SlideShare a Scribd company logo
About Mario Bunge's 'A Critical Examination of Dialectics'
Author(s): Pavel Apostol
Source: Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Feb., 1985), pp. 89-136
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20099996
Accessed: 31/10/2010 15:41

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.




                Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Studies in Soviet Thought.




http://www.jstor.org
fPAVEL     AP?STOL




     ABOUT MARIO BUNGE'S 'A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
                                         OF DIALECTICS'




We     submit  to analysis Mario Bunge's 4ACritical Examination of Dialectics',
which     sums up and develops objections, some of which appeared previously
 in his Method, Model and Matter (1973).
     Our comments have to do with this text.1 The admissibility of some of
Bunge's theses and the rejection of some others seems to us to be justifiable
from the point of view of a theoretical horizon which cannot be described,
now and in this context in all of its logical articulations, but which represents
a tacit supposition of our argumentation. This theoretical horizon, equivalent
to thinking through and constructing a new version of Marxian dialectics,
will be briefly outlined            at the end of our study.



                               0.       INTRODUCTORY     REMARKS

0.1 The fact that we have chosen Bunge in this context is no mere whim. As
a matter of fact, he himself seems to await such a retort, when he writes:
"Should anyone feel dissatisfied with this version, he iswelcome to produce a
more satisfactory formulation. In fact it is high time that somebody did it."
(p. 64). Confrontation with Bunge in this matter presents two advantages:
   (a) his argumentation   is formulated with              sufficient precision   to permit a
profitable discussion, and
   (b) his position is representative of some more recent orientations which
have assimilated acquisitions of the research on foundations of science and
those       of analytic     philosophy        (in the large sense given to the term by W.
Stegm?ller).2
   0.2 The discussion             in extremely difficult conditions which add to
                                    evolves
the usual difficulties which  accompany philosophic rhetoric.
   Without agreeing in many other respects with Jean-Fran?ois Revel, we will
acknowledge     that "philosophy    is the last domain to perpetuate two strong
illusions: religion and rhetoric - from which modern            thinking in other
 intellectual     fields has tended and partially succeeded in liberating the human
spirit."3 We have          to recognize openly that as regards dialectics we often


Studies in Soviet Thought 29 (1985) 89-136. 0039-3797/85/0292-0089                $04.80.
?    1985   by D. Reidel   Publishing     Company.
90                                                     PAVEL AP?STOL


witness          some unpleasant                  outbursts      of religious dogmatism or of rhetorical
excesses. While             Bunge's discourse                 is undogmatic   it avoids the pitfalls of idle
rhetoric.

   0.3 As a rule - and the author of these lines was no exception to this in
the past4 ? the Marxist and the Marxist-Leninist   or Hegelian dialectics are

approached  as if we possessed elaborated theories of Hegel, Marx, Engels
or Lenin           dialectics. But, on the contrary, as Dieter Henrich notes
                    about
 in his exegeses on Hegel's work: even in Hegel's monumental        Science of
Logic, published    170 years ago, we find a logical practice', but neither an
 'elaborated concept of the dialectical method', nor 'the law of unfolding' of
its operations,             or even           the statement            of
                                             'the peculiar conditions of then
application'.5  Similar remarks are to be made also with respect to Marx,
Engels, or Lenin. Certainly, we find also in their works isolated propositions
about dialectics - with really remarkable differences concerning how they
are understood. There are no elaborated theories on it. Yet we find in their
works         a 'logical practice'
                            of dialectics, embodied in the social research they
did. This 'logical practice' can be considered as so many        interpretations
of some abstract patterns of dialectics; but, since the latter have not been
explicitly formulated,                      the detecting of these patterns within the framework
of their interpretation                      is such a difficult task that it is often equivalent to
an     invention.

       0.4 On           the contrary,             we     retain a didactically                operational          concept       of
                    ?
dialectics              elaborated,          of     course,   with       reference        to     some     theses     of Marx,

Engels,        and Lenin ?              as a substitute            for a theoretical             concept      of dialectics.
That         'didactic-operational                concept     of     dialectics'        represents        a mere     narrative

texture,            in which          are
                            integrated quotations                            and      isolated        from    contexts
expressed through   different terminologies and in various languages.
   This didactically operational pattern of dialectics - which is to be found
in a great number of current handbooks and treatises - is largely indebted
to the exposition attributed to J. V. Stalin (in which can be easily discovered
elements            from Adorackij   and Rozenthal's                               lectures      of     the
                                                                                                       1930s).6 The
Stalinian           pattern is undoubtedly  indebted                               to the mechanical-deterministic
interpretation of historical materialism, as formulated by K. Kautsky.7
   0.50 Should then the discussion about dialectics be a mere scholastic
dispute about a pseudo-concept? Of course, not! Due to the ruse of 'historical'
reason {die List der Vernunft), present-day practice and theory-construction
demand a discussion about the elaboration or re-elaboration of the concept of
MARIO          BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                                  91


dialectics        in order to meet             both    practical       and theoretical          needs. We will
enumerate         these requirements.
       0.51 One       finds the acceleration               and increasing complexity   of today's
 social processes and, especially,                    the need to invent new strategies of radical
transformation, without which                         there will be no democratic and socialist
issue from the present planetary crisis of civilization. These new revolutionary
strategies are asking for a conceptual and methodological       framework which
actually means a new quest for a more flexible, more articulated, more open
dialectics, than the old didactical concept that somehow had been canonized.
   The fact is that even the very complicated,      troubled situations which
confront management      and planning in democratic and socialist super-in
dustrialized countries  also require a new thinking oriented on dialectics.
There are, for example, the achievements of C. West Churchman's school of
operational research which brings about, in practice, a validation of the idea
of dialectically programmed "inquiry systems", of a dialectical theory of
decision, management and planning.8 Present-day practice and the actual solu
tions of its problems leads one to rethink dialectics anew, in an operational
sense. No less relevant seems to me the recent trend in American political
science and international studies to resort to dialectical epistemologies  and
methodologies                   in concepts the diverging and/or converging
                          for capturing
asymetrical interdependencies  that prevail on the global scene.9
   0.52 This social need is normal. Practice demands programs of efficient
(or good) action even if these do not provide analytic problem-solving algo
rithms         since   social problems          which      accumulate        at a very          rapid rate and
exert     an    ever-rising     and   sometimes         overwhelming        pressure      for    their   solution

are,     in    a mathematical         sense,      "ill-formulated"         or   "ill-raised"       problems.10
Coping with   these presupposes a continuous reflexive return to the problem's
wording,11 because the most infinitesmal variation in the initial data can pro
voke excessive variations at the level of approximated solutions. Mathematics
approaches the matter of ill-formulated problems (that deny linearization)
in two ways which seem to be productive: the logic of fuzzy theory12, the
logic of exact operations with terms that designate by definition   inexact
(i.e. fuzzy) concepts: and the mathematical     theory of morphogenesis,      T.
Thorn's13 theory of "catastrophes",     an exact (i.e. topological) theory of
"qualitative leaps" (structure-building and structure-demolishing,  stabilizing
and destabilizing change).
   This confluence of some practical                       requirements with            the elaboration             of
92                              PAVEL AP?STOL


 some suitable mathematical     instruments necessarily  leads, of course, to a
new defining of the essential concepts of dialectics.
    0.53 Scientists'  thinking about the foundations of their disciplines has
flowed in two directions: (a) an analytic one, deeply rooted in epistemic prob
 lems for which solutions are found through adequately applied algorithms or
arithmomorphic   formulae (after the terminology of N. Georgescu-Roegen)14
and (b) a dialectical one, in the large sense attributed to the term by F.
Gonseth   and his review, Dial?ctica15,   especially  interested in epistemic
problems that resist a purely analytic approach: problems belonging to the
domain         of scientific
                         theory-construction, to that of foundations, and basic
concepts  of science in interaction with experiment and practice.
   Looking at the problem more deeply, the very evolution of the analytic
approach has also been characterized by a drift towards dialectics (Popper,
the latter Wittgenstein)16,     and by the relativization of the synchronie per
 spectives because of the search for the diachronicity of scientific theories.17
    0.54 Philosophic  thought itself has led to ever new discoveries and inven
 tions in dialectics.
    First of all, the Hegelian and the more recent Marxian exegeses have funda
mentally changed the earlier naive images of dialectics. Today we are aware of
 the extreme difficulties in interpreting these texts and especially in explaining
 in an acceptable manner "the logical practice' characteristic of Hegel, Marx
or others.18

     Onthe other hand, there are the attempts to formalize the Hegelian
         ? I
dialectics    mean, especially, the works of G. G?nther, L. S. Rogowski,
M. Kosok and D. Dubarle.19 Even if they have not led so far to generally
accepted results, they have succeeded in pointing out: (a) the possibility
of describing in a precise language a certain 'logical practice' belonging to
dialectics, and (b) the existence of some specific dialectical approaches (what
we  actually defined in 1964 as "dialectically operating with 'formal' logical
structures and operations",    valid or productive  from an epistemic point
of view, but unfounded      from the point of view of conventional     logical
formalism).
     Third,  the very process of proliferation    of conceiving different visions or
perspectives    about dialectics constitutes     the practical proof that several
dialectics are possible, differentiated  enough so that they not be totally and
directly  derived one from the other 20, and creates a space ? or a "theoretical
                                ? for a
topos", as Althusser calls it           reflection on dialectics. Imean by this an
MARIO         BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                                      93


approach in philosophic theory-building similar to that for creating in science
ametatheory with regard to certain theories. In some previous works, I defined
such an approach as a quasi-meta-theoretical  one. In the interpretation I gave
to Marx'         position      versus Hegel's dialectics I discovered elements of such a

meta-approach;               namely Marx does not merely oppose his dialectics to that
of Hegel, but considers          that in his own conception about dialectics that of
Hegel         can be meaningfully    interpreted. Such an approach seems to me to
offer the further possibility of constructing other dialectics.21
    Finally, the very confrontation     between Marxist philosophy     and anti
                  ? where the latter raises the
Marxist thought                                    question of the responsibility
of Marxian theory for any social practice that claims to derive from it -
presupposes            dialectics.22
                                                                    ?
    These        are      some         practical      grounds             including          the    contemporary            ideo
                 ? which
logical practice         justify the present discussion. I assert this in the
name of the concept of dialectics which I draw from Marx' work compared
to that of Hegel, and not in the name of a definitive 'Marxist' or 'Leninist'
dialectics.




                        1. THE GENERAL                    THESES OF MARIO BUNGE

      1.1 Dialectics is an ontological                     theory.
      1.21 This dialectical ontology                       has a 'plausible kernel'                  constituted          by two
hypotheses:
   1.211 Everything                     is in some process of change or other, and
      1.212     New                         emerge     at certain       moments         of    any    process.      But,
                           qualities
      1.22 this       'plausible kernel' is surrounded by a 'mystic fog                                            consisting
mainly         in the assertion of the following three theses:
    1.221        In rapport with                   every object         (thing)       there is an anti-object              (anti
thing).
    1.222 All         opposites   are in continuous                           conflict        with
                                                                                            each other, this
"conflict        resulting either in the annihilation                        of one of them, or in some new
object synthesizing both contradictories".
    1.223 Every stage in a development    negates the previous one and, fur
thermore,         two successive
                          negations  of this kind lead to a stage similar, but
somehow superior, to the original one (p. 63).
94                                                        PAVEL AP?STOL


      2. THE GENERAL                           CRITICISM OF DIALECTICS                                     BY MARIO            BUNGE

As         concerns              'the plausible kernel'                  of dialectics               taken as ontology,               in the
 formulation                   that itwas given,
                              ?                                  ?
       2.1     it        is         as Bunge          states          a common              thesis      for    every                  meta
                                                                                                                         process

physics (as a theory of existence, or ontology).
   2.2 In order to delimit dialectics against any process metaphysics,                                                                 it has
to be expanded into "a general (and consistent) theory" (ontology).
      As to 'themystic                       fog' that wraps dialectics,                    it proceeds         from
       2.3     the            use   of                         expressions,          such     as     "dialectical                        and
                                          ambiguous                                                                     negation"
 "dialecticalopposition".
   Bunge    thinks that by reducing somewhat the ambiguity                                                                of   the terms
(indicated   in 2.3) we can obtain "an intelligible doctrine",                                                           which        is not
dialectics in its present form, but
       2.41         this would              be a "weaker               dialectics"          which        could not claim univer
 sality, necessity,                     essentiality;      and would            be
      2.42      "at            best",     a limit-case         of    a richer                  of     transformation.
                                                                                 theory


      3.     FIRST             CRITICAL           REMARK               WITH          A VIEW           TO      MARIO        BUNGE'S

                                                                    CRITICISM

3.10 In discussing dialectics, Bunge has in view some formulations of it given
by Hegel, Engels, and Lenin, as well as by I. Narski, G. Pawelzig, and G.
Stiehler.23

      3.11 Dialectics                       is examined              by Bunge           as ontology                 (i.e. as universal),
although
    3.12 in the intellectual   constructs defining themselves as dialectics,                                                                 it
appears explicitly in this sense only among certain authors;
   3.13 others understand it as ontology and epistemology and methodology,
and even as logic (but not formal logic); other authors,
      3.14      once      again, dispute precisely   its status as a universal ontology,
accepting            only   the other senses of dialectics (enumerated at 3.13.). Some
admit
      3.15      dialectics only as social (historical) ontology, or
      3.16      as social ontology,   epistemology, methodology                                                 and logic of social
research,           or

         only as epistemology
      3.17                        and/or methodology                                                    (or logic with             a special
meaning)  of social cognition. Finally, it is understood
MARIO          BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                                     95


    3.18        as epistemology           and or methodology                     and/or      logic of philosophic
thinking.24
   3.2 The           result     is that       'the critical examination             of dialectics' by Bunge
concerns neither dialectics                as such nor dialecticsas              a generic term, designating
the ensemble of dialectics explicitly formulated                             in the literature, but
   3.3 a pattern of dialectics built up by Bunge and relying on his free inter
pretation of a rather arbitrary selection of texts and authors with a quite
unequal degree of representativity.
    3.4    Without        any                            one      can   assert     that   'the   critical    examina
                                   exaggeration,
tion of dialectics' by Mario Bunge concerns rather what we called (0.4.) 'the
                                               ? often met with in
didactic-operational   concept of dialectics'                            treatises,
handbooks or monographs       ? but even this one has been considered
                                                                           by him
only   in a very narrow sense, in the light of the restriction introduced ad hoc
                                                                   ? a restriction
through which dialectics is identified with universal ontology
which    is not applied, as a rule, in the writings consulted.
    Since    'the critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge operates with this
restriction, it does not relate to any possible dialectics, and, therefore, cannot
be considered          a criticism of the actual or possible pattern of 'logical practice'
                      in Hegel's      work,        on   the    one   hand,   or    in that    of Marx,                 or
 incorporated                                                                                               Engels,

Lenin, on the other hand, and still less of that incorporated or developed in
the writings of Gramsci, Luk?cs, Bloch, Raphael, Adorno, Gurvitch, Sartre,
Delia Volpe, De George, Bahm, Althusser, Markovic, etc.
    3.5 This does not yet mean that the objections mentioned by Bunge do
not deserve our attention, although they cannot aspire to the generality
which they suggest.



            4. CONSEQUENCES                        OF THE FIRST CRITICAL REMARK

We have seen (0.54.) that, in fact, there are
   4.11 many possible interpretations of some of the intellectual constructs
that present themselves and/or are defined by the scientific and philosophic
community as 'dialectical' and, at the same time, that there is
   4.12 a diversity of concepts about dialectics.
   4.13 We will designate this situation: 'the diversity of dialectics'.
   4.20 The diversity of dialectics can be put in order:
   4.21 in accordance with, either the author of a discourse about dialectics,
or of a work inwhich one can decipher a certain 'logical practice' of dialectics.
96                                                   PAVEL AP?STOL


Thus, we will                speak about various types of dialectics: Heraclitian,                                 Platonic,
                          . . .                                         . . .                                               . . .
Aristotelian,                     Hegelian,         Fichtean,                   Marxian,      Engelsian,    Leninist,

Gramscian,            Sartrean,        Luk?csian,         etc.,     etc.;
        4.22                  the philosophic domain where a certain dialectics
                   in accordance with
 is found. We distinguish different levels of dialectics: dialectical ontology,
 epistemology and, in a wider sense, methodology  as well as "logic".25
    4.23 Finally, admitting the possibility of some regional dialectical onto
logies, without accepting thereby the legitimacy of a general or fundamental
ontology,    from which these could be derived, one can differentiate among
diverse dialectical               fields:       dialectics        of history,        of society, of communication,
 etc.

        4.30 A certain theoretical                    construct         can refer to
        4.31       either a certain type,
        4.32       or a certain        level,
        4.33       or a certain dialectical
                                     field,
        4.34 or different possible combinations of these.
        4.4 The generic term 'dialectics' designates the set of the sets enumerated
at 4.31-4.34.

        4.5 We postulate,               as an assumption which                      is to be checked,       the possibility
                                                                            ?
of                     one    or more           meta-dialectics                                               in   the   sense
        building                                                                  quasi-meta-theories
 shown          at 0.54       ? within           which          different        dialectics     could be meaningfully
 interpreted and reformulated with                              relatively        satisfactory precision.


               5. A SHORT HISTORICAL                              EXCURSUS:                THE PROBLEM OF
               DIALECTICS              AS GENERAL                   (FUNDAMENTAL)                       ONTOLOGY

 5.1 The understanding of dialectics as a general ontology and its identity,
 as such, with the process and theory of knowledge, method       and logic, is
 constitutive for the absolute idealism of G. W. F. Hegel: Absolute     Spirit
 is the ground and the fulfillment of its own self-development, this 'develop
ment'  is for Hegel the essence of dialectics.26
   5.2 But even inHegelian philosophy, dialectics, understood as ontology,
cannot be dealt with, as is done in the paper of Bunge, independently from
dialectics conceived as method, logic, process and theory of cognition.
     5.30 Marx critically examined Hegel's dialectics of the Absolute21.   His
 criticism includes some elements of a possible (quasi-meta-theoretical) inter
pretation            of the Hegelian             dialectics,        as part of which             the Hegelian      dialectics
MARIO     BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                           97


is relativized (it is ascribed a definite domain of validity: the philosophy            of
absolute idealism), but, at the same time,
   5.31 I consider the Marxian approach to be asserting the possibility                 of
some other dialectics than what Marx calls the real one.
    S32      This assertion can be bolstered  by outlining ameta-approach   (meta
dialectics, quasi-meta-theory     of dialectics),  in which can be meaningfully

interpreted not only the Hegelian version, but also any other possible dia
lectics.28 One can then identify, inMarx,
                                                                 ? the dialectical
    5.33 'the logical practice' of a dialectics of the real
theory of the classical capitalistic economy's development,
    5.34    the outlining of a dialectical         theory   of   social development,   'the
materialistic view of history', and
    5.35     the elements       of an epistemology, methodology,       and logic of social
 sciences,    from among which         'the critique of ideologies'    represents a major
contribution.29

   5.36 But we do not find, inMarx, any explicit reference to dialectics                as
universalontology.  It seems that such an intellectual enterprise appeared              to
him both useless and impracticable.
    5.37 This last supposition can be argued indirectly, namely,
    5.38 when Marx makes up the regional ontology of a social-economic
 structure (i.e. capitalism) in its development, he resorts in an authentically
critical way30 to a tridimensional approach:
    (a) the study of the economic       (and social) phenomenon    as human
          = das
activity        Ding-fiir-uns,
    (b) its confrontation with the intellectual constructions which different
authors      and                (ideologists) of the economic process elaborate
                     'theoreticians'
with    referenceto this activity (= authentic or inauthentic; ideological, in a
negative sense) of knowledge and
   (c) the study of the practice under both of its aspects, material (a) and
 ideal (b) in order to reveal whether das Ding, as it showed itself to the actors,
 is independent of their will or wish; and, therefore, that the relevant action
programs      are   feasible   or not.

    5.39 It seems, therefore, plausible to suggest that Marx did not allow for
the dogmatic construction      of an ontology,    separated from the relevant
epistemologies  and practices, in which both of them are found and inwhich
alone they could be captured.
    5.40 The position of Engels is somewhat different. On the one hand,
98                                          PAVEL AP?STOL


     5.41 he contests even the possibility as well as the utility of universal

ontology31,    but admits of three correlated regional ontologies:       nature,
society, thinking (knowledge). On the other hand,
   5.42 he still speaks about dialectics in the sense of universal ontology of
developmental processes (the 'objective' dialectics) but only in interdepen
dence with an epistemology    and a methodology    (the 'subjective' dialectics),
both of which are continuously correlated with social-historical practice.
   5.43 Anyhow, when Engels writes about dialectics as a universal theory
of development,    from his point of view this is not a universal ontology
of the traditional type, but can actually be interpreted rather as a theory,
comparing descriptions   and scientific theories dealing with peculiar devel
opments.      Therefore,            it is universal      but       conditioned;             namely     comparing
              theories      or case-descriptions         of   some     developmental            processes.
particular
    5.50 As concerns Lenin's outlook,       this has to be drawn especially from
his Philosophic Notebooks     as well as from the study of the 'logical practice'
of dialectics   in his social (economic,     sociological, politological)  research.
But the formulations      from the Philosophic Notebooks           cannot be taken
into account as such: they are reading notes, within which formulations
from the text cited often interfere. That iswhy their interpretation increases
the difficulties. We will mention    the meanings that seem principal to us:
     5.51 Lenin  defines dialectics, in his well-known   article about Karl Marx,
published   in the Granat Encyclopaedia,       as the "formulation    of the prin
ciple of development",     in nature and society, in the theory of cognition

(of cognition's development),       as well as in methodology.32     In the Philo
sophic Notebooks             dialectics     is also defined          as logic (different             from formal

logic33).
    5.52 Sometimes, Lenin seems to admit the Hegelian position of identity
(in a sense typical of dialectics: concrete, 'contradictory identity') of logic,
dialectics and theory of cognition.34
     5.6 On     the contrary,          many        authors,        acknowledged             as dialecticians    of
                               ?
Marxian                             as A.   Gramsci35,        G.     Luk?cs36,         L.    Goldmann37        and
             expression
H. Lef?bvre38,           et al. ?    interpret dialectics mainly             as social (human) method
and ontology.
     5.7 In the above examples, dialectics                     cannot      be interpreted            as universal

ontology, as Bunge seems to think.
MARIO     BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                  99


                                   6. COUNTER-ARGUMENT


6.11 Although Bunge's thesis about dialectics as universal ontology    is not
consistent with the examples and interpretations above, it is abusive only
because of its claim to characterize any dialectics at all.
    6.12 The thesis mentioned       at 6.11 above is legitimate ? with some
restrictions as shown above (5.1?5.2) ? for Hegelian philosophy and others
that are similar (absolute idealism, objective idealism, etc.)
   6.13 It is also compatible with some formulations found     in Engels' and
Lenin's writings  (and  in those of some others who have taken over such an
interpretation), although, as has been shown (5.4 and 5.5), the general spirit
of these works does not admit
    6.131      the equivalence between dialectics and universal ontology nor
    6.132      the interpretation of (universal) ontology without       its connection
with     cognition (epistemology, methodology,     logic) and practice.
    6.20                       of dialectics as universal ontology
             Even if the definition                                                 is extremely
problematic, sometimes (with Hegel, for instance) this thesis                      is consistent
with an idealist, objective philosophic    standpoint. Sometimes     (in some of
Engels'      and Lenin's
                       formulations)  it is necessary to specify the meaning of
the interpretation of some formulae. For example, dialectics is the general
view on the development        of nature, society, knowledge     (thinking),  i.e.
dialectics = the theory of development.
   6.21 Considering Marx' and Lenin's or Engels' general conception, one
 interpretation         has    to be excluded
                                           the very beginning; namely that
                                                     from
proposed by Bunge: dialectics as universal ontology (theory of any possible
and actual, past, present and future existent [das Seiende] ?. Like the pre
vious speculative metaphysics                out of which       could be derived any particular
kind of existence or existent,                this will    not hold. Against   such an interpre
tation     one   can           unambiguous        texts.
                       quote
    6.22     The              do not leave out the understanding of dialectics
                       texts which
as ontology             refer to any existent or any existence, but to and only
                   do not
to existents   in development     and destruction,   or to the development       and
destruction of existents, or,    in other words, it refers to existents in so far as
these represent constituent moments        in some processes of development     (and
destruction), and therefore could be intelligible only as such.
    [Here and in what follows,               I differentiate
                                                           change (any observable variation
of state, properties, relations)             from transformation (any observable variation
100                                              PAVEL AP?STOL


of structural i.e. qualitative determinations)   and from development    (a series
of oriented transformations, for instance from simple to complex, from the
embryo to the grown-up individual, etc.)]
   6.231 Postulating that 'all that exists' is, finally, a moment     of a devel
opment (and destruction)       process, a hypothesis  can be formulated that it
 is possible           to build up a general              substantive    theory of development            (and
destruction)..
     6.232  In this case, it has to be demonstrated                          that such a general theory
 is also necessary, from a certain point of view,                           in comparison to particular
 theories         of     development          (and destruction)         regarding   certain     ontological
 regions.
     6.24        Independently          of the way        in which we specify the meaning
                                                                      assigned
to the expression "general theory of development (and destruction)",   at least
in the works of Engels or Lenin, this theoretical position is not constructed
by replying only on direct observations of development     (of some processes
of development and destruction), but by confronting such observations with
valid (verified or verifiable, tested or testable, confirmed or confirmable,
etc.) scientific descriptions or theories, as parts of a certain social-historical
praxis.
     6.25        Such an intellectual
                              construct (as that shown in 6.24) is logically and
historically subsequent to the particular scientific theories about development
and destruction and to the social-historical practices within which these have
been formulated.
     6.26        The      situation     presented       at 6.25   evinces     (as shown     also      in 5.32)
 remarkable            analogies    with     the   function   of meta-mathematics         vis-?-vis   mathe

matics,          and of a meta-theory
                                vis-?-vis a theory (or theories). That is why,
    6.27 we can specify dialectics (in the sense of 6.24) as a construct be
 longing to the foundations  of any conceptualization     of development   and
destruction as such, carrying out toward them a function similar to that of
a meta-theory              toward     a theory.

     6.28  Thus, dialectics is concerned with the conditions for making develop
ment     and destruction   intelligible and, as such, underlies any conception or
 intellectual construct that refers to these.
   6.29 Taking into account the considerations mentioned    above, it turns
out that dialectics ? even when interpreted as an ontology ? does not refer
 to 'things' ('phenomena',   'complexes', 'systems' are preferable                            terms) but to
 the development    and destruction of these and, consequently,                                it cannot be
MARIO   BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                             101

well-formulated        in an objectifying   (verdinglichende,   chosifiant)   language,
as done by Bunge.
   6.30 Dialectics  can be interpreted as an ontology (of development   and
destruction of complexes,   of systems, etc.) in the manner of the logic of
science and contemporary    epistemology which associate with each theory
the respective ontology not as a description of the object as such, but as
a description of the object of a certain theory (or an intellectual construct)
within the framework of an approach that leaves out the practical (existential,
pragmatic) relationship among the theory, the object of the theory, and the
object of the praxis, with which        the object of the theory and the respective
theory ought to be associated.
    6.31  In this sense, which is not yet to be explicitly found in texts of
some authors dealing with dialectics, one can assert that dialectics is also
an ontology of development and destruction.
   6.32 But, even on this hypothesis,   its principles cannot be formulated in
 the language used by Bunge (and described at 6.29).
    6.40 Since the dialectics of Marx, Engels or Lenin have been formulated
within the Weltanschauung of a revolutionary movement,   one may ask
    6.41 whether         the 'materialist dialectics'   or 'dialectical materialism',
understood       as universal ontology, is necessary for its legitimation?
    6.420      There are at least three reasons for not answering 6.41 in the
affirmative.

    6.421 First of all, there is a historical reason. The elaboration of Marx'
(and Engels') conception proceeds from the study of social praxis (the con
dition of the working-class  in capitalist society and its fights for the improve
ment of its own status) and not from a purely revealed dialectics of the
development     and implicitly of the destruction of some social 'systems' (the
materialist   conception of history), as well as the dialectics of the cognitive
process    about these. This dialectics of development   and destruction of the
forms of human societies and of the adequate scientific and ideological
constructs   grounded the option for revolutionary action. Only after drawing
this conclusion did the analysis of some scientific theories ? especially in
                -
Engels' work       bring out, in connection with these, a dialectics inherent in
the scientific image of the world (= nature), meaning a reconstitution of 'a
dialectics             (in the sense of 6.3). With the help of a reflection about
               of nature'
scientific issues, therefore, from a historical standpoint, the revolutionary
conception    and action could be unfounded ? and was argued as such by
102                                                PAVEL AP?STOL


Marx       and Engels            ?                   the elaboration           of a 'dialectics of nature' The
                                       before
latter, subsequentlysupported, in their eyes, the plausibility of the former.
    6.422 Secondly, the validity of revolutionary    conclusions  emerge for
them from the social dialectics, the development   and destruction of some
social realia and from                               reproduction of these (theories, quasi
                                            the mental
theories, ideologies)                 and do not result and cannot result from some charac
teristics of nature (non-society).                       With         respect to this, from a logical point of
                                     conclusions         are   free    from    the   admission     or non-admission
view,     revolutionary
of a dialectics           of nature or from that of a dialectics                          understood      as universal

ontology.
   6.423       Finally, one could construct a (idealistic-objective, for instance)
dialectics     of nature and of the Universe, as Teilhard de Chardin did, which
does     not   come       to    social-revolutionary               consequences.




               7. BUNGE'S                FORMULATION                    OF     'THE PRINCIPLES            OF
                                         DIALECTICAL                  ONTOLOGY'


7.1. The    principles of dialectical ontology    are formulated by Bunge in a

language   which I designated as being (6.29) objectifying and which I charac
terized as improper for meaningfully      expressing any other interpretation of
dialectics than that of their author.
    7.2 Bunge formulates five principles of dialectical ontology     in as many
definitions (p. 64), to which he also adds some derived definitions (pp. 64,
67, 69, 70) and some corollaries. These five definitions and the corresponding
derivatives      are:



    Dl     :       "Everything has an opposite."
    Dla:           "For every thing (concrete object) there is an anti-thing."
    Dlb:           "For every property of concrete objects there is an anti-property."


       This definition          has also a Sveaker' form (p. 67):


    Die:           "For some properties                    there are others (called their anti-properties)
                   that        counteract          or neutralize        the   former."

    D2:            "Every            object        is inherently  contradictory,                 i.e. constituted     by
                  mutually             opposing        components and aspects."
MARIO            BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                                         103

      Here also there is aVeaker'                        formulation        (p. 69):

      D2a:          "Some             systems have components                     that oppose one aspect in some
                    other         system."
      D3 :          "Every change is the outcome of the tension of struggle of oppo
                    sites, whether within the system of interest or among different
                       systems."


   Once more, the statement                             of the principle will be proposed                           in a 'weaker'
variant (p. 70):

      D3a:          "Some     changes are brought about by the opposition     (in some
                    respects)  of different things or different components of one and
                    the        same     thing."
      D4:           "Development                    is a helix,      every level of which                  contains,       and at
                       the     same     time      negates,     the                  rung."
                                                                     previous
      D5:           "Every quantitative change ends up in some qualitative change
                    and every new quality has its own new mode of quantitative
                    change."


      7.3     It is obvious      that Dl, D2, and D3 reproduce the content of textbooks
of dialectics,            and treatises of dialectical materialism call them the principle
or    the     law   of       "dialectical         contradiction",          of                 and              of    contraries"
                                                                                  "unity              fight

(or    of    opposites,            as Anglo-Saxon               authors         would        rather                   D4     corre
                                                                                                         say).39
sponds to the principle or law of 'negation of the negation', while D5 is
the principle or law of 'the leap from quantitative changes to qualitative
transformations'.

      7.4 For Bunge only Dl, D2, and D3 are 'typical' of dialectics.



        8. BUNGE'S ARGUMENTS                                  IN SUPPORT OF HIS CRITICISM OF
                                                             DIALECTICS

8.10 As regards each of the suggested definitions of dialectics                                               and, especially,
Dl, D2, and D3, Bunge brings arguments aimed to prove
    8.11 the groundless claim to universality.
Let    us    examine          these    arguments.
      8.20 As       regards Dl,  (and Dla and Dlb), Bunge shows, and he is per
fectly       right, that the definitions formulated in propositions using the terms
104                                     PAVEL AP?STOL


"anti-object"           and             (pp. 64?65,
                               "anti-property"          respectively  65?68)  are
meaningless    (are inconsistent, bring about formal contradictions).    He adds,
again correctly, that this deficiency manifests itself differently
   8.21 in idealist dialectics, which     is possible though scarcely plausible
(p. 68), and
    8.22 in materialist   ones, which would be implausible and inconsistent
within  an interpretation of knowledge as reflection.

    [The argument used in connection with Dlb         is as follows (p. 68): the
set of predicates of a certain order (arity) and a common reference (as in the
case of the totality of unitary predicates concerning mammals)      is a Boolean
function, while the corresponding  set of properties of the same individuals

(the mammals in the given example) is a semi-group, where the concatenation
is interpreted  as the conjunction    of properties.   Bunge   says that in
a materialist   dialectics, which does not admit the real existence of negative
properties, one cannot state that the "structure of predicates mirrors the
structure of properties" (ibidem). In this respect, we will note that in most
dialectical-materialist    epistemologies 'reflection' is not understood  as an
 'exact    ideal copy'         of an objectively      real original,    as Bunge      supposes,   but
rather     as   an                    relationship    between     the   two   terms     and   I have
                       equivalence

specified        it is a congruence relationship (see my paper in Dial?ctica,
                that
 1972). Compared to these interpretations of 'reflection', the argument of
Bunge has probatory strength only if the impossibility of establishing any
possible relationship of equivalence between the set of predicates and the set
of properties could be demonstrated. But such a relationship of equivalence
is not conditioned by any homomorphism   of the structures considered.]
    8.23 This argumentation   relies on the supposition that dialectics and its
principles would refer to things and properties of these, because it is in this
case and only in this case, that the rejection of the existence of dialectics
on   the ground of the impossibility                 of anti-things     and anti-properties       can
effectively be asserted.
     8.24 But          is this supposition really confirmed by the texts in which are
formulated       ?      even without    sufficient clarity and precision ? different views
on dialectics?
   8.30 We will answer this question, after the examination of the arguments
used to show the inconsistency of the definitions D2, D2a, and D3.
   8.310 Bunge formulates D2 in this way: "every thing is an unity of its
opposites".40
MARIO        BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                      105

      8.311considering that this "essential thesis of dialectics" could also be
interpreted with the help of the definition:      "Property (or relation) P2 if
PI tends to check (neutralize, balance, or dim) P2 and conversely", while,
later.

      8.312     he reformulates          it in the statement:    "all systems are contradictory".
      8.213 All          these formulations         are meaningless,   according to Bunge, who
admits only
   8.314 "the weaker               thesis" stated in D2a. More than this.
      8.315 the idea of dialectical  'opposition' (contradiction    or contrariety)
seems    to him an "oversimplifying"    one, belonging to a pre-scientific     ("ar
chaic") mentality,    unable to cope with "intermediate          states" in whose
description and explanation there is no room for polarity (p. 69).
      8.40     It should be stressed that here too dialectics                    is related to 'things'

(replaced, at a given moment     (pp. 68 and 69), without                         an explicit justifica
tion, by  the term 'system'), manifesting itself exclusively                     as opposition
    8.41  between polar properties of things or
      8.42     between      components       of    systems.
      8.5 We recall the question at 8.24 and we strengthen it with another:
is it true that in all the texts of some dialecticians or in most of these "the
unity of opposites" and similar expressions refer really to polar properties
of things, to polarized components of systems, or to something others
    8.6 But there is one specific question raised: does dialectics mean a
conceptualization    of change, as has been postulated by Bunge for instance,
or of development  (which, as we have shown before, is not the same)?
   8.7 This question is legitimate because Bunge rejects dialectics (pp. 70?
71) with the argument that it represents an unsatisfactory conceptualization
of change, which can be more adequately described through a series of
unpolarized states!
   8.80 The principle              stated in D4        is very superficially     dealt with    (p. 71) in
two      sentences:

      8.81     the terms "dialectical             negation"   and "sublation"        are foggy, that is
why
   8.82 D4 is also dim, confused, unintelligible ('misty'). The same for
   8.90 the principle formulated in D5, called this time "the quality-quantity
thesis". It is superficially dealt with, showing that
      8.91     the thesis about "the conversion               of quality       into quantity     and con
versely"       is unintelligible     and
106                                          PAVEL AP?STOL


     8.92       that it cannot be obtained                   as "a theorem within    a general    theory
of   change".
     8.931 We             also note        here    that      the argumentation    refers    to sentences
formulated in object terms and
   8.932 that dialectics  is considered                         as a particular   case of a theory of
change.
     8.94 The  study contains a chapter dealing with the relation between
"dialectics and formal logic" (pp. 73-76) which forms a special topic. Critical
examination of Bunge's opinions in this respect occurs below.



                                      9. BUNGE'S             CONCLUSIONS

9.11      The formulation            of the principles of dialectics in the 'extant' literature
(rather, Bunge's              arbitrary selection therefrom) is 'ambiguous and imprecise'.
Whence
     9.12       the necessity        of their reformulation.
   91.3 Obviously,                Bunge's     study tries to offer the pattern for such a clearer
formulation:
     9.21       Formulated     more carefully, the principles of dialectics   lose their
universality,           get a 'weaker form', through the application of particularizers,
whereby
     9.22                become     mere     'platitudes'.
                they
     9.3 Even more  clearly formulated and without any claim to universality,
 the principles of dialectics do not offer a ground for a "modern theory of
 change" which has to be "more precise, explicit and complete than that"
 (p. 76).
     9.41 Dialectics              does not embrace formal logic, and
     9.42   it is "incompatible             with any realistic epistemology"               (p. 77; about
 this matter, see 8.94)
    9.5 Yet Bunge concedes that one could designate a field proper to dia
 lectics (see, especially 18.1-18.8),    but,
    9.6 a dialectical ontology      relies obligatorily upon modern logic, mathe
matics,     and        science.
MARIO          BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                         107

         10. THE SECOND OBJECTION                       AGAINST   BUNGE'S      CRITICISM:
         REJECTION              OF THE FORMULATION            GIVEN TO 'PRINCIPLES
                                  OF DIALECTICAL           ONTOLOGY'


10.01 I refused above the groundless restriction of the meaning of dialectics
to that of a 'universal ontology', underlying the 'critical examination' under
taken by Bunge, who neglects the most frequent meanings attributed to the
term.

       10.02 That      is why I concluded    that the criticism calls for an ad hoc
concept        of dialectics, which is far from being generally admitted. Now we
must     go on     presenting         arguments.
       10.11 Since         the   'strongest' meaning   of dialectics ? according to its
system-building           (systembildende)    function and its frequency in very represen
                   ?
tative    texts        refers    to    'development'.
       10.12                of dialectics, of its field and principles in terms of
                  the formulation
                                         ? to which it is
 'objects' and 'properties of objects'                       hereafter added, from
                                ? is
outside, as a dynamic principle        illicit, and as such,
    10.13 can generate only meaningless and inconsistent statements. Relative
 to the referent of dialectical discourse (development), one has to operate not
with objects and properties (and relations among these), but
    10.14 with terms suitable for constructing meaningful     statements about
development (and destruction).
    10.15 The ontic referent of all materialist                   dialectics   and also of some
non-materialist  ones) is development   (and destruction as mode of existence
of the 'things' (= phenomena, finite processes, systems, etc.) and by no means
the 'things' as such (and/or their properties and relations) seen separately
from their mode of existence.
       10.16      In amaterialist
                           perspective, dialectics is not that 'universal ontology'
which   Bunge presents, but a theoretical reflecting (of a quasi-meta-theoretical
type) upon some particular theories of development, aiming
    10.17 not at discovering a priori principles out of which could be infered
any development, but
   10.18 at establishing     some firm criteria of intelligibility of development,
which could be retrieved, as they are applied, in any valid scientific theory
of the development    (and destruction) of a certain peculiar ontological region.
These criteria of intelligibility work as principles of construction in particular
scientific theories of development     (and destruction),    and dialectics ? even
108                                         PAVEL AP?STOL


taken as ontology, with the restrictions                                          in our          'first objection'       ?
                                                                  specified
is no substitute for them.
        10.19 Dialectics      is not ontology. On the contrary, any ontology or intel
 lectual construct with           the function of an ontology ('the scientific image of
the Universe',          Weltanschauung,     etc.) has to be a dialectical one if it wants
itself compatible            with      particular        scientific      theories         of development                (and
destruction).
    10.21 That  is why we hold that the principles of dialectics ? as clearly
formulated as possible ? refer to the process of development (and destruction)
and not to 'things' (properties and relations) cut off from their 'natural' mode
of existence, which is 'dialectical'.
    10.22 Observing this linguistic convention  (compatible with the literature),
confused   and meaningless    expressions or terms, like 'opposition within the
things',  'opposition   between    thing and anti-thing'   'opposition between
property   and anti-property (of the things)', 'negation' and 'sublation' in the
senses defined by Bunge, transform themselves into meaningful         expressions:
 'divergently polarized tendencies in and through which the development        (or
destruction) constitutes itself, 'opposition (here taken as equivalent to con
tradiction and contrariety) between these (tensorially) divergent tendencies
specific to development,     'opposition between the determinations, moments,
etc. of development'    (and destruction),   'negation' and 'sublation' not in the
formal       logic sense (as operators),            but as 'establishment                 and/or discarding of a
certain     moment,         determination,       etc.,     of   development           (and        destruction)',        etc.

        10.23 That which             appears meaningless               with     respect       to       'object' under
 stood out of its mode                of existence designated                 by the term 'development',
becomes           intelligible   and can be conceptualized                    with reference to this mode
of   existence.

        10.24 From         a logical point of view, therefore purely formally,                                     'develop
ment'       can    be   considered      as a particular         case    of                   or      'transformation'
                                                                              'change',

(but only in the sense of the distinctions     introduced before); but dialectics
understood   as a philosophic   (quasi-meta-)theory    of development   (and de
struction) cannot be built up this way.
           It can be elaborated only starting from the theories of development
        10.25
(and destruction)   actually accepted in science, with respect to determined
ontological regions (or fields), as they can be grasped at the level of a deter
mined    practice, within the framework of the interaction                                        between          the con
 structor of the theory and the object of the latter.
MARIO            BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                                    109

    10.26 The way suggested by Bunge (cf. 10.24) refers to the logical re
construction  of a theory of change (development),    leading to an axiomatic
formulation,  as meta-theory   of any possible substantive theory of change;
but
    10.27 that these substantive theories are or can be brought forth in an
exact form, is to be proved.
   10.28 Or, such a 'general theory                                   of change',             fulfilling   in fact a meta
theoretical           function         vis-?-vis         the    particular        theories,       cannot     be   'stronger',
of course, than the referenced theories. If this is the state of things, then
   10.29 the condition formulated by Bunge with respect to a future dia
lectics       seems       to be   an   excessive         one,                  especially,       a contentious     role.
                                                                 having,
    10.30 Bunge is certainly right, when he says that discourse about dialectics
suffers from obscure and often confused and vague terms: but,
      10.31                      of the principles of dialectics suggested by
                    the reformulations
him do take account     of the inconsistency of the theses (the Hegelian one,
the 'Marxist-Leninist',   the didactic interpretation), as such, but only the
inconsistency of these against the theoretical horizon adopted by Bunge:
the Verdinglichung                  of an ontology                 claiming,       at the same time, a dialectical
character.

      10.32 Through this method has been expelled the effective ontic referent
which     any materialist dialectics and many non-materialist ones known to us
                      ?
had       in view          development             and    destruction.

    10.33 From a logical point of view, the method used by Bunge is the
interchange of the significance of the terms (meaning change), without
any other justification except the appeal to 'evidence'.


The criticism of the 'critical examination                                   of dialectics'        by Bunge has obliged
us to formulate                   some objections.              The        refutation         (elenchus) did not result
only in negative aspects; proceeding self-critically                                          we tried to evince some
landmarks for a positive reconstruction  of the dialectics. Before starting to
examine in detail Bunge's opinions concerning the relation between dialectics
and formal logic, we would like to present concisely some consequences of
the previous critical confrontation.
  As was obvious, Bunge contests in particular the intelligibility of the
Hegelian   concept of Aufhebung,     'dialectical negation' and 'negation of
the negation'. Without  doubting the intelligibility of these Hegelian con
cepts, as Bunge actually does, there is no question that with Hegel, with
110                                 PAVEL AP?STOL


his   interpreters as well as with some dialecticians who claim themselves to
be Marxists but who do not want to pay the appropriate attention to the
criticism of the Hegelian dialectics, as dialectics, conceived by Marx (much
more    developed        in Kritik des Hegeischen     Staatsrechts     of 184341 and in the
?konomisch-philosophische      Manuskripte            of
                                                 184442),              it is exactly on these
 concepts that the 'fog' (the term belongs to Bunge) or the mystification   of
dialectics concentrates   itself. Let us proceed, then, with a problem largely
discussed     in the Hegelian    exegesis.


      11. THE      'TERNARY      STRUCTURE'         OF THE DIALECTICAL              LOGIC
                                IN HEGEL'S         PHILOSOPHY

 11.1 The kernel of Hegel's          dialectics,    its constitutive   principle   is a ternary
schema.44

      11.2 The triad is evident in the architectureof the system and not only as
an exterior   cover but, on the contrary, it is blended with the very substance
of the Hegelian philosophy of the Absolute Idea's and of the Absolute Spirit's
self-development.   This ternary structure, the 'triad', defined by Hegel's dis
                              ?
ciples in its three moments     thesis, antithesis and synthesis, is to overcome
the philosophic presuppositions of Absolute     Idealism45
    11.3 This determined Marx to concentrate his criticism of Hegel's dia
lectics on the category of the Aufhebung,   even in his youth, and to take it
up again  inDas Kapital, where he writes: "Die Entwicklung    (der Ware) hebt
diese Widerspr?che nicht auf, schafft aber die Form, worin sie sich bewegen
k?nnen. Dies ist ?berhaupt         die Methode,     wodurch     sich wirkliche Widerspr?che
l?sen."46

   11.4 The philosophic and consequently the ideological over-saturation (in
the sense of L. Althusser's    'sur-d?termination') of the Hegelian triad47 does
not justify its simple rejection; we have to ask ourselves whether this ternary
structure aims      to be more       than the mere manifestation         of the dialectics of
the Absolute1.
      11.5 Our answer is in the affirmative. Within
                                                  the framework of his exposi
tion of      'divine logic', the logic of 'God's thinking', Hegel states quite
             the
frequently theses of a 'human logic'.48 Taking into account this perspective,
we have to ask ourselves which is the real meaning of this ternary structure.
      11.6   It is not    the first time49     that I state that by the identification of
a ternary structure Hegel defines            the necessary condition of the intelligibility
MARIO             BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                                                     111

of development                     and destruction                and for           conceptualization                        of      them (of
 'becoming'          in    its Aristotelian               acceptance:            change,        generation             and        corruption,

growth        and     diminution,                 alteration).          In other         words,           this    ternary            structure

allows and only it allows one to make meaningful statements about 'develop
ment' and/or 'destruction', constituting the 'minimum for conceptualizing'
development                and      destruction,              a                         minimum',                the     'minimum                of
                                                                  'cognitive

 intelligibility' for coherent discourse on development and destruction.
     11.7 Development       and/or destruction    are interpreted as a series of
oriented          transformations;


                    TlfT2,           T3,...,Tn,


which    can be in fact the conceptual threshold for distinguishing an oriented
 transformation   from whatever     transformation  is occuring. The first two
 transformations   (taking only them)   warrant the conclusion that a transfor
mation        occurred        without             any     reference        to    its positive        or                       orientation.
                                                                                                           negative

Only                              allows us to specify if and to what extent the
           the third transformation
 respective series of transformations represent a development       and/or destruc
 tion (the maintaining,                ? under a certain
                           improving                        explicitly formulated
              ?                                      on
 respect            structuring,            or,             the      contrary,           the    destruction,             degeneration,

destructuring of the complex dynamic totality in view). This ternary struc
ture consisting of three asymetrically interdependent terms (determinations
=
   Bestimmungen)          (three              transformations,                  three      'moments',            thesis?antithesis
               . . .                         and        it is only       this     structure         that                      us      to estab
 synthesis.          ) permits                                                                               permits
lish a conceptual  limit between an indefinite series of any transformations
(which  does not affect the complex and dynamic totality from a qualitative
and structural point of view), and a series of oriented transformations:
development               and/or      destruction.50

    11.8 Thus the ternary structure identified by Hegel represents the neces
sary condition but obviously not also the sufficient one for the intelligibility
and the conceptualization    of development    and destruction; consequently
for any theory of development and/or destruction.



                                       12. THE             'LAWS' OF DIALECTICS

 12.11  In the literature, especially in that of 'Marxist' orientation, the 'laws
of dialectics' are often referred to. This way of speaking is derived from the
112                                                      PAVEL AP?STOL


classic German                philosophic                tradition,     in which          'law' is used in its larger sense
of   order,        norm      or    rule,      specific       to a series      of    events.

     12.12 By no means does 'law', in this context, claim to be equivalent to
 'law' in the experimental or exact sciences, as the term is used in French and
                           linguistic        areas.
Anglo-Saxon
      12.13         It would      to say that it represents the Aristotelian
                                        be much           better
arche (ta prot?) through which anything can be known ? a presupposition
which cannot be demonstrated but which represents in fact the starting point
of   any      cognition           and      rational       argumentation.51
     12.21 The laws or principles of dialectics revealed by the Hegelian and
Marxian exegesis represent a system of conceptual determinations     according
 to which    'development' and 'destruction',  identified through the ternary
 structure (presented at 11) ? identification which represents the necessary
condition   of their intelligibility ? become understood       or conceptually
determined             and this is the sufficient                     condition    of their intelligibility.
      12.22 The principles                      are, therefore,            criteria of the logical validation        of the
correct       use     of    the    terms        'development'           and        'destruction'.

      12.23 Understoodas such they designate the logical field in which any
theory of development and/or destruction can be conceived with a sufficient
degree        of    consistency.
     12.31 If we admit of dialectics as a theory of development and destruc
 tion, we have to specify from the very beginning that we are actually dealing
with a philosophic    theory (in the large meaning of the word, not in the
mathematical one),
         in a position to formulate the conditions of intelligibility of devel
      12.32
opment and destruction (as shown in 11.1?12.23),
   12.33 as well as their significance for understanding and transforming the
human         condition.52

      12.34 Within   this context a legitimate question arises as to whether or not
a 'philosophic theory of development and destruction', distinct from theories
of development and destruction belonging to other sciences (astronomy-cos
mogony, biology, history, sociology . . . ) has any justification when it is not
conceived in the exact language of a (formalized) meta-theory        of those special
 theories ? a meta-theory with the help of which some other such particular
 scientific theories of development and destruction could be provided.
      12.35 The              problem            requires        a discussion            which       cannot   be engaged   in
here.53       Nevertheless,
MARIO               BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                                                113

   12.36 there is a pragmatic argument in favour of the legitimacy of such
a philosophic theory of development   and destruction  (Ph.T.D.D.) with a
                                              function;               namely,          even         in    their     vague         form        such
quasi-meta-theoretical
                                                             ?                                                                            ?
Ph.T.D.D.'s             have        allowed          one             as    if they    were      the      very     meta-theories                   to

elaborate             dialectical
                        inquiry systems5*,                 planning   patterns55,      dialectical
dialectical          theories56, dialectical methodologies
                      decision                                 in economics and
social sciences57 Certainly    these are only examples of possible positive
answers to the question reformulated in proposition     12.34, and not a demon
stration         of    an answer.58

          I promised a reformulation of the principles of dialectics as a
         12.40
 system of the conceptual determinations of 'development' and/or 'destruc
tion'.     Here         and     now,          such       a    task        cannot     be     carried       out.    We     can      only    point
out the direction                   inwhich           its achievement              appears possible:
         12.41        one
                    can make meaningful                                       statements with reference     to develop
ment       and destruction if and only if it can be detected                                    empirically or if it can
be presupposed in accordance with                                         the scientific data available:
    12.42 the presence of an ontic field made up by a series of asymmetrically
interdependent quantitative changes (growth) which, reaching a certain limit
 specific        to each category of 'object', (here meaning                                             the bearer of a develop
ment       process),           complex             totalities,            dynamic         systems        etc.,    generate        necessarily
a                                             transformation
    qualitative-structural                                                    (or    transformations),               namely,
       12.431          that a new quality                        and/or         structure       emerges from the preceding
one,      representing,             at    least,     either

    12.432 an enlarged, but selective and/or (at least under a certain perspec
tive) optimized  reproduction of the 'object' (complex totality, system or
                                         considered59,                or
quasi-system)               being
       12.433               of a new complex totality, other than the preceding
                       a production
one (i.e. a significant part of the former goes directly into the structure
obtained by its transformation), or, contrariwise,
    12.434 a disaggregation, disintegration, destruction, decomposing, destruc
turing, destabilization   ... of this one, (I observe that 'destruction'
                                                                         (and its
synonyms)    do not mean complete annihilation, but 'destruction' of a given
complex totality (complexity),   understood as mode of existence and, at the
same time, 'liberation' of its components which become in this way possible
components of other complex totalities).
         12.5 These            asymmetrically        interdependent and oriented transformations
 signify development                       and/or destruction // and only if they are the result of
114                                              PAVEL AP?STOL


a collision (clashing, opposing) of at least two (in a vectorial sense) divergent
                                                  ?
tendencies, immanent to the process considered       diverging tendencies which
presuppose    each other (at least for a lapse of time) and, simultaneously,
exclude         each other           reciprocally           in the series of transformations                      taken into
 consideration.

     12.6 The system of these conceptual determinations    designates the ontic
 referent one has in view in the various formulations of the 'laws of dialectics'
or, as is preferable, of the system of the principles of dialectics.
      12.71       The        formulation         proposed            above       does     not     resort    to     terms   ex

 traneous to the language of science and
     12.72 does not neglect or reject the rules of formal logic.
     12.8 Dialectics, understood   like Ph.T.D.D. and relying on the study of
 the theories of development and destruction belonging to different sciences,
establishes          the conditions of intelligibility   (the ternary structure) and the
criteria of         intelligibility (the conceptual determinations,   called principles of
dialectics),        which are absolutely       necessary   to conceptualize   (to describe
                                 to explain       . . .                                 one
 in rational        terms,                                ) the   referents      that           has   in mind.

      12.9     We       cannot     examine       here       the   relations     between         the Ph.T.D.D.        and   the

human         condition.




     13. A SHORT ASIDE ON THE POSSIBILITIES                                               OF FORMULATING
                                     DIALECTICS               MORE PRECISELY

 13.1 There are several attempts to formalize dialectics (or at least the logic
of dialectics used by Hegel).60
     13.2 Except for Dubarle, these attempts ignored von Neumann's critical
remarks on the one-sidedness of formal (mathematical)      logic. He wrote in
 1948: "Everybody who has worked             in formal logic will confirm that
it is one of the technically most refractory parts of mathematics.  The reason
for this is that it deals with rigid, all-or-none concepts, and has very little
contact with the continuous concept of the real or of the complex number,
 that  is, with mathematical    analysis. Yet analysis is the technically most
 successful and best-elaborated part of mathematics.     Thus formal logic is, by
 the nature of its approach, cut off from the best cultivated portions of mathe
matics,        and forced onto                the most       difficult        part of mathematical               terrain, into
combinatorics."61

      13.3      It is not         our purpose             to examine           here     the consequences            of these
MARIO            BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                                                          115

objections directed against logical-mathematical reductionism, but we will
mention Ren? Thorn's recent attempt to capture in amathematical  formalism
 'the     origin            and        the    end     of     the      systems'62,             and mathematical                   morphogenesis
understood                  as an exact              study     of     any     creative         or destructive
                                                                                                                           process.63
        13.41          So    we         are    confronted              with       an     approach             based        upon          non-conven

 tional mathematical                          means          (different from the Boolean ones of mathematical
logic), which make possible                                    a topological description of genesis and of the
destructive processes, which                                   present remarkable analogies with the concepts
of 'development-destruction', and of 'dialecticity' that we have used above.
    13.42 This analogy is revealed once more by the concept of 'generalized
catastrophe' introduced by Thorn to designate the emergence of something
new which is also aimed at by the so-called 'dialectical leap': "D'une mani?re
g?n?rale,              l'apparition                 d'une          nouvelle           'phase'         dans       un     milieu             initialement

                        conduit               ? ce     genre                                    que       nous
homog?ne                                                             d'apparence,                                     appelons             'catastrophe

g?n?ralis?e'; tout processus dans lequel il y a rupture d'une sym?trie initiale
est de ce fait, structurellement    instable, et conduit ? une catastrophe g?n
           de tels processus ne sont pas formalisables: mais       ...
?ralis?e,                                                              [l'] issue
finale [du processus],     elle, peut-?tre bien d?termin?e    ... La mort d'un
?tre vivant semanifeste                              par le fait que la dynamique                             de son m?tabolisme                          local
passe          d'une                                         r?currente          a une                                      de                           c'est,
                             configuration                                                      configuration                        gradient;

 typiquement,                 une        catastrophe               g?n?ralis?e."64
        13.5      The             above-mentioned                      analogy           becomes             more          convincing               as        the

 'generalized                catastrophe'                   is understood                as     the     result        of    a        'conflict',         of         a

                                  or     of    a     'struggle'65:            "Dans           la mesure          o?     l'on     fait      du      'conflit'
 'competition',
un terme exprimant une situation g?om?trique bien d?finie dans un syst?me

dynamique, il n'y a aucune objection ? user de ce terme pour d?crire rapide
ment       et qualitativement                        un      syst?me          dynamique."66
        13.6                                         a Ph.T.D.D.               can     be       thought          again         and      reformulated
                  Consequently,
in the language and within the conceptual framework of the mathematical
theory of morphogenesis.67 But that is not the purpose of this study.



        14. DIALECTICS                             VERSUS             FORMAL                  LOGIC IN MARIO                           BUNGE'S
                                                                            VIEW


14.1 Bunge attributes to the dialecticians       the claim that "logic is a special
case of dialectics", which is, in fact, he states, a "false claim" (p. 73), because
116                                          PAVEL AP?STOL


      14.21     "formal logic . .. cannot be a particular case of dialectical             ontology:
for   the    very    reason    that

      14.22logic does not arise from an ontology and
    14.23 any rational non-logic theory presupposes a logic."
    14.24 To put it in another way: "formal logic refers to everything but
describes or represents nothing but its own basic concepts" (p. 74). So,
    14.25 the logical concepts refer or can be applied to propositions and not
to materialobjects.
           The argumentation
      14.261                    is based, Bunge pursues, on the disjunction
between physical objects and conceptual ones (p. 75).
    14.262 Of course, this hypothesis   cannot be proved but it can be made
plausible. On the contrary,
    14.263 "the thesis of the oneness      of logic and ontology  is possible, nay
necessary,  in an idealist system" (p. 75). He considers then that
    14.3 "The idea that the understanding of change requires a logic of its
own, be it dialectical logic or some version of temporal logic, because formal
logic is incapable of dealing with change, is a relic from ancient philosophy"
(pp. 75-76).
      14.4    From       the    perspective     of   contemporary      science,   says   Bunge,   we

would    not think any longer in opposites, but in degrees, meaning that "we
no   longer think dialectically,    i.e. in opposites and without distinguishing
logic  from the disciplines dealing with facts" (p. 76).
    14.51 Consequently,     "dialectics does not embrace formal logic" (p. 76),
and

      14.52     "the claim that dialectics generalizes logic can be upheld only within
a Platonistic       ontology and is incompatible with any realistic epistemology,
in particular with             naive realism (the reflection        theory of knowledge)"         (pp.
76-77).
    In conclusion,and Iwant to say from the very beginning that I completely
agree  with these theses, although my reasons are different from Bunge's:
    14.60 "the legitimate concerns of dialectics" consist in
      14.61"the analysis and codification of the patterns (both valid and merely
plausible) (cf. Polyain 1958 on plausible reasoning) of actual argumentation",
    14.62 "theory invention and problem solving" and, especially,
      14.63     "the patterns of rational dialogue" and
      14.64     those of "inductive inference" (p. 77).
MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                117

              15. A FIRST ARGUMENT           AGAINST       BUNGE'S THESES ON
                        DIALECTICS      VERSUS      FORMAL          LOGICS


 15.10 I. Narski68 is among the first to have responded to Bunge's conception
of the adepts of Hegelian or non-Hegelian dialectics.
    15.11 We can only partly agree with his retort, for reasons that have
become evident through our discussion.       It must be recalled that Bunge's
remarks with respect to the relationship between dialectics as ontology and
formal logic refer again rather
      15.121     to the concept    of dialectics which we have called the didactically
operational      one,

      15.122to the opinions of a small number of authors, in some cases of
a very doubtful representativity,
    15.123 ignoring completely the positions that could not be subordinated
to the model built up by Bunge, claiming, without     sufficient reason to be
very characteristic of the position of the Hegelian or Marxian dialecticians,
of the Marxist-Leninist or the non-Hegelian ones, and
    15.124 neglecting   especially many well-elaborated  positions  regarding
the relationship between          formal and dialectical   logic.

Remark No. I (to the proposition     15.11) In my books and studies published
up   to 1965, Imade regrettable concessions, adopting the didactically opera
 tional concept of dialectics but, replying on the texts, I largely argued that
Marx' dialectics  is not a mere transposition of the Hegelian one onto a
material   bearer but, on the contrary, it is radically different from it, as
dialectics, being in fact another dialectics in comparison with that expounded
in Hegel's works. The main difference        lies in the fact that Marx rejected
the   speculative  identity between the Absolute     Subject and the Absolute
Object69,   the identity of ontology and dialectical logics70, the identification
of the name (designating logical objects) with the real referent (the physical

object).71 The 'materialist reversal' of the Hegelian dialectics does not refer
                                                                  ? as it is
only to the bearer of the dialectical process and to its 'causes'            often
taken to be    ? but it affects the most
                                          intimate structure of dialectics. This
obliged us to introduce the distinction between Hegelian dialectical structures
and non-Hegelian ones. The differences between those two types of structures
can be shown up through the "dialectical cell" which I call 'ternary structure'
(set up for identifying a definite process of development).    In the event of
118                                       PAVEL AP?STOL


the Hegelian    ternary structure the transition from the initial moment    to
the other ones is achieved with the help of     an operator of necessity (this
conception   is quite legitimate within the framework of Absolute Idealism, in
which        all these moments
                           represent determinations of the Absolute Spirit and
consequently   they can 'move' only with absolute necessity); whence the uni
queness of the third moment. On the contrary, in the case of a non-Hegelian
ternary structure (e.g., that found in the economic analyses made by Marx)
the transition is achieved with the help of an operator of probability, hence,
the plurality of third moments. Marx' text is fully conclusive in this respect
 if we remember that for Marx, the commodity     is not a 'thing', but a dynamic
relationship: "Der der Ware immanente Gegensatz von Gebrauchswert               und
Wert,   von Privatarbeit,  die sich zugleich als unmittelbar     gesellschaftliche
Arbeit darstellen muss, von besonderer konkreter Arbeit, die zugleich nur
als abstrakt          allgemeine Arbeit gilt, von Personifizierung  der Sache und Ver
dinglichung           der Personen ? dieser immanente Widerspruch erh?lt in der
Gegens?tzen           der Warenmetamorphose      seine entwickelten Bewegungsformen.
Die Formen   schliessen daher die M?glichkeit,  aber auch nur die M?glichkeit
der Krisen ein. Die Entwicklung    dieser M?glichkeit  erfordert einen ganzen
Umkreis von Verh?ltnissen,   die vom Standpunkt der einfachen Warenzirkula
tion noch gar nicht existieren".72 Thus, let us take Tfor dialectical 'transition'
or transformation, Ml, Ml, M3 for the significant moments            of a process
identified as dialectical (a process of development or destruction), v for an
                                                                    -> for
operator of necessity, and m for an operator of probability and            implica
tion, and then: in aHegelian ternary structure we will have


                    Tv(Ml,M2)^Tv(M2,M3)

For      each      sequence Ml, Ml,        M3     there is only one M3,       which   occurs with

necessity.
    On       the   contrary,   a non-Hegelian      ternary   structure,



                    Tv (Ml,M2) ->Tm (M2, {M3})

for each sequence Ml, Ml, M3                    there is a determined     set of {M3}'s which   are
not necessarily equiprobable.
  Or, admitting the linguistic convention of designating the three moments
by thesis (T), antithesis (AT), and synthesis (S), in the first case we will have:
MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS                                                             119


                 v(T->AT-+S)


and, in the second,


                 v(T-*AT)->m                   {S1,S2,S3...}

I have mentioned     some possibilities of interpretation     to make clear the
arbitrary       characterthe simplification of Bunge's problem: dialectics or
                                 of
 logic? His arguments are justified only against the conceptions which operate
with the model of dialectics built up by himself.
   Remark No.             II Bunge's argumentation (14.1 and 14.21) a direct
                                                                 establishes
relation       between                  as ontology or the theory of the
                             dialectics (understood
physical object) and formal logic. Both the authors quoted by him and
many others tackle the problem differently; namely, mediating      terms are
introduced between                dialectics    as ontology and formal logic; i.e., (a) dialectics
as method       or methodology;              and (b) dialectics as dialectical logic.


                            16. TERMINOLOGICAL                    EXPLANATIONS

 16.0 To  avoid misunderstandings of a terminological nature, we want to
specify the meaning with which we use the terms: "(process of) cognition",
"knowledge",              "epistemology",           "methodology",              "formal          logic",      and     then

"dialectical      logic".73
     16.1 Thus we   understand by cognition     the processing of information
being  input by some privileged material systems (e.g. human beings), with
                                                                      ?
cybernetic properties, which are able to develop some psychic (ideal)   partly
                                                                                                                         ?
conscious,       partly       unconscious,         spontaneous         and/or     deliberately             provoked
internal models,    always formulated                          in an
                                                   interindividual communicative
language, of any other discernible real or ideal system and even of itself, func
tioning as 'referent' or 'object' (of the cognitive process under consideration).
    16.2 By knowledge we understand the set of results of the process shown
 in 16.1.

     16.3In this context,    epistemology appears to be the sole discipline
whose   subject-matter  is cognition and knowledge    in all their complexity
and dynamics,    in all their aspects and dimensions,   as a dialectical unity
of their formal and informal components.      Epistemology    is a philosophic
discipline,      too,      since the finitist        reduction       of the potentially               infinite set of
120                                          PAVEL AP?STOL


dynamic relations which constitute the field of the cognitive process has only
a pragmatic validity with reference to human existence. In the philosophy
                                                ? or                or philosophic
of knowledge (or philosophic epistemology)           metaphysics,
              ?                                are considered in their explicitly
anthropology       cognition and knowledge
formulated   connection     with human existence                    ?
                                                      (individuals      interacting
                     ? and            in societies ?               in their turn ?
among   themselves            grouped                  interacting
with specific parts of the explored universe), a connection only implicitly
involved in the properly epistemological approach.
    16.4 The object of synchronie logic (formal and symbolic) is the structure
(elements,  components)     of and the possible relations among meaningful
statements,   their properties, laws of combination    and/or transformation
 into logical complexes,     following explicit rules. In addition to formalism,
mathematical    logic  studies abstract structures, some of which may be inter
preted as able to convey 'products' (results) of human cognition. As such,
mathematical     logic explores not only the effectively used demonstrative
structures (texts), but also the possible ones.
    16.5 Diachronie    logic deals with the temporal                     status of the logical con
structs described by synchronie logic.
              logic of science (synchronie and/or diachronic),
        16.6 The                                                    in its turn,
studies the effectively utilized logical structures which convey actually, in
interhuman   communicative      languages, the results of scientific cognition
(knowledge),  verified, confirmed, and conforming to explicit rules admitted
in the 'world of science'. Therefore,    the logic of science                       concerns   only     a
subset of the structures described in symbolic logic.
        16.7    Paraphrasing       Rosser's    and   Turquette's   expressive   metaphorical    term,
           -
          in general           -
                         is dealing with the 'conduct' of propositions
logic                                                                     (their
combinations,   and transformations), whereas the methodology      of cognition
or knowledge     (and applying certain restrictive instances, that of scientific
research) deals with the conduct (behaviour) of determined cognitive subjects
(actors, agents) in making use of logical complexes       (syntactic   structures,
in corresponding      semantic interpretations) for solving problems      in some
epistemic   situations (by means of acquisition,    handling,    transformation,
etc.,     of   data).

        Broadly
              speaking, methodology      is a strategy or an operational program
to apply    noetically  relevant logical and exological    structures to cognitive
(epistemic)  actions.
    16.8 By dialectical    logic we will understand, at least for the time being,
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica
Bunge - critica a dialectica

More Related Content

What's hot

Staffan Carlshamre Unit 10 Semantics
Staffan Carlshamre Unit 10 SemanticsStaffan Carlshamre Unit 10 Semantics
Staffan Carlshamre Unit 10 Semantics
mjgvalcarce
 
Phonolgy Part 2
Phonolgy Part 2Phonolgy Part 2
Phonolgy Part 2
Dr. Cupid Lucid
 
GEB Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
GEB Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden BraidGEB Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
GEB Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
gordana comic
 
MELT 104 - Construction Grammar
MELT 104 - Construction GrammarMELT 104 - Construction Grammar
MELT 104 - Construction Grammar
Glynn Palecpec
 
Talmy lexicalizationpatterns
Talmy lexicalizationpatternsTalmy lexicalizationpatterns
Talmy lexicalizationpatterns
BrendaWongUdye
 
What is poetics, by stein haugom
What is poetics, by stein haugomWhat is poetics, by stein haugom
What is poetics, by stein haugom
Mariane Farias
 
Schema theory in poetry
Schema theory in poetrySchema theory in poetry
Schema theory in poetry
Atula Ahuja
 

What's hot (7)

Staffan Carlshamre Unit 10 Semantics
Staffan Carlshamre Unit 10 SemanticsStaffan Carlshamre Unit 10 Semantics
Staffan Carlshamre Unit 10 Semantics
 
Phonolgy Part 2
Phonolgy Part 2Phonolgy Part 2
Phonolgy Part 2
 
GEB Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
GEB Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden BraidGEB Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
GEB Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid
 
MELT 104 - Construction Grammar
MELT 104 - Construction GrammarMELT 104 - Construction Grammar
MELT 104 - Construction Grammar
 
Talmy lexicalizationpatterns
Talmy lexicalizationpatternsTalmy lexicalizationpatterns
Talmy lexicalizationpatterns
 
What is poetics, by stein haugom
What is poetics, by stein haugomWhat is poetics, by stein haugom
What is poetics, by stein haugom
 
Schema theory in poetry
Schema theory in poetrySchema theory in poetry
Schema theory in poetry
 

Similar to Bunge - critica a dialectica

Procedural pragmatics suncorrectedproofs
Procedural pragmatics suncorrectedproofsProcedural pragmatics suncorrectedproofs
Procedural pragmatics suncorrectedproofs
Louis de Saussure
 
Syntactic Structures (2nd Edition).pdf
Syntactic Structures (2nd Edition).pdfSyntactic Structures (2nd Edition).pdf
Syntactic Structures (2nd Edition).pdf
Meryana5
 
Black max models-and_metaphors_studies_in_language and philosophy
Black max models-and_metaphors_studies_in_language and philosophyBlack max models-and_metaphors_studies_in_language and philosophy
Black max models-and_metaphors_studies_in_language and philosophy
marce c.
 
Pragmatic Issues In Discourse Analysis
Pragmatic Issues In Discourse AnalysisPragmatic Issues In Discourse Analysis
Pragmatic Issues In Discourse Analysis
Louis de Saussure
 
Ontologia velez dpto_2015
Ontologia velez dpto_2015Ontologia velez dpto_2015
Ontologia velez dpto_2015
ELBA LISCANO
 
Manipulation and cognitive pragmatics. Preliminary hypotheses
Manipulation and cognitive pragmatics. Preliminary hypothesesManipulation and cognitive pragmatics. Preliminary hypotheses
Manipulation and cognitive pragmatics. Preliminary hypotheses
Louis de Saussure
 
Aristotle S Topics And Informal Reasoning
Aristotle S Topics And Informal ReasoningAristotle S Topics And Informal Reasoning
Aristotle S Topics And Informal Reasoning
Heather Strinden
 
The laboratoryandthemarketinee bookchapter10pdf_merged
The laboratoryandthemarketinee bookchapter10pdf_mergedThe laboratoryandthemarketinee bookchapter10pdf_merged
The laboratoryandthemarketinee bookchapter10pdf_merged
JeenaDC
 
A Sociological Reading Of Classical Sociological Theory
A Sociological Reading Of Classical Sociological TheoryA Sociological Reading Of Classical Sociological Theory
A Sociological Reading Of Classical Sociological Theory
Sandra Long
 
What Is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions.pdf
What Is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions.pdfWhat Is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions.pdf
What Is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions.pdf
Kizito Lubano
 
Vidal 2008 what-is-a-worldview
Vidal 2008 what-is-a-worldviewVidal 2008 what-is-a-worldview
Vidal 2008 what-is-a-worldview
Jonathan Dunnemann
 
Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argument...
Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argument...Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argument...
Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argument...
Nat Rice
 
Jacques Lacan on 'My Teaching'
Jacques Lacan on 'My Teaching'Jacques Lacan on 'My Teaching'
Jacques Lacan on 'My Teaching'
Shiva Kumar Srinivasan
 
bourdieu and passeron reproduction in education society and culture.pdf
bourdieu and passeron reproduction in education society and culture.pdfbourdieu and passeron reproduction in education society and culture.pdf
bourdieu and passeron reproduction in education society and culture.pdf
RadamirLiraSousa
 
A Bibliographic Synthesis Of Rhetorical Criticism
A Bibliographic Synthesis Of Rhetorical CriticismA Bibliographic Synthesis Of Rhetorical Criticism
A Bibliographic Synthesis Of Rhetorical Criticism
Lisa Riley
 
Good survey.83 101
Good survey.83 101Good survey.83 101
Good survey.83 101
ssairayousaf
 
Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...
Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...
Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...
Claudia Brown
 
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
theskyblue
 
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
theskyblue
 
Cognitive linguistics
Cognitive linguisticsCognitive linguistics
Cognitive linguistics
Adel Thamery
 

Similar to Bunge - critica a dialectica (20)

Procedural pragmatics suncorrectedproofs
Procedural pragmatics suncorrectedproofsProcedural pragmatics suncorrectedproofs
Procedural pragmatics suncorrectedproofs
 
Syntactic Structures (2nd Edition).pdf
Syntactic Structures (2nd Edition).pdfSyntactic Structures (2nd Edition).pdf
Syntactic Structures (2nd Edition).pdf
 
Black max models-and_metaphors_studies_in_language and philosophy
Black max models-and_metaphors_studies_in_language and philosophyBlack max models-and_metaphors_studies_in_language and philosophy
Black max models-and_metaphors_studies_in_language and philosophy
 
Pragmatic Issues In Discourse Analysis
Pragmatic Issues In Discourse AnalysisPragmatic Issues In Discourse Analysis
Pragmatic Issues In Discourse Analysis
 
Ontologia velez dpto_2015
Ontologia velez dpto_2015Ontologia velez dpto_2015
Ontologia velez dpto_2015
 
Manipulation and cognitive pragmatics. Preliminary hypotheses
Manipulation and cognitive pragmatics. Preliminary hypothesesManipulation and cognitive pragmatics. Preliminary hypotheses
Manipulation and cognitive pragmatics. Preliminary hypotheses
 
Aristotle S Topics And Informal Reasoning
Aristotle S Topics And Informal ReasoningAristotle S Topics And Informal Reasoning
Aristotle S Topics And Informal Reasoning
 
The laboratoryandthemarketinee bookchapter10pdf_merged
The laboratoryandthemarketinee bookchapter10pdf_mergedThe laboratoryandthemarketinee bookchapter10pdf_merged
The laboratoryandthemarketinee bookchapter10pdf_merged
 
A Sociological Reading Of Classical Sociological Theory
A Sociological Reading Of Classical Sociological TheoryA Sociological Reading Of Classical Sociological Theory
A Sociological Reading Of Classical Sociological Theory
 
What Is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions.pdf
What Is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions.pdfWhat Is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions.pdf
What Is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions.pdf
 
Vidal 2008 what-is-a-worldview
Vidal 2008 what-is-a-worldviewVidal 2008 what-is-a-worldview
Vidal 2008 what-is-a-worldview
 
Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argument...
Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argument...Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argument...
Argumentation And Tensiveness. A Semiotic Interpretation Of Ducrot S Argument...
 
Jacques Lacan on 'My Teaching'
Jacques Lacan on 'My Teaching'Jacques Lacan on 'My Teaching'
Jacques Lacan on 'My Teaching'
 
bourdieu and passeron reproduction in education society and culture.pdf
bourdieu and passeron reproduction in education society and culture.pdfbourdieu and passeron reproduction in education society and culture.pdf
bourdieu and passeron reproduction in education society and culture.pdf
 
A Bibliographic Synthesis Of Rhetorical Criticism
A Bibliographic Synthesis Of Rhetorical CriticismA Bibliographic Synthesis Of Rhetorical Criticism
A Bibliographic Synthesis Of Rhetorical Criticism
 
Good survey.83 101
Good survey.83 101Good survey.83 101
Good survey.83 101
 
Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...
Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...
Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...
 
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
 
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
01 multimodal text-analysis-o'halloran_and_smith
 
Cognitive linguistics
Cognitive linguisticsCognitive linguistics
Cognitive linguistics
 

More from Emerson Salinas

Buscando la filosofia en las ciencias sociales. Bunge
Buscando la filosofia en las ciencias sociales. BungeBuscando la filosofia en las ciencias sociales. Bunge
Buscando la filosofia en las ciencias sociales. Bunge
Emerson Salinas
 
Esquema detallado Ambitos y relaciones en la gestión ambiental
Esquema detallado Ambitos y relaciones en la gestión ambientalEsquema detallado Ambitos y relaciones en la gestión ambiental
Esquema detallado Ambitos y relaciones en la gestión ambiental
Emerson Salinas
 
Modificación Humana del Ambiente
Modificación Humana del AmbienteModificación Humana del Ambiente
Modificación Humana del Ambiente
Emerson Salinas
 
Propiedades, Indicadores e Indices
Propiedades, Indicadores e IndicesPropiedades, Indicadores e Indices
Propiedades, Indicadores e Indices
Emerson Salinas
 
impacto Ambiental al Habitat Humano
impacto Ambiental al Habitat Humanoimpacto Ambiental al Habitat Humano
impacto Ambiental al Habitat Humano
Emerson Salinas
 
gestión Impacto Ambiental en Habitat Humano
gestión Impacto Ambiental en Habitat Humanogestión Impacto Ambiental en Habitat Humano
gestión Impacto Ambiental en Habitat Humano
Emerson Salinas
 
Ambitos y relaciones en gestion ambiental
Ambitos y relaciones en gestion ambientalAmbitos y relaciones en gestion ambiental
Ambitos y relaciones en gestion ambiental
Emerson Salinas
 
Modelo Estado del Ambiente
Modelo Estado del AmbienteModelo Estado del Ambiente
Modelo Estado del Ambiente
Emerson Salinas
 
Indice Desarrollo Ambiental
Indice Desarrollo AmbientalIndice Desarrollo Ambiental
Indice Desarrollo Ambiental
Emerson Salinas
 

More from Emerson Salinas (9)

Buscando la filosofia en las ciencias sociales. Bunge
Buscando la filosofia en las ciencias sociales. BungeBuscando la filosofia en las ciencias sociales. Bunge
Buscando la filosofia en las ciencias sociales. Bunge
 
Esquema detallado Ambitos y relaciones en la gestión ambiental
Esquema detallado Ambitos y relaciones en la gestión ambientalEsquema detallado Ambitos y relaciones en la gestión ambiental
Esquema detallado Ambitos y relaciones en la gestión ambiental
 
Modificación Humana del Ambiente
Modificación Humana del AmbienteModificación Humana del Ambiente
Modificación Humana del Ambiente
 
Propiedades, Indicadores e Indices
Propiedades, Indicadores e IndicesPropiedades, Indicadores e Indices
Propiedades, Indicadores e Indices
 
impacto Ambiental al Habitat Humano
impacto Ambiental al Habitat Humanoimpacto Ambiental al Habitat Humano
impacto Ambiental al Habitat Humano
 
gestión Impacto Ambiental en Habitat Humano
gestión Impacto Ambiental en Habitat Humanogestión Impacto Ambiental en Habitat Humano
gestión Impacto Ambiental en Habitat Humano
 
Ambitos y relaciones en gestion ambiental
Ambitos y relaciones en gestion ambientalAmbitos y relaciones en gestion ambiental
Ambitos y relaciones en gestion ambiental
 
Modelo Estado del Ambiente
Modelo Estado del AmbienteModelo Estado del Ambiente
Modelo Estado del Ambiente
 
Indice Desarrollo Ambiental
Indice Desarrollo AmbientalIndice Desarrollo Ambiental
Indice Desarrollo Ambiental
 

Recently uploaded

NIPER 2024 MEMORY BASED QUESTIONS.ANSWERS TO NIPER 2024 QUESTIONS.NIPER JEE 2...
NIPER 2024 MEMORY BASED QUESTIONS.ANSWERS TO NIPER 2024 QUESTIONS.NIPER JEE 2...NIPER 2024 MEMORY BASED QUESTIONS.ANSWERS TO NIPER 2024 QUESTIONS.NIPER JEE 2...
NIPER 2024 MEMORY BASED QUESTIONS.ANSWERS TO NIPER 2024 QUESTIONS.NIPER JEE 2...
Payaamvohra1
 
Educational Technology in the Health Sciences
Educational Technology in the Health SciencesEducational Technology in the Health Sciences
Educational Technology in the Health Sciences
Iris Thiele Isip-Tan
 
Data Structure using C by Dr. K Adisesha .ppsx
Data Structure using C by Dr. K Adisesha .ppsxData Structure using C by Dr. K Adisesha .ppsx
Data Structure using C by Dr. K Adisesha .ppsx
Prof. Dr. K. Adisesha
 
How Barcodes Can Be Leveraged Within Odoo 17
How Barcodes Can Be Leveraged Within Odoo 17How Barcodes Can Be Leveraged Within Odoo 17
How Barcodes Can Be Leveraged Within Odoo 17
Celine George
 
Gender and Mental Health - Counselling and Family Therapy Applications and In...
Gender and Mental Health - Counselling and Family Therapy Applications and In...Gender and Mental Health - Counselling and Family Therapy Applications and In...
Gender and Mental Health - Counselling and Family Therapy Applications and In...
PsychoTech Services
 
REASIGNACION 2024 UGEL CHUPACA 2024 UGEL CHUPACA.pdf
REASIGNACION 2024 UGEL CHUPACA 2024 UGEL CHUPACA.pdfREASIGNACION 2024 UGEL CHUPACA 2024 UGEL CHUPACA.pdf
REASIGNACION 2024 UGEL CHUPACA 2024 UGEL CHUPACA.pdf
giancarloi8888
 
Présentationvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv2.pptx
Présentationvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv2.pptxPrésentationvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv2.pptx
Présentationvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv2.pptx
siemaillard
 
CIS 4200-02 Group 1 Final Project Report (1).pdf
CIS 4200-02 Group 1 Final Project Report (1).pdfCIS 4200-02 Group 1 Final Project Report (1).pdf
CIS 4200-02 Group 1 Final Project Report (1).pdf
blueshagoo1
 
skeleton System.pdf (skeleton system wow)
skeleton System.pdf (skeleton system wow)skeleton System.pdf (skeleton system wow)
skeleton System.pdf (skeleton system wow)
Mohammad Al-Dhahabi
 
Wound healing PPT
Wound healing PPTWound healing PPT
Wound healing PPT
Jyoti Chand
 
The basics of sentences session 7pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 7pptx.pptxThe basics of sentences session 7pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 7pptx.pptx
heathfieldcps1
 
Elevate Your Nonprofit's Online Presence_ A Guide to Effective SEO Strategies...
Elevate Your Nonprofit's Online Presence_ A Guide to Effective SEO Strategies...Elevate Your Nonprofit's Online Presence_ A Guide to Effective SEO Strategies...
Elevate Your Nonprofit's Online Presence_ A Guide to Effective SEO Strategies...
TechSoup
 
CHUYÊN ĐỀ ÔN TẬP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN CÂU HỎI TRONG ĐỀ MINH HỌA THI TỐT NGHIỆP THPT ...
CHUYÊN ĐỀ ÔN TẬP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN CÂU HỎI TRONG ĐỀ MINH HỌA THI TỐT NGHIỆP THPT ...CHUYÊN ĐỀ ÔN TẬP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN CÂU HỎI TRONG ĐỀ MINH HỌA THI TỐT NGHIỆP THPT ...
CHUYÊN ĐỀ ÔN TẬP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN CÂU HỎI TRONG ĐỀ MINH HỌA THI TỐT NGHIỆP THPT ...
Nguyen Thanh Tu Collection
 
How to Predict Vendor Bill Product in Odoo 17
How to Predict Vendor Bill Product in Odoo 17How to Predict Vendor Bill Product in Odoo 17
How to Predict Vendor Bill Product in Odoo 17
Celine George
 
Oliver Asks for More by Charles Dickens (9)
Oliver Asks for More by Charles Dickens (9)Oliver Asks for More by Charles Dickens (9)
Oliver Asks for More by Charles Dickens (9)
nitinpv4ai
 
Bonku-Babus-Friend by Sathyajith Ray (9)
Bonku-Babus-Friend by Sathyajith Ray  (9)Bonku-Babus-Friend by Sathyajith Ray  (9)
Bonku-Babus-Friend by Sathyajith Ray (9)
nitinpv4ai
 
Bossa N’ Roll Records by Ismael Vazquez.
Bossa N’ Roll Records by Ismael Vazquez.Bossa N’ Roll Records by Ismael Vazquez.
Bossa N’ Roll Records by Ismael Vazquez.
IsmaelVazquez38
 
RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE.pptx
RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE.pptxRESULTS OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE.pptx
RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE.pptx
zuzanka
 
HYPERTENSION - SLIDE SHARE PRESENTATION.
HYPERTENSION - SLIDE SHARE PRESENTATION.HYPERTENSION - SLIDE SHARE PRESENTATION.
HYPERTENSION - SLIDE SHARE PRESENTATION.
deepaannamalai16
 
BÀI TẬP BỔ TRỢ TIẾNG ANH LỚP 8 - CẢ NĂM - FRIENDS PLUS - NĂM HỌC 2023-2024 (B...
BÀI TẬP BỔ TRỢ TIẾNG ANH LỚP 8 - CẢ NĂM - FRIENDS PLUS - NĂM HỌC 2023-2024 (B...BÀI TẬP BỔ TRỢ TIẾNG ANH LỚP 8 - CẢ NĂM - FRIENDS PLUS - NĂM HỌC 2023-2024 (B...
BÀI TẬP BỔ TRỢ TIẾNG ANH LỚP 8 - CẢ NĂM - FRIENDS PLUS - NĂM HỌC 2023-2024 (B...
Nguyen Thanh Tu Collection
 

Recently uploaded (20)

NIPER 2024 MEMORY BASED QUESTIONS.ANSWERS TO NIPER 2024 QUESTIONS.NIPER JEE 2...
NIPER 2024 MEMORY BASED QUESTIONS.ANSWERS TO NIPER 2024 QUESTIONS.NIPER JEE 2...NIPER 2024 MEMORY BASED QUESTIONS.ANSWERS TO NIPER 2024 QUESTIONS.NIPER JEE 2...
NIPER 2024 MEMORY BASED QUESTIONS.ANSWERS TO NIPER 2024 QUESTIONS.NIPER JEE 2...
 
Educational Technology in the Health Sciences
Educational Technology in the Health SciencesEducational Technology in the Health Sciences
Educational Technology in the Health Sciences
 
Data Structure using C by Dr. K Adisesha .ppsx
Data Structure using C by Dr. K Adisesha .ppsxData Structure using C by Dr. K Adisesha .ppsx
Data Structure using C by Dr. K Adisesha .ppsx
 
How Barcodes Can Be Leveraged Within Odoo 17
How Barcodes Can Be Leveraged Within Odoo 17How Barcodes Can Be Leveraged Within Odoo 17
How Barcodes Can Be Leveraged Within Odoo 17
 
Gender and Mental Health - Counselling and Family Therapy Applications and In...
Gender and Mental Health - Counselling and Family Therapy Applications and In...Gender and Mental Health - Counselling and Family Therapy Applications and In...
Gender and Mental Health - Counselling and Family Therapy Applications and In...
 
REASIGNACION 2024 UGEL CHUPACA 2024 UGEL CHUPACA.pdf
REASIGNACION 2024 UGEL CHUPACA 2024 UGEL CHUPACA.pdfREASIGNACION 2024 UGEL CHUPACA 2024 UGEL CHUPACA.pdf
REASIGNACION 2024 UGEL CHUPACA 2024 UGEL CHUPACA.pdf
 
Présentationvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv2.pptx
Présentationvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv2.pptxPrésentationvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv2.pptx
Présentationvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv2.pptx
 
CIS 4200-02 Group 1 Final Project Report (1).pdf
CIS 4200-02 Group 1 Final Project Report (1).pdfCIS 4200-02 Group 1 Final Project Report (1).pdf
CIS 4200-02 Group 1 Final Project Report (1).pdf
 
skeleton System.pdf (skeleton system wow)
skeleton System.pdf (skeleton system wow)skeleton System.pdf (skeleton system wow)
skeleton System.pdf (skeleton system wow)
 
Wound healing PPT
Wound healing PPTWound healing PPT
Wound healing PPT
 
The basics of sentences session 7pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 7pptx.pptxThe basics of sentences session 7pptx.pptx
The basics of sentences session 7pptx.pptx
 
Elevate Your Nonprofit's Online Presence_ A Guide to Effective SEO Strategies...
Elevate Your Nonprofit's Online Presence_ A Guide to Effective SEO Strategies...Elevate Your Nonprofit's Online Presence_ A Guide to Effective SEO Strategies...
Elevate Your Nonprofit's Online Presence_ A Guide to Effective SEO Strategies...
 
CHUYÊN ĐỀ ÔN TẬP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN CÂU HỎI TRONG ĐỀ MINH HỌA THI TỐT NGHIỆP THPT ...
CHUYÊN ĐỀ ÔN TẬP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN CÂU HỎI TRONG ĐỀ MINH HỌA THI TỐT NGHIỆP THPT ...CHUYÊN ĐỀ ÔN TẬP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN CÂU HỎI TRONG ĐỀ MINH HỌA THI TỐT NGHIỆP THPT ...
CHUYÊN ĐỀ ÔN TẬP VÀ PHÁT TRIỂN CÂU HỎI TRONG ĐỀ MINH HỌA THI TỐT NGHIỆP THPT ...
 
How to Predict Vendor Bill Product in Odoo 17
How to Predict Vendor Bill Product in Odoo 17How to Predict Vendor Bill Product in Odoo 17
How to Predict Vendor Bill Product in Odoo 17
 
Oliver Asks for More by Charles Dickens (9)
Oliver Asks for More by Charles Dickens (9)Oliver Asks for More by Charles Dickens (9)
Oliver Asks for More by Charles Dickens (9)
 
Bonku-Babus-Friend by Sathyajith Ray (9)
Bonku-Babus-Friend by Sathyajith Ray  (9)Bonku-Babus-Friend by Sathyajith Ray  (9)
Bonku-Babus-Friend by Sathyajith Ray (9)
 
Bossa N’ Roll Records by Ismael Vazquez.
Bossa N’ Roll Records by Ismael Vazquez.Bossa N’ Roll Records by Ismael Vazquez.
Bossa N’ Roll Records by Ismael Vazquez.
 
RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE.pptx
RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE.pptxRESULTS OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE.pptx
RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE.pptx
 
HYPERTENSION - SLIDE SHARE PRESENTATION.
HYPERTENSION - SLIDE SHARE PRESENTATION.HYPERTENSION - SLIDE SHARE PRESENTATION.
HYPERTENSION - SLIDE SHARE PRESENTATION.
 
BÀI TẬP BỔ TRỢ TIẾNG ANH LỚP 8 - CẢ NĂM - FRIENDS PLUS - NĂM HỌC 2023-2024 (B...
BÀI TẬP BỔ TRỢ TIẾNG ANH LỚP 8 - CẢ NĂM - FRIENDS PLUS - NĂM HỌC 2023-2024 (B...BÀI TẬP BỔ TRỢ TIẾNG ANH LỚP 8 - CẢ NĂM - FRIENDS PLUS - NĂM HỌC 2023-2024 (B...
BÀI TẬP BỔ TRỢ TIẾNG ANH LỚP 8 - CẢ NĂM - FRIENDS PLUS - NĂM HỌC 2023-2024 (B...
 

Bunge - critica a dialectica

  • 1. About Mario Bunge's 'A Critical Examination of Dialectics' Author(s): Pavel Apostol Source: Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Feb., 1985), pp. 89-136 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20099996 Accessed: 31/10/2010 15:41 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Studies in Soviet Thought. http://www.jstor.org
  • 2. fPAVEL AP?STOL ABOUT MARIO BUNGE'S 'A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF DIALECTICS' We submit to analysis Mario Bunge's 4ACritical Examination of Dialectics', which sums up and develops objections, some of which appeared previously in his Method, Model and Matter (1973). Our comments have to do with this text.1 The admissibility of some of Bunge's theses and the rejection of some others seems to us to be justifiable from the point of view of a theoretical horizon which cannot be described, now and in this context in all of its logical articulations, but which represents a tacit supposition of our argumentation. This theoretical horizon, equivalent to thinking through and constructing a new version of Marxian dialectics, will be briefly outlined at the end of our study. 0. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 0.1 The fact that we have chosen Bunge in this context is no mere whim. As a matter of fact, he himself seems to await such a retort, when he writes: "Should anyone feel dissatisfied with this version, he iswelcome to produce a more satisfactory formulation. In fact it is high time that somebody did it." (p. 64). Confrontation with Bunge in this matter presents two advantages: (a) his argumentation is formulated with sufficient precision to permit a profitable discussion, and (b) his position is representative of some more recent orientations which have assimilated acquisitions of the research on foundations of science and those of analytic philosophy (in the large sense given to the term by W. Stegm?ller).2 0.2 The discussion in extremely difficult conditions which add to evolves the usual difficulties which accompany philosophic rhetoric. Without agreeing in many other respects with Jean-Fran?ois Revel, we will acknowledge that "philosophy is the last domain to perpetuate two strong illusions: religion and rhetoric - from which modern thinking in other intellectual fields has tended and partially succeeded in liberating the human spirit."3 We have to recognize openly that as regards dialectics we often Studies in Soviet Thought 29 (1985) 89-136. 0039-3797/85/0292-0089 $04.80. ? 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
  • 3. 90 PAVEL AP?STOL witness some unpleasant outbursts of religious dogmatism or of rhetorical excesses. While Bunge's discourse is undogmatic it avoids the pitfalls of idle rhetoric. 0.3 As a rule - and the author of these lines was no exception to this in the past4 ? the Marxist and the Marxist-Leninist or Hegelian dialectics are approached as if we possessed elaborated theories of Hegel, Marx, Engels or Lenin dialectics. But, on the contrary, as Dieter Henrich notes about in his exegeses on Hegel's work: even in Hegel's monumental Science of Logic, published 170 years ago, we find a logical practice', but neither an 'elaborated concept of the dialectical method', nor 'the law of unfolding' of its operations, or even the statement of 'the peculiar conditions of then application'.5 Similar remarks are to be made also with respect to Marx, Engels, or Lenin. Certainly, we find also in their works isolated propositions about dialectics - with really remarkable differences concerning how they are understood. There are no elaborated theories on it. Yet we find in their works a 'logical practice' of dialectics, embodied in the social research they did. This 'logical practice' can be considered as so many interpretations of some abstract patterns of dialectics; but, since the latter have not been explicitly formulated, the detecting of these patterns within the framework of their interpretation is such a difficult task that it is often equivalent to an invention. 0.4 On the contrary, we retain a didactically operational concept of ? dialectics elaborated, of course, with reference to some theses of Marx, Engels, and Lenin ? as a substitute for a theoretical concept of dialectics. That 'didactic-operational concept of dialectics' represents a mere narrative texture, in which are integrated quotations and isolated from contexts expressed through different terminologies and in various languages. This didactically operational pattern of dialectics - which is to be found in a great number of current handbooks and treatises - is largely indebted to the exposition attributed to J. V. Stalin (in which can be easily discovered elements from Adorackij and Rozenthal's lectures of the 1930s).6 The Stalinian pattern is undoubtedly indebted to the mechanical-deterministic interpretation of historical materialism, as formulated by K. Kautsky.7 0.50 Should then the discussion about dialectics be a mere scholastic dispute about a pseudo-concept? Of course, not! Due to the ruse of 'historical' reason {die List der Vernunft), present-day practice and theory-construction demand a discussion about the elaboration or re-elaboration of the concept of
  • 4. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 91 dialectics in order to meet both practical and theoretical needs. We will enumerate these requirements. 0.51 One finds the acceleration and increasing complexity of today's social processes and, especially, the need to invent new strategies of radical transformation, without which there will be no democratic and socialist issue from the present planetary crisis of civilization. These new revolutionary strategies are asking for a conceptual and methodological framework which actually means a new quest for a more flexible, more articulated, more open dialectics, than the old didactical concept that somehow had been canonized. The fact is that even the very complicated, troubled situations which confront management and planning in democratic and socialist super-in dustrialized countries also require a new thinking oriented on dialectics. There are, for example, the achievements of C. West Churchman's school of operational research which brings about, in practice, a validation of the idea of dialectically programmed "inquiry systems", of a dialectical theory of decision, management and planning.8 Present-day practice and the actual solu tions of its problems leads one to rethink dialectics anew, in an operational sense. No less relevant seems to me the recent trend in American political science and international studies to resort to dialectical epistemologies and methodologies in concepts the diverging and/or converging for capturing asymetrical interdependencies that prevail on the global scene.9 0.52 This social need is normal. Practice demands programs of efficient (or good) action even if these do not provide analytic problem-solving algo rithms since social problems which accumulate at a very rapid rate and exert an ever-rising and sometimes overwhelming pressure for their solution are, in a mathematical sense, "ill-formulated" or "ill-raised" problems.10 Coping with these presupposes a continuous reflexive return to the problem's wording,11 because the most infinitesmal variation in the initial data can pro voke excessive variations at the level of approximated solutions. Mathematics approaches the matter of ill-formulated problems (that deny linearization) in two ways which seem to be productive: the logic of fuzzy theory12, the logic of exact operations with terms that designate by definition inexact (i.e. fuzzy) concepts: and the mathematical theory of morphogenesis, T. Thorn's13 theory of "catastrophes", an exact (i.e. topological) theory of "qualitative leaps" (structure-building and structure-demolishing, stabilizing and destabilizing change). This confluence of some practical requirements with the elaboration of
  • 5. 92 PAVEL AP?STOL some suitable mathematical instruments necessarily leads, of course, to a new defining of the essential concepts of dialectics. 0.53 Scientists' thinking about the foundations of their disciplines has flowed in two directions: (a) an analytic one, deeply rooted in epistemic prob lems for which solutions are found through adequately applied algorithms or arithmomorphic formulae (after the terminology of N. Georgescu-Roegen)14 and (b) a dialectical one, in the large sense attributed to the term by F. Gonseth and his review, Dial?ctica15, especially interested in epistemic problems that resist a purely analytic approach: problems belonging to the domain of scientific theory-construction, to that of foundations, and basic concepts of science in interaction with experiment and practice. Looking at the problem more deeply, the very evolution of the analytic approach has also been characterized by a drift towards dialectics (Popper, the latter Wittgenstein)16, and by the relativization of the synchronie per spectives because of the search for the diachronicity of scientific theories.17 0.54 Philosophic thought itself has led to ever new discoveries and inven tions in dialectics. First of all, the Hegelian and the more recent Marxian exegeses have funda mentally changed the earlier naive images of dialectics. Today we are aware of the extreme difficulties in interpreting these texts and especially in explaining in an acceptable manner "the logical practice' characteristic of Hegel, Marx or others.18 Onthe other hand, there are the attempts to formalize the Hegelian ? I dialectics mean, especially, the works of G. G?nther, L. S. Rogowski, M. Kosok and D. Dubarle.19 Even if they have not led so far to generally accepted results, they have succeeded in pointing out: (a) the possibility of describing in a precise language a certain 'logical practice' belonging to dialectics, and (b) the existence of some specific dialectical approaches (what we actually defined in 1964 as "dialectically operating with 'formal' logical structures and operations", valid or productive from an epistemic point of view, but unfounded from the point of view of conventional logical formalism). Third, the very process of proliferation of conceiving different visions or perspectives about dialectics constitutes the practical proof that several dialectics are possible, differentiated enough so that they not be totally and directly derived one from the other 20, and creates a space ? or a "theoretical ? for a topos", as Althusser calls it reflection on dialectics. Imean by this an
  • 6. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 93 approach in philosophic theory-building similar to that for creating in science ametatheory with regard to certain theories. In some previous works, I defined such an approach as a quasi-meta-theoretical one. In the interpretation I gave to Marx' position versus Hegel's dialectics I discovered elements of such a meta-approach; namely Marx does not merely oppose his dialectics to that of Hegel, but considers that in his own conception about dialectics that of Hegel can be meaningfully interpreted. Such an approach seems to me to offer the further possibility of constructing other dialectics.21 Finally, the very confrontation between Marxist philosophy and anti ? where the latter raises the Marxist thought question of the responsibility of Marxian theory for any social practice that claims to derive from it - presupposes dialectics.22 ? These are some practical grounds including the contemporary ideo ? which logical practice justify the present discussion. I assert this in the name of the concept of dialectics which I draw from Marx' work compared to that of Hegel, and not in the name of a definitive 'Marxist' or 'Leninist' dialectics. 1. THE GENERAL THESES OF MARIO BUNGE 1.1 Dialectics is an ontological theory. 1.21 This dialectical ontology has a 'plausible kernel' constituted by two hypotheses: 1.211 Everything is in some process of change or other, and 1.212 New emerge at certain moments of any process. But, qualities 1.22 this 'plausible kernel' is surrounded by a 'mystic fog consisting mainly in the assertion of the following three theses: 1.221 In rapport with every object (thing) there is an anti-object (anti thing). 1.222 All opposites are in continuous conflict with each other, this "conflict resulting either in the annihilation of one of them, or in some new object synthesizing both contradictories". 1.223 Every stage in a development negates the previous one and, fur thermore, two successive negations of this kind lead to a stage similar, but somehow superior, to the original one (p. 63).
  • 7. 94 PAVEL AP?STOL 2. THE GENERAL CRITICISM OF DIALECTICS BY MARIO BUNGE As concerns 'the plausible kernel' of dialectics taken as ontology, in the formulation that itwas given, ? ? 2.1 it is as Bunge states a common thesis for every meta process physics (as a theory of existence, or ontology). 2.2 In order to delimit dialectics against any process metaphysics, it has to be expanded into "a general (and consistent) theory" (ontology). As to 'themystic fog' that wraps dialectics, it proceeds from 2.3 the use of expressions, such as "dialectical and ambiguous negation" "dialecticalopposition". Bunge thinks that by reducing somewhat the ambiguity of the terms (indicated in 2.3) we can obtain "an intelligible doctrine", which is not dialectics in its present form, but 2.41 this would be a "weaker dialectics" which could not claim univer sality, necessity, essentiality; and would be 2.42 "at best", a limit-case of a richer of transformation. theory 3. FIRST CRITICAL REMARK WITH A VIEW TO MARIO BUNGE'S CRITICISM 3.10 In discussing dialectics, Bunge has in view some formulations of it given by Hegel, Engels, and Lenin, as well as by I. Narski, G. Pawelzig, and G. Stiehler.23 3.11 Dialectics is examined by Bunge as ontology (i.e. as universal), although 3.12 in the intellectual constructs defining themselves as dialectics, it appears explicitly in this sense only among certain authors; 3.13 others understand it as ontology and epistemology and methodology, and even as logic (but not formal logic); other authors, 3.14 once again, dispute precisely its status as a universal ontology, accepting only the other senses of dialectics (enumerated at 3.13.). Some admit 3.15 dialectics only as social (historical) ontology, or 3.16 as social ontology, epistemology, methodology and logic of social research, or only as epistemology 3.17 and/or methodology (or logic with a special meaning) of social cognition. Finally, it is understood
  • 8. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 95 3.18 as epistemology and or methodology and/or logic of philosophic thinking.24 3.2 The result is that 'the critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge concerns neither dialectics as such nor dialecticsas a generic term, designating the ensemble of dialectics explicitly formulated in the literature, but 3.3 a pattern of dialectics built up by Bunge and relying on his free inter pretation of a rather arbitrary selection of texts and authors with a quite unequal degree of representativity. 3.4 Without any one can assert that 'the critical examina exaggeration, tion of dialectics' by Mario Bunge concerns rather what we called (0.4.) 'the ? often met with in didactic-operational concept of dialectics' treatises, handbooks or monographs ? but even this one has been considered by him only in a very narrow sense, in the light of the restriction introduced ad hoc ? a restriction through which dialectics is identified with universal ontology which is not applied, as a rule, in the writings consulted. Since 'the critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge operates with this restriction, it does not relate to any possible dialectics, and, therefore, cannot be considered a criticism of the actual or possible pattern of 'logical practice' in Hegel's work, on the one hand, or in that of Marx, or incorporated Engels, Lenin, on the other hand, and still less of that incorporated or developed in the writings of Gramsci, Luk?cs, Bloch, Raphael, Adorno, Gurvitch, Sartre, Delia Volpe, De George, Bahm, Althusser, Markovic, etc. 3.5 This does not yet mean that the objections mentioned by Bunge do not deserve our attention, although they cannot aspire to the generality which they suggest. 4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST CRITICAL REMARK We have seen (0.54.) that, in fact, there are 4.11 many possible interpretations of some of the intellectual constructs that present themselves and/or are defined by the scientific and philosophic community as 'dialectical' and, at the same time, that there is 4.12 a diversity of concepts about dialectics. 4.13 We will designate this situation: 'the diversity of dialectics'. 4.20 The diversity of dialectics can be put in order: 4.21 in accordance with, either the author of a discourse about dialectics, or of a work inwhich one can decipher a certain 'logical practice' of dialectics.
  • 9. 96 PAVEL AP?STOL Thus, we will speak about various types of dialectics: Heraclitian, Platonic, . . . . . . . . . Aristotelian, Hegelian, Fichtean, Marxian, Engelsian, Leninist, Gramscian, Sartrean, Luk?csian, etc., etc.; 4.22 the philosophic domain where a certain dialectics in accordance with is found. We distinguish different levels of dialectics: dialectical ontology, epistemology and, in a wider sense, methodology as well as "logic".25 4.23 Finally, admitting the possibility of some regional dialectical onto logies, without accepting thereby the legitimacy of a general or fundamental ontology, from which these could be derived, one can differentiate among diverse dialectical fields: dialectics of history, of society, of communication, etc. 4.30 A certain theoretical construct can refer to 4.31 either a certain type, 4.32 or a certain level, 4.33 or a certain dialectical field, 4.34 or different possible combinations of these. 4.4 The generic term 'dialectics' designates the set of the sets enumerated at 4.31-4.34. 4.5 We postulate, as an assumption which is to be checked, the possibility ? of one or more meta-dialectics in the sense building quasi-meta-theories shown at 0.54 ? within which different dialectics could be meaningfully interpreted and reformulated with relatively satisfactory precision. 5. A SHORT HISTORICAL EXCURSUS: THE PROBLEM OF DIALECTICS AS GENERAL (FUNDAMENTAL) ONTOLOGY 5.1 The understanding of dialectics as a general ontology and its identity, as such, with the process and theory of knowledge, method and logic, is constitutive for the absolute idealism of G. W. F. Hegel: Absolute Spirit is the ground and the fulfillment of its own self-development, this 'develop ment' is for Hegel the essence of dialectics.26 5.2 But even inHegelian philosophy, dialectics, understood as ontology, cannot be dealt with, as is done in the paper of Bunge, independently from dialectics conceived as method, logic, process and theory of cognition. 5.30 Marx critically examined Hegel's dialectics of the Absolute21. His criticism includes some elements of a possible (quasi-meta-theoretical) inter pretation of the Hegelian dialectics, as part of which the Hegelian dialectics
  • 10. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 97 is relativized (it is ascribed a definite domain of validity: the philosophy of absolute idealism), but, at the same time, 5.31 I consider the Marxian approach to be asserting the possibility of some other dialectics than what Marx calls the real one. S32 This assertion can be bolstered by outlining ameta-approach (meta dialectics, quasi-meta-theory of dialectics), in which can be meaningfully interpreted not only the Hegelian version, but also any other possible dia lectics.28 One can then identify, inMarx, ? the dialectical 5.33 'the logical practice' of a dialectics of the real theory of the classical capitalistic economy's development, 5.34 the outlining of a dialectical theory of social development, 'the materialistic view of history', and 5.35 the elements of an epistemology, methodology, and logic of social sciences, from among which 'the critique of ideologies' represents a major contribution.29 5.36 But we do not find, inMarx, any explicit reference to dialectics as universalontology. It seems that such an intellectual enterprise appeared to him both useless and impracticable. 5.37 This last supposition can be argued indirectly, namely, 5.38 when Marx makes up the regional ontology of a social-economic structure (i.e. capitalism) in its development, he resorts in an authentically critical way30 to a tridimensional approach: (a) the study of the economic (and social) phenomenon as human = das activity Ding-fiir-uns, (b) its confrontation with the intellectual constructions which different authors and (ideologists) of the economic process elaborate 'theoreticians' with referenceto this activity (= authentic or inauthentic; ideological, in a negative sense) of knowledge and (c) the study of the practice under both of its aspects, material (a) and ideal (b) in order to reveal whether das Ding, as it showed itself to the actors, is independent of their will or wish; and, therefore, that the relevant action programs are feasible or not. 5.39 It seems, therefore, plausible to suggest that Marx did not allow for the dogmatic construction of an ontology, separated from the relevant epistemologies and practices, in which both of them are found and inwhich alone they could be captured. 5.40 The position of Engels is somewhat different. On the one hand,
  • 11. 98 PAVEL AP?STOL 5.41 he contests even the possibility as well as the utility of universal ontology31, but admits of three correlated regional ontologies: nature, society, thinking (knowledge). On the other hand, 5.42 he still speaks about dialectics in the sense of universal ontology of developmental processes (the 'objective' dialectics) but only in interdepen dence with an epistemology and a methodology (the 'subjective' dialectics), both of which are continuously correlated with social-historical practice. 5.43 Anyhow, when Engels writes about dialectics as a universal theory of development, from his point of view this is not a universal ontology of the traditional type, but can actually be interpreted rather as a theory, comparing descriptions and scientific theories dealing with peculiar devel opments. Therefore, it is universal but conditioned; namely comparing theories or case-descriptions of some developmental processes. particular 5.50 As concerns Lenin's outlook, this has to be drawn especially from his Philosophic Notebooks as well as from the study of the 'logical practice' of dialectics in his social (economic, sociological, politological) research. But the formulations from the Philosophic Notebooks cannot be taken into account as such: they are reading notes, within which formulations from the text cited often interfere. That iswhy their interpretation increases the difficulties. We will mention the meanings that seem principal to us: 5.51 Lenin defines dialectics, in his well-known article about Karl Marx, published in the Granat Encyclopaedia, as the "formulation of the prin ciple of development", in nature and society, in the theory of cognition (of cognition's development), as well as in methodology.32 In the Philo sophic Notebooks dialectics is also defined as logic (different from formal logic33). 5.52 Sometimes, Lenin seems to admit the Hegelian position of identity (in a sense typical of dialectics: concrete, 'contradictory identity') of logic, dialectics and theory of cognition.34 5.6 On the contrary, many authors, acknowledged as dialecticians of ? Marxian as A. Gramsci35, G. Luk?cs36, L. Goldmann37 and expression H. Lef?bvre38, et al. ? interpret dialectics mainly as social (human) method and ontology. 5.7 In the above examples, dialectics cannot be interpreted as universal ontology, as Bunge seems to think.
  • 12. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 99 6. COUNTER-ARGUMENT 6.11 Although Bunge's thesis about dialectics as universal ontology is not consistent with the examples and interpretations above, it is abusive only because of its claim to characterize any dialectics at all. 6.12 The thesis mentioned at 6.11 above is legitimate ? with some restrictions as shown above (5.1?5.2) ? for Hegelian philosophy and others that are similar (absolute idealism, objective idealism, etc.) 6.13 It is also compatible with some formulations found in Engels' and Lenin's writings (and in those of some others who have taken over such an interpretation), although, as has been shown (5.4 and 5.5), the general spirit of these works does not admit 6.131 the equivalence between dialectics and universal ontology nor 6.132 the interpretation of (universal) ontology without its connection with cognition (epistemology, methodology, logic) and practice. 6.20 of dialectics as universal ontology Even if the definition is extremely problematic, sometimes (with Hegel, for instance) this thesis is consistent with an idealist, objective philosophic standpoint. Sometimes (in some of Engels' and Lenin's formulations) it is necessary to specify the meaning of the interpretation of some formulae. For example, dialectics is the general view on the development of nature, society, knowledge (thinking), i.e. dialectics = the theory of development. 6.21 Considering Marx' and Lenin's or Engels' general conception, one interpretation has to be excluded the very beginning; namely that from proposed by Bunge: dialectics as universal ontology (theory of any possible and actual, past, present and future existent [das Seiende] ?. Like the pre vious speculative metaphysics out of which could be derived any particular kind of existence or existent, this will not hold. Against such an interpre tation one can unambiguous texts. quote 6.22 The do not leave out the understanding of dialectics texts which as ontology refer to any existent or any existence, but to and only do not to existents in development and destruction, or to the development and destruction of existents, or, in other words, it refers to existents in so far as these represent constituent moments in some processes of development (and destruction), and therefore could be intelligible only as such. [Here and in what follows, I differentiate change (any observable variation of state, properties, relations) from transformation (any observable variation
  • 13. 100 PAVEL AP?STOL of structural i.e. qualitative determinations) and from development (a series of oriented transformations, for instance from simple to complex, from the embryo to the grown-up individual, etc.)] 6.231 Postulating that 'all that exists' is, finally, a moment of a devel opment (and destruction) process, a hypothesis can be formulated that it is possible to build up a general substantive theory of development (and destruction).. 6.232 In this case, it has to be demonstrated that such a general theory is also necessary, from a certain point of view, in comparison to particular theories of development (and destruction) regarding certain ontological regions. 6.24 Independently of the way in which we specify the meaning assigned to the expression "general theory of development (and destruction)", at least in the works of Engels or Lenin, this theoretical position is not constructed by replying only on direct observations of development (of some processes of development and destruction), but by confronting such observations with valid (verified or verifiable, tested or testable, confirmed or confirmable, etc.) scientific descriptions or theories, as parts of a certain social-historical praxis. 6.25 Such an intellectual construct (as that shown in 6.24) is logically and historically subsequent to the particular scientific theories about development and destruction and to the social-historical practices within which these have been formulated. 6.26 The situation presented at 6.25 evinces (as shown also in 5.32) remarkable analogies with the function of meta-mathematics vis-?-vis mathe matics, and of a meta-theory vis-?-vis a theory (or theories). That is why, 6.27 we can specify dialectics (in the sense of 6.24) as a construct be longing to the foundations of any conceptualization of development and destruction as such, carrying out toward them a function similar to that of a meta-theory toward a theory. 6.28 Thus, dialectics is concerned with the conditions for making develop ment and destruction intelligible and, as such, underlies any conception or intellectual construct that refers to these. 6.29 Taking into account the considerations mentioned above, it turns out that dialectics ? even when interpreted as an ontology ? does not refer to 'things' ('phenomena', 'complexes', 'systems' are preferable terms) but to the development and destruction of these and, consequently, it cannot be
  • 14. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 101 well-formulated in an objectifying (verdinglichende, chosifiant) language, as done by Bunge. 6.30 Dialectics can be interpreted as an ontology (of development and destruction of complexes, of systems, etc.) in the manner of the logic of science and contemporary epistemology which associate with each theory the respective ontology not as a description of the object as such, but as a description of the object of a certain theory (or an intellectual construct) within the framework of an approach that leaves out the practical (existential, pragmatic) relationship among the theory, the object of the theory, and the object of the praxis, with which the object of the theory and the respective theory ought to be associated. 6.31 In this sense, which is not yet to be explicitly found in texts of some authors dealing with dialectics, one can assert that dialectics is also an ontology of development and destruction. 6.32 But, even on this hypothesis, its principles cannot be formulated in the language used by Bunge (and described at 6.29). 6.40 Since the dialectics of Marx, Engels or Lenin have been formulated within the Weltanschauung of a revolutionary movement, one may ask 6.41 whether the 'materialist dialectics' or 'dialectical materialism', understood as universal ontology, is necessary for its legitimation? 6.420 There are at least three reasons for not answering 6.41 in the affirmative. 6.421 First of all, there is a historical reason. The elaboration of Marx' (and Engels') conception proceeds from the study of social praxis (the con dition of the working-class in capitalist society and its fights for the improve ment of its own status) and not from a purely revealed dialectics of the development and implicitly of the destruction of some social 'systems' (the materialist conception of history), as well as the dialectics of the cognitive process about these. This dialectics of development and destruction of the forms of human societies and of the adequate scientific and ideological constructs grounded the option for revolutionary action. Only after drawing this conclusion did the analysis of some scientific theories ? especially in - Engels' work bring out, in connection with these, a dialectics inherent in the scientific image of the world (= nature), meaning a reconstitution of 'a dialectics (in the sense of 6.3). With the help of a reflection about of nature' scientific issues, therefore, from a historical standpoint, the revolutionary conception and action could be unfounded ? and was argued as such by
  • 15. 102 PAVEL AP?STOL Marx and Engels ? the elaboration of a 'dialectics of nature' The before latter, subsequentlysupported, in their eyes, the plausibility of the former. 6.422 Secondly, the validity of revolutionary conclusions emerge for them from the social dialectics, the development and destruction of some social realia and from reproduction of these (theories, quasi the mental theories, ideologies) and do not result and cannot result from some charac teristics of nature (non-society). With respect to this, from a logical point of conclusions are free from the admission or non-admission view, revolutionary of a dialectics of nature or from that of a dialectics understood as universal ontology. 6.423 Finally, one could construct a (idealistic-objective, for instance) dialectics of nature and of the Universe, as Teilhard de Chardin did, which does not come to social-revolutionary consequences. 7. BUNGE'S FORMULATION OF 'THE PRINCIPLES OF DIALECTICAL ONTOLOGY' 7.1. The principles of dialectical ontology are formulated by Bunge in a language which I designated as being (6.29) objectifying and which I charac terized as improper for meaningfully expressing any other interpretation of dialectics than that of their author. 7.2 Bunge formulates five principles of dialectical ontology in as many definitions (p. 64), to which he also adds some derived definitions (pp. 64, 67, 69, 70) and some corollaries. These five definitions and the corresponding derivatives are: Dl : "Everything has an opposite." Dla: "For every thing (concrete object) there is an anti-thing." Dlb: "For every property of concrete objects there is an anti-property." This definition has also a Sveaker' form (p. 67): Die: "For some properties there are others (called their anti-properties) that counteract or neutralize the former." D2: "Every object is inherently contradictory, i.e. constituted by mutually opposing components and aspects."
  • 16. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 103 Here also there is aVeaker' formulation (p. 69): D2a: "Some systems have components that oppose one aspect in some other system." D3 : "Every change is the outcome of the tension of struggle of oppo sites, whether within the system of interest or among different systems." Once more, the statement of the principle will be proposed in a 'weaker' variant (p. 70): D3a: "Some changes are brought about by the opposition (in some respects) of different things or different components of one and the same thing." D4: "Development is a helix, every level of which contains, and at the same time negates, the rung." previous D5: "Every quantitative change ends up in some qualitative change and every new quality has its own new mode of quantitative change." 7.3 It is obvious that Dl, D2, and D3 reproduce the content of textbooks of dialectics, and treatises of dialectical materialism call them the principle or the law of "dialectical contradiction", of and of contraries" "unity fight (or of opposites, as Anglo-Saxon authors would rather D4 corre say).39 sponds to the principle or law of 'negation of the negation', while D5 is the principle or law of 'the leap from quantitative changes to qualitative transformations'. 7.4 For Bunge only Dl, D2, and D3 are 'typical' of dialectics. 8. BUNGE'S ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS CRITICISM OF DIALECTICS 8.10 As regards each of the suggested definitions of dialectics and, especially, Dl, D2, and D3, Bunge brings arguments aimed to prove 8.11 the groundless claim to universality. Let us examine these arguments. 8.20 As regards Dl, (and Dla and Dlb), Bunge shows, and he is per fectly right, that the definitions formulated in propositions using the terms
  • 17. 104 PAVEL AP?STOL "anti-object" and (pp. 64?65, "anti-property" respectively 65?68) are meaningless (are inconsistent, bring about formal contradictions). He adds, again correctly, that this deficiency manifests itself differently 8.21 in idealist dialectics, which is possible though scarcely plausible (p. 68), and 8.22 in materialist ones, which would be implausible and inconsistent within an interpretation of knowledge as reflection. [The argument used in connection with Dlb is as follows (p. 68): the set of predicates of a certain order (arity) and a common reference (as in the case of the totality of unitary predicates concerning mammals) is a Boolean function, while the corresponding set of properties of the same individuals (the mammals in the given example) is a semi-group, where the concatenation is interpreted as the conjunction of properties. Bunge says that in a materialist dialectics, which does not admit the real existence of negative properties, one cannot state that the "structure of predicates mirrors the structure of properties" (ibidem). In this respect, we will note that in most dialectical-materialist epistemologies 'reflection' is not understood as an 'exact ideal copy' of an objectively real original, as Bunge supposes, but rather as an relationship between the two terms and I have equivalence specified it is a congruence relationship (see my paper in Dial?ctica, that 1972). Compared to these interpretations of 'reflection', the argument of Bunge has probatory strength only if the impossibility of establishing any possible relationship of equivalence between the set of predicates and the set of properties could be demonstrated. But such a relationship of equivalence is not conditioned by any homomorphism of the structures considered.] 8.23 This argumentation relies on the supposition that dialectics and its principles would refer to things and properties of these, because it is in this case and only in this case, that the rejection of the existence of dialectics on the ground of the impossibility of anti-things and anti-properties can effectively be asserted. 8.24 But is this supposition really confirmed by the texts in which are formulated ? even without sufficient clarity and precision ? different views on dialectics? 8.30 We will answer this question, after the examination of the arguments used to show the inconsistency of the definitions D2, D2a, and D3. 8.310 Bunge formulates D2 in this way: "every thing is an unity of its opposites".40
  • 18. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 105 8.311considering that this "essential thesis of dialectics" could also be interpreted with the help of the definition: "Property (or relation) P2 if PI tends to check (neutralize, balance, or dim) P2 and conversely", while, later. 8.312 he reformulates it in the statement: "all systems are contradictory". 8.213 All these formulations are meaningless, according to Bunge, who admits only 8.314 "the weaker thesis" stated in D2a. More than this. 8.315 the idea of dialectical 'opposition' (contradiction or contrariety) seems to him an "oversimplifying" one, belonging to a pre-scientific ("ar chaic") mentality, unable to cope with "intermediate states" in whose description and explanation there is no room for polarity (p. 69). 8.40 It should be stressed that here too dialectics is related to 'things' (replaced, at a given moment (pp. 68 and 69), without an explicit justifica tion, by the term 'system'), manifesting itself exclusively as opposition 8.41 between polar properties of things or 8.42 between components of systems. 8.5 We recall the question at 8.24 and we strengthen it with another: is it true that in all the texts of some dialecticians or in most of these "the unity of opposites" and similar expressions refer really to polar properties of things, to polarized components of systems, or to something others 8.6 But there is one specific question raised: does dialectics mean a conceptualization of change, as has been postulated by Bunge for instance, or of development (which, as we have shown before, is not the same)? 8.7 This question is legitimate because Bunge rejects dialectics (pp. 70? 71) with the argument that it represents an unsatisfactory conceptualization of change, which can be more adequately described through a series of unpolarized states! 8.80 The principle stated in D4 is very superficially dealt with (p. 71) in two sentences: 8.81 the terms "dialectical negation" and "sublation" are foggy, that is why 8.82 D4 is also dim, confused, unintelligible ('misty'). The same for 8.90 the principle formulated in D5, called this time "the quality-quantity thesis". It is superficially dealt with, showing that 8.91 the thesis about "the conversion of quality into quantity and con versely" is unintelligible and
  • 19. 106 PAVEL AP?STOL 8.92 that it cannot be obtained as "a theorem within a general theory of change". 8.931 We also note here that the argumentation refers to sentences formulated in object terms and 8.932 that dialectics is considered as a particular case of a theory of change. 8.94 The study contains a chapter dealing with the relation between "dialectics and formal logic" (pp. 73-76) which forms a special topic. Critical examination of Bunge's opinions in this respect occurs below. 9. BUNGE'S CONCLUSIONS 9.11 The formulation of the principles of dialectics in the 'extant' literature (rather, Bunge's arbitrary selection therefrom) is 'ambiguous and imprecise'. Whence 9.12 the necessity of their reformulation. 91.3 Obviously, Bunge's study tries to offer the pattern for such a clearer formulation: 9.21 Formulated more carefully, the principles of dialectics lose their universality, get a 'weaker form', through the application of particularizers, whereby 9.22 become mere 'platitudes'. they 9.3 Even more clearly formulated and without any claim to universality, the principles of dialectics do not offer a ground for a "modern theory of change" which has to be "more precise, explicit and complete than that" (p. 76). 9.41 Dialectics does not embrace formal logic, and 9.42 it is "incompatible with any realistic epistemology" (p. 77; about this matter, see 8.94) 9.5 Yet Bunge concedes that one could designate a field proper to dia lectics (see, especially 18.1-18.8), but, 9.6 a dialectical ontology relies obligatorily upon modern logic, mathe matics, and science.
  • 20. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 107 10. THE SECOND OBJECTION AGAINST BUNGE'S CRITICISM: REJECTION OF THE FORMULATION GIVEN TO 'PRINCIPLES OF DIALECTICAL ONTOLOGY' 10.01 I refused above the groundless restriction of the meaning of dialectics to that of a 'universal ontology', underlying the 'critical examination' under taken by Bunge, who neglects the most frequent meanings attributed to the term. 10.02 That is why I concluded that the criticism calls for an ad hoc concept of dialectics, which is far from being generally admitted. Now we must go on presenting arguments. 10.11 Since the 'strongest' meaning of dialectics ? according to its system-building (systembildende) function and its frequency in very represen ? tative texts refers to 'development'. 10.12 of dialectics, of its field and principles in terms of the formulation ? to which it is 'objects' and 'properties of objects' hereafter added, from ? is outside, as a dynamic principle illicit, and as such, 10.13 can generate only meaningless and inconsistent statements. Relative to the referent of dialectical discourse (development), one has to operate not with objects and properties (and relations among these), but 10.14 with terms suitable for constructing meaningful statements about development (and destruction). 10.15 The ontic referent of all materialist dialectics and also of some non-materialist ones) is development (and destruction as mode of existence of the 'things' (= phenomena, finite processes, systems, etc.) and by no means the 'things' as such (and/or their properties and relations) seen separately from their mode of existence. 10.16 In amaterialist perspective, dialectics is not that 'universal ontology' which Bunge presents, but a theoretical reflecting (of a quasi-meta-theoretical type) upon some particular theories of development, aiming 10.17 not at discovering a priori principles out of which could be infered any development, but 10.18 at establishing some firm criteria of intelligibility of development, which could be retrieved, as they are applied, in any valid scientific theory of the development (and destruction) of a certain peculiar ontological region. These criteria of intelligibility work as principles of construction in particular scientific theories of development (and destruction), and dialectics ? even
  • 21. 108 PAVEL AP?STOL taken as ontology, with the restrictions in our 'first objection' ? specified is no substitute for them. 10.19 Dialectics is not ontology. On the contrary, any ontology or intel lectual construct with the function of an ontology ('the scientific image of the Universe', Weltanschauung, etc.) has to be a dialectical one if it wants itself compatible with particular scientific theories of development (and destruction). 10.21 That is why we hold that the principles of dialectics ? as clearly formulated as possible ? refer to the process of development (and destruction) and not to 'things' (properties and relations) cut off from their 'natural' mode of existence, which is 'dialectical'. 10.22 Observing this linguistic convention (compatible with the literature), confused and meaningless expressions or terms, like 'opposition within the things', 'opposition between thing and anti-thing' 'opposition between property and anti-property (of the things)', 'negation' and 'sublation' in the senses defined by Bunge, transform themselves into meaningful expressions: 'divergently polarized tendencies in and through which the development (or destruction) constitutes itself, 'opposition (here taken as equivalent to con tradiction and contrariety) between these (tensorially) divergent tendencies specific to development, 'opposition between the determinations, moments, etc. of development' (and destruction), 'negation' and 'sublation' not in the formal logic sense (as operators), but as 'establishment and/or discarding of a certain moment, determination, etc., of development (and destruction)', etc. 10.23 That which appears meaningless with respect to 'object' under stood out of its mode of existence designated by the term 'development', becomes intelligible and can be conceptualized with reference to this mode of existence. 10.24 From a logical point of view, therefore purely formally, 'develop ment' can be considered as a particular case of or 'transformation' 'change', (but only in the sense of the distinctions introduced before); but dialectics understood as a philosophic (quasi-meta-)theory of development (and de struction) cannot be built up this way. It can be elaborated only starting from the theories of development 10.25 (and destruction) actually accepted in science, with respect to determined ontological regions (or fields), as they can be grasped at the level of a deter mined practice, within the framework of the interaction between the con structor of the theory and the object of the latter.
  • 22. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 109 10.26 The way suggested by Bunge (cf. 10.24) refers to the logical re construction of a theory of change (development), leading to an axiomatic formulation, as meta-theory of any possible substantive theory of change; but 10.27 that these substantive theories are or can be brought forth in an exact form, is to be proved. 10.28 Or, such a 'general theory of change', fulfilling in fact a meta theoretical function vis-?-vis the particular theories, cannot be 'stronger', of course, than the referenced theories. If this is the state of things, then 10.29 the condition formulated by Bunge with respect to a future dia lectics seems to be an excessive one, especially, a contentious role. having, 10.30 Bunge is certainly right, when he says that discourse about dialectics suffers from obscure and often confused and vague terms: but, 10.31 of the principles of dialectics suggested by the reformulations him do take account of the inconsistency of the theses (the Hegelian one, the 'Marxist-Leninist', the didactic interpretation), as such, but only the inconsistency of these against the theoretical horizon adopted by Bunge: the Verdinglichung of an ontology claiming, at the same time, a dialectical character. 10.32 Through this method has been expelled the effective ontic referent which any materialist dialectics and many non-materialist ones known to us ? had in view development and destruction. 10.33 From a logical point of view, the method used by Bunge is the interchange of the significance of the terms (meaning change), without any other justification except the appeal to 'evidence'. The criticism of the 'critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge has obliged us to formulate some objections. The refutation (elenchus) did not result only in negative aspects; proceeding self-critically we tried to evince some landmarks for a positive reconstruction of the dialectics. Before starting to examine in detail Bunge's opinions concerning the relation between dialectics and formal logic, we would like to present concisely some consequences of the previous critical confrontation. As was obvious, Bunge contests in particular the intelligibility of the Hegelian concept of Aufhebung, 'dialectical negation' and 'negation of the negation'. Without doubting the intelligibility of these Hegelian con cepts, as Bunge actually does, there is no question that with Hegel, with
  • 23. 110 PAVEL AP?STOL his interpreters as well as with some dialecticians who claim themselves to be Marxists but who do not want to pay the appropriate attention to the criticism of the Hegelian dialectics, as dialectics, conceived by Marx (much more developed in Kritik des Hegeischen Staatsrechts of 184341 and in the ?konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte of 184442), it is exactly on these concepts that the 'fog' (the term belongs to Bunge) or the mystification of dialectics concentrates itself. Let us proceed, then, with a problem largely discussed in the Hegelian exegesis. 11. THE 'TERNARY STRUCTURE' OF THE DIALECTICAL LOGIC IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY 11.1 The kernel of Hegel's dialectics, its constitutive principle is a ternary schema.44 11.2 The triad is evident in the architectureof the system and not only as an exterior cover but, on the contrary, it is blended with the very substance of the Hegelian philosophy of the Absolute Idea's and of the Absolute Spirit's self-development. This ternary structure, the 'triad', defined by Hegel's dis ? ciples in its three moments thesis, antithesis and synthesis, is to overcome the philosophic presuppositions of Absolute Idealism45 11.3 This determined Marx to concentrate his criticism of Hegel's dia lectics on the category of the Aufhebung, even in his youth, and to take it up again inDas Kapital, where he writes: "Die Entwicklung (der Ware) hebt diese Widerspr?che nicht auf, schafft aber die Form, worin sie sich bewegen k?nnen. Dies ist ?berhaupt die Methode, wodurch sich wirkliche Widerspr?che l?sen."46 11.4 The philosophic and consequently the ideological over-saturation (in the sense of L. Althusser's 'sur-d?termination') of the Hegelian triad47 does not justify its simple rejection; we have to ask ourselves whether this ternary structure aims to be more than the mere manifestation of the dialectics of the Absolute1. 11.5 Our answer is in the affirmative. Within the framework of his exposi tion of 'divine logic', the logic of 'God's thinking', Hegel states quite the frequently theses of a 'human logic'.48 Taking into account this perspective, we have to ask ourselves which is the real meaning of this ternary structure. 11.6 It is not the first time49 that I state that by the identification of a ternary structure Hegel defines the necessary condition of the intelligibility
  • 24. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 111 of development and destruction and for conceptualization of them (of 'becoming' in its Aristotelian acceptance: change, generation and corruption, growth and diminution, alteration). In other words, this ternary structure allows and only it allows one to make meaningful statements about 'develop ment' and/or 'destruction', constituting the 'minimum for conceptualizing' development and destruction, a minimum', the 'minimum of 'cognitive intelligibility' for coherent discourse on development and destruction. 11.7 Development and/or destruction are interpreted as a series of oriented transformations; TlfT2, T3,...,Tn, which can be in fact the conceptual threshold for distinguishing an oriented transformation from whatever transformation is occuring. The first two transformations (taking only them) warrant the conclusion that a transfor mation occurred without any reference to its positive or orientation. negative Only allows us to specify if and to what extent the the third transformation respective series of transformations represent a development and/or destruc tion (the maintaining, ? under a certain improving explicitly formulated ? on respect structuring, or, the contrary, the destruction, degeneration, destructuring of the complex dynamic totality in view). This ternary struc ture consisting of three asymetrically interdependent terms (determinations = Bestimmungen) (three transformations, three 'moments', thesis?antithesis . . . and it is only this structure that us to estab synthesis. ) permits permits lish a conceptual limit between an indefinite series of any transformations (which does not affect the complex and dynamic totality from a qualitative and structural point of view), and a series of oriented transformations: development and/or destruction.50 11.8 Thus the ternary structure identified by Hegel represents the neces sary condition but obviously not also the sufficient one for the intelligibility and the conceptualization of development and destruction; consequently for any theory of development and/or destruction. 12. THE 'LAWS' OF DIALECTICS 12.11 In the literature, especially in that of 'Marxist' orientation, the 'laws of dialectics' are often referred to. This way of speaking is derived from the
  • 25. 112 PAVEL AP?STOL classic German philosophic tradition, in which 'law' is used in its larger sense of order, norm or rule, specific to a series of events. 12.12 By no means does 'law', in this context, claim to be equivalent to 'law' in the experimental or exact sciences, as the term is used in French and linguistic areas. Anglo-Saxon 12.13 It would to say that it represents the Aristotelian be much better arche (ta prot?) through which anything can be known ? a presupposition which cannot be demonstrated but which represents in fact the starting point of any cognition and rational argumentation.51 12.21 The laws or principles of dialectics revealed by the Hegelian and Marxian exegesis represent a system of conceptual determinations according to which 'development' and 'destruction', identified through the ternary structure (presented at 11) ? identification which represents the necessary condition of their intelligibility ? become understood or conceptually determined and this is the sufficient condition of their intelligibility. 12.22 The principles are, therefore, criteria of the logical validation of the correct use of the terms 'development' and 'destruction'. 12.23 Understoodas such they designate the logical field in which any theory of development and/or destruction can be conceived with a sufficient degree of consistency. 12.31 If we admit of dialectics as a theory of development and destruc tion, we have to specify from the very beginning that we are actually dealing with a philosophic theory (in the large meaning of the word, not in the mathematical one), in a position to formulate the conditions of intelligibility of devel 12.32 opment and destruction (as shown in 11.1?12.23), 12.33 as well as their significance for understanding and transforming the human condition.52 12.34 Within this context a legitimate question arises as to whether or not a 'philosophic theory of development and destruction', distinct from theories of development and destruction belonging to other sciences (astronomy-cos mogony, biology, history, sociology . . . ) has any justification when it is not conceived in the exact language of a (formalized) meta-theory of those special theories ? a meta-theory with the help of which some other such particular scientific theories of development and destruction could be provided. 12.35 The problem requires a discussion which cannot be engaged in here.53 Nevertheless,
  • 26. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 113 12.36 there is a pragmatic argument in favour of the legitimacy of such a philosophic theory of development and destruction (Ph.T.D.D.) with a function; namely, even in their vague form such quasi-meta-theoretical ? ? Ph.T.D.D.'s have allowed one as if they were the very meta-theories to elaborate dialectical inquiry systems5*, planning patterns55, dialectical dialectical theories56, dialectical methodologies decision in economics and social sciences57 Certainly these are only examples of possible positive answers to the question reformulated in proposition 12.34, and not a demon stration of an answer.58 I promised a reformulation of the principles of dialectics as a 12.40 system of the conceptual determinations of 'development' and/or 'destruc tion'. Here and now, such a task cannot be carried out. We can only point out the direction inwhich its achievement appears possible: 12.41 one can make meaningful statements with reference to develop ment and destruction if and only if it can be detected empirically or if it can be presupposed in accordance with the scientific data available: 12.42 the presence of an ontic field made up by a series of asymmetrically interdependent quantitative changes (growth) which, reaching a certain limit specific to each category of 'object', (here meaning the bearer of a develop ment process), complex totalities, dynamic systems etc., generate necessarily a transformation qualitative-structural (or transformations), namely, 12.431 that a new quality and/or structure emerges from the preceding one, representing, at least, either 12.432 an enlarged, but selective and/or (at least under a certain perspec tive) optimized reproduction of the 'object' (complex totality, system or considered59, or quasi-system) being 12.433 of a new complex totality, other than the preceding a production one (i.e. a significant part of the former goes directly into the structure obtained by its transformation), or, contrariwise, 12.434 a disaggregation, disintegration, destruction, decomposing, destruc turing, destabilization ... of this one, (I observe that 'destruction' (and its synonyms) do not mean complete annihilation, but 'destruction' of a given complex totality (complexity), understood as mode of existence and, at the same time, 'liberation' of its components which become in this way possible components of other complex totalities). 12.5 These asymmetrically interdependent and oriented transformations signify development and/or destruction // and only if they are the result of
  • 27. 114 PAVEL AP?STOL a collision (clashing, opposing) of at least two (in a vectorial sense) divergent ? tendencies, immanent to the process considered diverging tendencies which presuppose each other (at least for a lapse of time) and, simultaneously, exclude each other reciprocally in the series of transformations taken into consideration. 12.6 The system of these conceptual determinations designates the ontic referent one has in view in the various formulations of the 'laws of dialectics' or, as is preferable, of the system of the principles of dialectics. 12.71 The formulation proposed above does not resort to terms ex traneous to the language of science and 12.72 does not neglect or reject the rules of formal logic. 12.8 Dialectics, understood like Ph.T.D.D. and relying on the study of the theories of development and destruction belonging to different sciences, establishes the conditions of intelligibility (the ternary structure) and the criteria of intelligibility (the conceptual determinations, called principles of dialectics), which are absolutely necessary to conceptualize (to describe to explain . . . one in rational terms, ) the referents that has in mind. 12.9 We cannot examine here the relations between the Ph.T.D.D. and the human condition. 13. A SHORT ASIDE ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF FORMULATING DIALECTICS MORE PRECISELY 13.1 There are several attempts to formalize dialectics (or at least the logic of dialectics used by Hegel).60 13.2 Except for Dubarle, these attempts ignored von Neumann's critical remarks on the one-sidedness of formal (mathematical) logic. He wrote in 1948: "Everybody who has worked in formal logic will confirm that it is one of the technically most refractory parts of mathematics. The reason for this is that it deals with rigid, all-or-none concepts, and has very little contact with the continuous concept of the real or of the complex number, that is, with mathematical analysis. Yet analysis is the technically most successful and best-elaborated part of mathematics. Thus formal logic is, by the nature of its approach, cut off from the best cultivated portions of mathe matics, and forced onto the most difficult part of mathematical terrain, into combinatorics."61 13.3 It is not our purpose to examine here the consequences of these
  • 28. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 115 objections directed against logical-mathematical reductionism, but we will mention Ren? Thorn's recent attempt to capture in amathematical formalism 'the origin and the end of the systems'62, and mathematical morphogenesis understood as an exact study of any creative or destructive process.63 13.41 So we are confronted with an approach based upon non-conven tional mathematical means (different from the Boolean ones of mathematical logic), which make possible a topological description of genesis and of the destructive processes, which present remarkable analogies with the concepts of 'development-destruction', and of 'dialecticity' that we have used above. 13.42 This analogy is revealed once more by the concept of 'generalized catastrophe' introduced by Thorn to designate the emergence of something new which is also aimed at by the so-called 'dialectical leap': "D'une mani?re g?n?rale, l'apparition d'une nouvelle 'phase' dans un milieu initialement conduit ? ce genre que nous homog?ne d'apparence, appelons 'catastrophe g?n?ralis?e'; tout processus dans lequel il y a rupture d'une sym?trie initiale est de ce fait, structurellement instable, et conduit ? une catastrophe g?n de tels processus ne sont pas formalisables: mais ... ?ralis?e, [l'] issue finale [du processus], elle, peut-?tre bien d?termin?e ... La mort d'un ?tre vivant semanifeste par le fait que la dynamique de son m?tabolisme local passe d'une r?currente a une de c'est, configuration configuration gradient; typiquement, une catastrophe g?n?ralis?e."64 13.5 The above-mentioned analogy becomes more convincing as the 'generalized catastrophe' is understood as the result of a 'conflict', of a or of a 'struggle'65: "Dans la mesure o? l'on fait du 'conflit' 'competition', un terme exprimant une situation g?om?trique bien d?finie dans un syst?me dynamique, il n'y a aucune objection ? user de ce terme pour d?crire rapide ment et qualitativement un syst?me dynamique."66 13.6 a Ph.T.D.D. can be thought again and reformulated Consequently, in the language and within the conceptual framework of the mathematical theory of morphogenesis.67 But that is not the purpose of this study. 14. DIALECTICS VERSUS FORMAL LOGIC IN MARIO BUNGE'S VIEW 14.1 Bunge attributes to the dialecticians the claim that "logic is a special case of dialectics", which is, in fact, he states, a "false claim" (p. 73), because
  • 29. 116 PAVEL AP?STOL 14.21 "formal logic . .. cannot be a particular case of dialectical ontology: for the very reason that 14.22logic does not arise from an ontology and 14.23 any rational non-logic theory presupposes a logic." 14.24 To put it in another way: "formal logic refers to everything but describes or represents nothing but its own basic concepts" (p. 74). So, 14.25 the logical concepts refer or can be applied to propositions and not to materialobjects. The argumentation 14.261 is based, Bunge pursues, on the disjunction between physical objects and conceptual ones (p. 75). 14.262 Of course, this hypothesis cannot be proved but it can be made plausible. On the contrary, 14.263 "the thesis of the oneness of logic and ontology is possible, nay necessary, in an idealist system" (p. 75). He considers then that 14.3 "The idea that the understanding of change requires a logic of its own, be it dialectical logic or some version of temporal logic, because formal logic is incapable of dealing with change, is a relic from ancient philosophy" (pp. 75-76). 14.4 From the perspective of contemporary science, says Bunge, we would not think any longer in opposites, but in degrees, meaning that "we no longer think dialectically, i.e. in opposites and without distinguishing logic from the disciplines dealing with facts" (p. 76). 14.51 Consequently, "dialectics does not embrace formal logic" (p. 76), and 14.52 "the claim that dialectics generalizes logic can be upheld only within a Platonistic ontology and is incompatible with any realistic epistemology, in particular with naive realism (the reflection theory of knowledge)" (pp. 76-77). In conclusion,and Iwant to say from the very beginning that I completely agree with these theses, although my reasons are different from Bunge's: 14.60 "the legitimate concerns of dialectics" consist in 14.61"the analysis and codification of the patterns (both valid and merely plausible) (cf. Polyain 1958 on plausible reasoning) of actual argumentation", 14.62 "theory invention and problem solving" and, especially, 14.63 "the patterns of rational dialogue" and 14.64 those of "inductive inference" (p. 77).
  • 30. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 117 15. A FIRST ARGUMENT AGAINST BUNGE'S THESES ON DIALECTICS VERSUS FORMAL LOGICS 15.10 I. Narski68 is among the first to have responded to Bunge's conception of the adepts of Hegelian or non-Hegelian dialectics. 15.11 We can only partly agree with his retort, for reasons that have become evident through our discussion. It must be recalled that Bunge's remarks with respect to the relationship between dialectics as ontology and formal logic refer again rather 15.121 to the concept of dialectics which we have called the didactically operational one, 15.122to the opinions of a small number of authors, in some cases of a very doubtful representativity, 15.123 ignoring completely the positions that could not be subordinated to the model built up by Bunge, claiming, without sufficient reason to be very characteristic of the position of the Hegelian or Marxian dialecticians, of the Marxist-Leninist or the non-Hegelian ones, and 15.124 neglecting especially many well-elaborated positions regarding the relationship between formal and dialectical logic. Remark No. I (to the proposition 15.11) In my books and studies published up to 1965, Imade regrettable concessions, adopting the didactically opera tional concept of dialectics but, replying on the texts, I largely argued that Marx' dialectics is not a mere transposition of the Hegelian one onto a material bearer but, on the contrary, it is radically different from it, as dialectics, being in fact another dialectics in comparison with that expounded in Hegel's works. The main difference lies in the fact that Marx rejected the speculative identity between the Absolute Subject and the Absolute Object69, the identity of ontology and dialectical logics70, the identification of the name (designating logical objects) with the real referent (the physical object).71 The 'materialist reversal' of the Hegelian dialectics does not refer ? as it is only to the bearer of the dialectical process and to its 'causes' often taken to be ? but it affects the most intimate structure of dialectics. This obliged us to introduce the distinction between Hegelian dialectical structures and non-Hegelian ones. The differences between those two types of structures can be shown up through the "dialectical cell" which I call 'ternary structure' (set up for identifying a definite process of development). In the event of
  • 31. 118 PAVEL AP?STOL the Hegelian ternary structure the transition from the initial moment to the other ones is achieved with the help of an operator of necessity (this conception is quite legitimate within the framework of Absolute Idealism, in which all these moments represent determinations of the Absolute Spirit and consequently they can 'move' only with absolute necessity); whence the uni queness of the third moment. On the contrary, in the case of a non-Hegelian ternary structure (e.g., that found in the economic analyses made by Marx) the transition is achieved with the help of an operator of probability, hence, the plurality of third moments. Marx' text is fully conclusive in this respect if we remember that for Marx, the commodity is not a 'thing', but a dynamic relationship: "Der der Ware immanente Gegensatz von Gebrauchswert und Wert, von Privatarbeit, die sich zugleich als unmittelbar gesellschaftliche Arbeit darstellen muss, von besonderer konkreter Arbeit, die zugleich nur als abstrakt allgemeine Arbeit gilt, von Personifizierung der Sache und Ver dinglichung der Personen ? dieser immanente Widerspruch erh?lt in der Gegens?tzen der Warenmetamorphose seine entwickelten Bewegungsformen. Die Formen schliessen daher die M?glichkeit, aber auch nur die M?glichkeit der Krisen ein. Die Entwicklung dieser M?glichkeit erfordert einen ganzen Umkreis von Verh?ltnissen, die vom Standpunkt der einfachen Warenzirkula tion noch gar nicht existieren".72 Thus, let us take Tfor dialectical 'transition' or transformation, Ml, Ml, M3 for the significant moments of a process identified as dialectical (a process of development or destruction), v for an -> for operator of necessity, and m for an operator of probability and implica tion, and then: in aHegelian ternary structure we will have Tv(Ml,M2)^Tv(M2,M3) For each sequence Ml, Ml, M3 there is only one M3, which occurs with necessity. On the contrary, a non-Hegelian ternary structure, Tv (Ml,M2) ->Tm (M2, {M3}) for each sequence Ml, Ml, M3 there is a determined set of {M3}'s which are not necessarily equiprobable. Or, admitting the linguistic convention of designating the three moments by thesis (T), antithesis (AT), and synthesis (S), in the first case we will have:
  • 32. MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 119 v(T->AT-+S) and, in the second, v(T-*AT)->m {S1,S2,S3...} I have mentioned some possibilities of interpretation to make clear the arbitrary characterthe simplification of Bunge's problem: dialectics or of logic? His arguments are justified only against the conceptions which operate with the model of dialectics built up by himself. Remark No. II Bunge's argumentation (14.1 and 14.21) a direct establishes relation between as ontology or the theory of the dialectics (understood physical object) and formal logic. Both the authors quoted by him and many others tackle the problem differently; namely, mediating terms are introduced between dialectics as ontology and formal logic; i.e., (a) dialectics as method or methodology; and (b) dialectics as dialectical logic. 16. TERMINOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS 16.0 To avoid misunderstandings of a terminological nature, we want to specify the meaning with which we use the terms: "(process of) cognition", "knowledge", "epistemology", "methodology", "formal logic", and then "dialectical logic".73 16.1 Thus we understand by cognition the processing of information being input by some privileged material systems (e.g. human beings), with ? cybernetic properties, which are able to develop some psychic (ideal) partly ? conscious, partly unconscious, spontaneous and/or deliberately provoked internal models, always formulated in an interindividual communicative language, of any other discernible real or ideal system and even of itself, func tioning as 'referent' or 'object' (of the cognitive process under consideration). 16.2 By knowledge we understand the set of results of the process shown in 16.1. 16.3In this context, epistemology appears to be the sole discipline whose subject-matter is cognition and knowledge in all their complexity and dynamics, in all their aspects and dimensions, as a dialectical unity of their formal and informal components. Epistemology is a philosophic discipline, too, since the finitist reduction of the potentially infinite set of
  • 33. 120 PAVEL AP?STOL dynamic relations which constitute the field of the cognitive process has only a pragmatic validity with reference to human existence. In the philosophy ? or or philosophic of knowledge (or philosophic epistemology) metaphysics, ? are considered in their explicitly anthropology cognition and knowledge formulated connection with human existence ? (individuals interacting ? and in societies ? in their turn ? among themselves grouped interacting with specific parts of the explored universe), a connection only implicitly involved in the properly epistemological approach. 16.4 The object of synchronie logic (formal and symbolic) is the structure (elements, components) of and the possible relations among meaningful statements, their properties, laws of combination and/or transformation into logical complexes, following explicit rules. In addition to formalism, mathematical logic studies abstract structures, some of which may be inter preted as able to convey 'products' (results) of human cognition. As such, mathematical logic explores not only the effectively used demonstrative structures (texts), but also the possible ones. 16.5 Diachronie logic deals with the temporal status of the logical con structs described by synchronie logic. logic of science (synchronie and/or diachronic), 16.6 The in its turn, studies the effectively utilized logical structures which convey actually, in interhuman communicative languages, the results of scientific cognition (knowledge), verified, confirmed, and conforming to explicit rules admitted in the 'world of science'. Therefore, the logic of science concerns only a subset of the structures described in symbolic logic. 16.7 Paraphrasing Rosser's and Turquette's expressive metaphorical term, - in general - is dealing with the 'conduct' of propositions logic (their combinations, and transformations), whereas the methodology of cognition or knowledge (and applying certain restrictive instances, that of scientific research) deals with the conduct (behaviour) of determined cognitive subjects (actors, agents) in making use of logical complexes (syntactic structures, in corresponding semantic interpretations) for solving problems in some epistemic situations (by means of acquisition, handling, transformation, etc., of data). Broadly speaking, methodology is a strategy or an operational program to apply noetically relevant logical and exological structures to cognitive (epistemic) actions. 16.8 By dialectical logic we will understand, at least for the time being,