms like TikTok have become pivotal in spreading such propaganda, particularly through short video formats that are harder to track and regulate than traditional text- based posts. TikTok’s algorithm, which feeds users content based on previous viewing preferences rather than geographical location, enables Russian disinformation to reach a global audience. As of 2023, more than 12 million adult users in Ukraine alone were registered on TikTok, making the platform a significant battleground for influencing public opinion [14].
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  The viral natureof TikTok, combined with the platform’s rapid content consumption, makes it an ideal medium for disinformation campaigns. In 2023, TikTok identified approximately 12,000 fake accounts spreading Russian propaganda across Europe, Ukraine, and Russia. The deceptive techniques used in these videos vary, from altering audio tracks to misrepresenting footage, to crafting humorous content that trivializes serious issues. For example, a fake TikTok account impersonating a Ukrainian soldier circulated videos overlayed with misleading text and audio, designed to erode trust in the Ukrainian military and cast doubt on their ethical conduct. [14]. Russia’s use of emotionally charged disinformation on TikTok and other platforms extends beyond internal morale-building; it also serves to vilify Ukraine and the West, particularly through the recurring narrative of "de-Nazification." By framing its military actions as a liberation effort, Russia stokes fear among its citizens and sympathetic foreign audiences, encouraging them to view the invasion as a necessary moral imperative. This framing is particularly effective among older generations or specific ethnic groups who have historical connections to the fight against Nazism. Fake account of Ukrainian soldier spreading disinformation, eroding trust in the Ukrainian military. Source: https://rubryka.com/ en/article/rosijska- propaganda-u- tiktok/ Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Promoting conspiracy theories. Inconclusion, Russia’s exploitation of emotionally charged topics serves a dual purpose: it consolidates domestic support for its military actions while discrediting Ukraine and the West in the eyes of international and domestic audiences. Through manipulative content, particularly on platforms like TikTok, Russia sidesteps rational analysis and fosters emotional reactions, thereby achieving its disinformation objectives with remarkable efficiency. These efforts not only distort the facts but also leave lasting emotional imprints, making it more difficult for audiences to later separate truth from manipulation. Survey data reinforces the pervasiveness and efficacy of these campaigns. A May 2022 survey by VZIOM revealed that over a third of Russians adhere to conspiracy theories, with belief levels spiking to nearly half among older citizens (49%) and those reliant on state media (48%). Such findings underscore that state-sponsored narratives are not only reaching but resonating with Russia’s core demographics. These beliefs provide an essential layer of justification for government actions by embedding public perceptions of external threats, specifically from Western powers. This alignment between the state and popular belief fortifies a system where loyalty to the state narrative is paramount, allowing the Kremlin to maintain control over public opinion [15]. Russia’s use of conspiracy theories as state- sponsored disinformation is not just a propaganda tool; it’s a deliberate strategy to engineer public opinion and justify the Kremlin's actions. Unlike in democratic societies, where conspiracy theories typically emerge from popular mistrust of authority, in Russia they are strategically manufactured by the ruling elite, offering an alternative reality that validates government policies while stoking a perception of perpetual Western hostility. This top-down approach to conspiracy dissemination speaks to Russia’s authoritarian political structure, where state-sponsored narratives blur the line between truth and fiction, creating fertile ground for anti- Western sentiment. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Top 3 Russian Covid19 Narratives Source: https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/jabbed-in- the-back-mapping-russian-and-chinese- information-operations-during-the-covid-19- pandemic/
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  The Kremlin’s renewedaccusations of U.S. bio-laboratories in Ukraine illustrate how Russia leverages past Cold War narratives, revising them to fit contemporary contexts. Following the invasion of Ukraine, Russian Ministry of Defense spokesperson Igor Konashenkov claimed the U.S. was conducting biological experiments in Ukrainian labs to spread pathogens, a claim with roots in Soviet-era disinformation campaigns. This narrative hearkens back to Soviet accusations during the Korean War and later the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, when the U.S. was blamed for creating bioweapons intended to harm the communist bloc. These recycled accusations do more than just mislead; they establish a continuum of Western enmity, positioning Russia’s military actions as defensive maneuvers within a hostile global landscape. The extensive output on the subject—over 92,000 publications in 2022 alone—demonstrates the Kremlin’s commitment to reinforcing this perception of an imminent biosecurity threat [15]. Example of Russian disinformation campaign about biolaboratories. Source: https://aspeniaonline.it /a-state-of-mind-how- conspiracy-theories- became-the-kremlins- ideology/ Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Similarly, the narrativeof NATO’s supposed promise of non-expansion eastward, though debunked by Mikhail Gorbachev himself, remains deeply embedded in Russian discourse. The appeal of this theory lies in its emotive framing of Russia as a victim of Western deceit, overshadowing the historical Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which Russia agreed to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. Yet, by selectively emphasizing a broken “promise” regarding NATO, the Kremlin shifts public focus away from its own violations of international agreements, repositioning NATO’s presence as the primary source of regional tension. This narrative has not only fueled domestic support for anti-NATO sentiment but also found a receptive audience in far-left and far-right groups in Europe, highlighting its global reach. By casting NATO as the aggressor, Russian state media reframes Russia’s actions as a defensive stand against imperialistic Western forces, justifying its territorial ambitions under the guise of victimhood [15,16]. The cumulative effect of these conspiracy theories is the erosion of critical thought among the Russian populace, where skepticism about information—whether state- sanctioned or factual—becomes a default stance. As conspiracies become indistinguishable from reality, public distrust grows, making citizens more amenable to state-controlled narratives. This systemic skepticism bolsters the Kremlin’s power by entrenching an “us versus them” mentality, ensuring that narratives aligning with state interests dominate, and genuine truth is sidelined. By distorting facts to present Russia as a besieged civilization, Kremlin disinformation shapes a worldview that solidifies its control domestically while destabilizing democratic discourse globally. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Russian disinformation campaignsstrategically exploit and amplify internal divisions within target countries to destabilize societies, weaken democratic institutions, and undermine political stability. By identifying and deepening existing societal cleavages— such as those related to ethnicity, ideology, or political affiliation—these campaigns create environments of distrust and dysfunction. This tactic serves as a form of hybrid warfare that, while less overt than military action, is profoundly effective in degrading a target country’s unity, making coordinated responses to foreign threats more difficult. The mechanisms used in fostering these divisions involve coordinated social media influence operations, the promotion of false or misleading narratives, and the deployment of highly targeted content designed to appeal to specific groups within society. Troll farms, such as Russia's Internet Research Agency (IRA), leverage social media platforms to mimic domestic actors and fuel polarization by pushing far-left and far-right narratives, exacerbating ideological divisions, and creating an impression of organic domestic conflict. Through the repetition of inflammatory messages, these actors undermine trust in public institutions and instigate skepticism toward government, media, and democratic processes [3]. Fostering internal divisions within target countries to undermine political stability. Infographic: Russian disinformation during the 2016 US elections. Source: https://ora.ox.ac.uk /objects/uuid:620c e18f-69ed-4294- aa85- 184af2b5052e Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 27.
  The 2016 U.S.presidential election is a prominent example of this strategy’s effectiveness. Russian disinformation efforts targeted racial and ideological divides, promoting polarizing topics like immigration, law enforcement practices, and national identity. By creating Facebook pages and Twitter accounts that posed as American activists from both sides of the political spectrum, Russian agents were able to infiltrate online discussions and amplify tensions. This campaign contributed to a highly polarized political climate and lasting public distrust in democratic processes, fueling controversies over election integrity that persist today. The impact extended beyond the 2016 election, setting the stage for subsequent political polarization and decreasing public confidence in institutional authority [3; 17-18]. The 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom is another example where Russian disinformation leveraged social divisions to create a more polarized society. Russia amplified both pro- and anti-Brexit narratives, exploiting anxieties around national sovereignty, immigration, and economic stability. Through a combination of exaggerated or fabricated claims—such as the potential for uncontrolled immigration or economic ruin— Russian influence heightened the ideological rift between “Leave” and “Remain” factions. This polarization intensified mistrust, fostered instability, and contributed to a political deadlock that hampered the UK government’s capacity to effectively address pressing national and international issues in the years that followed [3; 19]. Russian Methods of Interference in Brexit, Dutch referendum and US Elections. Source: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/methods-of-foreign-electoral-interference/ Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 28.
  Ukraine’s Euromaidan protestsand the subsequent Donbas conflict offer a clear example of how Russian disinformation can create lasting fractures within a society. During Euromaidan, Russian media and online platforms characterized the protests as a Western- sponsored coup, painting Ukrainian patriots as violent extremists. This narrative inflamed existing divides between the pro-European West and the pro-Russian East, sowing distrust and resentment among Ukrainian citizens. By portraying Ukraine as deeply divided, Russia justified its annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine, destabilizing the country’s social fabric and paving the way for further conflict. The lingering effects of this campaign have hindered Ukraine’s internal cohesion and complicated its efforts to build a unified national identity in the face of external threats. These examples illustrate that fostering internal divisions is not merely about spreading false information but rather about strategically weakening the target nation’s societal bonds and democratic resilience. Russian disinformation disrupts trust in institutions, erodes social cohesion, and creates an environment where polarized narratives dominate, leaving societies more vulnerable to external influence. Countering this form of hybrid warfare requires coordinated efforts to enhance media literacy, rebuild trust in democratic institutions, and fortify international cooperation to detect and neutralize foreign disinformation campaigns. Recommendations To counter the divisive impact of disinformation, enhancing media literacy, fostering collaboration with social media companies, and strengthening international cooperation are essential. First, bolstering media literacy programs can address the public’s susceptibility to disinformation. Education systems must integrate critical thinking skills that enable individuals to identify false information and differentiate between credible sources and manipulative content. Programs aimed at increasing awareness about disinformation tactics can empower citizens to discern facts from polarizing narratives. By fostering a society that can independently evaluate information, states can mitigate the societal impacts of disinformation. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 29.
  create an accountableenvironment where false content is more easily recognized by users, especially on contentious issues like elections and public health. By enhancing transparency and adopting standards for labeling and reporting false or malicious content, social media companies can reduce the amplification of divisive messages. Additionally, platforms can benefit from guidelines that clarify user reporting procedures, thereby fostering a community-based approach to identifying harmful disinformation. Collaboration between governments and social media companies is also critical in combating disinformation, as these platforms are often the primary vehicles for spreading false narratives. Governments should work with social media platforms to develop efficient systems for identifying and flagging disinformation. This collaboration can help Collaboration between governments and social media companies to flag false content International cooperation to dismantle networks spreading disinformation. International cooperation further strengthens efforts to dismantle cross-border disinformation networks, as the reach and impact of disinformation campaigns often extend beyond national boundaries. Shared intelligence and collaborative task forces across nations can allow for real-time tracking and neutralization of disinformation operations originating abroad. Furthermore, global standards for accountability and platform transparency would help align national efforts, creating a united approach to combating disinformation’s spread. This cooperation is vital to building resilience across democracies, as states work together to counteract the destabilizing effects of foreign influence campaigns. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 30.
  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS
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  RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION AND RELIGIOUSFREEDOMS The Russian government’s approach to religious freedoms reveals a systematic attempt to prioritize the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), a deeply political, propagandistic organization, strongly connected to the Kremlin and aligned with the ideology of Russian imperialism, and its anti-cult organizations, including RACIRS, while marginalizing minority religious communities through legal repression and ideological manipulation. Although Russia’s Constitution formally guarantees freedom of religion, this guarantee is undermined by policies and laws that elevate the ROC, allowing it to operate as an extension of the state’s nationalist agenda, while minority faiths are criminalized and constrained. Jehovah’s Witnesses are among the most heavily targeted groups, facing an intensifying crackdown that has escalated in recent years. In 2023, Memorial, a human rights organization, identified 836 Jehovah’s Witnesses subjected to criminal prosecution, a substantial increase from 486 cases in 2022. Of these individuals, 385 are awaiting sentencing, with many detained, under house arrest, or listed as fugitives. Meanwhile, 353 individuals have already been sentenced, with many facing imprisonment, forced labor, or suspended sentences. Importantly, none of these Jehovah’s Witnesses had engaged in violent acts or incitement, underscoring that their prosecution is strictly due to their religious beliefs, not security concerns. This criminalization of religious identity reflects an effort to silence any group perceived as ideologically incompatible with state-sanctioned Russian Orthodoxy [20]. Evangelical Christians and other Protestant groups also face significant repression. In April 2023, a court in Bryansk convicted Mikhail Lipsky, a pastor of the First Church of Evangelical Christian Baptists, of “violating legislation on freedom of conscience and religion” by holding a worship service in a public cultural center. This ruling exemplifies the state’s use of administrative controls to restrict non-Orthodox religious expression under the guise of enforcing public order and conformity. Evangelical and Protestant communities, which often emphasize active missionary work, are particularly vulnerable to these tactics. By criminalizing missionary activity as an offense against public order, the Russian state disrupts these groups’ ability to gather and communicate freely [20]. Violations of Religious Freedoms in Russia Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 32.
  The state’s preferentialtreatment of the ROC further highlights Russia’s selective approach to religious freedoms. Independent observers note that Russian authorities interpret the ROC’s constitutionally recognized “special role” as grounds for exclusive privileges, including state-funded security services, official vehicles for ROC leaders, and preferential access to property. This support enables the ROC to act as an extension of the state, reinforcing a religious-nationalist narrative that strengthens state control over Russian identity. According to the SOVA Center, the ROC receives more state-granted property than any other religious organization, solidifying its dominance while limiting the capacity of other faiths to operate on equal footing. Through this privileged relationship, the ROC is positioned not only as the spiritual authority within Russia but also as a cultural institution aligned with Russian geopolitical ambitions. This religious favoritism also extends into the state’s ideological justification for its actions abroad, particularly in Ukraine. Russian leaders frequently frame the invasion of Ukraine as a “denazification” campaign, drawing distorted parallels between contemporary conflicts and WWII. In 2023, President Putin repeatedly used antisemitic tropes to attack Ukraine’s leadership, suggesting that Western powers had installed a Jewish president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in Ukraine to “mask” the country’s “anti- human essence” and Nazi sympathies. Kirill, the Russian Orthodox Church bishop These statements, coupled with Foreign Minister Lavrov’s Holocaust references accusing the West of a “final solution” against Russia, reflect a calculated effort to exploit historical atrocities to bolster support for Russia’s actions. Holocaust experts and international observers have condemned this rhetoric as a manipulation of history that trivializes the Holocaust, dishonoring the memory of its victims while using religious and ideological arguments to legitimize Russia’s aggression [20]. Through these policies and narratives, Russia’s government systematically constrains religious freedoms while leveraging religion as a tool of political control, both domestically and internationally. This approach not only positions the ROC as the dominant religious authority within Russia but also uses religious Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 33.
  In Crimea, Donbas,and other Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, Russia’s approach to religious freedoms reflects a calculated attempt to suppress religious diversity while imposing a dominant Russian Orthodox framework. The Kremlin systematically targets religious groups that do not conform to Russian Orthodox structures, particularly those affiliated with Ukrainian or Western traditions, such as Baptists, Adventists, and Protestant communities. About 400 of Ukraine’s 2,300 Baptist churches have been lost during the war with Russia, according to Yaroslav Pyzh, president of the Ukrainian Baptist Theological Seminary [21]. Through a combination of repressive measures and disinformation, Russia aims to weaken independent religious expression and create a monolithic religious environment under its control. Occupation authorities employ a range of legal and administrative mechanisms designed to isolate and penalize communities outside the Orthodox Church of Russia. For example, these authorities enforce laws requiring annual re-registration of religious groups, which subjects them to invasive scrutiny and documentation demands. and historical claims to undermine the legitimacy of religious and cultural pluralism, aligning Russian Orthodoxy with state-sanctioned nationalism. Ultimately, these actions signal a broader Kremlin strategy to suppress dissenting identities and centralize ideological authority under the Russian Orthodox banner, erasing religious diversity within Russia and co-opting religious narratives to justify Russian expansionism. Violations in Occupied Territories of Ukraine Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 34.
  Many Protestant communitieshave reported regular harassment, including raids on gatherings and surveillance of worship activities. Such tactics restrict their ability to gather freely and pressure them into passive compliance or dissolution. The administrative burdens placed on these groups erode their support bases and diminish their organizational capabilities, ultimately weakening their influence and visibility [22]. Through these policies and narratives, Russia’s government systematically constrains religious freedoms while leveraging religion as a tool of political control, both domestically and internationally. This approach not only positions the ROC as the dominant religious authority within Russia but also uses religious and historical claims to undermine the legitimacy of religious and cultural pluralism, aligning Russian Orthodoxy with state- sanctioned nationalism. Ultimately, these actions signal a broader Kremlin strategy to suppress dissenting identities and centralize ideological authority under the Russian Orthodox banner, erasing religious diversity within Russia and co-opting religious narratives to justify Russian expansionism. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security In addition to bureaucratic repression, physical violence and property expropriation further demonstrate the extent of this suppression. Pro-Russian militias in Donbas have targeted congregants and clergy with threats and physical assaults, while religious structures have often been subjected to shelling or repurposed for military use. Distribution of reported Russian persecution events against Ukrainians. Source: https://releaseinternational.org/russia-weaponising-religion-and-persecuting-churches-in-ukraine/
• 35.
  A significant numberof Baptist churches have been expropriated by occupation authorities and converted into military encampments, field hospitals, or storage facilities. In some cases, religious sites belonging to one faith have been appropriated by another, underscoring the systematic nature of this repression. Many Protestant properties have been destroyed, and some churches have been forcibly closed by occupation officials [20;22]. Disinformation and propaganda serve as central tools in this strategy, with Russian media frequently portraying Protestant and evangelical communities as “agents of the West” or “extremists.” This framing positions these groups as threats to the stability and security of the region, fostering a climate of suspicion toward minority religious communities and public organizations. Such narratives enable occupation authorities to target Baptists, Adventists, and other groups under anti-extremism laws, justifying detentions, fines, and the confiscation of community property. By criminalizing routine religious expression, occupation authorities systematically dismantle community structures and discourage open worship. The repression of these communities highlights Russia’s disregard for religious plurality in occupied territories, underscoring its intent to enforce a homogenous religious environment. The Kremlin seeks to replace diverse faith practices with the Orthodox Church of Russia as the central institution, channeling both spiritual and nationalistic loyalty toward itself. In Crimea, this has led to significant reductions in the number of Protestant communities able to operate, while in Donbas, Russian-backed militias maintain significant control, leading to aggressive suppression of religious practices. Many Protestant congregations have disbanded or relocated due to threats of violence and persistent harassment from local militias, which view them as ideological threats. The Kremlin's strategy of marginalizing Baptists, Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other non-Orthodox communities enforces a religious hierarchy that subordinates all non- Orthodox faiths. This approach not only strips religious minorities of their rights but also systematically dismantles the cultural and spiritual fabric that once characterized these regions, replacing it with a singular Russian Orthodox identity. Such homogenization violates international humanitarian laws, which mandate the protection of religious freedoms under occupation, reflecting the Kremlin’s broader goal of erasing Ukrainian cultural and religious identity from the public sphere in occupied territories. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 36.
  In Ukraine, theRussian Apologetic Center under the Moscow Patriarchate's Synodal Department for Youth Affairs was established in 2011, with Pavel Broide serving as its coordinator. The center became the official representative of the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religions and Sects (RACIRS) in Ukraine in 2012, allowing it to expand its influence and activities. It actively engaged in disseminating disinformation favorable to Russia under the guise of "combating sects and protecting society." The center regularly hosted conferences that served as platforms for promoting narratives aligned with the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia, discussing themes such as "Holy Rus," "common Russian traditions," and the "seizure of power by sects." Analysis of the events organized by the center before 2014 indicates that they played a preparatory role in shaping pro-Russian public opinion. Leaked correspondence from 2016 related to Vladislav Surkov, known as Russia's "gray cardinal," revealed Broide's role in destabilizing political processes in Ukraine. This correspondence showed that Russian authorities utilized information wars and political technologies to exert control both domestically and abroad. ROC as a tool of Russian Disinformation in Ukraine Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Source: https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/russian-church-declares-war-against-ukraine-holy/
• 37.
  Pavel Broide Moreover, Russiauses the Russian Orthodox Church and affiliated organizations as instruments for so-called "anti-sect" and "anti-cult" activities to expand its influence on the internal politics of other countries. By claiming to combat "dangerous cults," these organizations build trusting relationships with media and law enforcement in various nations, leveraging these connections to serve Russia's interests. Members of the anti-cult network spread Kremlin-favorable rhetoric abroad, advocate for anti-democratic laws, and promote divisive narratives that destabilize other states from within. It is through such "anti- cult" organizations that Russia has conducted its disinformation campaigns, particularly in Ukraine, actively shaping narratives necessary for the Kremlin in Ukrainian society since the 2000s. Agents of the anti-cult network and the associated rhetoric were employed to create artificial justifications that Russia used to legitimize its military aggression against Ukraine. Key figures in the Russian influence anti-cult network include Alexander Dvorkin, the founder and director of RACIRS, and the Center for Religious Studies named after Irenaeus of Lyons, established in 1993 with the blessing of Patriarch Alexy II. Dvorkin, known as the "main fighter against sects in Russia," acts as the ideologist of the international anti-cult network, promoting Nazi geopolitical interests in various countries, including Ukraine. He has introduced terms like "totalitarian sect," which have been widely utilized to dehumanize and persecute organizations unfavorable to the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church [25]. Broide’s media strategies represented a manipulative approach to influencing public opinion in Ukraine. He proposed creating specialized internet resources targeting specific audience segments with tailored disinformation goals. His activities contributed significantly to the escalation of the conflict, resulting in ongoing military actions. Analysis of Broide's role as a RACIRS agent reveals that the anti-cult theme was a tool for integrating into the media landscape and forming a network of influence agents across various public life spheres. The resources created under this strategy were involved in a large- scale disinformation campaign masquerading as anti-cult activity [24]. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 38.
  Dvorkin has receivedhigh honors from the Russian Orthodox Church, including the Order of St. Sergius of Radonezh III degree, the Order of St. Innocent of Moscow III degree, and the Order of St. Nestor the Chronicler of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as well as the Order of Prince Daniel of Moscow III degree. With the blessing of Patriarch Kirill, he was awarded the Patriarchal sign "For Contribution to the Development of Russian Literature." His activities and comments are actively covered by the Orthodox Russian channel "Spas," which is under EU sanctions, and the ultra-right religious channel "Tsargrad," which promotes the transformation of Russia into the "Third Rome." Under Dvorkin's influence, the law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" was adopted in 1997, restricting the activities of new religious movements. In 2002, the law on combating extremist activities was approved, allowing for the prosecution of religious organizations and significantly expanding the power and influence of both Dvorkin and anti-cult activists. In 2016, the "Yarovaya Law" was enacted, which further limited the activities of religious organizations. In 2017, Jehovah's Witnesses, whom Dvorkin actively discredited throughout his career, were banned in Russia as an "extremist organization." The Center for Religious Studies named after Irenaeus of Lyons, led by Dvorkin, maintains constant interaction with anti-cult organizations in Russia and abroad, serving as the main center of RACIRS, established in 2006. The association's leadership includes Professor A. L. Dvorkin as president, with Protopriest Alexander Novopashin and Protopriest Arseny Vilkov as vice-presidents, and Priest Alexander Kuzmin as the responsible secretary. An annual report prepared by the Institute of Freedom of Conscience with the participation of the Moscow Helsinki Group in 2012 indicates that the Irenaeus of Lyons Center, as an organization affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, received a state grant of 2.5 million rubles. Dvorkin served as a subdeacon at the Church of the Life- Giving Trinity in Kholokhi under Protopriest Alexei Uminsky, with whom he previously had close ties. However, after Patriarch Kirill defrocked Uminsky, Dvorkin publicly stated that "for him, Protopriest Uminsky no longer exists." Reports indicate that former Russian Justice Minister Konovalov studied under Dvorkin. In 2009, Dvorkin was appointed head of the government Expert Council on conducting state religious studies, established at Konovalov's initiative. Alexander Dvorkin Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  The fact thatthe "anti-cult" direction is inseparable from the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church is further confirmed by the predominance of missionary centers affiliated with dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church, both in Russia and abroad, within the RACIRS association led by Dvorkin. The organization and operational model of these "anti- cult" centers within RACIRS, including the Center for Religious Studies named after Irenaeus of Lyons, can be traced back to a unified template established by the Nazi Apologetics Center founded in 1921 by anti-Semitic Protestant pastor Walter Künnet. The German Center's objective was to combat free thinking and all non-Protestant movements, actively gathering materials and methods to fight disfavored groups. These methods were later utilized by the Gestapo and Nazi leadership for propaganda against the Jewish people and for organizing genocide. In the 1950s, Bavarian pastor Wilhelm Haack became the heir to Künnet's legacy, organizing a vigorous struggle against dissent in Germany. Together with Danish national Johannes Aagaard, he founded an anti-cult organization called "Dialogue Center" in the 1970s, where Dvorkin trained in the early 1990s, later referring to Aagaard and Haack as his teachers. The continuity of knowledge and methods in anti-cult activity has thus never been interrupted, preserving a lineage from the Third Reich to the present day. Through the direct chain "Künnet – Haack and Aagaard – Dvorkin," the knowledge and methods used by the Nazis to suppress the rights and freedoms of citizens were passed on to Dvorkin, who integrated them into the work of RACIRS, where they are currently employed to serve Russia's totalitarian interests worldwide [26]. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) highlighted in 2020 the dangerous anti-democratic influence of Dvorkin and his anti-cult network, unequivocally emphasizing the threat posed by their activities and associated structures to religious freedom and democratic values in the region. In this complex landscape, Irina Kremenovskaya, director of the “Center for Economic and Legal Research” and the “Hovori” internet portal, has most likely emerged as a significant figure in the Russian anti-cult movement in Ukraine, apparently effectively acting as an agent for the ROC. As can be seen, following the departure of another key figure Pavel Broide, Kremenovskaya has attempted to fill the position of the “chief anti-cultist” within the Russian Association of Centers for Study of Religions and Sects (RACIRS) in Ukraine. Numerous pieces of evidence suggest that her rhetoric and actions align closely with Russian disinformation campaigns, demonstrating direct coordination with the Russian anti-cult network spearheaded by Alexander Dvorkin. This collaboration obviously aims to divide the Ukrainian population, suppress their rights and freedoms, and justify the aggressor's military actions on Ukrainian territory.. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 40.
  Kremenovskaya continues Dvorkin'snarrative regarding the influence of American “cults” on Ukrainian governance, thereby emphasizing the perceived weakness of the state and discrediting its institutions. She dehumanizes and insults American organizations such as the Church of Scientology, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, along with the non-religious organization ALLATRA, perpetuating a destructive narrative beneficial to Russia’s totalitarian ambitions [27]. Moreover, Kremenovskaya has systematically discredited respected Ukrainian scholars and experts simply for offering professional evaluations of religious movements that diverge from those endorsed by RACIRS [28]. She praises Russia's extremist laws that have facilitated widespread persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia, which have been deemed illegal by the European Court of Human Rights while lamenting the absence of similar legislation in Ukraine [29]. This mirrors the previous efforts of Broide, another RACIRS agent, who aimed to implement such anti-democratic laws in Ukraine. Irina Kremenovskaya The observed evidence of Kremenovskaya's systematic collaboration with RACIRS and her ties to Russian anti-cult groups, characterized by an overtly hostile stance toward Ukraine and its sovereignty, is compelling. For example, her articles have been featured on RACIRS-associated platforms, showcasing her alignment with their objectives [30]. Kremenovskaya has collaborated with radical anti-Ukrainian figures like Alexander Neveev, frequently citing him as an authority in her publications while directing her readers to his blog, which actively promotes anti-Ukrainian narratives justifying Russia's military aggression [31, 32, 33]. Kremenovskaya's usage of the classic RACIRS rhetoric and methods of persecution is evident in her publications aimed at various Ukrainian organizations. Her articles exhibit a systematic employment of arguments characteristic of the anti-cult movement, which is ideologically rooted in the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religions and Sects (RACIRS). Journalists and analysts have noted that her rhetoric bears significant resemblance to the narratives disseminated by representatives of the so-called "Russian world" and the Moscow Patriarchate [34, 35]. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 41.
  The exposure ofKremenovskaya's subversive activities has been aided by the case of a defamation campaign against the American organization ALLATRA, initiated by RACIRS in 2015. Kremenovskaya publicly claimed influence over investigations and judicial proceedings concerning the organization. The discrediting of ALLATRA is a direct result of Russian disinformation efforts, with the characteristic anti-cult rhetoric employed in this campaign first appearing on sites affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate and RACIRS [36]. Over the past nine years, Kremenovskaya has perpetuated narratives aligned with RACIRS, publishing defamatory materials against ALLATRA and its participants while using highly dehumanizing and hateful rhetoric. She later admitted to attempting to instigate a criminal case against ALLATRA and its participants, evidently forming an influence group to pressure law enforcement. These actions were undertaken to enact favorable decisions for Russia regarding the suppression of the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens. Despite the resilience of Ukrainian democracy in withstanding these unlawful actions, Kremenovskaya, as can be seen, exploited the military situation to advance Russian agendas by manipulating individuals within law enforcement to initiate criminal proceedings against members of ALLATRA. Furthermore, she has publicly confessed to writing expert assessments and justifications for the charges against ALLATRA, despite such actions being unlawful when conducted by an interested party [37]. The apparent integration of Kremenovskaya's actions within the ROC's broader geopolitical strategies reveals a concerning dimension of how religious institutions can be co-opted for state-sponsored activities, posing significant threats to regional stability and the integrity of democratic institutions in Ukraine and beyond. . Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 42.
  Historically, the ROChas had a complex relationship with the Russian state, oscillating between independence and subservience to political authority. Under President Vladimir Putin, this relationship has evolved into a strategic alliance where the ROC actively supports state objectives. This is particularly evident in its outreach to Orthodox communities in the Balkans, where it seeks to reassert Russian influence amid growing tensions with the West. In recent years, the Kremlin has leveraged the ROC to exert pressure on neighboring Orthodox churches. For instance, in North Macedonia, Russian agents disguised as clergy have been reported to engage in espionage and political manipulation. The ROC's actions in this context are not isolated but part of a broader strategy to undermine local church authority and assert Russian dominance over the Orthodox Christian community in the region. Reports have indicated that Russian clergy are actively recruiting local church Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Russia’s violation of religious freedoms in the EU and US The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has increasingly emerged as a pivotal instrument of the Kremlin’s foreign policy, particularly within Eastern Europe and the Balkans. This relationship reflects a broader strategy wherein the church operates not merely as a religious institution but as an extension of Russian geopolitical interests. The implications of this dynamic are profound, raising concerns about national security, regional stability, and the integrity of democratic institutions across several nations.
• 43.
  officials, thereby infiltratingreligious institutions to foster loyalty to Moscow. This infiltration poses a significant challenge to NATO, as destabilizing activities in Macedonia could undermine the alliance's southern flank [38;39] Montenegro serves as a critical case study illustrating the Kremlin’s ambitions in the Balkans through the ROC. The church's influence in Montenegro has been a focal point for Russian strategic interests, with President Putin allegedly aiming to leverage the ROC to destabilize the nation. Should Montenegro become compromised, the ramifications could ripple throughout the Balkans, endangering NATO’s collective security and potentially revitalizing nationalist movements in the region. The situation emphasizes the need for NATO and Western governments to remain vigilant in monitoring the ROC’s activities, recognizing its capacity to influence political and social dynamics. The response from several Eastern European countries to the ROC’s activities has been increasingly assertive. For instance, in Latvia, the Orthodox Church has sought to distance itself from the Moscow Patriarchate, actively requesting autokefaly (independence). This move is motivated by the desire to sever ties with the ROC, which has been associated with the Kremlin's aggressive foreign policy and support for military actions in Ukraine. Latvian President Egils Levits has articulated the necessity of this separation, linking it directly to national security concerns. Estonia has taken a more drastic step by contemplating the designation of the Moscow Patriarchate as a terrorist organization. This proposal from Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets reflects the growing sentiment that the ROC represents not only a religious body but a potential source of instability that undermines democratic values and security. The rhetoric around the ROC's alignment with Kremlin policies parallels concerns over radical Islamist movements, indicating a recognition of the church as a vehicle for subversive state activity [40] The expulsion of clergy in Bulgaria accused of espionage highlights the acute tensions surrounding Russian influence in Eastern Europe. The Bulgarian authorities, identifying these individuals as agents of the Kremlin, emphasize the ROC's role in promoting Russian geopolitical interests at the expense of national sovereignty. Such actions reveal the church's operational role as a tool of espionage, with reports suggesting that Russian intelligence services utilize clergy to recruit informants and gather intelligence in various nations [41]. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 44.
  Recommendations To address thegrowing threat of disinformation that infringes upon religious freedoms, it is crucial to establish comprehensive monitoring systems designed to track and report instances of disinformation campaigns targeting various religious communities. This involves not only identifying specific narratives and tactics employed by perpetrators but also documenting the adverse impacts these campaigns have on the ability of individuals and groups to freely express their faith and practice their beliefs. Regular reporting can serve to inform policymakers, civil society organizations, and the public about the extent and nature of these violations, fostering greater awareness and understanding of the issues at hand. To prevent the influence of Russian disinformation, countries should closely monitor and scrutinize individuals actively disseminating anti-cult rhetoric within the information space. It is essential to consider that even in the absence of an apparent connection to the Russian Orthodox Church and despite the seemingly "anti-Russian" orientation of their activities, this does not preclude the possibility of their role as agents of the Kremlin. Anti- cult rhetoric, lobbying for restrictive anti-democratic laws, and the persecution of certain population groups within a country primarily serve Russia's interests, which aim to establish a totalitarian regime and destabilize the internal situation in other nations. It is recommended to develop mechanisms for monitoring and analyzing such "anti-cult" activities to respond promptly to potential threats and protect democratic processes in free democratic countries. In addition, international religious organizations should actively engage in dialogues aimed at exposing and countering disinformation that targets faith groups. By bringing together leaders from different religious traditions, civil society actors, and media representatives, these dialogues can create a platform for sharing experiences, strategies, and best practices. Collaborative efforts will enhance the capacity of religious communities to combat misinformation and articulate their narratives more effectively in the public sphere. Such initiatives can help build coalitions that promote interfaith solidarity and resilience against disinformation, emphasizing the importance of accurate representations of religious diversity and the value of coexistence. Furthermore, there is an urgent need for advocacy aimed at establishing and enforcing legal frameworks that hold accountable those entities that promote religious discrimination through disinformation. This includes the development of robust legal instruments that specifically address hate speech, misinformation, and the use of propaganda against religious groups. Such laws should include clear definitions and provisions for prosecution, Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 45.
  ensuring that violatorsface appropriate penalties for their actions. Legal measures must be complemented by educational campaigns that inform the public about the legal consequences of promoting religious discrimination, thereby fostering a culture of respect and tolerance. Additionally, governments should work collaboratively with civil society organizations to create monitoring bodies that can oversee the implementation of these legal measures and ensure that complaints regarding disinformation and religious discrimination are taken seriously. This oversight can help build trust within communities that their rights are being protected and that their grievances will be addressed in a timely and just manner. Ultimately, a multifaceted approach that combines monitoring, dialogue, and legal accountability is essential to effectively combat disinformation that undermines democratic laws safeguarding religious freedoms. By prioritizing these actions, we can contribute to creating a more inclusive society that strengthens democracy, and where all individuals have the opportunity to practice their faith freely, without fear of discrimination or persecution. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 46.
  Russian disinformation campaignsin Ukraine and Syria reflect a sophisticated strategy to shape perceptions, legitimize military actions, and stymie international responses. By deploying narratives that obscure facts, manipulate public sentiment, and exploit existing geopolitical divisions, Russia’s disinformation serves as a key instrument of influence, capable of altering both domestic and international realities. In Ukraine, a core narrative that emerged from the first days of Russia’s invasion was that victory was inevitable—even before the conflict fully escalated. On March 8, Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky stated that Kyiv saw it as “practically impossible” to recognize Crimea as part of Russia or acknowledge the sovereignty of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, implying that time and negotiations would eventually sway Ukraine’s stance. This framing served to portray Russia’s demands as not only justified but also destined to prevail. Just one day later, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced that Russia’s goal of “demilitarizing” Ukraine was nearly complete, pressuring Ukraine to halt its “military actions” as though resistance was futile. Russian state-controlled media echoed this rhetoric, portraying support for the invasion as widespread and consensual. Reports from Kommersant suggested that support for the “special operation” had risen by 9% since late February, with public backing reaching 74%. This self-reinforcing narrative of inevitability aimed to psychologically disarm both Ukrainian resistance and international opposition by presenting Russian victory as a foregone conclusion supported by Russian citizens [42]. Disinformation in active conflicts: Case studies on Russian Disinformation during the war in Ukraine and the Syrian conflict Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security President Vladimir Putin's framing of the conflict frequently employed religious and historical rhetoric that demonized not only Ukrainian leadership but also religious and ethnic minorities. When announcing Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine, Putin likened Ukrainian officials to far-right nationalists and neo-Nazis, distorting the historical context of World War II to mobilize support by invoking the collective memory of Russian society regarding Nazi Germany. He characterized the invasion as a necessity to "demilitarize and denazify Ukraine," despite a lack of corroborating evidence for claims of genocide against Russian-speaking citizens in Ukraine. These narratives often omit or distort the Holocaust, further intertwining Russian nationalism with anti-Semitic tropes, such as questioning the legitimacy of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's Jewish identity. High-ranking officials, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, have perpetuated anti-Semitic rhetoric, suggesting that Jews are responsible for their own persecution, which exemplifies the troubling intersection of nationalism and historical distortion used to justify aggression. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has launched investigations into war crimes committed by the Russian forces daily. Russia has denied these accusations and instead claimed that Ukrainian authorities staged the crimes, as in the case of Bucha. According to Russia, all bodies of the people in the photos and videos published by the official Kyiv don’t exhibit postmortem rigidity or lividity, and the blood in their wounds is not clotted. This means that those corpses are in fact actors and their deaths are either a fabrication by the Ukrainian authorities or a result of the crimes of Ukrainian “Nazis.” [39]. Since the start of Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies have been engaged in collecting evidence and investigating war crimes. Ukrainian war crimes prosecutors also work with mobile justice teams supported by forensic specialists and international legal experts. They conduct joint visits to deoccupied territories and collect reports about the inhumane treatment of civilians and other crimes. They also collect evidence from battlefields, including body parts and DNA samples. Ukraine is utilizing some DNA databases and rapid DNA technologies for human remains identification and Russian war crime documentation. For instance, last year Ukraine received provided by French and American partners; the labs are driven around deoccupied territories in police vans, enabling teams to process evidence in real time. This equipment significantly speeds up the identification of thousands of dead Ukrainians and the collection of evidence for hundreds of war crime cases. Investigating and prosecuting war crimes can play a crucial role in bringing Russia to justice for the actions Russian troops have committed against Ukrainians.
• 48.
  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security In Syria, Russia’s disinformation strategy mirrored its approach in Ukraine by casting its intervention as a moral obligation, aligning with the global counter-terrorism agenda. Russian media depicted Assad’s regime as a stabilizing force defending Syria against extremism, obscuring the extensive evidence of human rights abuses committed by Assad’s forces. By framing opposition forces as “foreign-backed terrorists,” Russian disinformation legitimized the intervention and cast opponents of Assad’s regime as destabilizing actors. This narrative gained traction internationally, complicating the global discourse around Syria and enabling Russia to maintain a stronghold without facing unified condemnation. disinformation targeting Syrian humanitarians and human rights defenders on Twitter between 2015 and 2021. Source: Deadly Disinformation The Deadly Disinformation report by The Syria Campaign illustrates the real-world consequences of Russia’s disinformation. Russian-backed falsehoods have systematically attacked humanitarian groups, such as the White Helmets, who were depicted as propaganda tools of the West. By casting doubt on the credibility of humanitarian organizations and discrediting their documentation of war crimes, Russian disinformation further complicated international responses and delayed decisive action. Policymakers interviewed in the report revealed that Russian disinformation sowed enough doubt to stymie international intervention in Syria, even in the face of clear atrocities. Through this prolonged “information fog,” Russia effectively neutralized political pressure and enabled the Assad regime’s continued actions with relative impunity [43].
• 49.
  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security Russia’s denial of chemical weapons use by the Assad regime is another example of strategic narrative control. The Kremlin’s frequent attributions of these attacks to opposition “false flag” operations undermined the legitimacy of humanitarian reports and deflected accountability. This tactic not only reshaped public opinion domestically, portraying Russian involvement as morally defensible, but also diffused international consensus on the Assad regime’s culpability, further hindering unified policy responses. The disinformation efforts in Ukraine and Syria underscore Russia’s sophisticated use of narrative warfare. By embedding its military actions within historical and moral frames, creating narratives of inevitable victory, and casting opposition as illegitimate, Russia uses disinformation to control perceptions, sway international attitudes, and delay collective action. Through sustained media reinforcement, these campaigns create an alternate reality that complicates both immediate responses and long-term strategies, transforming disinformation into an enduring tool of psychological and geopolitical influence. Disinformation Targeting International Peacekeeping Efforts: Narratives Undermining International Organizations like the UN and NATO Russian media narratives have continuously targeted the Armed Forces of Ukraine with a strategy of dehumanization that dates back to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and escalated markedly with the full-scale invasion in 2022. From the onset of the invasion, major Russian outlets, such as Kommersant and Izvestia, frequently labeled Ukrainian military personnel as "nationalists" and "neo-Nazis," terms intended to evoke fear and rally support within Russia by invoking the specter of World War II. This language deliberately conflates terms like “Nazi” and “fascist” with “nationalist,” ignoring the nuanced distinctions in a way that, as intended, blurs moral lines. For instance, on February 25, 2022, Kommersant reported President Putin’s call for Ukrainian forces to prevent “Benderites and neo-Nazis” from using civilians as “human shields”—phrasing that constructs a sinister image of Ukrainian forces while appealing to the Russian historical memory of Nazi occupation. This language was mirrored by Izvestia, which alleged that Ukrainian “Nazis” established “detachments” to discipline those unwilling to fight, casting doubt on Ukrainian unity and painting Ukraine’s defense as a forced, violent mobilization Disinformation in active conflicts: Case studies on Russian Disinformation during the war in Ukraine and the Syrian conflict
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  rather than alegitimate national effort. Such messages are not isolated incidents; rather, they reflect an overarching narrative aimed at eroding international sympathy for Ukraine by portraying its armed forces as aggressive and radicalized [42]. For instance, Izvestia attributed “pumping Kyiv with weapons” and NATO military exercises in the area as factors that exacerbate tensions, thus portraying Western support for Ukraine as reckless and irresponsible. By characterizing NATO's involvement as a calculated push towards violence, Russian media seek to discredit NATO’s support for Ukraine, casting it as a means to escalate conflict rather than a genuine response to Ukrainian sovereignty under threat [42]. This language deliberately conflates terms like “Nazi” and “fascist” with “nationalist,” ignoring the nuanced distinctions in a way that, as intended, blurs moral lines. For instance, on February 25, 2022, Kommersant reported President Putin’s call for Ukrainian forces to prevent “Benderites and neo-Nazis” from using civilians as “human shields”—phrasing that constructs a sinister image of Ukrainian forces while appealing to the Russian historical memory of Nazi occupation. This language was mirrored by Izvestia, which alleged that Ukrainian “Nazis” established “detachments” to discipline those unwilling to fight, casting doubt on Ukrainian unity and painting Ukraine’s defense as a forced, violent mobilization rather than a legitimate national effort. Such messages are not isolated incidents; rather, they reflect an overarching narrative aimed at eroding international sympathy for Ukraine by portraying its armed forces as aggressive and radicalized [42]. These characterizations are complemented by allegations against Ukraine’s international supporters, especially NATO. Russian officials and media have framed Western military assistance as a deliberate provocation, positioning NATO as a destabilizing force in the region that “pushes Kyiv to bloodshed.” State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin argued in March 2022 that NATO-supported "Nazis" would have invaded Donbas had Russia not intervened preemptively, implying a necessity for Russian aggression as a defensive action. This assertion reinforces the narrative that NATO both directly and indirectly fuels extremism in Ukraine [42]. Vyacheslav Volodin, the State Duma Speaker Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  These characterizations arecomplemented by allegations against Ukraine’s international supporters, especially NATO. Russian officials and media have framed Western military assistance as a deliberate provocation, positioning NATO as a destabilizing force in the region that “pushes Kyiv to bloodshed.” State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin argued in March 2022 that NATO-supported "Nazis" would have invaded Donbas had Russia not intervened preemptively, implying a necessity for Russian aggression as a defensive action. This assertion reinforces the narrative that NATO both directly and indirectly fuels extremism in Ukraine. For instance, Izvestia attributed “pumping Kyiv with weapons” and NATO military exercises in the area as factors that exacerbate tensions, thus portraying Western support for Ukraine as reckless and irresponsible. By characterizing NATO's involvement as a calculated push towards violence, Russian media seek to discredit NATO’s support for Ukraine, casting it as a means to escalate conflict rather than a genuine response to Ukrainian sovereignty under threat [42]. Parallel to these portrayals, Russian media also actively target international organizations, particularly the United Nations, with accusations of ineffectiveness or bias. The United Nations, perceived as representative of Western ideologies when it condemns Russia’s actions, is criticized for failing to adequately protect or address what Russia portrays as the West’s unchecked interventions. Russian media portray the UN as unable to act impartially, suggesting that its actions are merely tools of Western influence, further undermining the legitimacy of international law and norms when they contradict Russian objectives. This delegitimizing stance is designed to undercut global institutions that could coordinate responses or interventions against Russia’s actions in Ukraine, positioning Russia as an independent global actor committed to its own sense of order and justice. By consistently employing such narratives, Russian media aims to construct a worldview in which Russia's actions in Ukraine are rationalized as both defensive and morally necessary, while international condemnation is dismissed as hypocritical and Western-driven. This narrative strategy bolsters domestic support for the invasion and attempts to diminish international sympathy for Ukraine, reinforcing Russia’s portrayal as a besieged nation defending itself from both internal and external threats. In this way, Russian media not only aim to justify military action but also foster a perception of Western alliances and institutions as aggressors, implicitly endorsing the notion that global stability can only be achieved on Russian terms. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 52.
  Since Russia's full-scaleinvasion of Ukraine in 2022, a complex interplay of disinformation strategies has emerged surrounding the economic impacts of international sanctions. This disinformation seeks not only to destabilize global markets but also to manipulate public opinion regarding the legitimacy and efficacy of sanctions imposed by Western nations. Russian media narratives portray these sanctions as unfair and illegitimate, framing them as a form of economic warfare aimed at undermining the Russian state and its populace. This framing serves to cultivate a narrative of victimization that resonates with both domestic and international audiences, allowing the Kremlin to deflect responsibility for economic challenges back onto the West. In response to Russia’s aggressive actions, the European Union, the United States, and other allies implemented a comprehensive suite of economic sanctions targeting key sectors of the Russian economy, including finance, defense, energy, and technology [44]. These sanctions were designed to cut off critical resources necessary for sustaining military operations and economic stability. However, Russian media outlets, such as Rossiyskaya Gazeta and TASS, have reported that the country is adapting to these sanctions, claiming that it has adjusted to sanctions and is emerging stronger [45]. This transformation of the narrative serves a dual purpose: it reassures the domestic audience and aims to sway international perceptions by suggesting that the sanctions are ineffective. By presenting an image of resilience, the Kremlin hopes to deter further sanctions and maintain its political capital. Economic Consequences of Disinformation During Conflicts: Impact on Sanctions and Global Markets Due to Misinformation Campaigns Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Moreover, Russian disinformationhas targeted international markets, particularly regarding energy exports. State-controlled media outlets have disseminated narratives claiming that European reliance on Russian energy would prevent a full-scale economic backlash from sanctions. By portraying energy exports as a critical bargaining chip, Russia seeks to foster uncertainty in global markets and challenge the legitimacy of sanctions. This tactic aims to create divisions within the EU and among Western allies regarding the implementation and sustainability of sanctions, ultimately undermining their effectiveness [46]. To effectively address the pervasive issue of disinformation during conflicts, it is imperative to strengthen international fact-checking networks dedicated to conflict reporting. These networks serve as critical guardians of truth, ensuring that information disseminated during crises is accurate and reliable. By enhancing the capacity and reach of these networks, we can foster greater accountability among media outlets, which is essential in an era where misinformation can significantly influence public perception and policy decisions. Furthermore, such networks can collaborate across borders, sharing best practices and resources to establish a robust framework for verifying information in real- time, thereby enhancing the overall quality of conflict reporting. Source: https://www.eifec.org/eu- sanctions-on-russia-home Recommendations Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  In tandem withbolstering fact-checking efforts, developing counter-narratives in real- time is crucial for combating the spread of false information during crises. As disinformation proliferates, the ability to swiftly create and disseminate accurate narratives becomes vital. This requires a strategic approach that not only identifies misleading claims but also presents compelling, fact-based responses that resonate with the affected populations. By employing a variety of media platforms and utilizing innovative storytelling techniques, these counter-narratives can effectively counteract disinformation and reinforce public understanding of the situation on the ground. Such proactive measures are essential in mitigating the harmful effects of false narratives, which can exacerbate tensions and hinder conflict resolution efforts. Lastly, imposing sanctions on media outlets that are proven to distribute disinformation in conflict zones is a necessary step toward accountability and deterrence. By holding these outlets responsible for their role in perpetuating misleading information, we send a clear message that disinformation will not be tolerated. Such sanctions can discourage other media organizations from engaging in similar practices, thereby promoting a more responsible and ethical approach to reporting. Additionally, these measures can serve to protect the integrity of the information ecosystem during conflicts, ensuring that credible reporting prevails over sensationalism and misinformation. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION AND ELECTIONS
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  The role ofRussian disinformation in electoral processes across the globe has become increasingly apparent, particularly in Eastern Europe, the European Union, and the United States. These campaigns are characterized by a strategic blend of misinformation, social media manipulation, and the exploitation of existing societal tensions, all aimed at undermining democratic institutions and influencing electoral outcomes. In Eastern Europe, countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have experienced significant electoral interference through disinformation campaigns. The 2014 presidential election in Ukraine serves as a critical case study. Russian operatives leveraged social media and traditional media to propagate false narratives about candidates and create an atmosphere of distrust towards Western influences. This was not merely an attempt to sway the election in favor of pro-Russian candidates; it was a broader strategy to destabilize Ukraine’s political landscape and weaken its ties with the West. The disinformation tactics employed—ranging from creating fake news stories to manipulating public sentiment—served to polarize the electorate and incite social unrest, showcasing how vulnerable democratic processes can be to external influence [47]. RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION AND ELECTIONS 5.1 INFLUENCE ON ELECTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE: Example of Russian disinformation against EU in Georgia. Source: https://www.isfed.ge/eng/blogi/ganakhlebuli- rusuli-sainformatsio-operatsia-saqartveloshi- evrokavshiris-tsinaaghmdeg- Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 57.
  Similarly, in Georgia,the 2018 presidential election was marked by coordinated disinformation efforts designed to discredit the ruling government and amplify public dissatisfaction [48]. The campaigns targeted the electoral process itself, sowing doubts about the integrity of the elections and fostering divisions among the populace. Moldova has faced analogous challenges, particularly during its 2020 presidential election, where pro-Kremlin narratives sought to manipulate public perception in favor of candidates advocating closer ties with Russia. These examples underscore a disturbing trend: disinformation is not only a tool for influencing immediate electoral outcomes but also a means of eroding public trust in democratic institutions over the long term. In the European Union, Russian disinformation has been similarly insidious, targeting various member states to disrupt electoral processes and foment distrust in democratic systems. The 2017 French presidential election highlighted these tactics, where Russian state media disseminated false information aimed at undermining candidate Emmanuel Macron [49]. By framing Macron as a puppet of Western elites, the disinformation campaigns sought to rally support for his opponents and create a climate of skepticism about the election's legitimacy. Such campaigns have proven effective in exploiting existing divisions within society, particularly around contentious issues like immigration and national identity, thereby posing a significant threat to the integrity of electoral processes across Europe. Russian propagandists spreading disinformation: Olga Skabeyeva, Dmitry Kiselyov, and Vladimir Solovyov. Source: https://imi.org.ua/en/news/pace-may-consider-a-resolution-on-russian-propagandists- accountability-within-a-year-people-s-deputy-i48562 Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  5.2 INFLUENCE ONU.S. ELECTIONS: Russian disinformation has emerged as a formidable threat to the integrity of U.S. elections, particularly evident during the presidential elections of 2016 and 2020. The sophistication and scope of these disinformation campaigns reveal a strategic effort to manipulate public perception, sow discord, and undermine trust in democratic processes. This multifaceted approach highlights the need for a comprehensive understanding of how disinformation can affect electoral outcomes and the broader implications for American democracy. The 2016 presidential election serves as a pivotal case study in the manipulation of social media and information dissemination strategies. Russian operatives, notably linked to the Internet Research Agency (IRA), launched extensive disinformation campaigns across platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. These campaigns involved creating fake accounts and pages that mimicked authentic American political discourse, often focusing on polarizing issues such as immigration, race, and gun control. By targeting specific demographic groups, these operatives were able to amplify divisive narratives, effectively manipulating public opinion to favor particular candidates while discrediting others. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security One of the most significant tactics employed was the use of "fake news" stories designed to create confusion and mistrust among voters. For instance, fabricated stories suggesting that certain candidates had engaged in unethical or illegal activities circulated widely, often gaining traction through shares and retweets. These narratives not only swayed
• 59.
  The aftermath ofthe 2016 election highlighted the long-term implications of these disinformation campaigns on American political discourse. Following the election, a significant portion of the electorate began to question the legitimacy of the electoral outcome, fueled by narratives of widespread voter fraud and foreign interference. This skepticism was particularly pronounced among supporters of the losing candidate, who were subjected to a barrage of disinformation suggesting that their candidate had been wronged. The erosion of trust in electoral institutions poses a fundamental threat to democracy, as it undermines the principle of fair and free elections. In the lead-up to the 2020 presidential election, Russian disinformation tactics evolved, reflecting lessons learned from the previous election cycle. The focus shifted towards delegitimizing specific electoral processes, particularly mail-in voting, which was expected to play a crucial role in the election due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Disinformation campaigns propagated false claims that mail-in ballots were susceptible to fraud, effectively sowing doubt about the integrity of the electoral system. These narratives not only aimed to suppress voter turnout among certain demographics but also sought to create chaos around the election process itself [51]. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security individual opinions but also contributed to a broader atmosphere of skepticism surrounding the electoral process. The spread of disinformation was further exacerbated by the existing partisan divides, which allowed false information to resonate more deeply with audiences already predisposed to distrust the opposing side [50]. Moreover, the use of social media advertising played a crucial role in the dissemination of disinformation. Russian operatives invested heavily in targeted advertising campaigns that reached millions of users, exploiting the platforms’ algorithms to maximize exposure. These ads often included inflammatory imagery and slogans that resonated with specific voter groups, making them particularly effective in shaping public sentiment. The scale and precision of these operations revealed vulnerabilities in how social media platforms manage political advertising, raising concerns about accountability and transparency. Example of fake news spread by Russia. Source: CNN
• 60.
  The convergence ofsocial media, disinformation, and public sentiment created a volatile environment leading into the 2020 elections. As the election approached, numerous false narratives circulated regarding the supposed risks of mail-in voting, including claims that ballots would be altered or discarded. These disinformation efforts were not isolated incidents; rather, they were part of a broader strategy aimed at undermining public confidence in the electoral process. The ramifications of these campaigns were evident as segments of the electorate voiced skepticism about the election results, culminating in the unprecedented events of January 6, 2021, when supporters of the losing candidate stormed the U.S. Capitol in an attempt to overturn the election outcome. The impact of Russian disinformation on U.S. elections extends beyond immediate electoral outcomes; it has lasting implications for the health of American democracy. The normalization of disinformation as a tactic in political discourse poses a fundamental challenge to democratic institutions. As citizens increasingly encounter conflicting narratives and misinformation, the potential for societal polarization grows, threatening the cohesion necessary for a functioning democracy. The response to these challenges must involve not only technological solutions to combat disinformation but also an emphasis on media literacy and critical thinking among the electorate. In light of these developments, it is imperative for policymakers, technology companies, and civil society to collaborate in creating robust defenses against disinformation. This includes implementing stringent regulations on political advertising, enhancing transparency in campaign funding, and fostering initiatives that promote media literacy. By addressing the underlying vulnerabilities that allow disinformation to thrive, the United States can take significant steps toward safeguarding the integrity of its electoral processes and restoring public trust in democratic institutions. Recommendations: To effectively counter the pervasive threat of Russian disinformation in U.S. elections, a multifaceted approach is necessary. Implementing robust recommendations across various domains can help strengthen electoral integrity and restore public confidence in democratic processes: Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Create Cybersecurity Frameworksto Safeguard Elections from Disinformation: Establishing comprehensive cybersecurity frameworks is essential to protect electoral infrastructure from the threats posed by disinformation campaigns. This involves not only securing the technical aspects of voting systems but also implementing protocols for monitoring and responding to potential disinformation threats. Governments should collaborate with cybersecurity experts to develop standards that ensure the integrity and resilience of electoral systems. Regular assessments and stress tests of voting technology can help identify vulnerabilities, while incident response plans should be established to swiftly address potential breaches or attempts to manipulate election outcomes. Furthermore, partnerships with private sector technology firms can enhance cybersecurity efforts by leveraging their expertise in threat detection and mitigation. By creating a coordinated effort between government agencies and technology companies, a more robust defense against disinformation can be achieved. Additionally, training election officials and poll workers on cybersecurity best practices will empower them to recognize and respond to disinformation tactics effectively. Fact-Checking Collaboration between Political Campaigns and Media Organizations: Promoting collaboration between political campaigns and media organizations through fact-checking initiatives is critical to counteracting disinformation. Establishing formal partnerships can facilitate the sharing of information about potential disinformation campaigns, allowing campaigns to respond quickly to false narratives. Implementing real-time fact-checking services during campaigns can provide voters with accurate information and context, helping to mitigate the impact of misleading narratives. Moreover, campaigns should adopt transparent communication strategies that prioritize fact-based messaging. By committing to honesty and integrity in their communications, political actors can build trust with voters and help reduce the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns. Additionally, media organizations should invest in fact-checking resources, ensuring that accurate information is readily available to the public. By creating a culture of accountability and verification, the electoral discourse can be safeguarded against manipulation. Implement Policies for Transparency in Political Advertising on Social Media Platforms: To address the challenges posed by disinformation in political advertising, implementing policies that promote transparency is crucial. Social media platforms should be mandated to disclose the sources of funding for political advertisements, providing voters with insight into who is behind specific messages. This transparency can help to identify foreign influence and reduce the effectiveness of deceptive Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
• 62.
  Additionally, social mediacompanies must enhance their content moderation practices to quickly identify and remove false information related to elections. Employing advanced algorithms and human moderators can facilitate the detection of disinformation campaigns before they gain traction, protecting the electoral discourse from manipulation. By adopting these recommendations, stakeholders can collaboratively create a fortified electoral environment that prioritizes the integrity of democratic processes. The multifaceted approach involving cybersecurity frameworks, fact-checking partnerships, and transparency in advertising is essential in safeguarding elections from disinformation. This proactive stance will not only protect the electoral process but also restore public confidence in the institutions that uphold democracy. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security advertising strategies. Furthermore, platforms should establish clear guidelines for political advertising that include comprehensive labeling of sponsored content. This would enable users to differentiate between organic posts and paid advertisements, making it easier to scrutinize the information being presented. Regular audits of political advertising practices by independent third parties can further enhance accountability, ensuring compliance with transparency regulations.
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security GENERAL THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY FROM RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION
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  GENERAL THREATS TONATIONAL SECURITY FROM RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION Disinformation campaigns have increasingly targeted national companies, particularly in sectors vital to national interests, such as energy, technology, and defense. For instance, the energy sector, which is often intertwined with national security, has seen targeted efforts to undermine companies like Naftogaz in Ukraine and various energy firms in Western Europe. By disseminating false information about a company's financial health, operational capabilities, or even the safety of its products, these campaigns aim to create instability in key sectors. The resulting uncertainty can lead to fluctuations in stock prices, diminished investor confidence, and potential economic repercussions that ripple through national economies. Moreover, the technology sector is not immune to these tactics. Russian disinformation campaigns frequently cast doubt on the integrity of Western tech giants, portraying them as tools of U.S. foreign policy. For example, during election cycles, misleading narratives around data privacy and security breaches can lead to public outcry against companies like Facebook and Twitter. Such efforts can diminish consumer trust and prompt regulatory scrutiny, further complicating the operational landscape for these firms. The consequences extend to critical infrastructure, where disinformation can exacerbate vulnerabilities. During crises, disinformation campaigns can instigate panic, leading to public disarray that hampers effective communication from government and corporate entities. For instance, misinformation about energy supply disruptions can lead to panic buying and hoarding, exacerbating supply shortages and further destabilizing markets. In essence, the impact of Russian disinformation is a direct threat to the stability and resilience of national economies, which are critical to overall national security [52]. 6.1 IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMPANIES AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  6.2 CYBERSECURITY AND INFORMATIONATTACKS: The nexus between disinformation and cyberattacks represents a significant and evolving threat to national security. Russian disinformation tactics often go hand-in-hand with cyber operations, creating a multifaceted assault on targeted nations. The 2016 U.S. presidential election serves as a prime example, where Russian cyber operatives infiltrated the Democratic National Committee, stealing sensitive data and subsequently disseminating that information to sow discord and amplify existing political divisions. Cyberattacks can be used to gather intelligence, disrupt services, and compromise sensitive data, while disinformation campaigns work to misdirect blame and distort public perception. For instance, after the NotPetya cyberattack targeted Ukraine in 2017, the Russian government leveraged disinformation to deflect responsibility, framing the attack as an act of retaliation against perceived Ukrainian aggression. This dual approach not only undermined the immediate response efforts but also complicated international attribution, allowing Russia to evade accountability [53]. The implications of such coordinated efforts are profound. When cyberattacks are accompanied by a steady stream of disinformation, public trust in institutions erodes, and citizens become more vulnerable to manipulation. This creates a feedback loop where misinformation can influence policy responses to cyber threats, allowing adversaries to exploit weaknesses in national security frameworks. A holistic approach to national security must recognize this interplay and seek to develop integrated strategies that address both cyber vulnerabilities and the disinformation landscape. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Russian disinformation campaignshave demonstrated a remarkable capacity to destabilize public opinion and fracture social cohesion. By strategically targeting specific ethnic and social groups, these campaigns aim to cultivate distrust in government institutions and exacerbate societal divisions. The exploitation of sensitive social issues, such as race relations and economic disparities, serves to amplify existing tensions and create an environment ripe for unrest. In the United States, the Russian government has exploited movements for social justice to fuel polarization. For instance, during the Black Lives Matter protests, Russian operatives disseminated disinformation that framed protests in a negative light, creating rifts between communities and fostering an environment of hostility. By manipulating social media algorithms and targeting specific demographics, these campaigns can effectively magnify grievances, leading to increased radicalization and division within society [54]. 6.3 IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL STABILITY: Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  The consequences ofthis disinformation-driven destabilization are profound. When public trust in government erodes, it opens the door for extremist ideologies to take root, as citizens become disillusioned with traditional democratic processes. The potential for increased civil unrest and challenges to state authority grows, creating an unstable social fabric that poses significant risks to national security. Moreover, in regions with historical ethnic conflicts, such as the Balkans, disinformation campaigns can stoke nationalist sentiments, leading to violent clashes and further destabilizing already fragile political environments. By portraying certain ethnic groups as threats to national identity, these campaigns can incite violence and perpetuate cycles of conflict. The long-term impact of such disinformation efforts not only undermines social cohesion but also complicates efforts for reconciliation and peacebuilding. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Russian disinformation campaign against the Black Lives Matter protests. Source: Alliance for Citizen Engagement
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  6.4 EXPANDING RUSSIANGEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE THROUGH DISINFORMATION: Disinformation has become a critical tool for Russia to extend its geopolitical influence across various regions, including the Balkans, Central Asia, and Africa. By promoting pro- Russian narratives and exploiting existing societal divisions, Russia seeks to enhance its strategic foothold while countering Western influence. In the Balkans, for example, Russian disinformation campaigns have targeted the region's integration into the European Union, casting Western influences as detrimental to national interests [55]. By disseminating narratives that promote distrust in EU institutions and portraying Russia as a traditional ally, these campaigns effectively undermine democratic aspirations. This strategy has been particularly evident in Serbia, where pro- Kremlin media amplify nationalist sentiments and frame Western engagement as a threat to national sovereignty. In Africa, Russian disinformation plays a role in fostering strategic partnerships and expanding influence in resource-rich regions. By positioning itself as a counterbalance to Western hegemony, Russia uses disinformation to cultivate relationships with authoritarian regimes, offering military support and economic cooperation. This approach not only solidifies Russia's geopolitical presence but also complicates international efforts to promote democracy and human rights in the region [56]. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  The implications ofthese disinformation efforts are far-reaching, as they shape regional politics and impact global security dynamics. By fostering dependency and promoting narratives that align with its strategic interests, Russia can effectively challenge Western influence and reshape the geopolitical landscape in its favor . Disinformation map, Africa. Source: https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a- surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/ Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Develop public-private partnershipsto strengthen critical infrastructure against disinformation. Establishing collaborative frameworks between government agencies and private sector entities is essential for enhancing defenses against disinformation. By sharing resources, intelligence, and expertise, stakeholders can collectively identify vulnerabilities and develop effective countermeasures. Joint training initiatives and simulation exercises can also prepare companies to respond swiftly to disinformation threats that target their operations. Increase government funding for cybersecurity to prevent information attacks. Adequate funding for cybersecurity initiatives is crucial for protecting national interests. This includes investing in advanced technologies that can detect and counteract disinformation campaigns, as well as enhancing training programs for cybersecurity personnel. By prioritizing cybersecurity as a national security concern, governments can bolster their defenses against both cyberattacks and disinformation efforts. Promote international collaboration to develop joint disinformation counteraction strategies. Given the transnational nature of disinformation campaigns, countries must work together to share best practices and develop coordinated responses. Establishing international frameworks for information sharing and joint training exercises can enhance the collective ability to counter disinformation. Additionally, promoting international norms and agreements surrounding disinformation can foster accountability and deter malicious actors. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Recommendations: In light of the multifaceted threats posed by Russian disinformation, a series of strategic recommendations should be pursued to mitigate risks and bolster national security:
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  Strengthen Legislative MeasuresAgainst Disinformation. Governments should consider implementing legislative measures that hold individuals and organizations accountable for disseminating false information. Stricter penalties for deliberate disinformation campaigns, particularly those originating from foreign actors, can serve as a deterrent. Additionally, regulations governing the transparency of online political advertising can help identify and mitigate the spread of disinformation. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Implement Comprehensive Public Awareness Campaigns. Educating the public about the nature of disinformation and its potential impacts is essential for building resilience. Public awareness campaigns can equip citizens with critical thinking skills to recognize and question misleading information. By promoting media literacy and encouraging skepticism towards sensationalist narratives, governments can empower individuals to resist manipulation.
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  The pervasive reachof Russian disinformation presents a profound challenge to global stability and national security. This report has demonstrated how Russian disinformation campaigns are intricately designed to exploit social, political, and ideological divisions in targeted nations, using a blend of traditional media, social media platforms, and state- backed and unofficial actors. Through these mechanisms, Russian influence campaigns have reshaped public perception across multiple fronts, including political elections, national conflicts, religious freedoms, and international alliances. By undermining democratic institutions, fostering internal societal divisions, and manipulating public sentiment, these campaigns aim not only to destabilize specific nations but also to shift the balance of geopolitical power in Russia's favor. A unique characteristic of Russian disinformation is its adaptability across cultural and political contexts, with narratives tailored to resonate within local populations, often aligning with far-right or nationalist movements. As seen in Eastern Europe, the European Union, and the United States, disinformation efforts target critical political events— elections, referendums, and high-stakes international conflicts—to amplify ideological polarization, erode public trust, and weaken democratic resilience. In conflict zones, such as Ukraine and Syria, disinformation has further served to obscure Russian military intentions, diminish international opposition, and create a distorted reality that hinders coordinated responses. Religious and cultural narratives also play a key role, with disinformation efforts seeking to manipulate the influence of religious institutions and exploit longstanding tensions. The Russian Orthodox Church and anti-cult organizations such as RACIRS, for instance, have become a potent tool for promoting pro-Russian narratives, particularly in regions with shared religious or cultural heritage. This strategy not only deepens Russia's influence but also marginalizes minority religions and consolidates control under a state-approved religious identity, further aligning with the Kremlin’s ideological objectives. To counter the adverse impact of these campaigns, this report underscores the importance of a multifaceted approach. First, enhancing public media literacy is essential for building individual resilience against disinformation. Education systems must integrate programs that emphasize critical thinking, media literacy, and digital awareness, enabling individuals to better discern credible information and resist manipulative content. CONCLUSION Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  These skills areparticularly vital in societies where misinformation is prevalent across multiple media channels, and where public opinion can be easily swayed by coordinated disinformation efforts. Collaboration with social media companies is equally crucial. Social media platforms are often the primary vehicle for spreading disinformation, and greater accountability is needed to flag, label, and mitigate false narratives in real-time. Strengthening transparency around content moderation, developing clear guidelines for user reporting, and improving fact-checking capabilities will help curb the rapid spread of disinformation. Governments and platforms must work together to establish systems that effectively combat disinformation, especially on issues like elections, public health, and national security. International cooperation also plays an indispensable role in tackling cross-border disinformation. Given the transnational nature of modern information warfare, individual nations alone cannot fully combat the reach and influence of Russian disinformation networks. Collaborative task forces, real-time intelligence sharing, and coordinated sanctions against state and private actors involved in disinformation are necessary for a united defense. Developing global standards for platform accountability and transparency is essential, helping to align efforts to counter the disinformation threats that increasingly transcend national borders. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Boksa, M. 2019.Russian information warfare in Central and Eastern Europe: Strategies, impact, countermeasures. https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Russia%20disinformation%20CEE%20- %20June%204.pdf 1. Wooley, S. & Guilbeault. 2019. Computational propaganda in the United States of America: Manufacturing consensus online. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:620ce18f- 69ed-4294-aa85-184af2b5052e 2. Denton, A. 2019. Fake news: The legality of the Russian 2016 Facebook influence campaign. https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2020/04/Denton.pdf 3. Laine, M. & Morozova, A. 2024. Leaked files from Putin’s troll factory: How Russia manipulated European elections. https://vsquare.org/leaked-files-putin-troll-factory- russia-european-elections-factory-of-fakes/ 4. Mioc, A., Jentovic, M. & Wesolowsky, T. 2024. Under Investigation Across Europe, Pro- Kremlin Voice Of Europe Has Deep Balkan Ties. https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-voice-of- europe-czech-information-war/32904006.html 5. Vinocur, N., Haeck, P. & Wax, E. 2024. Russian influence scandal rocks EU. https://www.politico.eu/article/voice-of-europe-russia-influence-scandal-election/ 6. Hellman, M. 2024. The News Media Organizations RT and Sputnik and Their Audiences. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-58747-4_2 7. Muenster, R. 2024. Influencers ‘promising avenue’ in misinformation spread. https://news.cornell.edu/media-relations/tip-sheets/influencers-promising-avenue- misinformation-spread 8. Suciu, P. 2024. Russian Disinformation Remains All Too Common On Social Media. https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2024/06/06/russian-disinformation-remains- all-too-common-on-social-media/ 9. Russian influence efforts converge on 2024 Paris Olympic Games. A MICROSOFT THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT. https://cdn-dynmedia- 1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/final/en-us/microsoft- brand/documents/MTAC_Report_Russian_Influence_and_Paris_2024.pdf 10. RFI. 2024. French cyber experts reveal vast network of Russian disinformation sites. https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20240213-french-cyber-experts-reveal-vast-network- of-russian-disinformation-sites 11. REFERENCES Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  12. Detector media.2023. Tactics and tools How Russian propaganda uses the “40 to 60” method to achieve its own goals. https://disinfo.detector.media/en/post/how-russian- propaganda-uses-the-40-to-60-method-to-achieve-its-own-goals 13. Hung, H.T. 2022. Distorting Your Perception of Russia’s Aggression: How Can We Combat Information Warfare? https://connections- qj.org/system/files/21.3.28_distorting_perceptions.pdf 14. Rubryka. 2024. Russia's propaganda on Tiktok and why we shouldn't trust everything we see. https://rubryka.com/en/article/rosijska-propaganda-u-tiktok/ 15. Lanza, R. 2023. A state of mind: how conspiracy theories became the Kremlin’s ideology. https://aspeniaonline.it/a-state-of-mind-how-conspiracy-theories-became-the- kremlins-ideology/ 16. Radnitz, S. 2023. Conspiracy Theories and Russia's Invasion of Ukraine. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/88690/ssoar-russanald-2023- 299-radnitz-Conspiracy_Theories_and_Russias_Invasion.pdf? sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-russanald-2023-299-radnitz- Conspiracy_Theories_and_Russias_Invasion.pdf 17. Alvarez, G. et al. Good News, Bad News: A Sentiment Analysis of the 2016 Election Russian Facebook Ads. https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/1090d0d5-366a-46cc-b1b1- a3a18421cc28/content 18. Eady, G. et al. 2023. Exposure to the Russian Internet Research Agency foreign influence campaign on Twitter in the 2016 US election and its relationship to attitudes and voting behavior. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-022-35576-9 19. Richards, J. (2021). Fake news, disinformation and the democratic state: a case study of the UK government’s narrative. Icono14, 19(1), 95-122. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/7756865.pdf 20. Refat Alimov. https://www.uscirf.gov/religious-prisoners-conscience/forb-victims- database/refat-alimov 21. 2023 report on international religious freedom: Russia. https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-report-on-international-religious-freedom/russia/ 22. Connell, R. 2022. Supposedly Defending Christian Civilization - Putin Savages Churches. https://usukraine.org/blog/supposedly-defending-christian-civilization-putin- savages-churches REFERENCES Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  23.Analytical Note: FREEDOMOF SPEECH AND OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (Ukrainian). https://ac.ucu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/LDK_-svobod-sovisti.pdf 24.Ukrsekta.info. https://ukrsekta.info/news/2286-v-ukraine-poyavilsya-predstavitel- racirs.html 25.Iriney.ru. https://iriney.ru/main/o-czentre/oficzialnaya-biografiya-a.-l.-dvorkina.html 26. Mayer, R. 2016. A brief overview of attitudes of Western European states towards new religious movements. https://www.religion.info/pdf/2016_11_nrms.pdf 27. Vilneslovo. https://vilneslovo.com/sektoznavstvo/#google_vignette 28. Vilneslovo. https://vilneslovo.com/лобіювання-інтересів-релігійних-орг/ 39. Vilneslovo. https://vilneslovo.com/свідки-єгови-історія-виникнення-та-ід/ 30. Ansobor. https://ansobor.ru/news.php?news_id=9000 31. Vilneslovo. https://vilneslovo.com/тренінги-користь-або-небезпека/#google_vignette 32. Neveev. https://neveev.livejournal.com/31385.html 33. 360.ru. https://360.ru/tekst/obschestvo/satanizatsija-obschestva-ukrainskij-narod- pogruzili-v-sluzhenie-zlu/ 34. Priboi News. https://www.priboi.news/govorit-odessa/rupor-russkogo-mira-i- religioznogo-ekstremizma-v-ukraine-ot-popugaya-romy-k-borbe-s-destruktivnymi-kultami/ 35. Obozrevatel. https://news.obozrevatel.com/society/deti-ne-vinovatyi-komu-vyigodno- porochit-fond-pomogayuschij-onkobolnyim.html 36.Pravlife.https://web.archive.org/web/20200812092548/https://pravlife.org/content/ tehnologiya-obmana-v-deystvii-okkultnoe-dvizhenie-allatra 37. Vilneslovo. https://vilneslovo.com/pro-znakhidky-na-obshukakh-u-sekti-allatra-i- sotsialnu-bezvidpovidalnist-mediynykiv/ 38. Zagorcheva, D. 2023. Praying for Putin: Spies in Cassocks Threaten the West. https:// cepa.org/article/praying-for-putin-spies-in-cassocks-threaten-the-west/ 39. Vistinomer. https://vistinomer.mk/ruski-agenti-vo-mantija/ 40. Novayagazeta. https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/04/22/zapad-zametil-terroristov- v-riasakh 41. Alternative Press. Bulgaria expels a Russian and 2 Belarusian clerics accused of spying for Moscow. https://apnews.com/article/bulgaria-russia-expulsions- clerics-1dc57038ae2bd0756be1d37200e3ff1e REFERENCES Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  42. Brusylovska, O.& Maksymenko, I. 2023. Analysis of the media discourse on the 2022 war in Ukraine: The case of Russia. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S1757780223002834#rsp312579-sec-0008 43. Deadly Disinformation. How online conspiracies about Syria cause real-world harm. https://deadlydisinformation.org/source/Deadly_Disinformation_EN.pdf 44.European Council. EU sanctions against Russia explained. https:www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/ 45. Mazurenko. 2022. https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/02/23/7325151/ 46. EU Russia sanctions. https://www.eifec.org/eu-sanctions-on-russia-home 47.Mejias, U. A., & Vokuev, N. E. (2017). Disinformation and the media: the case of Russia and Ukraine. Media, culture & society, 39(7), 1027-1042. 0163443716686672 48. Clem, R., Herror, E.S. & Tepnadze, A. 2023. Russian Anti-Western Disinformation, Media Consumption and Public Opinion in Georgia. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2023.2220997 49. Vilmer, J.-B.J. 2018. Successfully Countering Russian Electoral Interference. https:// www.jbjv.com/IMG/pdf/180621_Vilmer_Countering_russiam_electoral_influence.pdf 50. Jensen, M. (2018). Russian trolls and fake news: Information or identity logics?. Journal of International Affairs, 71(1.5), 115-124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2650812550. 51. Andrew R. N. Ross. Cristian Vaccari. Andrew Chadwick. Russian Meddling in U.S. Elections: How News of Disinformation’s Impact Can Affect Trust in Electoral Outcomes and Satisfaction with Democracy https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/en/publications/russian- meddling-in-us-elections-how-news-of-disinformations-impa 52. Francesco Pierri, Luca Luceri, Nikhil Jindal, Emilio Ferrara. Propaganda and Misinformation on Facebook and Twitter during the Russian Invasion of Ukraine https:// www.researchgate.net/ publication/365942748_Propaganda_and_Misinformation_on_Facebook_and_Twitter_du ring_the_Russian_Invasion_of_Ukraine 53. McQuade, M. 2018. The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History. https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed- the-world/ 54. Samantha Bradshaw, Renée DiResta, Carly Miller https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ abs/10.1177/19401612221082052 REFERENCES Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  55. European parliament.2022. Russia and the Western Balkans Geopolitical confrontation, economic influence and political interference. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ etudes/BRIE/2023/747096/EPRS_BRI(2023)747096_EN.pdf 56. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 2024. Mapping a Surge of Disinformation in Africa. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-a-surge-of-disinformation-in-africa/ REFERENCES Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  Liudmyla Fylypovych —Ukrainian philosopher and religious scholar, author, lecturer, writer, and public figure. Professor in Grygorii Skovoroda Philosophy Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, professor of the National University “Kyiv Mohyla Academy”. The vice-president of the Ukrainian Association of Religious Studies, and operational director of the Centre of Religious Information and Freedom. Svitlana Kagamlyk — Ukrainian historian, archivist, lecturer and writer. Specialist in Ukrainian culture, religion, and confessional processes, history of Russian Eparchies in Ukraine, and Phenomenon of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church hierarchy. Senior Researcher in Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Editor of a scientific journal – Ukrainian studies almanac. Leonid Chuprii — Psychologist, researcher, lecturer, and writer on pedagogical, political, and social sciences. Professor at the State Tax University. Specialist in globalism, geopolitics, political science, and national security. Andriy Ivanets - Ukrainian historian, author, writer, social activist. Senior Researcher at the National Museum of the Holodomor Genocide. Volunteer, public activist, and projects coordinator in Taurian Humanitarian Platform. Specialist in Crimea's history, wars and revolutions in modern Ukraine and Crimea, problems of the Crimean Tatars, ethical politics, and social conflicts. EDITORIAL BOARD Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  EDITORIAL BOARD Russian Disinformation:Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Dietmar Pichler — Communications expert, analyst of disinformation and foreign interference, director of the organization Disinfo Resilience Network. Public activist, vice-president of the Vienna- based NGO "Vienna Goes Europe". Catherine Nastoyashcha — Ukrainian sociologist and social philosopher, lecturer and writer on ethnical sociology, mass- communications processes, author of the methodology of research global and local social processes. Head of Institute of Ukrainian Studies in Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Senior Researcher in European Research Association. Volunteer, social activist, and projects coordinator at Democracy Youth Initiatives. Yuliya Komarova-Piletska — a political strategist and political expert. She is a Communication Energizer at DTEK and works in corporate communications at "Ukrenergo." She heads the consulting agency Concept GR, frequently appears as a guest on political talk shows, and authors a blog on Korrespondent, a well-known blogging platform in Ukraine. Yuriy Gavrilechko — an expert with the "Ukrainian Think Tank" project, an economic expert, and holds a Ph.D. in public administration. He is a frequent guest on televised talk shows.
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  EDITORIAL BOARD Russian Disinformation:Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security Orest Shevchuk — Legal Expert and Human Rights Advocate, with extensive experience in both private practice and human rights advocacy. After graduating with a law degree from the Academy of Advocacy of Ukraine in 2006, he began his career as a legal advisor for several organizations before launching his own practice in 2009. Since 2014, he has been actively involved in human rights protection, participating in OSCE human rights conferences in Warsaw. T.C. Cameron — Former C-Suite speech writer for the Mortgage Bankers Association, working with media strategists from agencies such as FHFA, CFPB, HUD Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae. Before moving into communications, Cameron authored four books and was an editor and reporter for 15 years, most recently for the Baltimore Sun Media Group from 2009-2015. Launai Wells — Political and media strategist, forward thinker, based in Washington D.C. Graduated with a Master's degree in Political Management from George Washington University and Political Science from Alabama State University. Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Launai Wells Consulting and Management. Lesya Zaburanna — Politician, economist, public figure. Member of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and member of the permanent delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Anna Skorokhod — Ukrainian politician, parliamentarian, human rights defender, lecturer and mentor. Specialist in the war in Ukraine, mass communication and national information security, transparent state policy, anti-corruption reform sphere.
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security Institute for Democracy and Development “PolitA” is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization. It conducts educational and analytical projects in the fields of democracy development and support for reforms. The organization was created by experts in political science, strategic planning, and analytics, and aims to engage active citizens to promote democratic development and build civil society worldwide. Since the establishment, the institute has formulated solutions for domestic politics and democracy development, mentored over 5,000 program participants, written over 30 strategy papers, conducted over 200 events with decision-makers, and written over 50 press releases. For 5+ years, the institute has been actively cooperating with American partners on mutual experience exchange programs (2 exchange programs were implemented), analytical work, and events (including the International GR Forums and the Political Campaign and Management Forums) with American experts in Brussels, Instanbul, and Washington. Trainer Association of Ukraine (TAU) is a public organization established in August 2003, dedicated to defending the social, economic, creative, and other shared interests of citizens. TAU promotes gender equality and the development of new modular technologies for integrating social-psychological education into people's lives to foster healthier, safer living. The organization also aims to raise public awareness and build a civil society. They also held annual Trainer-Consultant Forums in an Open Space format from 2006 to 2010, producing bilingual textbooks to aid in training. Additionally, TAU regularly organized conferences for Eurasia Foundation grant recipients up until 2014. In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, TAU provided psychological support to displaced individuals, including women, children, the elderly, and those with disabilities. The organization collaborated with teachers in Kyiv to offer art therapy for internally displaced children and has continued supporting local communities through weekly psychological support groups since 2022. TAU has partnered with various organizations on impactful projects, such as the "Art Therapy" initiative and the grant-funded "Business Incubator for Women and Girls from Occupied Mariupol," supported by the Ukrainian Women’s Fund and the Canadian Government. They also implemented the "Creative Workshops for Women and Girls from Occupied Territories," aiding those affected by the war. Currently, TAU brings together 176 psychologists and holds weekly group meetings for psychologists and IDP women. ORGANIZERS
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  LingvaLexa was established in2023 to work in-depth on propaganda-related crimes that lead to the most serious international crimes in armed conflicts. The objective is to collaborate extensively with national law enforcement agencies, aiming to support their efforts in conducting thorough investigations and establishing criminal proceedings that adhere to international standards. The organization actively works on preparing and submitting documents for the imposition of international sanctions. The organization’s partners are the Auschwitz institute, Prosecutor’s training center of Ukraine, and the Clooney Foundation for Justice. The organization is headed by Anna Vyshnyakova, a distinguished expert in international criminal law and currently serves as an advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, contributing to the shaping of Ukraine's foreign policy. Throughout her career, Anna has been actively involved in international projects. She served as a legal consultant with the Human Rights Group in Crimea, a field analyst for the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA), and has led numerous initiatives as the head and project coordinator at LingvaLexa NGO, focusing on providing legal consultancy and educational training. is a think tank investigating the Russian Orthodox Church and a Crimean information project of the public organization "Crimean Center for Business and Cultural Cooperation 'Ukrainian House'," established in 2014 with the support of the Media Development Fund of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine. NA "Voice of Crimea" is a public media project aimed at covering topics related to Crimea, including materials on the de- occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security ORGANIZERS The Department for Countering Crimes Committed in Armed Conflict of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine is an independent structural unit of the Office of the Prosecutor General that specializes in combating propaganda and disinformation. The news agency "Voice of Crimea"
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security ORGANIZERS The Slovenian Certified Ethical Hackers (SiCEH) is a rapidly expanding foundation of Ethical Hackers and Cybersecurity Experts dedicated to advancing cybersecurity awareness, education, and resilience across the NATO alliance. Founded nine years ago, SiCEH’s mission is not only to bolster national cybersecurity but also to influence cyber policies, ethical standards, and best practices within NATO allied nations. Foundation members actively engage in strategic initiatives, collaborations, and knowledge-sharing with enthusiasts, professionals, industry partners as well as with various Ministries of Defence, strengthening cybersecurity on an alliance-wide level. SiCEH is deeply committed to addressing the complexities of modern cyber threats, including the rise of disinformation campaigns conducted through digital means. By combining threat intelligence monitoring, strategic research, and active participation in international cybersecurity conferences, SICEH experts provide essential insights that support the defense efforts and, most importantly, the safety and well-being of citizens across NATO countries. https://siceh.si Lenta.ua an independent daily online publication that provides a comprehensive view of the day’s events in accordance with the principles of quality journalism. It offers timely news and original articles on the most important events in Ukraine and beyond, firmly avoiding sensationalism and bias. The main topics covered by Lenta.UA include politics, economics, societal issues, ecology, culture, and sports. No significant topic for its readership, nor any important event or phenomenon, is overlooked; each is given due attention in its publications. Bohush Communications is a group of companies specializing in strategic communications, political technologies, PR, media, and promotions. Founded in 2000 in Kyiv, the company has extensive experience in implementing various projects on regional, national, and international levels. Bohush Communications focuses on image and reputation enhancement, branding, creating television products, and conducting market and electoral research for business and political clients.
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  Russian Disinformation: Tactics,Impact, and Threats to National Security ORGANIZERS The "Center for Russian Studies" (hereinafter referred to as the Center) is an organization that supports the work of Ukrainian and international experts conducting research on socio-political processes within the Russian Federation. The Center unites these efforts to enable a comprehensive and in-depth examination of security, foreign policy, economic, informational, and socio-political development trends in modern Russia; Russia’s impact on global and regional security; Russia’s strategies and tactics regarding Ukraine.
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  1.Jason Shelton -Policy Advisor, Regional Administrator for General Services Administration Regions in the Biden-Harris Administration. Public activist and leader, two-term mayor of Tupelo, Mississippi, during which the city achieved record-breaking success and successfully overcame numerous hardships. 2. Jonathan Fink - Writer, Professor, Editor. Podcast host at Silicon Curtain and founder of iWi. Studied Russian at the University of Edinburgh. Author of three books of poetry: Don't Do It - We Love You, My Heart (forthcoming from Dzanc in January 2025), Barbarossa: The German Invasion of the Soviet Union and the Siege of Leningrad (Dzanc, 2016), and The Crossing (Dzanc, 2015). 3. Glenn Ignazio - Veteran, public figure and national security expert with special operations and intelligence experience. His background as a retired Air Force Special Operations Commander and Defense Intelligence Technology expert has made him a sought-after consultant. After 22 years of military service, he continues to provide assistance in hostile environments such as conducting humanitarian aid and establishing evacuation operations in Ukraine & Afghanistan. 4. John Miller Coo - Expert in strategic planning, organizational and human resource development. Specialist in the Afghan Peace Process. President & Founder of Trident Undersea Trekking. Senior Consultant, Governance & Corporate Affairs at the Heart Of Asia Society Think Tank, Kabul, Afghanistan & Ottawa, Canada. 5. Ruslan Mahamdiyovych Kutaev - a Chechen statesman and public figure who has held various positions in the leadership of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. He later became the president of the public organization "Assembly of the Peoples of the Caucasus." 6. Anna Vyshnyakova - a distinguished expert in international criminal law, head of LingvaLexa, NGO, author of the book “Incitement to genocide: how to ensure accountability for propaganda.” CONTIBUTORS TO CONFERENCE AND REPORT Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security
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  7. Areig Elhag- journalist and television anchor based in the Washington, DC metro area. She holds an Executive Master's in International Relations, a program jointly offered by the Maxwell School and CSIS, as well as Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Science from the Sudan University of Science & Technology. 8. David Plaster - Doctor, social activist, lecturer, mentor. Founder and chairman of the civil initiative "Anomaly". After a career as a medic in the US Army, David came to Ukraine in 2011 and decided to build a life here. Along with other volunteers, he served as a combat medic both on the Ukrainian Maidan and on the front lines in Donbas. Since then, he has been working to make Ukraine a better state for its people. 9. Robert Rose - Filmmaker, producer and host of Raw Travel TV (USA). Author of the documentary film “My Summer in Ukraine.” Member of public initiative DemocracyDefend.com, an affiliation of artists committed to fighting fascism and defending democracy. 10. Iryna Valles - Ukrainian-American singer, songwriter, author. Artist and member of the Cultural Forces of Ukraine. Volunteer, social activist and project coordinator at the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America Georgia Branch, worldwide promoter of Ukrainian cultural heritage. 11. Artem Chornomorov - Ukrainian politician, Member of Parliament, specialist in economic aspects of the war in Ukraine. 12. Igor Rozkladay - Deputy director, chief expert on media law, Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law. a think-and-act tank that has been working in the Ukrainian public sector since 2005, focusing on developing independent media, civil society and building the rule of law in Ukraine. He will participate online. 13. Malka Mariya Bondar - journalist, PR strategist and executive director of MM communications. She will participate online. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security CONTIBUTORS TO CONFERENCE AND REPORT
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  14. Dina Shaikhislam- political and GR consultant based in Kazakhstan. She studied at Nazarbayev University, the United Nations University in Tokyo and worked at the United Nations Development Program Japan and represented Elsevier in Kazakhstan. 15. Josh Marcano - CEO of Reach (Reach Tactical LLC.) and Director of Business Development for Tardigrade Industries. He has worked in support of Ukraine since the illegal invasion by Russian forces in February 2024. Since its inception, Reach has leveraged its international network of collaborators across the defense, civilian, and humanitarian sectors to bring innovative approaches to a variety of challenges. 16. Rostyslav Pavlenko - Candidate of Political Sciences, Associate Professor. 2005-2008, 2009 - Head of the Analytical Service of the Secretariat of the President of Ukraine. 2014-2018 - Deputy Head of the Administration of the President of Ukraine. 2018-2019 - Director of the National Institute for Strategic Studies. 17. Maxym Krupskyi - director of the Religious Freedom Department of the Adventist Church in Ukraine. 18. Andrii Oliinyk - head of the Aggression Division of the Department for Combating Crimes in Armed Conflict at the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine. 19. Anton Stepanov - senior Investigator for Special Cases at the Main Investigation Department of the Security Service of Ukraine. 20. Marietta van der Tol - college lecturer in politics at Lincoln College and postdoctoral research fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security CONTIBUTORS TO CONFERENCE AND REPORT
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  21. Elina Smith- a recent graduate from the University of Cambridge, where she studied Theology and Religion. At Cambridge, Elina’s studies focused on the lasting damages of Russian imperial conquests on religious freedoms in Ukraine and the Caucasus. 22. Paolo von Schirach - president of the Global Policy Institute, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bay Atlantic University, BAU, in Washington DC. He previously served as Chair of the Department of Political Science and IR at BAU. 23. Anton Tarasyuk - experienced IT professional, co-founder of Mantis Analytics, the AI platform that enables the organizations to manage informational risks. 24. Tadej Nared - co-founder and chairman of the board of SICEH Foundation - Association of Slovenian Ethical Hackers. He is a businessman with over 20 years experience in IT, with an extensive background in e-commerce and cybersecurity. 25. Rostyslav Tistyk - a Ukrainian politician. He is a Member of the Ukrainian Parliament of the 9th convocation and a member of the permanent delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 26. Ruslan Mahamdiyovych Kutaev - a Chechen statesman and public figure who has held various positions in the leadership of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. He later became the president of the public organization "Assembly of the Peoples of the Caucasus." 27. Klyment (Kushch) - Metropolitan of Simferopol and Crimea. Since 2000, he has been the Bishop of Simferopol and Crimea of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP). 28. Ederi Liron - head of the "Association for the Development of Jewish Communities in Ukraine" Chief Rabbi in Kryvyi Rih, Ukraine. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security CONTIBUTORS TO CONFERENCE AND REPORT
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  29. Yuriy Kulakevych- Head of the Department of International Relations and Religious Freedom of the Ukrainian Pentecostal Church (Ukrainian Church of Evangelical Faith). 30. Maxym Krupskyi - director of the Religious Freedom Department of the Adventist Church in Ukraine. 31. Oleksandr Zayets - founder and Director of the Institute for Religious Freedom. As an expert, he provides consultations to both religious communities and government entities, including the parliament and local authorities, to facilitate interaction between them and to protect freedom of religion. 32. Serhiy Kolysnyk - Managing Director of LOBBY CLUB and Head of its Kyiv Office, has over 15 years of experience in human rights advocacy. He ranks 9th in the national rating of recognized lawyers by "Legal Practice." 33. Institute for Democracy and Development “PolitA” is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization. It conducts educational and analytical projects in the fields of democracy development and support for reforms. The organization was created by experts in political science, strategic planning, and analytics, and aims to engage active citizens to promote democratic development and build civil society worldwide. 34. Trainer Association of Ukraine (TAU) is a public organization established in August 2003, dedicated to defending the social, economic, creative, and other shared interests of citizens. TAU promotes gender equality and the development of new modular technologies for integrating social-psychological education into people's lives to foster healthier, safer living. The organization also aims to raise public awareness and build a civil society. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security CONTIBUTORS TO CONFERENCE AND REPORT
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  35. The publicorganization "Stop Corruption" - a Ukrainian non-profit organization that conducts public anti-corruption investigations and human rights activities aimed at preventing abuse of power, combating corruption, and promoting democratic transformations in Ukraine. It has been accused of lobbying for developers and spreading Russian influence. 36. Global Policy Institute (GPI) - a Washington, D.C.-based think tank dedicated to addressing pressing global challenges through in-depth research and analysis. With a strong focus on global affairs, economics, and international relations, GPI aims to provide actionable insights that inform policy decisions and shape public discourse. 35. The "Center for Russian Studies" (hereinafter referred to as the Center) is an organization that supports the work of Ukrainian and international experts conducting research on socio-political processes within the Russian Federation. The Center unites these efforts to enable a comprehensive and in-depth examination of security, foreign policy, economic, informational, and socio- political development trends in modern Russia; Russia’s impact on global and regional security; and Russia’s strategies and tactics regarding Ukraine. 36. Bohush Communications is a group of companies specializing in strategic communications, political technologies, PR, media, and promotions. Founded in 2000 in Kyiv, the company has extensive experience in implementing various projects on regional, national, and international levels. Bohush Communications focuses on image and reputation enhancement, branding, creating television products, and conducting market and electoral research for business and political clients. 37. The Department for Countering Crimes Committed in Armed Conflict of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine is an independent structural unit of the Office of the Prosecutor General that specializes in combating propaganda and disinformation. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security CONTIBUTORS TO CONFERENCE AND REPORT
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  38. LingvaLexa wasestablished in 2023 to work in-depth on propaganda-related crimes that lead to the most serious international crimes in armed conflicts. The objective is to collaborate extensively with national law enforcement agencies, aiming to support their efforts in conducting thorough investigations and establishing criminal proceedings that adhere to international standards. The organization actively works on preparing and submitting documents for the imposition of international sanctions. 39. The news agency "Voice of Crimea" is a think tank investigating the Russian Orthodox Church and a Crimean information project of the public organization "Crimean Center for Business and Cultural Cooperation 'Ukrainian House'," established in 2014 with the support of the Media Development Fund of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine. 40. The Slovenian Certified Ethical Hackers (SiCEH) is a rapidly expanding foundation of Ethical Hackers and Cybersecurity Experts dedicated to advancing cybersecurity awareness, education, and resilience across the NATO alliance. Russian Disinformation: Tactics, Impact, and Threats to National Security CONTIBUTORS TO CONFERENCE AND REPORT