Technology Innovation and Great Power Competition,TIGPC, Gordian knot Center, DIME-FIL, department of defense, dod, intlpol 340, joe felter, ms&e296, raj shah, stanford, Steve blank, AI, ML, AI/ML, china, Disinformation

1. Original Problem Statement
Disinformation is a national security threat.
Team Babel
Andrea Collins
CS + M.S. MS&E
Andrew Gerges
Econ & IR
Jackson Richter
Pub Pol + MPP
Keely Podosin
STS
Shreyas Lakhtakia
M.S. MS&E
Mohamed Mohsen
Econ + M.S. MS&E
Total Interviews
Conducted: 26
Final Problem Statement
The U.S.'s ability to close the disinformation
response kill chain is hampered by a lack of
coordination between U.S. government
agencies, no clear ownership of the
disinformation problem, and a lack of clear
guidelines on public-private partnerships.

2. OUR TEAM
Andrea Collins
CS + M.S. MS&E
Keely Podosin
STS
Jackson Richter
Pub Pol + MPP
Mohamed Mohsen
Econ + M.S. MS&E
Andrew
Gerges
Econ & IR
Shreyas
Lakhtakia
M.S. MS&E

3. We walked in with a tech hammer, and all we
could think was… where are the nails?
Disinformation is a tech problem
1
The U.S. government can’t do much
to monitor disinformation because of
slow tech adoption
2
Tech companies and algorithms are
the best hope to solving this
disinformation problem
3

4. 26 Conversations with leaders changed our
minds
Total Interviews: 26 Total Interviews Requested: 63

5. In 10 weeks, we narrowed the problem,
structured it, pivoted twice, and got to the root
Tech can solve
“disinformation”
WEEK
EMOTIONAL STATE
0 - 2 3 - 4 5 - 6 7 - 8 9 - 10
Tech platforms
are the
problem
This is a Russian
doll of a problem
The US solved this
problem before
Our poor response
results from a lack
of ownership and
coordination
Pivot #1: Need
for US govt.
involvement
Pivot #2: Need for clear ownership in
US govt. + better coordination
😎
😏
😳
😶
🌫
️
😫

6. Work with Private
Companies
What are they doing?
Why?
Disinformation
Misinformation?
What type of
disinformation?
Early project time was spent boiling the ocean
National
Security Threat
What makes it a
threat?
Domestic vs.
Foreign
Disinformation
If foreign, which
countries
specifically?
Weeks 1-2
Mental state: 😶
🌫️

7. China Russia Other
Actors CCP, Chinese diplomats Russian gov’t + citizens {bots}
Messaging “Golden China” message,
propaganda +
COVID-19 disinfo
“Broken, divided America”
message, Election disinfo
Targets Chinese-Americans,
Chinese expats
Political Activists
Platforms Social media and the web:
Twitter, WeChat, TikTok
Social media and the web:
Twitter, Facebook, Youtube
Foreign actors have different approaches to
disinformation, but they all rely on tech platforms

8. BIG IDEA #1
Tech platforms are the common thread across
various foreign powers enabling spread of
disinformation

9. We assumed platforms didn’t care about
disinformation and didn’t make it a priority BUT
1. Platforms actually care about addressing disinformation
2. Platforms don't collaborate on disinformation strategies
3. Platforms don’t know what’s expected of them
Weeks 3-5 Mental state: ️

10. BIG IDEA: Tech companies are working in the dark
without collaboration with the U.S. government
or other tech companies.
“We don't have any communication with
other tech platforms, even though we're all
part of the disinformation supply chain.”
- Google PM

11. Spread of disinformation can be broken down
Lie created
1
Algorithms amplify reach
3
Users exposed to disinfo
4
Lie placed on platform X
2
Users buy into lies
5

12. Different factors drive each stage of the
disinformation supply chain
Lies created with specific
intent, fabricated to play into
psychology
Eg. China spreads
disinformation with the goal of
increasing acceptance of
Chinese cultural and economic
norms in the Asian diaspora.
Lie created
1
Algorithms amplify reach
3
Users exposed to disinfo
4
Lie placed on platform X
2
Users buy into lies
5

13. The spread of disinformation can be amplified by
black-box algorithms in service of clickbait
Political economy of clickbait
It can be lucrative to post disinformation
because of ad revenue.
Tech companies create their
own individual standards
Ranking of disinformation through
black-box algorithms
Lie created
1
Algorithms amplify reach
3
Users exposed to disinfo
4
Lie placed on platform X
2
Users buy into lies
5

14. Disinformation targets existing social divides,
making lies easy to buy into
Disinformation created to hack
into people’s psychology, prey
on vulnerability to spread
Americans are susceptible; we
are not taught media literacy
(eg. Finnish education)
Lie created
1
Algorithms amplify reach
3
Users exposed to disinfo
4
Lie placed on platform X
2
Users buy into lies
5

15. BIG IDEA
There’s no single entity looking across
each layer of the problem, and
coordinating a response strategy for
maximum effectiveness

16. PIVOT!
Collaboration between tech
companies and the U.S. government
will be key to combating foreign
disinformation.
Weeks 3-5 Mental state: 😯

17. KEY LEARNING:
The US beat back
disinformation before
Weeks 6-7 Mental state: ️

18. ● The Nature of Lies
● Personalities of Leaders
● The Goals of Disinformation
● Roles and Risks to Partners, Allies
Parallels between today’s
disinformation and KGB/Cold War era
disinformation
1. Social media
a. Cheap and fast spread of
speech
2. The lack of response coordination
a. Active Measures Working Grp,
comprehensive response
… but there are a few key
differences in both the problem
and response:
Stage 3 Precursor: we have fought this war before

19. No one agency leads disinformation efforts, which
are scattered and rarely collaborative.
Department of
State
Global Engagement
Center, Active
Measures Working
Group (terminated)
Department of
Defense
Cyber
Command,
DARPA
Department of
Homeland
Security
Governance
Board
(terminated)
CIA, NSA and
others
Covert
FCC
(Limited only
to broadcast)
Tech Companies
Google, Meta,
Twitter,
Reddit,
Microsoft

20. BIG IDEA: US response is fragmented; agencies
collaborate ad hoc on disinformation with no
formal patterns of collaboration
"There’s no clear flowchart of where insights, issues, or
findings should go, so agency staffers end up just
reaching out to “buddies” or contacts in other agencies
- Former DHS staffer
Week 7 Mental state: ️

21. PIVOT!
NEW PROBLEM STATEMENT
A lack of interagency linkages and clear
problem-level ownership within the U.S.
government's disinformation response hinders it
from closing the kill chain.
Week 8 Mental state: ️

22. Solution: A national strategy with a
clear owner and mandate to align U.S.
government agencies and private
sector actors
Week 9 Mental state: ️

23. The national strategy should have an owner,
formal inter-agency collaboration, and public-
private collaboration
1. Designate an owner for the problem
a. Draw inspiration from the Active Measures Working Group
b. Give it a mandate that explicitly focuses on foreign disinformation
2. Build formal interagency linkages so that collaboration is easier
a. Create a clear organizational flow diagram of who oversees a given response
b. Create an interagency group to triage different trends and scenarios
3. Coordinate this response with social media companies
a. Cohesive and consistent response minimize the risk of being seen as partisan
b. Global Engagement Center can build strong relationships with tech companies to
coordinate responses across platforms

24. We propose a Disinformation Response Org Chart
with a clear owner and more formal links
DHS, CDC,
other
individual
agencies
Department
of Education
Intelligence
community
Diplomats
Active Measures
Working Group
Identify
Triage
Act
Global
Engagement
Center + tech
companies
Cyber
Command +
tech
companies

25. We have open questions about our proposal
1. What are the tradeoffs of housing the Active Measures Working Group 2.0
in State vs Defense?
2. The US currently responds/retaliates to a very small proportion of
disinformation. What does proportional response even mean?
3. How can we include a long-term plan for dealing with this problem by
reforming education policy?
Week 10 Mental state: 😌

26. Questions?
Mental state: ️

27. Fin