Client side encryption without knowing its limits is a ticking tim...

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SESSION ID:SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Mohamed Nabeel
Client side encryption without knowing
its limits is a ticking time bomb!
PDA...

#RSAC
Encryption is USELESS
Unless You know how and where it ”lives”!

#RSAC
Broken disk encryption
DROWN SSL attack
Apple “goto” TLS
ScreenOS backdoors
Broken file encryption
Heartbleed

#RSAC
Cause Vulnerability
Weak PBKDF
Weak RNG
Key in the memory
Implementation flaw
Design flaw
Insecure configuration
Bac...

#RSAC
Encryption Algorithms are NOT
Broken
Attackers exploit weak links to grab the keys!

#RSAC
Right Encryption is better than
USEFUL, it keeps us SAFE!
What is right Encryption?

#RSAC
iPaaS
Sensitive Data
* Photo Credit: SnapLogic

#RSAC
Sensitive Data Exposure is a key
CONCERN for organizations
Where does sensitive data reside? How to protect them?

#RSAC
Cloud Security Alliance – The Notorious Seven
9
1. Abuse of Cloud
2. Insecure APIs
3. Malicious Insider
4. Shared Te...

#RSAC
Server
Data
API
API

#RSAC
API
API
Server
Data

#RSAC
Right Encryption Can HELP
What is the right encryption for this deployment model?

#RSAC
Server
Data
API
API
plaintext
plaintext
Data-at-Rest Encryption
HTTPS
Data-in-Motion Encryption

#RSAC
Client Side Encryption
May the keys be with you!

#RSAC
Server
Data
You can’t see my data!

#RSAC
Server
Data
Broken Functionality

#RSAC
Two competing requirements!

#RSAC
Computing over Encrypted Data
Can we process ciphertext without decrypting?

#RSAC
Homomorphic Encryption
19
Non-deterministic
encryption
Additive
homomorphic
Multiplicative
homomorphic
Fully homo...

#RSAC
Property Preserving Encryption
to the Rescue
Can we perform business operations on encrypted data?

#RSAC
Property Preserving Encryption (PPE) Schemes
21
Deterministic
Encryption
(DE)
E(bob)
E(bob)
#@x*9
Searchable
Encr...

#RSAC
Systems built on top of PPE Technologies (SoPETs)
22
DBMask
CryptDB
BigQuery
Deterministic Encryption (DE)
DBMask
Cr...

#RSAC
SoPET Products in the Market
23
Salesforce
Workday
Office 365
Enterprise Users
CASB
Cloud Access Security Brokers
Go...

#RSAC
What Security Guarantees
SoPETs Provide?
A time ticking bomb!

#RSAC
Threat Models
25
Drive Through
Snapshot passive adversary
“Grab and go”
Dine In
Persistent passive adversary
“Sit an...

#RSAC
Encrypted Databases: MS SQL Always Encrypted
26
Name SSN Title Department
Alice *&x@#12# &*xr^t+!# IT
Bob 9(4$$^*1 ^...

$#RSAC Encrypted Databases: BigQuery 27 [ { “name”: Alice, ”SSN”: *&x@#12#, “age”: 2345 }, { “name”: Bob, ”SSN”: 9(4$$^*1, ...$

#RSAC
Encrypted Web Apps: Mylar* (Encrypted Meteor Apps)
28
Data
Principal Graph
Mylar
client
Mylar
server
Encrypted
Serve...

#RSAC
Inferring Encrypted Data [1/2]
29
Snapshot Passive Adversary
Based on background information/what you don’t encrypt ...

#RSAC
Inferring Encrypted Data [2/2]
30
Persistent Passive Adversary
Monitoring access patterns and metadata to infer encr...

#RSAC

#RSAC
NOT ENCRYPTED
ENCRYPTED

#RSAC
A
C
C
E
S
S
P A
T T
E
R
N
S

#RSAC
Property Preserving Leaking
Encryption

#RSAC
SoPETs are not so Secure
Which adversaries can SoPETs defend against?

#RSAC
SoPETs at best Protect only against
Snapshot Passive Adversaries
What can we do to defend against stronger adversar...

#RSAC
Apply
37
{identify}
Encryption Cast
{in depth}
Defense
{less}
Metadata
{secure}
System Design
{stronger}
PPE Schemes...

#RSAC
One does not simply use PPE to encrypt.
There are stronger adversaries waiting to get your data. There is
unencrypt...

#RSAC
Q&A
More details: medium.com/@nabeelxy