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[Session 6] PANEL: Global Equity Market Update by Read Price

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APAFS 2019
19th PRIC

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[Session 6] PANEL: Global Equity Market Update by Read Price

  1. 1. TM FISHER INVESTMENTS EUROPETM FISHER INVESTMENTS AUSTRALASIA FISHER INVESTMENTS JAPAN
  2. 2. PAGE 49 TABLE OF CONTENTS • Market Outlook • Developed Markets • Emerging Markets • Sector Views • Current Market Topics 1 10 18 28 37 For Professional Use Only
  3. 3. PAGE 1 MARKET OUTLOOK  The bull market should continue with volatility into 2020  Long, flat periods followed by gains has been a hallmark of this bull  Stable growth with low inflation benefit equities  Equity valuations should continue expanding in 2019 after contracting in 2018  Macroeconomic and geopolitical concerns garner far more attention than healthy corporate results  Equity outflows reflect excessive caution, setting the stage for upside surprise As of 9/30/2019.
  4. 4. PAGE 2 Source: FactSet. MSCI World Total Return Index, daily, 6/4/2012 – 6/4/2013, 2/11/2016 – 2/11/2017, and 12/25/2018 – 9/30/2019. Returns show the subsequent 365 calendar days from correction bottom. 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 2018 Correction 2016 Correction 2012 Correction A TYPICAL CORRECTION RECOVERY The recovery from the late 2018 downturn looks like a typical strong-but-volatile correction recovery, similar to correction recoveries in 2012 and 2016. 1 Year Returns Following Corrections Bottom
  5. 5. PAGE 3 0% 50% 100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 A STRONG BULL WITH FITS AND STARTS Source: FactSet, as of September 2019. MSCI World Total Return Index, cumulative, monthly, February 2009 to September 2019. Overall this bull has been a strong bull market, but investors have had to wait through long, flat periods to enjoy subsequent gains. This recent flat period looks likely to follow that pattern. Flat Market Growth FlatMSCI World Cumulative Returns 27 Months 19 Months 20 Months
  6. 6. PAGE 4 NEW HIGHS LEAD TO CONTINUING BULL Source: Global Financial Data and FactSet, as of April 2019. S&P 500 Total Return Index, May 1928 to July 2018. Corrections are common and healthy features of bull markets. Corrections can give investors confidence the market has digested their fears, helping to enable the bull market to continue. S&P 500 Corrections Peak - Trough New High (Recovery) Forward Returns After New High +12 M +18 M +24 M May 1928 - Jun 1928 8/28/1928 56.0% 19.5% 10.7% Jun 1932 - Jul 1932 7/22/1932 96.8% 124.9% 98.1% Sep 1932 - Feb 1933 5/26/1933 8.0% 7.5% 14.9% Jun 1933 - Jun 1933 6/27/1933 -6.5% -12.7% -0.3% Jul 1933 - Mar 1935 10/22/1935 44.5% 48.9% 5.3% Apr 1936 - Apr 1936 7/14/1936 9.5% -19.3% -15.3% Jul 1943 - Nov 1943 6/13/1944 24.4% 46.5% 62.2% Feb 1946 - Feb 1946 4/9/1946 -18.0% -13.4% -10.7% Jun 1950 - Jul 1950 9/22/1950 29.1% 36.2% 44.0% Jan 1953 - Sep 1953 3/11/1954 40.6% 75.7% 90.5% Sep 1955 - Oct 1955 11/14/1955 3.0% 6.5% -8.2% Aug 1959 - Oct 1960 1/27/1961 14.6% -2.2% 14.6% Aug 1962 - Oct 1962 11/14/1962 25.2% 40.9% 50.6% Sep 1967 - Mar 1968 4/30/1968 9.6% 4.2% -10.8% Apr 1971 - Nov 1971 2/4/1972 12.1% 6.0% -5.6% Nov 1974 - Dec 1974 1/27/1975 37.1% 45.8% 46.2% Jul 1975 - Sep 1975 1/12/1976 11.4% 9.5% 1.3% Sep 1976 - Mar 1978 8/15/1979 22.4% 26.6% 35.3% Oct 1979 - Nov 1979 1/21/1980 23.2% 23.3% 14.3% Feb 1980 - Mar 1980 7/14/1980 13.3% 3.7% 2.2% Oct 1983 - Jul 1984 1/21/1985 22.3% 42.9% 64.8% Oct 1989 - Jan 1990 5/29/1990 9.9% 9.5% 23.0% Oct 1997 - Oct 1997 12/5/1997 21.4% 37.9% 49.8% Jul 1998 - Aug 1998 11/23/1998 19.7% 17.8% 14.0% Jul 1999 - Oct 1999 11/16/1999 -2.2% -7.9% -17.8% Nov 2002 - Mar 2003 5/12/2003 18.2% 28.7% 27.1% Apr 2010 - Jul 2010 11/4/2010 4.7% 15.7% 20.8% Apr 2011 - Oct 2011 2/24/2012 13.5% 25.9% 41.3% Apr 2012 - Jun 2012 9/6/2012 18.2% 35.4% 46.3% May 2015 - Feb 2016 7/11/2016 15.9% 33.5% 35.1% Sep 2018 - Dec 2018 4/23/2019 ? ? ? Average Return: 19.9% 23.9% 24.8% Freq. of Positive Performance: 90.0% 83.3% 76.7%
  7. 7. PAGE 5 MULTIPLE EXPANSION FOLLOWS CONTRACTION Source: FactSet as of December 2018. Based on annual data points. The difference between earnings growth and stock market performance in 2018 was one of the biggest since 2002. The only years of up earnings but down markets since 1995 were 2000, 2002, and 2018. Every year in recent history except 2000 that has featured earnings outpacing equity market returns has been positive the following year. Year S&P 500 Return S&P 500 EPS Growth Difference Following Year Return 2000 -9.1% 9.5% -18.6% -11.9% 2002 -22.1% 6.3% -28.4% 28.7% 2004 10.9% 24.6% -13.7% 4.9% 2005 4.9% 14.2% -9.3% 15.8% 2008 -37.0% -15.7% -21.3% 26.5% 2010 15.1% 40.5% -25.4% 2.1% 2011 2.1% 13.6% -11.5% 16.0% 2018 -4.4% 20.8% -25.2% ? -40% -25% -10% 5% 20% 35% 50% 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 S&P 500 Return S&P 500 EPS Growth Difference
  8. 8. PAGE 6 AN UNLOVED BULL MARKET Source: ICI Mutual & ETF Flow Monthly Data, 1/1/1991 – 8/31/2019. Flows represent ~30% of investable assets. Flows shown on a cumulative basis for respective bull market cycles. Relative to equities in prior cycles and bonds in this cycle, equity investment flows have been weak during this bull market. Negative sentiment has been persistent and suggests we are a long way from a euphoric peak. $1,378 $903 $649 $217 $510 $2,550 0 0.1 $0 $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 Cumulative Equity Flows Cumulative Bond Flows S&P 500 Bear Cumulative Mutual Fund & ETF Flows by Bull Market Cycle: Bonds vs. Equities
  9. 9. PAGE 7 BULL MARKETS TYPICALLY ACCELERATE IN LAST THIRD Source: FactSet and Global Financial Data. “Historical Bull Markets” includes bulls from June 1932 - October 2007. Bull markets before 1990 rounded to nearest month to match GFD’s S&P 500 Total Return extended data. Bull markets typically pause before reaccelerating. Bull markets typically have steep gains early, flatten out in the middle, and reaccelerate upward in the final third. We believe we are in the latter third of the current bull market. 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Duration of Bull Historical Bull Markets, 1932-2007
  10. 10. PAGE 8 21% 12% 18% 23% 26% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% <-5% -5% to 5% 5% to 15% 15% to 25% >25% AVERAGE RETURNS AREN’T NORMAL Source: Global Financial Data and FactSet, as of September 2019. Annual S&P 500 Total Return from December 1925 to December 2018. Numbers may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Strong equity returns in 2019 leave some wondering how much farther the bull market has to run. But big yearly gains are more common than many appreciate and don’t portend reversals. The S&P 500 has been up 15% or more nearly 50% of calendar years since 1925.2015 2011 2007 2005 1994 1992 1987 1984 1978 1970 1960 1956 1948 1930 1932 1940 1946 1962 1969 1974 1981 2001 2008 Annual Return Range & Frequency of Returns 1929 1931 1937 1941 1957 1966 1973 1977 2000 2002 1934 1953 1970 1994 2011 2018 1939 1960 1990 2005 2015 1926 1948 1959 1968 1978 1987 1993 2007 2016 1947 1956 1965 1971 1984 1992 2004 2014 1935 1938 1945 1954 1958 1975 1985 1991 1997 2003 2013 1928 1933 1936 1943 1950 1955 1961 1980 1989 1995 1998 2009 1927 1949 1952 1964 1972 1979 1983 1988 1999 2010 2017 1942 1944 1951 1963 1967 1976 1982 1986 1996 2006 2012
  11. 11. PAGE 9 CORPORATE RESULTS REMAIN HEALTHY Source: FactSet as of 9/30/2019. Estimated Calendar Year Earnings and Sales Growth for MSCI EM, S&P 500, MSCI Europe ex-UK, MSCI World & MSCI Japan benchmarks. Consensus estimates are for strong corporate revenue and earnings growth in 2020. Yet strong corporate results receive far less attention than macroeconomic and geopolitical fears, setting the stage for upside surprise. 13.5% 10.4% 10.0% 9.5% 4.7% 7.3% 5.3% 3.5% 4.0% 2.2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% EM US EU ex-UK World Japan Estimated CY 2020 Earnings Growth Estimated CY 2020 Sales Growth
  12. 12. PAGE 10 KEY DEVELOPED MARKETS THEMES  European equities should benefit from political gridlock, better-than-appreciated economic results, and excessive investor pessimism  Fears about Brexit, populism, trade wars, and manufacturing weakness have left sentiment excessively dour  Chinese stimulus has been meaningful and should stabilize the economy if trade tensions persist  Strength in the dominant services sector more than offsets manufacturing weakness  Larger, high-margin growth equities should continue to outperform through the late stages of the market cycle Our highest conviction views on developed market regions As of 9/30/2019.
  13. 13. PAGE 11 EU BENEFITS FROM FALLING UNCERTAINTY EU parliamentary elections concluded earlier this year, and gridlock prevailed. European equities usually benefit from the falling political uncertainty which follows these elections. Source: FactSet, as of May 2019. Performance is shown for the MSCI Europe-ex UK index, based in USD. Top chart is rebased to 100 at election dates. EU Parliament Election Dates 6 Months Pre-Election 6 Months Post-Election 12 Months Post-Election June 10, 1979 -0.9% 5.8% 6.2% June 14, 1984 -1.4% -3.8% 20.5% June 15, 1989 4.2% 24.6% 32.3% June 9, 1994 -0.1% 3.1% 16.6% June 13, 1999 -5.2% 22.3% 22.2% June 13, 2004 1.2% 17.8% 14.3% June 7, 2009 13.9% 22.1% -0.6% May 22, 2014 6.3% -7.6% -7.0% May 27, 2019 1.4% ?? ?? Average 2.2% 10.5% 13.1% Median 1.2% 11.8% 15.5% Frequency Positive 56% 75% 75% 95 100 105 110 115 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 # of Months Before and After EU Parliament Elections Avg. Europe Returns Around EU Parliament Elections Election
  14. 14. PAGE 12 Centrist parties have historically dominated European politics, but power has been gradually shifted from the center to both the left and right ends of the political spectrum. As a result, forming governments requires greater coalition building, which hampers decision making and increases gridlock. Source: Fisher Investments Research, EU Parliament, pollsofpolls.com as of April 10, 2019. 17% 58% 23% 0% 15% 30% 45% 60% 75% 90% Left Center Right 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019 EU Parliament Party Stance by Election Since 1979 (% of Seats) CHANGING EU POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
  15. 15. PAGE 13 EMU stocks consistently outperform when the broader market is very strong. Source: Factset, as of August 2019. Based on monthly data (12/31/1995 to 8/30/2019). Shows frequency and magnitude of regional outperformance vs MSCI World when MSCI World Y/Y change is +20% or greater. 78% 51% 47% 45% 83% 44% 50% 33% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% EMU UK US Japan % of Time a Region Outperforms in +20% Market Current Cycle 6.2% 0.03% -0.6% -1.3% 4.7% 1.1% 0.6% 1.7% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% EMU UK US Japan Median Relative Return When Market is +20% Current Cycle EMU STOCKS EXCEL IN STRONG MARKETS
  16. 16. PAGE 14 FUND MANAGERS NEGATIVE ON EMU Source: Monthly BofA Fund Manager Survey. Survey and performance data through 9/14/2019. Shows net EMU fund manager weight as a 3 year inverted z-score. MSCI EMU – World lagged 18 months, based on year-over-year change. The BofA Fund Manager Survey (FMS) shows a substantially reduced position to the EMU. This has historically been a reliable contrarian indicator; when managers become uniformly negative on the EMU, the region typically outperforms over the next 12-18 months. -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0-20% -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Europe outperforms when the line is rising Managers selling Europe when the line is rising FMS weight to Europe (Z-score, RHS inverted) MSCI Europe - MSCI World (18M lagged returns, LHS)
  17. 17. PAGE 15 QUANTITATIVE DIS-EASING Quantitative easing (QE) has increased base money and bank reserves, but it has contributed to depressed loan and broader money supply growth. QE’s unprecedented expansion of the monetary base Failed to translate to broader money supply Or lending – which accelerated after Fed tapering Source: Federal Reserve and Centre for Financial Stability as of September 2019. Cumulative M4 Growth 1970-1973 1975-1979 1982-1990 1991-2001 2001-2007 2009-Present Cumulative M0 Growth Cumulative Loan Growth 90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Months Into Expansion 90 110 130 150 170 190 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Months Into Expansion 9.8% ann. 7.2% ann. 5.8% ann. 6.2% ann. 5.5% ann. 4.2% ann.Post QE 0.8% ann.QE 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Months Into Expansion 16.0% ann. 11.2% ann. 8.9% ann. 9.5% ann. 6.5% ann. 5.9% ann.Post QE 1.2% ann.QE
  18. 18. PAGE 16 CHINA-EU TRADE BOTTOMING Top chart source: FactSet, BEA, Japanese Cabinet Office, Oxford Economics and European Commission as of August 2019. Country exports as a percentage of GDP. All data uses 2018 annual numbers except Poland (2016 data). Bottom chart source: FactSet and Eurostat as of July 2019 – the latest available data. Both series shown as year-over-year 3 month moving averages. Disappointing EU GDP and other economic data has been the result of a weak external environment, as the EU relies heavily on exports. Slowing trade with China has played a large role, but appears to be reaccelerating since late 2018, similar to prior instances in this economic cycle. 25% 20% 18% 12% 22% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% Eurozone China Japan US Exports as % of GDP Exports to other eurozone members Exports to non-eurozonecountries -25% 0% 25% 50% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Eurozone to China Exports Eurozone from China Imports
  19. 19. PAGE 17 SERVICES DWARF MANUFACTURING Global PMI Index Level Components as % of GDP European Union United States Japan 73.4% 25.0% 1.7% 80.2% 18.9% 1.0% 69.5% 29.3% 1.2% Source: OECD, FactSet, as of August 2019. Value added as a % of GDP in agricultural, services (including non-market) and industrial (including construction) sectors in the US, European Union and Japan, 2017; JP Morgan Global services, manufacturing, and composite PMIs, 01/01/2016 – 08/30/2019. Weak manufacturing Purchasing Managers Indexes (PMIs) globally tend to receive more attention, but services dominate most major developed economies. Despite manufacturing weakness, service PMI’s continue to indicate expansion, supporting future economic growth. Services Manufacturing Agriculture Composite 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 2016 2017 2018 2019
  20. 20. PAGE 18 KEY EMERGING MARKETS THEMES  China’s economy is slowing, not imploding  Chinese stimulus should stabilize growth, benefitting all of EM  Tame inflation, loose monetary policy, and reform optimism provide a boost for Brazil  Low EM valuations reflect excessive pessimism  More stable, lower inflation and accommodative monetary policies should be a structural tailwind to EM Our highest conviction views on Emerging Markets As of 9/30/2019.
  21. 21. PAGE 19 STIMULUS FOLLOWS SLOWING M1 IN CHINA Top chart source: FactSet and People’s Bank of China as of August 2019. Bottom chart source: FactSet, People’s Bank of China, Bloomberg and Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business as of August 2019. China access to credit as of May 2019, shown with a 6 month lead. Both charts show M1 increase on a year-over-year basis. Chinese M1 is comprised primarily of corporate bank deposits and is among the best barometers of economic activity. Prior periods of slow growth have been met with significant stimulus measures to reverse deceleration. Moreover, credit availability data suggests a coming rebound in China’s money supply. -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 20 30 40 50 60 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 China Access to Credit (LHS) China M1 (RHS) -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 Stimulus China M1
  22. 22. PAGE 20 CURRENT & PREVIOUS STIMULUS ARE COMPARABLE Source: FactSet, World Bank, People’s Bank of China and Fisher Investments Research as of August 2019. Fiscal stimulus defined as infrastructure spending and tax cuts. Recent Chinese stimulus has been on par with prior stimulus, which has effectively stabilized the economy. Fiscal Stimulus Date % of GDP Other Important Policies Date % of GDP Vocational Training Program 4/30/19 0.1% Additional Reserve Ratio Requirement (RRR) Cuts to Small Banks 3/5/19 -- VAT Cuts 3/5/19 0.6% >30% Y/Y Target Bank Loans to Small- and-Medium Enterprises (SME) 2/26/19 3.0% Personal Income Tax Cuts 1/1/19 1.0% Increased Perpetual Bond Issuance and Central Bank Bond Swaps 2/20/19 -- Small Business Tax Cuts 1/1/19 0.2% Shadow Banking crackdown will slow, allowing more natural development 1/28/19 -- Local Government Bonds - Infrastructure 2018/2019 3.0% 13.4% 0.0% 6.9% 5.9% 0% 5% 10% 15% 2.0% 1.5% 3.0% 3.5% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 2008/2009 2011/2012 2015/2016 2018/2019 Fiscal Stimulus as % of GDP Magnitude of RRR Cuts
  23. 23. PAGE 21 2.10 1.56 1 2 3 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 18.25 12.55 5 10 15 20 25 FALSE FEARS IN CHINA DEFLATE VALUATIONS Source: FactSet as of September 2019. Shows current price-to-earnings & price-to-book ratio for the MSCI China IMI. Sentiment surrounding China has soured since early 2018, with trade war fears depressing valuations. We believe trade war fears are overblown, negative sentiment boosts the probability of upside surprise. Price-to-Earnings Ratio Price-to-Book Ratio MSCI China IMI
  24. 24. PAGE 22 CONSUMERS INCREASINGLY RELEVANT IN CHINA Top chart source: FactSet & Thompson Reuters DataStream as of September 2019. Both data series indexed to 1. Bottom chart source: Bloomberg as of 8/30/2019. Consumer credit growth shown as year- over-year percentage increase, while consumer loans shown as billions of Yuan. Consumer spending and sentiment have become more important as China shifts to a more consumption driven economy. Part of this consumption boom has been driven by a steady flow of short term lending, increasing at a healthy ~20% Y/Y despite a recent slow down. 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Consumer Sentiment - China MSCI China/MSCI EM ¥0 ¥2,000 ¥4,000 ¥6,000 ¥8,000 ¥10,000 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Short Term Consumer Credit Growth (LHS) Short Term Consumer Loans (RHS)
  25. 25. PAGE 23 Source: AmCham Shanghai, AmCham China, as of 6/11/2019. “How Multinationals Are Managing The Trade War: Second Joint Survey on the Impact of Tariffs”, 5/16/2019 – 5/20/2019, survey published 5/22/2019. *Out of 239 AmCham member companies represented by 61.6% manufacturing-related, 25.5% services, 3.8% retail & distribution and 9.6% from other industries. Option % of Respondents* Further localization in China 35.3% Delaying or canceling investment decisions 33.2% Adjusting supply chains away from the US 25.2% Adjusting supply chains away from China 22.7% Considering relocating some or all manufacturing out of China 19.7% No impact 14.3% Considering relocating some or all manufacturing out of the US 9.7% Increasing investment 2.9% Considering exiting the China market 2.5% How Multinationals Are Managing The Trade War: Second Joint Survey on the Impact of Tariffs MIXED BUSINESS RESPONSE TO TARIFFS Firms are taking different approaches to US-China trade tensions. Some are moving supply chains away from China, some are localizing there, and others are taking a wait-and-see approach.
  26. 26. PAGE 24 LOW RATES AND INFLATION BUOY BRAZIL As the Brazilian economy recovers, credit is increasingly provided by private institutions which augments private credit availability. Moreover, significantly lower inflation rates have allowed the central bank to cut rates to all-time lows, leading to more favorable lending conditions. Top chart source: Central Bank of Brazil, year-over-year credit growth as of August 2019. Bottom chart source: FactSet and Central Bank of Brazil, as of August 2019. -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total Credit Growth Private Lending Subsidized Lending 5% 10% 15% 20% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Selic Target Rate (RHS) Core CPI (Y/Y, LHS) Inflation Target Upper Lower Inflation is moving below the upper end of 4.25% ± 1.5% target range New 5.5% Rate
  27. 27. PAGE 25 REFORM OPTIMISM IS POSITIVE FOR BRAZIL Pro-growth economic reforms can be a key driver of Emerging Market country performance. But the expectation of reform is often more powerful in the short term than the reform itself. Reforms are inevitably harder to enact and have a more delayed economic impact than investors hope. Optimism about Brazilian reforms is growing and should lead to strong performance, but eventually Brazil will likely face introduction and execution challenges. Source: FactSet & Fisher Investments Research as of September 2019. Shows MSCI India/EM & MSCI Brazil/EM using daily data from 11/26/2013 – 3/28/2018 and 4/27/2018 – 9/30/2019, respectively. Trading Days Surrounding Elections 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 MSCI India / MSCI Emerging Markets 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 -130 0 130 260 390 520 650 780 910 MSCI Brazil / MSCI Emerging Markets Bolsonaro wins elections Vale mining disaster Pension reform package presented to Congress Temer arrested for corruption Pension reform package passes the lower house Modi wins elections Corporate tax reform announced, phased in April 2017 Global correction on China fears Universal payment (Aadhaar Bill) Bankruptcy bill Corporate bond market liberalization Banking reform GST passes Reform Optimism Introduction Phase Execution Phase
  28. 28. PAGE 26 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.1 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 EM VALUATIONS ARE HISTORICALLY ATTRACTIVE Emerging Market valuations have recovered from the extreme lows of 2018, but still remain at a large discount to the developed world. As global growth continues, negative sentiment should abate, pushing EM valuations higher. Source: FactSet as of September 2019. Based on monthly forward valuations. Price to Earnings Price to Sales Price to Book 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 MSCI EM Index MSCI World Index MSCI EM Index 10 Year 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
  29. 29. PAGE 27 LONG-TERM DISINFLATIONARY TREND Source: Bank for International Settlement, World Bank & Global Financial Data as of July 2019 – the latest available data. EM monthly central bank policy rates and consumer price index weighted against annual GDP data, excluding Argentina & Turkey. Historically, many Emerging Markets have struggled with high inflation and resulting high policy rates. Excluding recent outliers (Argentina & Turkey), global disinflationary trends and improved monetary policies should benefit many EM countries going forward. 1.5% 2.5% 3.5% 4.5% 5.5% 6.5% 7.5% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 GDP Weighted EM Central Bank Rates (ex-Argentina & Turkey) GDP Weighted EM Consumer Price Index (ex-Argentina & Turkey)
  30. 30. PAGE 28 KEY SECTOR POSITIONING  Technology outperformance continues, with volatility  Health Care supported by strong pipelines and drug approvals  Negative sentiment indicates Eurozone banks are well positioned to outperform  The global oil market is in balance  Rising bond yields would be a headwind to defensive sectors Our highest conviction views on sectors As of 9/30/2019.
  31. 31. PAGE 29 TECH’S ROCKY ROAD Top chart source: FactSet, Inc. as of September 2019. MSCI World Information Technology and MSCI World Total Return Indexes, daily, indexed to 1 on April 18, 2013. Bottom chart source: FactSet & BEA as of August 2019 – based on quarterly data points. Over the past six years, Technology has outperformed despite brief periods of underperformance. Technology spending has accelerated alongside overall business spending, supporting the Information technology sector. 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 -2.7% -3.9% -2.9% -5.0% -7.6% -4.1% -6.6% -4.0% -4.4% -4.4% -4.3% MSCI World Technology/ MSCI World -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 Technology Investment Growth
  32. 32. PAGE 30 ACCELERATED DRUG APPROVALS SUPPORT HEALTH CARE With FDA new drug approvals picking up in Q3, 2019 is shaping to be an above average year for drug approvals, but off the record-setting pace of 2018. Strong drug pipelines and a concerted effort by regulators to get new drugs to market quickly provide a positive backdrop for drug makers. Source: US Food and Drug Administration novel drug approvals of new molecular entities (NMEs) as of September 2019. NMEs provide new therapies for patients. 0 20 40 60 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec FDA New Drug Approvals Picked up in Q3 2019 2018 2019 1999 - 2018 Avg Previous Record Year (1996) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Annual FDA New Molecular Entity Approvals Traditional Biologics
  33. 33. PAGE 31 303 446 433 565 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 2015 2016 2017 2018 109 42 143 175 0 50 100 150 200 2015 2016 2017 2018 CHINESE DRUG APPROVALS SURGING The Chinese drug approval process is surging, with record approvals of innovative and foreign drugs—a huge new opportunity for drug makers. Source: China Center of Drug Evaluation, as of 12/31/2018. Chinese Innovative Drug Approvals Chinese Approvals for Innovative Drug Trials Chemical Biologic Traditional Chinese Medicine
  34. 34. PAGE 32 UNDERPENETRATED MARKETS BOOST EM FINANCIALS Underpenetrated banking systems tend to outperform during economic expansions as previously underserved consumers and businesses gain access to credit for the first time. These new entrants’ first loans tend to be highly profitable with low default rates. China Brazil Poland India Hungary Peru Indonesia 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160% 180% 200% $- $20,000 $40,000 $60,000 $80,000 $100,000 Private Sector Credit (% of GDP) Source: World Bank Development Indicators as of September 2019. Based on annual data points. 3 outliers were excluded from the data set (Hong Kong, Luxembourg & Singapore).
  35. 35. PAGE 33 EMU bank balance sheets are strong and continue to improve more rapidly than US banks. Access to and demand for credit, and the yield curve, in the EMU are the most attractive in the developed world. All factors indicate strong lending and bank margins moving forward. EMU BANKS’ STRONG POSITIONING Top charts source: FactSet and IMF as of September 2019. Quarterly Tier 1 Capital Ratio to Risk Weighted Assets, as of December 2018. Non-performing loans to total gross loans, quarterly as of December 2018. Bottom left chart source: Federal Reserve and European Central Bank monthly Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey as of August 2019. Bottom right chart source: FactSet and OECD as of September 2019. 10Y Government bond yield minus overnight interbank rate, daily. USEMU 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Tier 1 Capital Ratio -2% -1% 0% 1% 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Non-Performing Loans % Change Y/Y -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 Total Credit Demand -1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 3.0% 4.5% 1995 2001 2007 2013 2019 Yield Curve Spread
  36. 36. PAGE 34 EXTREME NEGATIVE SENTIMENT TOWARD EMU BANKS Source: FactSet as of September 2019. Based on monthly data for MSCI EMU, S&P500, MSCI World and MSCI EAFE benchmarks. 12M Forward Returns After Extreme Dividend Yield Reading Date EAFE EMU World EMU Banks 1/2/2009 24.9% 22.3% 23.5% 46.0% 5/4/2012 17.9% 21.8% 17.2% 32.8% 7/1/2016 16.2% 24.0% 15.4% 65.0% 8/30/2019 -- -- -- -- Average 19.7% 22.7% 18.7% 47.9% EMU Financials are trading at a large discount to the World and US on a Price/Book basis, which we believe is unjustified based on fundamentals. Additionally, relative to the EMU, Banks’ dividend yield is at an extreme high which should be an indicator of outperformance over the coming 12 months. 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 MSCI EMU Banks/MSCI EMU (Div. Yield) Extreme Readings -68.6% -47.4% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 1995 2001 2007 2013 2019 EMU Financials/ World World P/B EMU Financials/ US Financials P/B
  37. 37. PAGE 35 -4% -2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 Global Oil Supply Global Oil Consumption 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2013 Barrels of Oil US WELL INSULATED FROM OIL SHOCKS Trailing 30 Days Correlation % of US Personal Consumption Expenditure Not only is increasing domestic production making the US more oil independent, but the US economy is less oil sensitive than ever. Oil markets are largely in balance, the relationship between stocks and oil is weak, and oil represents a small part of overall consumption. 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 1972 1982 1992 2002 2012 Gasoline (~2%) Natural Gas Electricity Heating Oil Energy Spending -1.00 -0.60 -0.20 0.20 0.60 1.00 1983 1993 2003 2013 Current: 0.21 Average: 0.09 Average Correlation, S&P 500 and WTI Barrels Needed per $1,000 of GDPGlobal Oil Supply & Consumption Source: FactSet & World Bank. Top left: rolling 30 day correlation of S&P500 and WTI price change, daily, 12/31/1982–9/13/2019. Top right: personal consumption expenditures from 1/31/1972 – 7/31/2019. Bottom left: EIA, shown as 6M moving average as of 9/30/2019. Bottom right: 12M moving average of US crude oil and petroleum products against 4-quarter moving average real GDP from 12/31/1996 – 8/31/2019.
  38. 38. PAGE 36 DEFENSIVE SECTORS AND BOND YIELDS Defensive, higher-yielding sectors tend to be influenced by bond-yield changes. Falling yields have provided support so far this year, but rising yields could become a headwind. Source: FactSet as of September 2019. MSCI World Real Estate/World, MSCI World Utilities/MSCI World and MSCI World Consumer Staples/MSCI World Indexed to March 1, 2003. 1.2 1.6 2 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 0.68 0.73 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.93 0.98 1.03 1.08 1.13 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 MSCI World Real Estate/MSCI World (LHS) MSCI World Utilities/MSCI World (LHS) MSCI World Consumer Staples/MSCI World (LHS) 10 US Treasury Year (RHS)
  39. 39. PAGE 37 CURRENT MARKET TOPICS  Is the US yield curve inversion signaling a near-term recession?  Is global GDP experiencing a recession or mid-cycle slowdown?  What is the current reading on credit measures?  Can equities rise as economic growth slows?  Will tariffs induce a global recession? Our views on contemporary investor topics in the market As of 9/30/2019.
  40. 40. PAGE 38 YIELD CURVE INTEREST PEAKS BEFORE MARKET Source: Google Trends as of May 2019. Searches for the term “Yield Curve” worldwide, for the period covering June 2004 to May 2019. Each data point is divided by the total searches of the geography and time range it represents, to compare relative popularity. The resulting numbers is then scaled on a range of 0 to 100 based on a topics proportion to all searches. Equities discount known information. Spiking interest in the yield curve just as it inverts saps its surprise power. If the yield curve becomes problematic—which isn’t a sure thing—it is likely not until investor interest has faded. -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 -0.8 0.0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 22 months 10Y-3M UST Yield Spread (LHS) Google Trends: "Yield Curve" Interestover Time (RHS) S&P Bear
  41. 41. PAGE 39 THE YIELD CURVE IS A POOR TIMING TOOL There have been four modern occurrences when US yield curve inversion was not immediately followed by a recession or bear market. Top chart source: Global Financial Data, US Federal Reserve, and FactSet, Inc. as of September 2019. S&P price index 10-year US Treasury yield and 3-month US Treasury Bill yield, Daily April 1978 to December 2008. Bottom chart source: Global Financial Data and FactSet, Inc. as of September 2019. US recessions, US 10-year bond and 3-month Treasury yield spread, monthly, January 1952 to February 2019, daily to September 2019. Inversion Date Rising short rates? Falling long rates? -6M -3M +6M +12M To Mkt Peak # Months Before Bear 11/01/1978 X -0.8% -3.8% 5.0% 5.9% 45.1% 25 03/27/1989 X 8.3% 5.0% 18.8% 17.5% 27.0% 16 09/10/1998 X -7.9% -11.9% 31.3% 37.9% 55.8% 19 01/17/2006 X 4.5% 7.8% -3.8% 11.5% 22.0% 21 Average 1.0% -0.7% 12.8% 18.2% 37.5% 20 Inversion Cause Returns Before Inversion Returns Following Inversion -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 1952 1958 1964 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006 2012 2018 US Bear Market US Recession 10Y-3M US Yield Spread
  42. 42. PAGE 40 Bank deposit rates typically track the short end of the yield curve. But the flood of excess reserves resulting from quantitative easing (QE) and increased banks’ excess reserves, reduced deposit competition, and kept deposit costs low despite rising short-term interest rates. The spread between bank deposit costs and long-term interest rates is far wider than the yield curve implies. Top chart source: Federal Reserve, as of September 2019. National rate on >$100K (large) 12-month CD and <$100K (small) savings account, and 3-month US Treasury yield, weekly, 5/18/2009 – 9/27/2019. Bottom chart source: Federal Reserve, as of 9/27/2019. National rate on >$100K 12M CD – 3M US Treasury yield, <$100K savings account – 3M US Treasury yield, and 10Y-3M US Treasury yield spread, weekly, 05/18/2009 – 9/27/2019. BANK DEPOSIT COSTS REMAIN LOW 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3M Treasury Yield >$100K Bank Deposit Rate <$100K Bank Deposit Rate -0.5% 0.5% 1.5% 2.5% 3.5% 4.5% 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 10Y Treasury-Small CD Rates 10Y Treasury - Large CD Rates 10Y Treasury-Small CD Rates
  43. 43. PAGE 41 FED FUNDS AND DEPOSIT RATE DIVERGENCE Top chart source: Federal Reserve & San Francisco Federal Reserve, monthly, 12/31/1990 – 9/30/2019. Shows policy rate & bank cost of funds index rate of change during hike cycles. Bottom chart source: Federal Reserve. 10Y-3M US Treasury yield spread, monthly, 12/31/1990 – 9/30/2019. Bank Net Interest Margin, FDIC, Quarterly. -3% 0% 3% 6% 2.8% 3.1% 3.4% 3.7% 4.0% 4.3% 4.6% 1990 1997 2004 2011 2018 US Bank NIM (LHS) US Yield Curve (RHS) An abundance of excess reserves reduces deposit competition among banks and their incentive to pass higher short-term interest rates on to depositors. As a result, banks net interest margins (NIMs) don’t track the yield curve spread as they have historically. NIMs & the yield curve typically move in tandem, but split in different directions in early 2015 -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 1990 1997 2004 2011 2018 Pass-Through: 43% Pass-Through: 63% Pass-Through: 62% Pass-Through: 23% Bank Cost of Funds Index During Rate Hike Cycle Policy Rate Hikes Cycles
  44. 44. PAGE 42 0 0.01-3 3 9 15 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 Measures of credit availability other than the yield curve – like bank lending standards, the leading credit index, and global loan growth – suggest lending conditions remain healthy. CREDIT MEASURES ARE NOT SOUNDING ALARMS US – Q/Q Change of Lending Standards vs. S&P Bears Source: FactSet, as of 08/19/2019. GDP-weighted Aggregate Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS), 09/30/1990 – 08/31/2019, Leading Credit Index, 9/30/1990 – 8/31/2019 and y/y global loan growth, 01/01/2011 – 05/31/2019 – the latest available data. S&P 500 Bears Leading Credit Index (Inverted) 0 0.01 -75% -45% -15% 15% 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018 S&P 500 Bears Aggregate SLOOS 4.5% 6.5% 8.5% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Global Loan Growth (Y/Y)
  45. 45. PAGE 43 MEASURING THE MID-CYCLE SLOW DOWN Source: FactSet and OECD as of August 2019. Global GDP as of June 2019 – the latest available data. Shows GDP growth rate and MSCI ACWI total return level change on a year-over-year basis. The current economic slowdown is the 3rd of the current cycle, and is following a similar trajectory to previous rounds. Subsequent market and GDP bounces have been strong following previous slowdowns, with the market having led GDP growth by roughly 6 months. Global GDP (RHS) MSCI ACWI (LHS) 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% -20% -5% 10% 25% 40% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Mid Cycle Slowdown Recovery 24 Month 15 Month 18 Month 12 Month 12 Month Global GDP (RHS) MSCI ACWI (LHS)
  46. 46. PAGE 44 EQUITY RETURNS LEAD ECONOMIC GROWTH Top chart source: FactSet, IMF and Global Financial Data as of February 2019. Yearly GDP Growth, Real % Change - United States and S&P 500 Total Return (net), annualized December 1970 to December 2016. Bottom chart source: Source: FactSet, IMF and Global Financial Data as of February 2019. Yearly GDP Growth, Real % Change - United States and S&P 500 Total Return (gross), annualized, December 1970 to December 2016. We believe equity markets abhor recessions and often fall ahead of economic contractions. But equities can thrive in any level of economic growth. If economic growth slows, equity returns needn’t suffer, in our view. -9.1% 12.4% 16.7% 12.2% -15% -5% 5% 15% 25% Average Return 28.6% 88.9% 96.0% 66.7% 0% 50% 100% <0% 0% - 2.5% 2.5% - 5% >5% Frequency of Positive Returns S&P 500 Return with 1 Year GDP lag GDP Growth
  47. 47. PAGE 45 TARIFFS LACK SCALE TO DERAIL EXPANSION Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) and CBP Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis as of September 2019. GDP forecast (USD, current prices), 2019 estimate based on the IMF’s April 2019 World Economic Outlook global nominal GDP growth and calculated growth projection of 3.0%.Worst-case tariff impact from the Office of US Trade Representative and US Census Bureau, May 2019. 2019 YTD Global Merchandise Trade as of July 2019, merchandise world trade volumes, seasonally adjusted and prices, monthly. Trade worries are warranted, but unless trade tariffs escalate massively, they simply lack the scale to derail the global economy. 208 2,525 14,217 21,345 87,230 87,265 0 15,000 30,000 45,000 60,000 75,000 90,000 Tariffs Worst-Case 2019 Global GDP Growth China GDP 2019 (Est.) United States GDP 2019 (Est.) 2019 YTD Global Merchandise Trade 2019 Global GDP (Est.) $Billion
  48. 48. PAGE 46 EU-Singapore FTA (EUSTFA) EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA) US-Mexico- Canada Agreement (USMCA) Korea-Central American FTA (KCAFTA) Peru- Australia FTA (PAFTA) Value of goods traded between regions with free trade agreements: $244M $281M $281M $244M $1,263,493M $1,959M $1,959M $150,508M $64,747M $64,747M $73,638M $54,938M $150,508M $97,620M $97,620M$307M $439,848M $439,848M Value of goods traded between the US & China: $659,845M $54,938M $1,263,493M $307M $73,638M $2,147,587M Ukraine- Israel FTA Singapore-Sri Lanka FTA African Continental FTA (afCFTA) EU-Mercosur Trade Deal EU-Japan EPA Comp. & Progressive Agrmt. for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) While most focus on US/China trade relations, few notice the large number and relative size of recent free trade deals elsewhere. NEW TRADE DEALS LARGELY OVERLOOKED Source: FactSet, World Bank, European Commission, as of 07/29/2019. Bilateral goods trade and global ratified or signed free trade agreements, 2018 (2017 data used when 2018 data was not available).
  49. 49. PAGE 47 HOW WE MONITOR FOR A BEAR MARKET Source: Fisher Investments Research as of June 2019. We provide a sample list above, this is not a comprehensive list of indicators monitored. Indicator ’29 ’37 ’46 ’56 ’61 ’66 ’68 ’73 ’80 ’87 ’90 ’00 ’07 Present today? Recession ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Unlikely Large War ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Unlikely Trade War ✔ Yes, but small Liquidity Freeze ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Unlikely Monetary Policy ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Slightly tight Fiscal Policy ✔ ✔ ✔ Not tight Regulation ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ No major changes Equity Oversupply ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Not present Euphoria ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Not present Cause Description Examples The Wall A bull market climbs the “Wall of Worry” then runs out of steam amid widespread investor euphoria 1990s Dot Com Bubble The Wallop A negative surprise with the power to knock several trillion dollars off global GDP hits an ongoing bull market 2007 Financial Crisis
  50. 50. PAGE 50 Complete Investment Process  Top-down approach accounts for three critical decisions helping to maximize probability of excess return Complementary Portfolio  Diversification via process and style Experienced  Investment Policy Committee members’ average experience at FI: 25 years STRATEGY OFFERINGS AND BENEFITS AUM figures depict assets managed by Fisher Investments and its subsidiaries as of month end September 2019. “Years” is calculated using the date on which Fisher Investments was established as a sole proprietorship: 1979. Back cover photographs: The offices of FI are located in Washington and California, USA. The London, UK office is the headquarters of Fisher Investments Europe, FI’s wholly-owned subsidiary in England. The Dubai International Financial Centre office is a branch office of FI. Fisher Investments Australasia Pty Ltd is FI’s wholly-owned subsidiary based in Sydney, Australia. Fisher Investments Japan is FI’s wholly-owned subsidiary based in Tokyo, Japan. Global US Global Ex-US $8.2 Billion $9.8 Billion $22.3 Billion All World Equity US Equity All Non-US Equity MSCI ACWI Index S&P 500 Index MSCI ACWI ex-US Index Global Equity US Mid Cap Value All Non-US Equity Growth MSCI World Index Russell Mid Cap Value Index MSCI ACWI ex-US Growth Index Global Equity Focused US Small and Mid Cap Core Non-US Equity MSCI World Index Russell 2500 Index MSCI EAFE Index Global Small Cap US Small and Mid Cap Value Emerging Markets Equity MSCI World Small Cap Index Russell 2500 Value Index MSCI Emerging Markets Index Global High Dividend Yield US Small Cap Core Frontier Markets Equity MSCI World High Dividend Yield Index Russell 2000 Index MSCI FrontierMarkets Index Global Quant US Small Cap Value All Non-US Equity Small Cap MSCI ACWI Index Russell 2000 Value Index MSCI ACWI ex-US Small Cap Global Long/Short US Small Cap Opportunities Non-US Equity Small Cap MSCI World (50%) 3-Month T-Bill (50%) Russell Micro Cap Value Index MSCI World ex-US Small Cap US Small Cap Quant Emerging Markets Small Cap ESG Russell 2000 Index MSCI Emerging Markets Small Cap Index Global Research Platform
  51. 51. PAGE 51 DISCLOSURES Fisher Investments Fisher Asset Management, LLC, doing business as Fisher Investments (FI), is a leading independent investment adviser registered with US Securities and Exchange Commission (US SEC). As of September 30, 2019, FI and its subsidiaries managed over $112 billion. Fisher Investments Europe Fisher Investments Europe Limited (FIE) is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (191609). It is registered in England, Company Number 3850593. FIE is wholly‐owned by FI, which is wholly‐owned by Fisher Investments, Inc. FIE delegates portfolio management to FI. FI’s Investment Policy Committee is responsible for all strategic investment decisions. FIE’s Investment Oversight Committee (IOC) is responsible for overseeing FI’s management of portfolios that have been delegated to FI. This material has been approved by FIE. Fisher Investments Australasia Fisher Investments Australasia Pty Ltd (FIA) holds an Australian Financial Services Licence (#433312) with the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). FIA is wholly owned by FI. FIA delegates portfolio management to its parent company, FI. This material is designed for use with wholesale prospective clients and clients. Fisher Investments DIFC Fisher Investments, DIFC Branch (FI DIFC) is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) and is authorised to conduct business with Professional Clients and Market Counterparties only as defined by the DFSA. Fisher Investments Japan Fisher Investments Japan (FIJ) is registered as a Financial Instruments Business Operator with the Japan Financial Services Agency under Director-General of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Financial Instruments Firm No. 2766), and is a member of Japan Investment Advisers Association. FIJ serves as the investment manager, and delegates a portion of the portfolio management function to FI, or invests client’s assets into the fund that is managed by FI, subject to the oversight of the FIJ Portfolio Engineer. FIJ provides discretionary investment management service to clients in Japan. FIJ was established in Tokyo Japan in 2015 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of FI. Investment in securities involves the risk of loss. Past performance is no guarantee of future returns. Other methods may produce different results, and the results for individual portfolios and for different periods may vary depending on market conditions and the composition of the portfolio. The information in this document constitutes the general views of Fisher Investments and should not be regarded as personalized investment advice or a reflection of the performance of Fisher Investments or its clients. We provide our general comments to you based on information we believe to be reliable. There can be no assurances that we will continue to hold this view; and we may change our views at any time based on new information, analysis or reconsideration. Some of the information we have produced for you may have been obtained from a third party source that is not affiliated with Fisher Investments. Fisher Investments requests that this information be used for your confidential and professional use. Data is month end and USD unless stated otherwise.
  52. 52. Fisher Investments Camas Fisher Investments Woodside Fisher Investments JapanFisher Investments Australasia Fisher Investments DIFCFisher Investments Europe

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