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This is a primer for those anti-corruption crusaders who need just a little more info on this monster to fight a more effective battle and argue with government representatives on the Lokpal Bill or any other similar matter. I wish I could too!

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  1. 1. Why Have This Show - I?
  2. 2. Why Have This Show - II? 54% of Indian users paid a bribe to at least one of nine selected serviceproviders in 2010 – TI, 2011 49% Pakistanis, 11% Chinese, 62% Afghans, 4% Brazilians, 27% Russians,63% Nigerians and 31% Mexicans too paid bribes – TI, 2011 Yet 19% Indonesians, 17% Filipinos, 9% Malays, 4% Canadians, 2%British and 5% Americans paid bribes – TI, 2011 India scores 3.3, Brazil 3.7, China 3.5, Mexico 3.1 – TI, 2011 Series of megabuck scams in last decade Very few convictions Virtually no forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth International reputation downhill
  3. 3. Why Have This Show - III? An international watchdog study shows India has been drained of$462 billion between 1948 and 2008 - nearly 40% of Indias annualgross domestic product India tops the list for black money in the entire world with almostUS$1456 billion in Swiss banks Indian Swiss bank account assets are worth 13 times the country‘snational debt ED probes US$ 24.86 billion transactions - enough to fund nationaldrinking water project in all 6,00,000) villages in India for the next 10years The Economist: A rotten state (11th Mar, 2011)ARE WE A POOR NATION BECAUSE WE ARE CORRUPT?
  4. 4. Why Have This Show - III?
  5. 5. What Causes Corruption – The Layman‘s View Absolute authority vested in political and administrativebureaucracies Ineffective/antiquated and overburdened legal system leads toskewing of power structures Ineffective anti-corruption mechanisms Ineffective ombudsmen Inadequate enforcement of laws and punishment Government rules and regulations encourage rent-seeking Privatization , Liberalization and Globalization
  6. 6. Defining Corruption - I Joseph Nye (1996): ―Behavior, which deviates from the formal duties of a publicrole because of private-regarding (family, close family, privateclique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against theexercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. Thisincludes such behavior as bribery; use of a reward to pervertthe judgment of a person in a position of trust; nepotism(bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationshiprather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriationof public resources for private-regarding uses).‖
  7. 7. Defining Corruption - IIMushtaq Khan (1996):―Behavior that deviates from the formalrules of private-regarding motives such aswealth, power, or status‖Pranab Bardhan (1996): ―The use of public office for privategains.‖
  8. 8. Defining Corruption - III Oxford Unabridged Dictionary definescorruption as ―perversion or destruction ofintegrity in the discharge of public duties bybribery or favor.‖ Merriam Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionarydefines it as ―inducement to wrong by improperor unlawful means (as bribery).‖
  9. 9. Defining Corruption - IV Can occur in either the public or private sector buttypically characterized as the use of public office forprivate gain Economists claim that levels of corruption maydepend on discretionary power, economic rents, andoversight and weak enforcement institutions May vary according to the scope of supervision andthe number of hierarchical levels in an organization
  10. 10. Typology of Corruption - IGrand: Senior officials, major decisions orcontracts, and the exchange of large sums ofmoney, e.g. 2G & CWGPetty: Low-level officials, the provision ofroutine services and goods, and small sums ofmoney, e.g. licensing & enforcementSystemic: Permeates an entire government orministry, e.g. DDA & MCDIndividual: Isolated and sporadic, e.g. trafficconstable & sanitation inspector
  11. 11. Typology of Corruption - IISyndicated: Elaborate systems devised for receiving and disseminatingbribes, e.g. 2G, Bofors & New Nationalized Bank BranchesNon-syndicated: Individual officials may seek or compete for bribes inan ad hoc and uncoordinated fashion, e.g. pension sanction & bankloansInternal: Interfere with the ability of a government agency to recruitor manage its staff, make efficient use of its resources, or conductimpartial in-house investigations, e.g. ED & CBIExternal: Efforts to manipulate or extort money from clients orsuppliers, or to benefit from inside information, e.g. CPWD & SEBIAdministrative: Unwarranted interference in market operations, suchas the use of state power to artificially restrict competition andgenerate monopoly rents, e.g. PSU IPOs & land sales to private sector
  12. 12. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - I Design or selection of uneconomical projects becauseof opportunities for financial kickbacks and politicalpatronage, e.g. realigning rail track to inflate cost Procurement fraud, including collusion, overcharging,or the selection of contractors, suppliers, andconsultants on criteria other than the lowest evaluatedsubstantially responsive bidder, e.g. cartelization & pre-qualification of vendors Illicit payments of "speed money" to governmentofficials to facilitate the timely delivery of goods andservices to which the public is rightfully entitled, such aspermits and licenses, e.g. transfer of govt. lands
  13. 13. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - II Illicit payments to government officials to facilitate access togoods, services, and/or information to which the public is notentitled, or to deny the public access to goods and services towhich it is legally entitled, e.g. fire clearances & change of landuse Illicit payments to prevent the application of rules andregulations in a fair and consistent manner, particularly in areasconcerning public safety, law enforcement, or revenue collection,e.g. hafta & income tax refund advice Payments to government officials to foster or sustainmonopolistic or oligopolistic access to markets in the absence ofa compelling economic rationale for such restrictions, e.g.limiting construction of new airports
  14. 14. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - III Misappropriation of confidential information for personalgain, such as using knowledge about public transportationroutings to invest in real estate that is likely to appreciate, e.g.extension of DMRC, location of SEZ & national highwayrealignment Deliberate disclosure of false or misleading information onthe financial status of corporations that would preventpotential investors from accurately valuing their worth, such asthe failure to disclose large contingent liabilities or theundervaluing of assets in enterprises slated for privatization,e.g. valuation of assets prior to disinvestment of PSUshareholding by GOI Theft or embezzlement of public property and monies, e.g.Railway property & preferment of duplicate bills
  15. 15. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - IV Sale of official posts, positions, or promotions;nepotism; or other actions that undermine the creation ofa professional, meritocratic civil service, e.g. State PWD,Irrigation, NHAI & Central Secretariat Extortion and the abuse of public office, such as usingthe threat of a tax audit or legal sanctions to extractpersonal favors, e.g. income tax notice & overstated excisepenalties Obstruction of justice and interference in the duties ofagencies tasked with detecting, investigating, andprosecuting illicit behavior, e.g. ED & CBI
  16. 16. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - IV•Sale of official posts, positions, or promotions; nepotism;or other actions that undermine the creation of aprofessional, meritocratic civil service, e.g. State PWD,Irrigation, NHAI & Central Secretariat•Extortion and the abuse of public office, such as usingthe threat of a tax audit or legal sanctions to extractpersonal favors, e.g. income tax notice & overstated excisepenalties•Obstruction of justice and interference in the duties ofagencies tasked with detecting, investigating, andprosecuting illicit behavior, e.g. ED & CBI
  17. 17. Corruption in History - I―Just as it is impossible not to take thehoney (or the poison) that finds itself atthe tip of the tongue, so it is impossiblefor a government servant not to eat upat least a bit of the King‘s revenue. Justas fish moving under water cannotpossibly be found out either as drinkingor not drinking water, so governmentservants employed in the governmentcannot be found out (while) takingmoney (for themselves)‖ - Kautilya
  18. 18. Corruption in History - II―This is the ―decree‖ or ―mandate‖ of heaven. If theemperor or king, having fallen into selfishness andcorruption, fails to see to the welfare of the people,heaven withdraws its mandate and invests it inanother. The only way to know that the mandate haspassed is the overthrow of the king or emperor; ifusurpation succeeds, then the mandate has passed toanother, but if it fails, then the mandate still resideswith the king‖ - The Chou c.1050-256 BC
  19. 19. Corruption in History - III Machiavelli: Discourses on the need for virtu inrepublican government Rousseau: Government officials, selected by the peopleto manage society‘s business, must carry out their dutiesin a manner transcending personal interests Kautilya: Lists ―at least forty ways‖ of embezzlingmoney from the government in India Ancient China: Failed extra allowance to governmentofficials called Yang-lien, meaning ―nourishincorruptness.‖ Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldun: Root of corruption was―the passion for luxurious living within the ruling group‖
  20. 20. Corruption in History - IV The servants of the nation are to render their services without any taking of presents. … To form your judgment and then abide by it is no easy task, and it‘s a man‘s surest course to give loyal obedience to the law which commands, ‗Do no service for a present‘ - Plato
  21. 21. Corruption in History - V ―Corruption is worse than prostitution. The latter might endanger the morals of an individual the former invariably endangers the morals of the entire country‖ - Karl Kraus (1874-1936)
  22. 22. Bishop Creighton:―People in authority are not [to] be snubbed orsneezed at from our pinnacle of conscious rectitude‖ Lord EE Dalberg-Acton, 1887: ―If there is any presumption, it is the other way against holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of legal responsibility. Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely‖
  23. 23. Where India Stands: Ends Justify Means ―Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it. That is the point at which...the end learns to justify the means‖
  24. 24. Frameworks of Research & Practice of CorruptionTwo alternative frameworks dominate research andpractice on corruption:Economic perspective: Focuses limitedly on the roles ofrational self-interest, efficiency pressures, and explicit,formal regulative structures in explaining and combatingcorruptionOrganizational behavior: Focuses on the normative andcognitive aspects of corrupt behavior however, withinorganizations and instead of on the wider institutionalorders that also influence the behavior of individuals andorganizations
  25. 25. Causes of Corruption - I Greater efficacy of common law in curbingcorruption than civil law Democratic and open political systems fosterfreedom of association and of the press andengender public interest groups to expose abuses Competitors for office have an incentive todiscover and publicize the incumbent‘s misuseof office whenever an election beckons – Daniel Triesman (2000)
  26. 26. Causes of Corruption - II Federal structure in which each level hasits own police force can reduce thevulnerability of any one law enforcementagency (Rose-Ackerman, 1994) Relatively balanced power of central andsubnational officials over certain commonpool resources — the tax or ‗bribe‘ base ina given region — leads to suboptimal overextraction (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993)
  27. 27. Corruption: Driver or Retarder of Growth? - IYESLeff (1964) and Huntington (1968): Raises economic growthrates .―Speed money‖ would speed up procedural delays ingovernment by encouraging civil servants to work harder forsuch ―incentives‖ on a piece rate (Mauro, 1995).NOShleifer and Vishny (1993): Corruption lowers economicgrowthRose-Ackerman (1978): Difficulty in limiting corruption toareas where it may be desirable.
  28. 28. Corruption: Driver or Retarder of Growth? - II If Bangladesh were to increase the level of integrity of itsbureaucracy to that of Uruguay, its investment rate would riseby 5% and yearly GDP growth rate by 0.5% Bureaucracy efficiency index, 1 being the lowest grade and 10the highest: India listed along with Bangladesh in the second lowestcategory with a score of 4.5-5.5 with Pakistan in the lowestcategory of 1.5-4.5 while Sri Lanka is slotted in the next highercategory of 6.5-7 A one standard deviation improvement in the bureaucracyefficiency rate was associated with a 4.75% annual rise in GDP(Mauro, 1995, 696) and a 1.03% rise in GDP per capitaPaulo Mauro, IMF, 1995
  29. 29. Corruption: Driver or Retarder of Growth? - III Mauro, 1998: One standard-deviation improvement in the corruption index leadseducation expenditure to rise by over six percentage points of total governmentconsumption expenditure Also affects government expenditure on health services Lambsdorff (1999): If corruption affects the productivity of capital, an adverseimpact on the ratio of investment to GDP will result Tanzi and Davoodi(1998): Retards growth by increasing public investment whilereducing its productivity Higher corruption associated with higher total expenditure on wages and salaries Retards growth by reducing the quality of the existing infrastructure byincreasing the cost of doing business for both government and private sectorleading to lower output and growth Lowers growth by lowering government revenue needed to finance productivespending
  30. 30. Corruption & Inflation Al-Marhubi (1999): Faced with rising tax evasion and taxcollection costs in corrupt countries, governments sometimeshave a motive for creating inflation to generate seigniorage(difference between face value and cost of circulation of a coin;also referred to as inflation tax in some countries) as a source ofgovernment revenue Force businesses underground thereby increasing relianceon the inflation tax Capital flight, shrinking taxable assets and income of thosemost able to meet government revenue requirements By reducing revenues and increasing public spending, mayalso contribute to larger fiscal deficits, with attendant inflation
  31. 31. Corruption & Growth of Private Sector Fisman and Svensson (2007): Found anegative correlation between the rate oftaxation and bribery and firm growth Concluded that ―a one-percentage pointincrease in the bribery rate wasassociated with a reduction in firmgrowth of three percentage points, aneffect that was about three times greaterthan that of taxation.‖
  32. 32. Corruption & Growth of Private Sector Fisman and Svensson (2007): Found anegative correlation between the rate oftaxation and bribery and firm growth Concluded that ―a one-percentage pointincrease in the bribery rate wasassociated with a reduction in firmgrowth of three percentage points, aneffect that was about three times greaterthan that of taxation.‖
  33. 33. Corruption & Creditworthiness Increases likelihood of arbitrary government actions that reduceprofits and leave firms unable to repay loans May lower the effectiveness of government services, making it evenmore difficult for firms to realize profits (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Reduce legal protection for bondholders as controlling shareholdersmay divert resources from the firm to their own private ends. Higher risk premium when issuing bonds. An important source of default risk Surprisingly, corruption does not distinguish between firm spreadsand sovereign spreads to the same degree even though in theorycorruption should matter in very different ways for these two types ofborrowers (Cocchini, et al, 2003)
  34. 34. Corruption & Defense Expenditure - I From 1980-2007, global arms imports haverisen from $40.58 billion to $ 819.04 billion at1990 constant prices (SIPRI, 2009) Tanzi (1998) estimated that bribes account foras much as 15% of the total spending onweapons acquisition Therefore based on purchases during 2007may be as high as approximately $ 125 billion,i.e. about the GDP of the UAE, New Zealandand Egypt each in 2007 (World Bank, 2009).
  35. 35. Corruption & Defense Expenditure - IICountry TI (CPI) Purchases Country TI (CPI) Purchases Ranking ($ billion) Ranking ($ billion) 2008 in 2007 2008 in 2007Greece 57 19.27 China 71 29.02Mexico 72 1.74 Saudi Arabia 80 18.95India 85 25.01 Egypt 115 16.60Vietnam 121 2.00 Pakistan 134 9.57Yemen 141 1.95 Venezuela 158 2.32Myanmar 178 2.35
  36. 36. Causes of Corruption in Defense Expenditure - IGupta, DeMello and Sharan (2001) Foreign suppliers may bribe officials of countries importing armsand military equipment facilitated by the tax code of arms-exportingcountries, that allow bribery as a business expense Payment of bribes to foreign officials typically not considered as acriminal act in many recipient countries Since the mid-1980s and the breakup of the former Soviet Unionthe defense industry in Russia and the CIS had large idle capacitiesand huge fixed sunk costs that prompted arms producers to scoutaggressively for markets abroad Regulations typically confer power on the officials in charge ofauthorizing contracts
  37. 37. Causes of Corruption in Defense Expenditure – II Limited competition among suppliers encourages rent seeking and provides incentives for officials to engage in malfeasant behavior The secrecy surrounding defense outlays gives rise to corruption. Defense contracts are often excluded from freedom of information legislation, where available Administrative procedures in military spending are not closely monitored by tax and customs authorities and standard budget oversight like auditing and legislative approval
  38. 38. Causes of Corruption in Defense Expenditure – III Stock of defense assets—such as military-controlled land, hardware, testing grounds, transport vehicles and facilities such as housing and training centers, tends to be large and provides further opportunities for corruption Size of Global Defense Spending SIPRI: $1339 billion in 2007—a real-term increase of 6% over 2006 and 45 per cent since 1998 Corresponds to 2.5 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP) and $202 GDP per capita
  39. 39. Corruption & Inequity: Water SupplyFalsified meter readingsDistorted site selection of boreholes or abstraction pointsCollusion and favouritism in public procurementBribes to cover up wastewater and pollution dischargeKickbacks to accept inflated bills in productionNepotism in allocation of public offices in water administrationBribes for diversion of water for irrigationBribes for preferential treatment (spread, service level etc)
  40. 40. Corruption & Iniquity: Water Limited Potable Water in Rural AreasCorruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability
  41. 41. Corruption & Iniquity: Urban Poor Burgeoning SlumsCorruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability
  42. 42. Corruption & Iniquity: Rural Poor Rural & District SchoolsCorruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability
  43. 43. Corruption & Iniquity: Land Acquisition Transfer of Agricultural Land to Private IndustryCorruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability
  44. 44. Corruption & Inequity: Social Security Social Security for Unorganized SectorCorruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability
  45. 45. Corruption & Inequity: Public Works - I Public-Private PartnershipCorruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability
  46. 46. Corruption & Inequity: Public Works - II Government ExecutedCorruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability
  47. 47. National Integrity System – Institutional LayoutNon-government Government Political Parties Legislature Public Procurement International Central Information Local & Regional Institutions Commission Governments Media Central Election Judiciary Commission Civil Society CAG Police & prosecutors Private Sector Public Sector Ombudsman Executive
  48. 48. National Integrity System – Institutional Layout Pillar Core Rules/PracticesExecutive Conflict of interest; administrative law; judicial review of official decisionsLegislature Fair and transparent electionsLegislative Committees Power to question senior officialsAuditor General Public ReportingPublic Service Public service ethics; monitoring assets and integrity testing; conflict of interest, nepotism and cronyismJudiciaryMedia Access to informationCivil Society Freedom of speech; the right to information and giving citizens a voiceAnti-corruption/watchdog Enforceable and enforced lawsagenciesPrivate Sector Competition policy; public procurement; good financial managementInternational Effective mutual legal/judicial assistance
  49. 49. National Integrity SystemObjectives Combating corruption as part of the larger struggleagainst misconduct and misappropriation Creating an efficient and effective governmentworking in the public interest. In fine, the ultimategoal of the NIS is promoting good governance,“. . . the aim is not complete rectitude or a one-time cureor remedy, but an increase in the honesty or integrity ofgovernment as a whole . . . (Pope, 1997)
  50. 50. National Integrity System – Oversight Layout CAG CBI CVC_______ Parliament_______ Courts
  51. 51. National Integrity System – Legal Environment CAGA SPEA PCA CVCA_______ Parliament_______ Courts
  52. 52. National Integrity System – Vigilance Layout DCVO CVO ACVO CVC JS (Vig) Dir/DS VC MoPT VC
  53. 53. National Integrity System – The Linkages ParliamentCAG‘s (DPC) PAC CVC Act SPE Act Act COPUConstitutional Statutory Constitutional Enforceable Advisory Advisory Advisory
  54. 54. National Integrity System – Some Pitfalls: I Line budget and accounting system are non-transparent, often arbitrary Key government data not available online to public Key public services not brought online including at the rural level Enforcement agencies must conform to civil service regulations – cannothire specialists at market rates – budget dependent on uncertain governmentgrants Conveyor belt recruitment by UPSC based merely on a third division BAminima Ministries and Depts. expanded from 18 in 1947 to over 150 now –decentralization may breed more corruption as number of employees in theapprovals chain increases manifold Non-standard contract specifications for identical stores, buildings, etc . Internal audit, statutory audit and accounts face charges of corruption
  55. 55. National Integrity System – Some Pitfalls: II Constitutional authority of Parliamentary Oversight Committees and CAGeroded by their advisory powers Statutory authority of CVC eroded by advisory powers – also plagued bycharges of corruption CBI needs prior approval of cadre controller to investigate cases againstofficers of Jt. Secretary and above – also charged with internal corruption Inadequate CBI courts Multiple layers of appeal – delays of several decades No higher courts for PCA cases – delays of several decades Non-transparent appointment of senior civil servants of Jt. Secretary andabove rank Senior civil service not trained to deal with demands of an opening economy
  56. 56. National Integrity System – Some Pitfalls: III Discretion in senior management in post-liberalization era, e.g. omission oftransfer clause in BOT PPP projects or CWG‘s OC Failure of public grievance redressing systems in Ministries/Depts Lack of transparency in government decisions – very little data andjustification available in public domain No exemplary punitive action for dismissing employees caught red-handedtaking a bribe or unable to explain disproportionate wealth within a stipulatedtime frame; Corruption associated with outsourcing Delays in audit and submission of accounts Denial of documents to audit and investigative agencies by Ministries/Depts Ministers‘ powers to appoint senior civil servants without recording reasons
  57. 57. Jan Lokpal Bill: The Magic Potion? An intelligentsia-fuelled expression of massdiscontentLokpal: Too much on one table? Violates separation of powers in Constitution Merges executive and judicial authority Investigation + policy evaluation Omnibus Public Ombudsman Seeks to override existing National Integrityinstitutions instead of strengthening them
  58. 58. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - I? Pass Public Audit Bill of CAG Vest control of CBI in PMO? Statutory and binding status of CVC andParliamentary Oversight Committees Create a parallel legal framework to try PCAcases headed by the Lok Pal All CBI courts to report to Lok Pal asbenches HR and financial autonomy for CBI, CAG &CVC
  59. 59. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - II? Like CVC, CAG too should be multi-member Mandatory professional and educationalqualifications to be prescribed for CAsG, CICs,CVC & VCs + all posts at the rank of Jt.Secretary and above in Central Secretariat Extend mandate of High Powered Committeefor CVC to include CAG and all Secretaries toGOI Induct non-police specialists to man and headCBI and other investigative agencies All public projects costing over Rs. 1000 crorebe preceded by public consultation
  60. 60. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - III? Switchover to accrual accounting andperformance budgeting – both in publicdomain Reduce Ministries and Depts by two-thirdsand classify them in five standalone groups, viz.infrastructure & environment, social services,security & foreign affairs, economic servicesand miscellaneous Foreclose all public projects that have notreached even 50% completion after five years Social Audit of government spending byexpert citizen groups
  61. 61. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - IV? Prohibit re-employment of judges afterretirement Prohibit appointment of retired civil servantsto constitutional posts Re-look civil services recruitment system andintroduce professional requirements forselection Shorten recruitment time for civil servants tonot more than three months to attract the best Invite outstanding people from the privatesector to head Ministries/public projects
  62. 62. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - V? Pre-audit scrutiny of estimates for all publicprojects and schemes of layout of Rs. 1000 crore andabove by CAG Earmark 20% of all GOI expenditure foroversight, vigilance and Lok Pal Earmark 5% of GOI expenditure for training Repeal all obsolete Acts and Rules that inducecorruption within three months Evaluation of officers of Jt. Secretary and aboveto GOI at 20, 25 and 30 years of service by multi-member committees vested with statutory bindingpowers
  63. 63. What is Enough - I? The day a corrupt officer is jailed and his ill-gotten propertyforfeited within a month of his being caught – shift the onus ofdisproving guilt on the employee Competent officers and outsiders drafted in to government by atransparent process to provide governance – mandatory professionalqualification for each senior manager 5,00,000 redundant govt. posts at a conservative median cost of Rs.25 lakh per annum each abolished to save the nation Rs. 1,00,000crore per annum and provide employment for 365 days with Rs.200/day as minimum wage would employ 1.40 crore people with anannual wage of Rs. 0.73 lakh per head Assuming 3 adults/family, annual income would be Rs. 2.19 lakh perannum, several times over our present average national income forover 45 lakh families
  64. 64. What is Enough - II? Strengthen vigilance and punishments for State civil servants too Remove prior sanction of Ministry for prosecuting officers of Jt.Secretary to GOI and above Grant powers of a criminal court to the CVC, CAG & Ombudsmen At least 75% of public services made online even in rural areas Promote use of plastic cards for all payments Ban cash payment of government receipts/revenues Promote expert Citizens‘ Councils to mandatorily evaluategovernment programs/schemes Replace obsolete Acts with contemporary ones
  65. 65. What is Enough - III? List all government contracts online with linkage of benefits toeach Parliamentary constituency Abolish all subsidies and introduce single-point subsidy of 50% onPOL Privatize government railways, hospitals, airports, publictransportation, non-NH highways on Build-Own-Operate Basis, etc. Rationalize personal and corporate tax structure by removing allexemptions and substituting with lump sum deductions for personaltaxes and turnover percentage on corporate taxes Mandatory possession of PAN cards by all members of a family,akin to Social Security No. in the USA Divest Ministers of their power to select bureaucrats
  66. 66. What is Enough - IV? Remove staff car concept in government – each car costs approx. Rs.One lakh per month (with driver) – 50000 cars removed andsubstituted with hired cars @ Rs. 40,000/month saves government Rs.300 crore per annum from wastage, misuse and corruption Introduce annual quantitative work contracts between Minister andSecretary to reduce Ministerial discretion Abolish Ministers‘ discretion to locate public projects in theirconstituencies and reallocate budgetary provisions Abolish Ministers‘ powers to change end use of government land Government departments not to procure land for private projects Introduce licensing system for the real estate sector Release surplus government land to bring down real estate prices
  67. 67. Our Nation has suffered enough!Corruption has:
  68. 68. Views expressed in thispresentation are personal