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Digital Transformation, Platforms, & Dynamic
Capabilities
David J. Teece
Institute for Business Innovation
August 3, 2021
For AOM Session Titled:
How Should We Regulate Platforms & Ecosystems?
Management Tools for a Key Societal Challenge
81st Meeting of the Academy of Management
Copyright David J. Teece
Digital Transformation
• The internet and mobile wireless technologies enable:
– New business models and organizational forms
– Unprecedented scale and scope economies
• These dynamics will sooner or later impact every sector of the
economy
– Big impact already in some, e.g. music distribution, shopping
– Some sectors much slower, e.g. banking, healthcare, education
• Result is that digital platforms will be everywhere sooner or
later
– Regulation of the digital economy means regulation of everything?
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Copyright David J. Teece
Firm Capabilities are Essential to
Robust Competition
• Tech firms must have strong dynamic capabilities and data science
skills to collect, organize, and analyze data
– Machine learning and AI plays a role in classifying raw data
– Understanding what data to store, and for how long, is a capability
• Knowing how, when, and where to leverage data across markets is
capability that helps:
– Improve the product
– Create new product and services
– Leveraging is procompetitively employed in both B2B and B2C situations (e.g.
aircraft engines; Netflix movies)
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European firms often lack these capabilities… which is why they cannot compete
Copyright David J. Teece
Management Matters… Problem Isn’t the Scale
and Scope of FAANGS but the Weak Dynamic
Capabilities of Many Complaining Incumbents
• Consumers aren’t complaining; competitors are
• Strong dynamic capabilities requires:
– Entrepreneurial management
– Management that favors the future
– Keynesian “animal spirits”
– Strong technological innovation and heavy investment
in R&D; open innovation as a complement
• DMA likely very bad for European innovation
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Copyright David J. Teece
A common (but wrong) assumption is that platform
dominance is inexorable
 Build a platform and wait for it to tip
 Light a cigar – and enjoy the easy life
 Reality is quite different. “Only the paranoid survive”*
Copyright David J. Teece
 Industry boundaries don’t matter…competition from complements
(Adner & Lieberman, 2021)
 Success requires sensing current and future user/customer needs,
existing and possible future capabilities, and new combinations of
assets.
Weak dynamic capabilities of competitors
often explains dominance
*Andy Grove, former CEO of Intel 5
Common to think that monopolization is
natural because of increasing returns.
Platforms that do not Innovate will be
overtaken by others offering something better
• Excite and Lycos lost the search engine game to
Yahoo. Then Yahoo lost out to Google.
• Incumbency only gives you a seat at the table for
the next round of innovation.
• Absent strong dynamic capabilities, new entrants
will fail.
• There is no automatic “tipping point;” management
matters.
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Example of the Problematic (Proposed)
Legislation:
The European Digital Markets Act
(DMA)
• Allow businesses to promote offers to end users acquired via a core
platform (article 5, item c)
• Portability of business user data in real time
(article 6, item h)
• Search query and click data to be made available to third parties (article
6, item j)
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European DMA: Monumental (Terrifying?) in
Scope and Impact
• Layer of heavy handed regulation on top of antitrust
– Implicit assumptions: Antitrust not up to the task
• Aimed at big platforms (FAANGS); but all industries
will have big platforms sooner rather than later…
• Far bigger experiment than the US divestiture of
AT&T… and poorly thought through
• Some regulation (e.g., privacy) is undoubtedly needed
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Copyright David J. Teece
The (DMA) Impact Assessment Study (Dec 2020)
• Supposedly a study to support the DMA
• Asserts that:
– The ability of certain players to have platform control and act as
gatekeepers is anticompetitive.
• Platform power “risks concentrating R&D and undermining innovation” and:
disrupts entry, limits choice, and potentially increases prices
– Existing competition policy cannot cope. E.U. wide legislation to
apply ex arte regulation is needed.
– Assumes, and makes no effort to prove, that regulation will improve
Europe GDP, R&D, and employment.
– Assumes that DMA will lead to more R&D in Europe… no analysis
to support the assumption… and it’s most assuredly wrong as there
is nothing in the literature on innovation economics to support it.
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Europe needs stronger dynamic capabilities to
become more competitive… both then (1967)
and now!
“it is time for us to take stock and face the hard truth…
what threatens to crush us today is… a more
intelligent use of skills”
What Europe needs is “the ability to transform an idea
into reality through… the talent for coordinating skills
and making rigid organizations flexible” i.e., dynamic
capabilities!
Jean-Jacques Servan-
Schreiber
Le Défi Américain
1967
Copyright David J. Teece
1. Favor innovation, and don’t take it for granted when it
is present.
2. Endogeneity Principle of Competition: Innovation
drives competition as powerfully, if not more so, as
competition drives innovation.
3. Disruption comes in many flavors: Christensen,
Abernathy & Utterback, Teece, Adner & Helfat,
Jacobides
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Copyright David J. Teece
Lessons From the Field of Technology
Management
Legislation/Regulation Should Be About
Promoting Dynamic Competition
1. Dynamic competition should be favored over it’s weaker sibling:
static competition
• Free riding should be disfavored
2. Architectural (systemic innovation) should not be disfavored over
autonomous innovation
• The type of innovation the DMA is likely to encourage is autonomous innovation
• “autonomous innovation can be commercialized without any accommodations
by other elements of the technological systems of which it is a part”
(Teece: Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management)
3. There is an alternative path: Improve antitrust by:
• Favoring dynamic competition
– Forward looking assessment of market structure
– Recognize creation of new markets
• Fast track litigation
• Burden shifting on M&A issues
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Copyright David J. Teece
Regulation Will Likely Reduce the Speed of
Transformation of Incumbent Firms and
Old Industries
• Big Tech has been blasting into sectors of the economy that were
slow to innovate, e.g.:
• Books
• Consumer Goods
• Financial Services
• Medical Supplies
• Smaller platforms cannot take on stodgy old incumbents as
successfully as big platforms
• Transformation of the economy will be slowed when the FAANGS
are “defanged”
• Curtails incentives of capable firms to innovate while providing
strong incentives for weak firms to free ride… resulting in
unproductive entrepreneurship. (Baumol)
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Copyright David J. Teece
Heavy Handed Regulation Will Chill Dynamic
Competition
• Problem isn’t with antitrust law (Klobuchar Bill) but with
antitrust economics. Regulation will likely:
– Creates diverging and confusing obligations on digital platforms…
including with respect to consumer and business users.
– Force platform developers to share the benefits of their
investments with business users and rivals.
– Requires companies to provide a helping hand to competitors.
– Blunts investment incentives.
– Allow rivals to free ride on the incumbent or innovating firms.
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Copyright David J. Teece
Most Regulatory Initiatives with Respect to Digital
Platforms
1. Failure to understand dynamic competition.
a) Ignores broad spectrum dynamic competition
3. Promote free riding.
a) Off-platform contracting free rides on investment in custom acquisition
b) Search engine services priced on a FRAND basis
4. Risk curtailing investment in R&D and blunting innovation by
incumbent platforms.
a) Turns platform into “essential services” and advances a quasi public utility type
regulation
5. Doesn’t recognize that innovation and competition is substantially
global in nature.
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References
Teece, D. J. (2007). Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of (sustainable) enterprise
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 28(13), 1319-1350.
Teece, D. J. (2012). Dynamic capabilities: Routines vs entrepreneurial action. Journal of Management Studies, 49(8), 1395-1401.
Teece, D. J. (2014). The foundations of enterprise performance: Dynamic and ordinary capabilities in an (economic) theory of
firms. Academy of Management Perspectives, 28(4), 328-352.
Teece, D. J. (2016). Dynamic capabilities and entrepreneurial management in large organizations: Toward a theory of the
(entrepreneurial) firm. European Economic Review, 86, 202-216.
Teece, D. J. (2018). Dynamic capabilities as (workable) management systems theory. Journal of Management &
Organization, 24(3), 359-368.
Teece, D. J. (2019). A capability theory of the firm: an economics and (strategic) management perspective. New Zealand
Economic Papers, 53(1), 1-43.
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management
Journal, 18(7), 509-533.
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