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![Interview
Parzhitsky agrees [...] that the unusually high number of
downloads can most likely be attributed to developers
making typos](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/slidesmolejarkaomh-221206074523-d8c9bf95/75/Developer-in-a-digital-crosshair-2022-edition-Oh-My-H-ck-12-2048.jpg)
![Protestware
https://api.ipgeolocation.io/ipgeo?apiKey=[cut]
./
../
../../
/
country_name
russia
belarus](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/slidesmolejarkaomh-221206074523-d8c9bf95/75/Developer-in-a-digital-crosshair-2022-edition-Oh-My-H-ck-41-2048.jpg)
![Our use of Codecov’s Bash Uploader script was
limited: it was set up on a single CI server used
to test and build some internal tooling […].
We were not using Codecov on any CI
server used for product code.
https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/05/13/rapid7s-response-to-codecov-incident/](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/slidesmolejarkaomh-221206074523-d8c9bf95/75/Developer-in-a-digital-crosshair-2022-edition-Oh-My-H-ck-52-2048.jpg)
![Ruby Gems
An ordering mistake in the code that accepts gem uploads
allowed some gems […] to be temporarily replaced in the
CDN cache by a malicious package
https://github.com/rubygems/rubygems.org/security/advisories/GHSA-2jmx-8mh8-pm8w](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/slidesmolejarkaomh-221206074523-d8c9bf95/75/Developer-in-a-digital-crosshair-2022-edition-Oh-My-H-ck-62-2048.jpg)
![Yesterday (2021-03-28) two malicious commits were pushed
to the php-src repo [1] from the names of Rasmus Lerdorf
and myself.
We don't yet know how exactly this happened, but
everything points towards a compromise of the git.php.net
server (rather than a compromise of an individual git
account).
https://news-web.php.net/php.internals/113838](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/slidesmolejarkaomh-221206074523-d8c9bf95/75/Developer-in-a-digital-crosshair-2022-edition-Oh-My-H-ck-69-2048.jpg)
![Something I was not aware of at the time is that
git.php.net (intentionally) supported pushing
changes not only via SSH […] but also via HTTPS.
The latter did not use gitolite, and instead used git-http-
backend behind Apache2 Digest authentication against
the master.php.net user database.
https://news-web.php.net/php.internals/113981](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/slidesmolejarkaomh-221206074523-d8c9bf95/75/Developer-in-a-digital-crosshair-2022-edition-Oh-My-H-ck-72-2048.jpg)
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Developer in a digital crosshair, 2022 edition - Oh My H@ck!
The document discusses various security threats in software development, particularly focusing on vulnerabilities related to library dependencies, tools, and infrastructure. It highlights issues like typosquatting, dependency confusion, and potential attacks on platforms such as npm and Ruby Gems. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of awareness and security practices among developers to mitigate these risks.
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Developer in a digital crosshair, 2022 edition - Oh My H@ck!
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- 3. BIO • Principal SecurityConsultant @ SecuRing • Head of Web Security • Co-author of Security Aware Developer training • Ex-developer https://www.linkedin.com/in/molejarka/ https://twitter.com/molejarka
- 4. Agenda • Attacks onlibraries • Attacks on tools • Attacks on infrastructure • Summary
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- 11. Interview I mean noharm to anyone in any way https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/software/empty-npm-package-has-over-700-000-downloads-heres-why/
- 12. Interview Parzhitsky agrees [...]that the unusually high number of downloads can most likely be attributed to developers making typos
- 13. Attacks on libraries •Typosquatting • Dependency confusion • Maintainer’s account takeover • Protestware
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- 21. Dependency Confusion What happensif malicious code is uploaded to npm under these names? Is it possible that some of PayPal’s internal projects will start defaulting to the new public packages instead of the private ones? https://medium.com/@alex.birsan/dependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610
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- 44. https://blog.sonatype.com/all?q=package Some numbers Packages flaggedas malicious, suspicious, or dependency confusion attacks in npm and PyPi: October 7, 2022 ~100 October 14, 2022 ~50 October 21, 2022 ~40 October 28, 2022 ~70 Weekly in September ~89 Weekly in October ~65
- 45.
- 46. Attacks on Tools •Codecov • Homebrew • npm • Ruby Gems
- 47. On Thursday, April1, 2021, we learned that someone had gained unauthorized access to our Bash Uploader script and modified it without our permission.
- 48. This customer wasusing the shasum that is available on our Bash Uploader to confirm the integrity of the uploader fetched from https://codecov.io/bash.
- 49.
- 50.
- 52. Our use ofCodecov’s Bash Uploader script was limited: it was set up on a single CI server used to test and build some internal tooling […]. We were not using Codecov on any CI server used for product code. https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/05/13/rapid7s-response-to-codecov-incident/
- 53. While investigation hasnot revealed evidence of unauthorized usage of the exposed GPG key, it has been rotated in order to maintain a trusted signing mechanism https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2021-12-codecov-security-event-and-hashicorp-gpg-key-exposure/23512
- 54.
- 55. Homebrew In the Homebrew/homebrew-caskrepository, it was possible to merge the malicious pull request by confusing the library that is used in the automated pull request review script developed by the Homebrew project. https://blog.ryotak.me/post/homebrew-security-incident-en/
- 56. Homebrew This is dueto a flaw in the git_diff dependency of the review-cask-pr GitHub Action, which is used to parse a pull request’s diff for inspection. Due to this flaw, the parser can be spoofed into completely ignoring the offending lines, resulting in successfully approving a malicious pull request.
- 57. Homebrew By abusing it,an attacker could execute arbitrary Ruby codes on users' machine who uses brew. The discovered vulnerability would allow an attacker to inject arbitrary code into a cask and have it be merged automatically
- 58. Second, on November2 we received a report to our security bug bounty program of a vulnerability that would allow an attacker to publish new versions of any npm package using an account without proper authorization https://github.blog/2021-11-15-githubs-commitment-to-npm-ecosystem-security/
- 59. We determined thatthis vulnerability was due to inconsistent authorization checks and validation of data across several microservices that handle requests to the npm registry.
- 60. This vulnerability existedin the npm registry beyond the timeframe for which we have telemetry to determine whether it has ever been exploited maliciously.
- 61. However, we cansay with high confidence that this vulnerability has not been exploited maliciously during the timeframe for which we have available telemetry, which goes back to September 2020
- 62. Ruby Gems An orderingmistake in the code that accepts gem uploads allowed some gems […] to be temporarily replaced in the CDN cache by a malicious package https://github.com/rubygems/rubygems.org/security/advisories/GHSA-2jmx-8mh8-pm8w
- 63. Ruby Gems 1. Anattacker could guess the next version number, and create a gem with the name sorbet-static-0.5.9996-universal- darwin and version number 20.
- 64. Ruby Gems 2. Witha crafted invalid gemspec, it was possible to coerce RubyGems.org to save that gem to S3 without creating a matching database record.
- 65. Ruby Gems 3. Later,the real sorbet-static gem would release version 0.5.9996 as usual, and the attacker-controlled file would be overwritten on S3.
- 66. Ruby Gems 4. However,if the attacker had already primed the Fastly CDN cache by requesting their malicious gem, Fastly would continue to serve the old, malicious package.
- 67.
- 68. Attacks on infrastructure •PHP • GitHub
- 69. Yesterday (2021-03-28) twomalicious commits were pushed to the php-src repo [1] from the names of Rasmus Lerdorf and myself. We don't yet know how exactly this happened, but everything points towards a compromise of the git.php.net server (rather than a compromise of an individual git account). https://news-web.php.net/php.internals/113838
- 72. Something I wasnot aware of at the time is that git.php.net (intentionally) supported pushing changes not only via SSH […] but also via HTTPS. The latter did not use gitolite, and instead used git-http- backend behind Apache2 Digest authentication against the master.php.net user database. https://news-web.php.net/php.internals/113981
- 74. It is notablethat the attacker only makes a few guesses at usernames, and successfully authenticates once the correct username has been found. While we don't have any specific evidence for this, a possible explanation is that the user database of master.php.net has been leaked
- 75. The master.php.net system,which is used for authentication and various management tasks, was running very old code on a very old operating system / PHP version, so some kind of vulnerability would not be terribly surprising.
- 76. On April 12,GitHub Security began an investigation that uncovered evidence that an attacker abused stolen OAuth user tokens issued to two third-party OAuth integrators, Heroku and Travis-CI, to download data from dozens of organizations, including npm. https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/
- 77. Our analysis ofother behavior by the threat actor suggests that the actors may be mining the downloaded private repository contents, to which the stolen OAuth token had access, for secrets that could be used to pivot into other infrastructure.
- 78. GitHub contacted Herokuand Travis-CI to request that they initiate their own security investigations, revoke all OAuth user tokens associated with the affected applications, and begin work to notify their own users.
- 79. We do notbelieve the attacker obtained these tokens via a compromise of GitHub or its systems, because the tokens in question are not stored by GitHub in their original, usable formats.
- 80. On April 7,2022, a threat actor obtained access to a Heroku database and downloaded stored customer GitHub integration OAuth tokens. Access to the environment was gained by leveraging a compromised token for a Heroku machine account. https://status.heroku.com/incidents/2413
- 81. On that sameday, the threat actor downloaded data from another database that stores pipeline-level config vars for Review Apps and Heroku CI. Additionally, another small subset of Heroku users had their Heroku tokens exposed in a config var for a pipeline.
- 82. On April 15,2022, Travis CI personnel were informed that certain private customer repositories may have been accessed by an individual who used a man-in-the-middle 2FA attack, leveraging a third-party integration token. https://blog.travis-ci.com/2022-04-17-securitybulletin
- 83. Upon further reviewthat same day, Travis CI personnel learned that the hacker breached a Heroku service and accessed a private application OAuth key used to integrate the Heroku and Travis CI application.
- 84. Travis CI immediatelyrevoked all authorization keys and tokens preventing any further access to our systems. No customer data was exposed and no further access was possible.
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- 88. Libraries • Awareness • Notypos ;)
- 89. Libraries • Awareness • Notypos ;) • Use tools to detect malicious dependencies
- 90. Libraries • Awareness • Notypos ;) • Use tools to detect malicious dependencies • Download from official sources
- 91. Libraries • Awareness • Notypos ;) • Use tools to detect malicious dependencies • Download from official sources • When not sure do not install
- 92. Libraries • Awareness • Notypos ;) • Use tools to detect malicious dependencies • Download from official sources • When not sure do not install • Enable 2FA (as a maintainer)
- 93. Enforcing 2FA • Top100 packages • Started on: 1.02.2022 • Packages classified as critical: ~4000 • Started on: 8.07.2022 • Top 100 packages • Started on: 15.08.2022
- 94.
- 95.
- 96. What can gowrong with enforcing 2fa? https://github.com/untitaker/python-atomicwrites/issues/61
- 97. atomicwrites I'd rather justwrite code for fun and only worry about supply chain security when I'm actually paid to do so.
- 98. Libraries • Awareness • Notypos ;) • Use tools to detect malicious dependencies • Download from official sources • When not sure do not install • Enable 2FA (as a maintainer)
- 99.
- 100. Tools • I willnot download and run scripts directly from the net
- 101. Tools • I willnot download and run scripts directly from the net • I will verify checksums and signatures of downloaded files
- 102. Tools • I willnot download and run scripts directly from the net • I will verify checksums and signatures of downloaded files • I will install only from official sources
- 103. Tools • I willnot download and run scripts directly from the net • I will verify checksums and signatures of downloaded files • I will install only from official sources • I will update frequently what I’ve already installed
- 104. Tools • I willnot download and run scripts directly from the net • I will verify checksums and signatures of downloaded files • I will install only from official sources • I will update frequently what I’ve already installed
- 105.
- 106. Infrastructure • Keep goodinventory, especially of what is in the clouds
- 107. Infrastructure • Keep goodinventory, especially of what is in the clouds • Disable/shutdown what’s unused
- 108. Infrastructure • Keep goodinventory, especially of what is in the clouds • Disable/shutdown what’s unused • Secure configurations
- 109. Infrastructure • Keep goodinventory, especially of what is in the clouds • Disable/shutdown what’s unused • Secure configurations • Frequently update (to fix known issues)
- 110. Infrastructure • Keep goodinventory, especially of what is in the clouds • Disable/shutdown what’s unused • Secure configurations • Frequently update (to fix known issues) • Monitor, monitor, monitor
- 111. Infrastructure • Keep goodinventory, especially of what is in the clouds • Disable/shutdown what’s unused • Secure configurations • Frequently update (to fix known issues) • Monitor, monitor, monitor
- 112. 2023? • Google AssuredOpen Source Software • Google Software Delivery Shield • Widespread MFA adoption • Built-in detection of typosquatting
- 113.