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Identity and Interdependence: Two Views on Groups

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Guest lecture, Group Processes, BSc. Politics, Psychology, Law, and Economics, University of Amsterdam

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Identity and Interdependence: Two Views on Groups

  1. 1. Identity and Interdependence: Two Views on Groups Simon Columbus Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam simon@simoncolumbus.com November 21, 2016 Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 1 / 49
  2. 2. Three Questions What does it mean to be a group? What are the forces that govern group life? How can (and should) we study group life? Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 2 / 49
  3. 3. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 3 / 49 Lewin (1948, p. 84)
  4. 4. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 4 / 49
  5. 5. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 5 / 49
  6. 6. Situations are Games Any interpersonal situation can be represented as a ‘game’, a matrix of outcomes given choices. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 6 / 49 Kelley et al. (2003)
  7. 7. Game Theory In game theory, each matrix has a solution a pure or mixed strategy a payoff-maximising player should play Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 7 / 49
  8. 8. Outcome Controls In game theory, each matrix has a solution a pure or mixed strategy a payoff-maximising player should play Interdependence theory decomposes the matrix into sources of control: the person’s own actions (‘Actor Control’, AC) the partner’s actions (‘Partner Control’, PC) the interaction between their two actions (‘Joint Control’, JC) Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 8 / 49
  9. 9. Outcome Controls In game theory, each matrix has a solution a pure or mixed strategy a payoff-maximising player should play Interdependence theory decomposes the matrix into sources of control: the person’s own actions (‘Bilateral Actor Control’, BAC) the partner’s actions (‘Mutual Partner Control’, MPC) the interaction between their two actions (‘Mutual Joint Control’, MJC) Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 9 / 49
  10. 10. Outcome Controls In game theory, each matrix has a solution a pure or mixed strategy a payoff-maximising player should play Interdependence theory decomposes the matrix into sources of control: the person’s own actions (‘Bilateral Actor Control’, BAC) the partner’s actions (‘Mutual Partner Control’, MPC) the interaction between their two actions (‘Mutual Joint Control’, MJC) Interdependence theory A theory of how people control their own and other’s outcomes. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 10 / 49
  11. 11. Outcome Controls Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 11 / 49 Kelley et al. (2003)
  12. 12. Outcome Controls Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 12 / 49 Kelley et al. (2003)
  13. 13. Dimensions of Interdependence From ratios of the outcome controls, we can derive four fundamental dimensions of interdependence, on which all situations vary: Degree of interdependence = PC2 e + JC2 e AC2 e + PC2 e + JC2 e In some situations, individuals control their own outcomes; in other situations, they are fully dependent on their partner’s actions. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 13 / 49
  14. 14. Dimensions of Interdependence From ratios of the outcome controls, we can derive four fundamental dimensions of interdependence, on which all situations vary: Basis of interdependence = PCe JCe The basis of interdependence varies from exchange, in which each person determines their partner’s outcomes, to coordination. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 14 / 49
  15. 15. Dimensions of Interdependence From ratios of the outcome controls, we can derive four fundamental dimensions of interdependence, on which all situations vary: Conflict of interest = 2 × ACe × PCk + ACk × PCe + JCe × JCk AC2 e + PC2 e + JC2 e + AC2 k + PC2 k + JC2 k Interests vary from corresponding to conflicting. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 15 / 49
  16. 16. Dimensions of Interdependence From ratios of the outcome controls, we can derive four fundamental dimensions of interdependence, on which all situations vary: Asymmetry of dependence = PC2 e + JC2 e AC2 e + PC2 e + JC2 e − PC2 k + JC2 k AC2 k + PC2 k + JC2 k Dependence ranges from a person having unilateral power over their partner to depending unilaterally on their partner; with symmetric dependence in the middle. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 16 / 49
  17. 17. Dimensions of Interdependence From ratios of the outcome controls, we can derive four fundamental dimensions of interdependence, on which all situations vary: Degree of interdependence = PC2 e + JC2 e AC2 e + PC2 e + JC2 e Basis of interdependence = PCe JCe Conflict of interest = 2 ACe × PCk + ACk × PCe + JCe × JCk AC2 e + PC2 e + JC2 e + AC2 k + PC2 k + JC2 k Asymmetry of dependence = PC2 e + JC2 e AC2 e + PC2 e + JC2 e − PC2 k + JC2 k AC2 k + PC2 k + JC2 k Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 17 / 49
  18. 18. Dimensions of Interdependence From ratios of the outcome controls, we can derive four fundamental dimensions of interdependence, on which all situations vary: Degree of interdependence = PC2 e + JC2 e AC2 e + PC2 e + JC2 e Basis of interdependence = PCe JCe Conflict of interest = 2 ACe × PCk + ACk × PCe + JCe × JCk AC2 e + PC2 e + JC2 e + AC2 k + PC2 k + JC2 k Asymmetry of dependence = PC2 e + JC2 e AC2 e + PC2 e + JC2 e − PC2 k + JC2 k AC2 k + PC2 k + JC2 k Future interdependence Information certainty Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 18 / 49
  19. 19. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 19 / 49 Kelley et al. (2003)
  20. 20. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 20 / 49 Kelley et al. (2003)
  21. 21. Summary Interdependence is the idea that in interpersonal situations, one’s outcomes are, in part, determined by the actions of others (and one may likewise control their outcomes) Any situation can be represented as a matrix of actions and outcomes A person’s outcomes are controlled by the person’s own actions their partner’s actions the interaction between their two actions Each situation is characterised by six dimensions of interdependence Degree of interdependence Basis of interdependence Conflict of interest Asymmetry of dependence Future interdependence Information certainty Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 21 / 49
  22. 22. The Minimal Group Paradigm Minimal Group Paradigm What is the least of a group people will still favour over another? Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 22 / 49
  23. 23. The Minimal Group Paradigm You can reward and punish other participants. For each matrix, how would you like to divide rewards and punishments? Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 23 / 49 Tajfel et al. (1971)
  24. 24. The Minimal Group Paradigm People favour their in-group—even when the group is based on an arbitrary characteristic. Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 24 / 49 Tajfel et al. (1971)
  25. 25. Social Identity Theory The Social Identity Approach Based on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974) and Self-categorisation Theory (Turner et al., 1987) Two parts of the self, personal and social identity, “the part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership.” (Tajfel, 1974) Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 25 / 49
  26. 26. Social Identity Theory People are motivated to maintain positive self-esteem As a consequence, people are motivated to maintain a positive social identity When people self-categorise as belonging to a group, mere categorisation initiates thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that attempt to positively differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup The meta-contrast principle Without the presence of an outgroup, ingroup categorisation does not occur and subsequent discrimination should not emerge (Van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1988) Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 26 / 49
  27. 27. Not as Minimal as You Thought In Tajfel et al.’s experiments, who rewarded the rewarders? ‘Implicit interdependence’: If I control their outcomes, maybe they control mine. . . ? (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989) i.e., participants assumed mutual partner control (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999) Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 27 / 49
  28. 28. Not as Minimal as You Thought In Tajfel et al.’s experiments, who rewarded the rewarders? ‘Implicit interdependence’: If I control their outcomes, maybe they control mine. . . ? (Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989) i.e., participants assumed mutual partner control (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999) Outgroup Favouritism If participants knew their outcomes were determined by outgroup members, they favoured—the outgroup (Rabbie et al., 1989). Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 28 / 49
  29. 29. Not as Robust as You Thought, Either Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 29 / 49 Yamagishi et al. (1999)
  30. 30. The Essence of a Group What Makes a Group? There is a difference between “perceiving oneself as merely subsumed under the ‘same abstract concept’ versus ‘belonging to a group”’ (Lewin in Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988) That difference, most simply speaking, is interdependence Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 30 / 49
  31. 31. “. . . reciprocation of the favor given to a particular ingroup member is expected to come from any ingroup member rather than directly from that particular member.” (Yamagishi et al., 1999) Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 31 / 49
  32. 32. A System of Generalised Exchange Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 32 / 49 Nowak & Sigmund (2005)
  33. 33. A System of Generalised Exchange Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 33 / 49 Nowak & Sigmund (2005)
  34. 34. Cooperation Through Reputation Concern for their reputation makes people cooperative When people know that their future interaction partners know about their history, they behave more cooperative in the present (e.g. Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Milinski & Wedekind, 2001, 2002; Seinen & Schram, 2006) Both because cooperators are treated nicer, and are more likely to be chosen as interaction partners in the first place (cf. Roberts, 1998) Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 34 / 49
  35. 35. Cooperation Through Reputation Concern for their reputation makes people cooperative When people know that their future interaction partners know about their history, they behave more cooperative in the present (e.g. Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Milinski & Wedekind, 2001, 2002; Seinen & Schram, 2006) Both because cooperators are treated nicer, and are more likely to be chosen as interaction partners in the first place (cf. Roberts, 1998) Reputation Overcomes Boundaries Observation by an out-group partner can lead people to favour other out-group members (Chang, n.d.) Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 35 / 49
  36. 36. Gossip Gossip spreads one’s reputation A reputation is built from the experience of one’s interaction partners... ... but it is spread by partners and onlookers alike The group is the natural container for gossip However, networks can transcend group boundaries Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 36 / 49 Nowak & Sigmund (2005)
  37. 37. Gossip Gossip spreads one’s reputation It is only gossip to future interaction partners that enhances cooperation ... and only among those who do not cooperate voluntarily The larger the network of potential recipients of gossip, the stronger its effect Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 37 / 49 Wu et al. (2015,2016)
  38. 38. Bounded Generalised Reciprocity Groups are containers for a network of generalised exchange (Yamagishi et al., 1999; Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2000)) People prefer to cooperate with others who have a good reputation Therefore, people are motivated to maintain a good reputation by cooperating As a consequence, people have generalised trust that other in-group members will cooperate Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 38 / 49
  39. 39. In-group Favouritism Comparing Social Identity Theory and Bounded Generalised Reciprocity Comparison SIT BGR In- vs. outgroup + + Ingroup vs. stranger 0 + Outgroup vs. stranger 0 0 Interdependence +/++ +/++ Reciprocity +/+ +/++ Common knowledge + + Unilateral knowledge + 0 Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 39 / 49
  40. 40. Meta-Analysing Economics Games Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 40 / 49 Balliet, Wu, & de Dreu (2014)
  41. 41. In-group Favouritism Comparing Social Identity Theory and Bounded Generalised Reciprocity Comparison SIT BGR In- vs. outgroup + + Ingroup vs. stranger 0 + Outgroup vs. stranger 0 0 Interdependence +/++ +/++ Reciprocity +/+ +/++ Common knowledge + + Unilateral knowledge + 0 Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 41 / 49
  42. 42. There is in-group favouritism in cooperation (d = .32) Discrimination between in-group members and strangers (d = .30) But not between out-group members and strangers (d = -.09) More in-group favouritism in interdependent situations (d = .19) No intergroup discrimination when reputational concerns are muted (d = .04) In contrast, discrimination occurs when reputational concerns are active (d = .32) Overall, eight out of eight predictions of BGR were correct Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 42 / 49
  43. 43. Summary Even where no objective interdependence exists, people may perceive a shared fate The ‘Minimal Group Paradigm’ is not that minimal, after all Interdependence is crucial to feeling ‘like a group’ Within a group, people expect generalised reciprocity Generalised reciprocity is based on reputational concern Reputation spreads via gossip Generalised reciprocity explains intergroup discrimination better than social identity theory Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 43 / 49
  44. 44. Functional Interdependence Theory How do people make sense of situations? Over the course of evolution, our mind has been shaped to perceive variations in interdependence Take in cues from the environment (Brunswik, 1955) Cues are integrated into internal regulatory variables (Tooby et al., 2008) Four IRV represent the four dimensions of interdependence (Balliet, Tybur, & van Lange, 2016) Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 44 / 49
  45. 45. Functional Interdependence Theory How do people make sense of situations? People can distinguish five dimensions of interdependence (Gerpott, Balliet, & de Vries, forthcoming) Degree of interdependence Conflict of interest Asymmetry of dependence Future interdependence Information certainty Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 45 / 49
  46. 46. Do perceptions of interdependence matter for cooperation? Study 1: People played a prisoner’s dilemma Study 2: People played a prisoner’s dilemma and a dictator game Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 46 / 49
  47. 47. Do perceptions of interdependence matter for cooperation? Study 1: People played a prisoner’s dilemma Study 2: People played a prisoner’s dilemma and a dictator game Results Perceptions of interdependence explain 24% of variance in cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma. More cooperative when more interdependent, less conflict, and less power People are more cooperative in the PD than the DG Due to differences in perceived (greater) interdependence and (less) conflict Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 47 / 49
  48. 48. Where Do People Live? Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 48 / 49 Kelley et al. (2003)
  49. 49. Thank You Simon Columbus (VU) Interdependence November 21, 2016 49 / 49

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