A Segwit Coin is not a Bitcoin
1 July 2017
Peter Rizun
“Cryptocurrency is more theology than science”
Skepticism Fanaticism
Alan Turing Medieval theologist
Null hypothesis Divine scriptures
“Cryptocurrency is more theology than science”
III
Thou shalt download code
from only the bitcoin core
repo, for only it is divine
IV
Thou shalt mine no block
larger than the holy
number of 1 MB
Passage from the Book of Blockstream/Core
I
Bitcoin can move from place to place
but cannot be created ex nihilo
II
In order for a bitcoin to move, the
transfer must be authorized by the
owner’s digital signature
What rules do I consider unchallengeable?
What rules do I consider unchallengeable?
I
Bitcoin can move from place to place
but cannot be created ex nihilo
II
In order for a bitcoin to move, the
transfer must be authorized by the
owner’s digital signature
With Bitcoin, both rules are on equal footings; with Segwit, the private
property rule is subordinate to the physical property rule.
Physical property rule
Private property rule
Manifestations of our ideologies
All rules could be seen as fanatical
Debate will not be settled by science
A Segwit Coin is not a Bitcoin
1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives
them different properties.
2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without
witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures.
3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less
value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners
do not require them in order to claim fees.
4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness
the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT
exist for segwit coins.
5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins.
Claims:
Simplifying Assumptions
• Miners are rational short-term profit-maximizing agents
• No miner will knowingly be complicit in fraud
• I.e., No miner will mine directly on top of a block that he knows to
contain a fraudulent transfer
A Segwit Coin is not a Bitcoin: talk outline
1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives
them different properties.
2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without
witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures.
3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less
value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners
do not require them in order to claim fees.
4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness
the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT
exist for segwit coins.
5. Segwit coins have a weaker private-property model than bitcoins.
What is the definition of a bitcoin?
Good place
to look
What is the definition of a bitcoin?
Find it on page 2
What is the definition of a bitcoin?
What is the definition of a bitcoin?
What is the definition of a bitcoin?
What is the definition of a bitcoin?
What is the definition of a bitcoin?
What is the definition of a bitcoin?
What is the definition of a bitcoin?
How is a Segwit coin different?
A bitcoin A segwit coin
Signatures are an integral
part of the chain
Signatures are outside
of the chain
How is a Segwit coin different?
A bitcoin A segwit coin
A bitcoin is a chain of digital signatures while a segwit coin is not
How does this change the coin’s properties?
A Segwit Coin is not a Bitcoin: talk outline
1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives
them different properties.
2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without
witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures.
3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less
value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners
do not require them in order to claim fees.
4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness
the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT
exist for segwit coins.
5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins.
Transferring Ownership
Without Witnessing the
Signatures
• Each node maintains a ledger of
which coins belong to which entities
(UTXO set)
• Upon receiving a new block, miner
parses transactions, removing spent
outputs from his UTXO set and
adding newly-created outputs
• For bitcoins, since outputs are
identified by hash, miner cannot
update his UTXO set without
witnessing the signatures that
authorize the transfer
• For segwit coins, miners can update
their UTXO set
Hash Public key
A46E Alice’s
58F1 David’s
88CE Ethyl's
UTXO set
Transferring Ownership
Without Witnessing the
Signatures
Hash Public key
A46E Alice’s
58F1 David’s
88CE Ethyl's
UTXO set
✓
• Each node maintains a ledger of
which coins belong to which entities
(UTXO set)
• Upon receiving a new block, miner
parses transactions, removing spent
outputs from his UTXO set and
adding newly-created outputs
• For bitcoins, since outputs are
identified by hash, miner cannot
update his UTXO set without
witnessing the signatures that
authorize the transfer
• For segwit coins, miners can update
their UTXO set
Transferring Ownership
Without Witnessing the
Signatures
Hash Public key
A46E Alice’s
58F1 David’s
88CE Ethyl's
B56A Bob’s
UTXO set
• Each node maintains a ledger of
which coins belong to which entities
(UTXO set)
• Upon receiving a new block, miner
parses transactions, removing spent
outputs from his UTXO set and
adding newly-created outputs
• For bitcoins, since outputs are
identified by hash, miner cannot
update his UTXO set without
witnessing the signatures that
authorize the transfer
• For segwit coins, miners can update
their UTXO set
B56A
Must witness
signature for
bitcoins
Transferring Ownership
Without Witnessing the
Signatures
Hash Public key
A46E Alice’s
58F1 David’s
88CE Ethyl's
F31A Bob’s
UTXO set
F31AWitnessing
signature is not
necessary for
segwit coins
Not part
of hash
• Each node maintains a ledger of
which coins belong to which entities
(UTXO set)
• Upon receiving a new block, miner
parses transactions, removing spent
outputs from his UTXO set and
adding newly-created outputs
• For bitcoins, since outputs are
identified by hash, miner cannot
update his UTXO set without
witnessing the signatures that
authorize the transfer
• For segwit coins, this does not hold
A Segwit Coin is not a Bitcoin: talk outline
1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives
them different properties.
2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without
witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures.
3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less
value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners
do not require them in order to claim fees.
4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness
the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT
exist for segwit coins.
5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins.
Segwit signatures are less valuable
Bitcoin Segwit
Profit with sigs Reward + Fees – Cost Reward + Fees – Cost
Profit without Reward x (1-P) – Cost
(Reward + Fees)(1-P) –
Cost
Value of sigs P x Reward + Fees P x (Reward + Fees)
As P → 0 Fees 0
- -
Note: P is probability that previous block was invalid
A Segwit Coin is not a Bitcoin: talk outline
1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives
them different properties.
2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without
witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures.
3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less
value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners
do not require them in order to claim fees.
4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness
the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT
exist for segwit coins.
5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins.
To witness or not to witness?
A Nash equilibrium is stable if
a small change for one player
leads to a situation where two
conditions hold:
1. the players who did not
change have no better
strategy in the new
circumstance
2. the player who did change
is now playing with a strictly
worse strategy
Bitcoins
To witness or not to witness?
A Nash equilibrium is stable if
a small change for one player
leads to a situation where two
conditions hold:
1. the players who did not
change have no better
strategy in the new
circumstance
2. the player who did change
is now playing with a strictly
worse strategy
Witnessing becomes
more profitable
Bitcoins:
stable equilibrium
To witness or not to witness?
A Nash equilibrium is stable if
a small change for one player
leads to a situation where two
conditions hold:
1. the players who did not
change have no better
strategy in the new
circumstance
2. the player who did change
is now playing with a strictly
worse strategy
Segwit coins:
multiple equilibriums
To witness or not to witness?
A Nash equilibrium is stable if
a small change for one player
leads to a situation where two
conditions hold:
1. the players who did not
change have no better
strategy in the new
circumstance
2. the player who did change
is now playing with a strictly
worse strategy
Segwit coins:
multiple equilibriums
To witness or not to witness?
A Nash equilibrium is stable if
a small change for one player
leads to a situation where two
conditions hold:
1. the players who did not
change have no better
strategy in the new
circumstance
2. the player who did change
is now playing with a strictly
worse strategy
Segwit coins:
multiple equilibriums
To witness or not to witness? Segwit coins:
multiple equilibriums
Only stable
equilibrium
A Segwit Coin is not a Bitcoin: talk outline
1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives
them different properties.
2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without
witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures.
3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less
value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners
do not require them in order to claim fees.
4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness
the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT
exist for segwit coins.
5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins.
Kill Segwit and Earn a Profit
• Tempt other miners into
not witnessing the segwit
signatures
• Strategically withhold and
release witness extension
block using variant of
selfish-mining strategy
• γ is the fraction of miners
that mines on our block
when we have a block race
Kill Segwit and Earn a Profit
• Tempt other miners into
not witnessing the segwit
signatures
• Strategically withhold and
release witness extension
block using variant of
selfish-mining strategy
• γ is the fraction of miners
that mines on our block
when we have a block race
Keep
private
Kill Segwit and Earn a Profit
• Tempt other miners into
not witnessing the segwit
signatures
• Strategically withhold and
release witness extension
block using variant of
selfish-mining strategy
• γ is the fraction of miners
that mines on our block
when we have a block race
Now
release
Kill Segwit and Earn a Profit
• Tempt other miners into
not witnessing the segwit
signatures
• Strategically withhold and
release witness extension
block using variant of
selfish-mining strategy
• γ is the fraction of hash
power that mines on our
block when we have a block
race
This block more likely to
be orphaned. Punishes
miners who wait for
witness data.
Kill Segwit and Earn a Profit
• Tempt other miners into
not witnessing the segwit
signatures
• Strategically withhold and
release witness extension
block using variant of
selfish-mining strategy
• γ is the fraction of hash
power that mines on our
block when we have a block
race
γ = 1
Our strategy is
always more profitable
Kill Segwit and Earn a Profit
• Tempt other miners into
not witnessing the segwit
signatures
• Strategically withhold and
release witness extension
block using variant of
selfish-mining strategy
• γ is the fraction of hash
power that mines on our
block when we have a block
race
γ =0.5
Our strategy is more profitable if defectors
control more than 25% of the hash power
Kill Segwit and Earn a Profit
• Tempt other miners into
not witnessing the segwit
signatures
• Strategically withhold and
release witness extension
block using variant of
selfish-mining strategy
• γ is the fraction of hash
power that mines on our
block when we have a block
race
γ = 0
Our strategy is more profitable if defectors
control more than 33% of the hash power
• When we’re confident that the majority of the network is no
longer waiting for witness data then:
• Begin re-routing segwit transactions to our own personal addresses
• Never release the witness data (no valid witness exists)
• Blocks get built above confirming our fraudulent transfer
• No one has proof that a fraud occurred
• “Everyone must have pruned the witness data”
Kill Segwit and Earn a Profit
This wouldn’t work for the P2SH soft fork
• Variation of this attack for P2SH:
• Instead of withholding the segwit extension block, just withhold the signature
for a P2SH transaction
• Use same strategy to entice miners to mine on the block (missing only a
single signature for a single transaction)
• Doesn’t work!
• There is no way the other miners can be sure that the transactions that make
up the block actually correspond to the Merkle root in the block header.
• Any third party could have proposed that a different block corresponded to the
known block header! There’s no way to tell who is lying.
• Miners would have to mine empty blocks instead and the entire system
breaks down.
Thought Experiment
Imagine that you have 100 BTC in a segwit address and a few
days later you notice that they've been transferred to an address
that you do NOT control. You try to find the signature that
authorized the transfer to prove the theft (you're sure your private
keys were secure so you think the signature must be bogus) but
conveniently nobody seems to have it saved.
Can you prove that your funds were stolen?
Thank you!
Peter Rizun
peter.rizun@gmail.com

A Segwit Coin is not a Bitcoin

  • 1.
    A Segwit Coinis not a Bitcoin 1 July 2017 Peter Rizun
  • 2.
    “Cryptocurrency is moretheology than science” Skepticism Fanaticism Alan Turing Medieval theologist Null hypothesis Divine scriptures
  • 3.
    “Cryptocurrency is moretheology than science” III Thou shalt download code from only the bitcoin core repo, for only it is divine IV Thou shalt mine no block larger than the holy number of 1 MB Passage from the Book of Blockstream/Core
  • 4.
    I Bitcoin can movefrom place to place but cannot be created ex nihilo II In order for a bitcoin to move, the transfer must be authorized by the owner’s digital signature What rules do I consider unchallengeable?
  • 5.
    What rules doI consider unchallengeable? I Bitcoin can move from place to place but cannot be created ex nihilo II In order for a bitcoin to move, the transfer must be authorized by the owner’s digital signature With Bitcoin, both rules are on equal footings; with Segwit, the private property rule is subordinate to the physical property rule. Physical property rule Private property rule Manifestations of our ideologies All rules could be seen as fanatical Debate will not be settled by science
  • 6.
    A Segwit Coinis not a Bitcoin 1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives them different properties. 2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures. 3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners do not require them in order to claim fees. 4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT exist for segwit coins. 5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins. Claims:
  • 7.
    Simplifying Assumptions • Minersare rational short-term profit-maximizing agents • No miner will knowingly be complicit in fraud • I.e., No miner will mine directly on top of a block that he knows to contain a fraudulent transfer
  • 8.
    A Segwit Coinis not a Bitcoin: talk outline 1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives them different properties. 2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures. 3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners do not require them in order to claim fees. 4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT exist for segwit coins. 5. Segwit coins have a weaker private-property model than bitcoins.
  • 9.
    What is thedefinition of a bitcoin? Good place to look
  • 10.
    What is thedefinition of a bitcoin? Find it on page 2
  • 11.
    What is thedefinition of a bitcoin?
  • 12.
    What is thedefinition of a bitcoin?
  • 13.
    What is thedefinition of a bitcoin?
  • 14.
    What is thedefinition of a bitcoin?
  • 15.
    What is thedefinition of a bitcoin?
  • 16.
    What is thedefinition of a bitcoin?
  • 17.
    What is thedefinition of a bitcoin?
  • 18.
    How is aSegwit coin different? A bitcoin A segwit coin Signatures are an integral part of the chain Signatures are outside of the chain
  • 19.
    How is aSegwit coin different? A bitcoin A segwit coin A bitcoin is a chain of digital signatures while a segwit coin is not How does this change the coin’s properties?
  • 20.
    A Segwit Coinis not a Bitcoin: talk outline 1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives them different properties. 2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures. 3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners do not require them in order to claim fees. 4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT exist for segwit coins. 5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins.
  • 21.
    Transferring Ownership Without Witnessingthe Signatures • Each node maintains a ledger of which coins belong to which entities (UTXO set) • Upon receiving a new block, miner parses transactions, removing spent outputs from his UTXO set and adding newly-created outputs • For bitcoins, since outputs are identified by hash, miner cannot update his UTXO set without witnessing the signatures that authorize the transfer • For segwit coins, miners can update their UTXO set Hash Public key A46E Alice’s 58F1 David’s 88CE Ethyl's UTXO set
  • 22.
    Transferring Ownership Without Witnessingthe Signatures Hash Public key A46E Alice’s 58F1 David’s 88CE Ethyl's UTXO set ✓ • Each node maintains a ledger of which coins belong to which entities (UTXO set) • Upon receiving a new block, miner parses transactions, removing spent outputs from his UTXO set and adding newly-created outputs • For bitcoins, since outputs are identified by hash, miner cannot update his UTXO set without witnessing the signatures that authorize the transfer • For segwit coins, miners can update their UTXO set
  • 23.
    Transferring Ownership Without Witnessingthe Signatures Hash Public key A46E Alice’s 58F1 David’s 88CE Ethyl's B56A Bob’s UTXO set • Each node maintains a ledger of which coins belong to which entities (UTXO set) • Upon receiving a new block, miner parses transactions, removing spent outputs from his UTXO set and adding newly-created outputs • For bitcoins, since outputs are identified by hash, miner cannot update his UTXO set without witnessing the signatures that authorize the transfer • For segwit coins, miners can update their UTXO set B56A Must witness signature for bitcoins
  • 24.
    Transferring Ownership Without Witnessingthe Signatures Hash Public key A46E Alice’s 58F1 David’s 88CE Ethyl's F31A Bob’s UTXO set F31AWitnessing signature is not necessary for segwit coins Not part of hash • Each node maintains a ledger of which coins belong to which entities (UTXO set) • Upon receiving a new block, miner parses transactions, removing spent outputs from his UTXO set and adding newly-created outputs • For bitcoins, since outputs are identified by hash, miner cannot update his UTXO set without witnessing the signatures that authorize the transfer • For segwit coins, this does not hold
  • 25.
    A Segwit Coinis not a Bitcoin: talk outline 1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives them different properties. 2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures. 3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners do not require them in order to claim fees. 4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT exist for segwit coins. 5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins.
  • 26.
    Segwit signatures areless valuable Bitcoin Segwit Profit with sigs Reward + Fees – Cost Reward + Fees – Cost Profit without Reward x (1-P) – Cost (Reward + Fees)(1-P) – Cost Value of sigs P x Reward + Fees P x (Reward + Fees) As P → 0 Fees 0 - - Note: P is probability that previous block was invalid
  • 27.
    A Segwit Coinis not a Bitcoin: talk outline 1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives them different properties. 2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures. 3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners do not require them in order to claim fees. 4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT exist for segwit coins. 5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins.
  • 28.
    To witness ornot to witness? A Nash equilibrium is stable if a small change for one player leads to a situation where two conditions hold: 1. the players who did not change have no better strategy in the new circumstance 2. the player who did change is now playing with a strictly worse strategy Bitcoins
  • 29.
    To witness ornot to witness? A Nash equilibrium is stable if a small change for one player leads to a situation where two conditions hold: 1. the players who did not change have no better strategy in the new circumstance 2. the player who did change is now playing with a strictly worse strategy Witnessing becomes more profitable Bitcoins: stable equilibrium
  • 30.
    To witness ornot to witness? A Nash equilibrium is stable if a small change for one player leads to a situation where two conditions hold: 1. the players who did not change have no better strategy in the new circumstance 2. the player who did change is now playing with a strictly worse strategy Segwit coins: multiple equilibriums
  • 31.
    To witness ornot to witness? A Nash equilibrium is stable if a small change for one player leads to a situation where two conditions hold: 1. the players who did not change have no better strategy in the new circumstance 2. the player who did change is now playing with a strictly worse strategy Segwit coins: multiple equilibriums
  • 32.
    To witness ornot to witness? A Nash equilibrium is stable if a small change for one player leads to a situation where two conditions hold: 1. the players who did not change have no better strategy in the new circumstance 2. the player who did change is now playing with a strictly worse strategy Segwit coins: multiple equilibriums
  • 33.
    To witness ornot to witness? Segwit coins: multiple equilibriums Only stable equilibrium
  • 34.
    A Segwit Coinis not a Bitcoin: talk outline 1. Segwit coins have a different definition than bitcoins, which gives them different properties. 2. Unlike with bitcoins, miners can update their UTXO sets without witnessing the previous owners’ digital signatures. 3. The previous owners’ digital signatures have significantly less value to a miner for segwit coins than for bitcoins because miners do not require them in order to claim fees. 4. Although a stable Nash equilibrium exists where all miners witness the previous owners’ digital signatures for bitcoins, one does NOT exist for segwit coins. 5. Segwit coins have a weaker security model than bitcoins.
  • 35.
    Kill Segwit andEarn a Profit • Tempt other miners into not witnessing the segwit signatures • Strategically withhold and release witness extension block using variant of selfish-mining strategy • γ is the fraction of miners that mines on our block when we have a block race
  • 36.
    Kill Segwit andEarn a Profit • Tempt other miners into not witnessing the segwit signatures • Strategically withhold and release witness extension block using variant of selfish-mining strategy • γ is the fraction of miners that mines on our block when we have a block race Keep private
  • 37.
    Kill Segwit andEarn a Profit • Tempt other miners into not witnessing the segwit signatures • Strategically withhold and release witness extension block using variant of selfish-mining strategy • γ is the fraction of miners that mines on our block when we have a block race Now release
  • 38.
    Kill Segwit andEarn a Profit • Tempt other miners into not witnessing the segwit signatures • Strategically withhold and release witness extension block using variant of selfish-mining strategy • γ is the fraction of hash power that mines on our block when we have a block race This block more likely to be orphaned. Punishes miners who wait for witness data.
  • 39.
    Kill Segwit andEarn a Profit • Tempt other miners into not witnessing the segwit signatures • Strategically withhold and release witness extension block using variant of selfish-mining strategy • γ is the fraction of hash power that mines on our block when we have a block race γ = 1 Our strategy is always more profitable
  • 40.
    Kill Segwit andEarn a Profit • Tempt other miners into not witnessing the segwit signatures • Strategically withhold and release witness extension block using variant of selfish-mining strategy • γ is the fraction of hash power that mines on our block when we have a block race γ =0.5 Our strategy is more profitable if defectors control more than 25% of the hash power
  • 41.
    Kill Segwit andEarn a Profit • Tempt other miners into not witnessing the segwit signatures • Strategically withhold and release witness extension block using variant of selfish-mining strategy • γ is the fraction of hash power that mines on our block when we have a block race γ = 0 Our strategy is more profitable if defectors control more than 33% of the hash power
  • 42.
    • When we’reconfident that the majority of the network is no longer waiting for witness data then: • Begin re-routing segwit transactions to our own personal addresses • Never release the witness data (no valid witness exists) • Blocks get built above confirming our fraudulent transfer • No one has proof that a fraud occurred • “Everyone must have pruned the witness data” Kill Segwit and Earn a Profit
  • 43.
    This wouldn’t workfor the P2SH soft fork • Variation of this attack for P2SH: • Instead of withholding the segwit extension block, just withhold the signature for a P2SH transaction • Use same strategy to entice miners to mine on the block (missing only a single signature for a single transaction) • Doesn’t work! • There is no way the other miners can be sure that the transactions that make up the block actually correspond to the Merkle root in the block header. • Any third party could have proposed that a different block corresponded to the known block header! There’s no way to tell who is lying. • Miners would have to mine empty blocks instead and the entire system breaks down.
  • 44.
    Thought Experiment Imagine thatyou have 100 BTC in a segwit address and a few days later you notice that they've been transferred to an address that you do NOT control. You try to find the signature that authorized the transfer to prove the theft (you're sure your private keys were secure so you think the signature must be bogus) but conveniently nobody seems to have it saved. Can you prove that your funds were stolen?
  • 45.

Editor's Notes

  • #46 Good afternoon everyone. I’ll start my talk with an anecdote: