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Introduction to the DOD 101 workshop - narrative H$D Stanford 2016

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stanford, H4D, Hacking for Defense, Pete Newell, Joe Felter, Jackie Space, agile, Lean, Mission Model Canvas, DOD,

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Introduction to the DOD 101 workshop - narrative H$D Stanford 2016

  1. 1. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 1 of 20 Hacking for Defense @ Stanford DOD/IC 101 Workshop Read this narrative along with the slides at http://www.slideshare.net/sblank/h4d-dod-101-workshop-040516 Slides 1 -11 Joe Felter: In the spirit of doing more work than any of your other classes, it's 7pm and its not a scheduled class session and you're all here. We appreciate all of you attending and we’ll not waste your time. I'm going to give you a little background, and a few vignettes and context to help frame and understand the nature of the contemporary and emerging challenges we are facing. This is a brave new world and a threat environment unlike those we have faced in previous decades. I’d like to describe the complexities and challenges of this environment to help you get you motivated to address the problems your teams are taking on. Next, Pete Newell is going to give you some background on where our DOD and IC problems come from. And our guest, Jackie Space is going to talk to us about some of the practical applications of the acquisition process and the challenges and opportunities it presents. (Slide 2) This is a scene from West Point in 1963. You may recognize the speaker, Douglas MacArthur, just before he passed away. This is his famous duty honor country speech. …the “big idea”- to use Steve Blank’s vernacular - from this speech was that, “the mission of West Point cadets and the entire DOD is to win our nation's wars”. How do we do this? Think about the types of wars that General MacArthur was thinking of when he said "Our mission is to win our wars." (Slide 3) Back in his day, wars were not easy but much simpler to understand how to fight. When a state was attacked, they knew the source of the attack and it was usually another nation state with the capacity to project power. For example, consider the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. We knew who attacked us and in general terms how to respond. The US mobilized its resources and industrial base, raised powerful military forces and projected power - directing it at a defined enemy and the enemies industrial base. In conventional state-on-state warfare, the operational and tactical level activities that support a strategy to win are often clear. You mass fire power on objectives. You destroy the enemy’s military and industrial capabilities and seize terrain. All those things are missions that the military can get their head around. Conventional wars against well defined enemies are not easy but are simple to appreciate what it takes to win them.
  2. 2. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 2 of 20 (Slide 4) If you fight these wars effectively you eventually win. In MacArthur’s time we actually defeated our enemies, drove them to unconditional surrender. We had victory parades- kissed the nurse, went home and demobilized. The US and their allies’ back- to-back world war champions. …We're the winning team. It was good to be king then, right? We used to win our wars, and we knew how do it. We not only won conventional wars like WWI and WWII, we were pretty good at winning low-intensity conflicts, unconventional wars, limited wars. There's no low-intensity conflict when you're at the other end of an AK47, trust me, but we were even good at leveraging our technology and our capabilities to win low-intensity conflicts and small wars. We were dominant, but today's it's something that's changed. (Slide 5) This is a picture at the tail end of the cold war. It’s taken in December 1989 in Operation Just Cause in Panama where we were conducting a night combat airborne assault into Panama and ultimately seized former Panamanian President Manuel Noriega. Pete Newell and I were both junior officers, I was with the 3d Ranger Battalion, Pete was in the 82nd Airborne division. We knew the mission was dangerous. We were parachuting in in the middle of the night to hostile territory under fire. We were not cocky, but we had a certain level of confidence going in to the mission. We were the winning team - nobody could stand up to our powerful military. We had aircraft carriers and ICBMs, but we also had a pretty good tech when it comes down to the small unit, the individual level technology. Let me tell you about some of the technology we had back then. (Jokingly) It's going to just blow you away - nobody but the US and other powerful states’ militaries had access to this level of tech. We had night vision goggles you could put on your head and you could see in the dark. No kidding. See at night! It was phenomenal. We landed on the airfield, people are shooting at you, they don't know where we are but they're spraying trying to hit people, we could see them. We had night vision scopes on some of our rifles. We could put a crosshair on the white T-shirts they were wearing. It is “good to be the king” and have access to these game changing technologies. Before we went in we had overhead images from satellites taking pictures of the earth and giving us maps so we knew how to plan, and knew where our objectives were. These images obtained from national assets were so sensitive that the satellite imagery was classified material. I remember tying my imagery with parachute cord onto my cargo pocket because if you lost it, it was losing a sensitive item and I would be subject to an investigation.
  3. 3. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 3 of 20 I literally was jumping out of a C-130 at 450 feet which was pretty low. Getting shot at. My map rips out of my pocket. All I can think of is, “oh my God I'm in big trouble because I just lost my overhead imagery,” which is pretty sensitive stuff. At the same time we also had satellites up in orbit triangulating to tell us within 10 meters of accuracy where we were standing. GPS. It was crazy. We had communications, where every individual soldier in my platoon could talk to each other. I mean little tiny radios that could talk to each other. These little pens that could shoot a laser to direct fire and maneuver. Never before in the history of warfare has an organization been able to direct its operations and fire and maneuver with that kind of technology. And all of this cost thousands and thousands and thousands of dollars, really expensive stuff that few other states if any could afford to deploy. There’s a saying that, “the strong do what they want to do and the weak do what they have to do.” We're one of the strong states. What do strong states like the United States care about? Who do they worry about? Other strong states, right? So who was bigger than the U.S. back then? But this was the end of an era. This is 1989, the cold war was about over. In some ways, despite the nuclear menace, those seem in retrospect like the good old days. When it was good to be king – where power and resources translated almost directly in to battlefield dominance. What's changed? Who are these folks? (slide 6) I was joking about the advanced technology we had in 1989. Today with a credit card and Internet connection and you can get any one of those things described as game changing advantages for us when Pete and I jumped in to Panama for a $100. Night vision goggles are cheap and available, Google Maps with images of almost any part of the planet are online, you can just get that and download it. All of this was formerly only in the hands of the very strongest states, the very strongest super powers. The following slides highlight just a few examples of how the proliferation and diffusion of technology changes the face of the battlefield today and why this matters. Let's look at some examples of the asymmetries that groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda and other groups take advantage of to do us harm.
  4. 4. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 4 of 20 (Slide 7) ISIS is able to use overhead imagery and drone surveillance to plan and execute their operations. It's not so hard to do, they've got their own drones. They're using this against us. This is an example of technology that's now in the hands of our adversaries that formerly was only in the hands of the strongest states like the United States. (Slide 8) Terrorists and other nation states are using social media against us. I remember going to SERE school as a special forces officer candidate. We were trained to develop a cover story to hide our identify if captured. This was a whole convincing cover story that you give so you don't get found out. Today, if you Google me or call up my Facebook page it would be pretty clear who I was and my background. (Slide 9) Imagine what our our enemies can do with readily available technology like 3D printing? The instructions for making the semi-automatic rifle in this photo are available online. (Slide 10) Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure. Think about how the internet and social media have changed the ability to recruit, to train, to radicalize, motivate and inspire our enemies. It's just unbelievable what this technology is doing to empower our groups intent on doing us harm. One of the big advantages of being a strong superpower-like state was that you got to project power. Now anyone sitting anywhere in the world can project power … so now the ability to project power is not only the purview of strong states and superpowers, it's kids who are just logging on and they're able to attack us from afar, with cyber threats. (Slide 11) Back to MacArthur. … when he told the West Point Corps of Cadets in 1963 that their mission was to win our he was talking about defeating strong states which were our biggest threats at the time. Think about what the threats are now. International relations theory states that said, strong states need to be most
  5. 5. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 5 of 20 concerned by threats posed by other strong states, has been turned on its head. Today, weak states, sub-state actors, even individuals are now empowered through increasingly available technology to do us harm. Addressing these emerging and lethal threats is now also required to “win our wars”,- this is definitely a different kind of threat environment that we're in. So what do we do about it? How do we win our wars going forward? At a minimum we need to stack the deck again in our favor. We used to be back-to-back world war champs, able to mobilize our resources effectively and take it to our enemies. Well I would argue that in many ways we're not doing well in todays changed threat environment. Not only do we need to stack the deck in our favor, in some cases we are at a disadvantage and just need to level the playing field. Ironically we aren't there yet. We've got to continue to defend against high-intensity threats. This isn't just a war against ISIS and terrorism, we've got a resurgent China, pushing us in the South China Sea. We have to basically defend on both fronts. ISIS doesn't have federal acquisition regulations; in Steve Blank’s definition ISIS is a Lean Organization. They are pivoting, learning and adapting and they rapidly react to evolving threat environments. This is a tough adversary - an adaptive enemy. This is a threat environment where our adversaries have access to technologies and they're able to adapt, to overcome, and improvise and pivot and deploy that technology in ways that are way ahead of us. I’m trying to emphasize that this is a different type of threat environment, different type of adversaries. The formerly linear relationship between state power and military effectiveness has forever changed. States don’t automatically generate the power predicted by their resources – choices matter. Some of the advantages that we enjoyed back in the day when we were “back-to-back world war champs” don't really apply today. The stakes are high and we're losing ground on many fronts. We need to do something about it. You can help. Pete Newell is going to give you the background of how we develop our requirements, where our missions come from and then our guest Jackie Space is going to talk about some of the challenges and opportunity of the acquisition process. Slides 12-29 Pete Newell Obviously, things have changed over the years. The environment has changed, our country has changed, the economy has changed. Each of your teams has a problem that was generated by a government sponsor for a reason. The rest of the discussion tonight is peeling back the layers to figure out what that reason is, where that problem might have come from and who else shares that problem.
  6. 6. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 6 of 20 To begin the search you must understand how our National Strategies are built and how they come together to drive this massive organization called the Department of Defense. What we're going to try and do here is fast as we possibly can, is give you a one over the world of how strategy and funding effect how things are bought. (Slides 13-15) On this first slide is a big, complicated chart that would take me 30 years to explain to you. So we're not going to do that. We'll cut it down from 2000 slides to about 15. Here's the chart. This is the defense acquisition system. Way up there in the upper left hand corner, is where the requirements for military systems come from and what gets things started. To make it simple if you start on the top left you have the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System, (JCIDS). JCIDS is how we handle the collision between two many requirements and not enough money. We're going to split this talk. I'm going to take care of the tanks and airplane side of this and then we're going to hand it off to Jackie Space and she's going to talk through the islands of innovation where a lot of these rules don't apply, or they've condensed them into much tighter acquisition cycles. Looking at the red boxes at the top of the chart I’ve highlighted the key activities you need to understand, beginning with how requirements are developed. Next we develop prototypes. Then we figure how we're going to produce something. Then we figure out how we're going to sustain it. That's kind of the life cycle of the acquisition system. It's not real complicated until you dig in to who does what to who and how and when they make decisions. For the purposes of this class what is in the red boxes at top of the slide are the things we've got to keep in mind. (Slides 16-17) Here's what you've really got to remember, there are three key activities that take place. In the bottom left corner of this slide is the planning, programming, and budget execution work - no different than any major corporation out there. You have to figure out what funds are coming in and where you're going to prioritize and send those funds out to. This is largely driven by a process of strategy documents that we'll talk through in just a second. To the right in yellow is JCIDS, the system used to develop requirements. Finally, in red at the top of the slide is the acquisition process of how we buy things to fill the gaps that were identified in original documents. Jackie Space: Do the people in the audience know what we mean by requirements? Basically requirements are what are used to build a system, it’s the technical parameters by which the system is being built. So there is a whole process of people that develop the
  7. 7. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 7 of 20 requirements and the cost requirements, the technical requirements around what system is actually being built. Joe Felter: For example, defending against dismounted IEDs (roadside bombs) in Afghanistan versus the IED threat in Iraq, which were against vehicles. The lag time that it took for the military to address the dismounted IEDs threat in Afghanistan caused thousands of casualties. Pete made that a very poignant point last week. Pete Newell: (Slide 18) All right so here we go. Let's start with the strategy documents. The strategy document that starts it all is the National Security Strategy (NSS). This is a document that the President of the United States produces that lays out America's enduring interests, not just militarily but also economically, and socially. The NSS lists four things that are considered to be our enduring interests. 1. The security of the United States, its citizens, and US allies and partners. 2. A strong innovative and growing US economy. 3. An open international economic system that can produce opportunity for prosperity, respect for universal values at home and around the world, and 4. An international order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through cooperation to meet global challenges. (Slide 19) The Secretary of Defense uses the NSS as a basis for issuing his strategy. The Department of Defense calls it the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS takes the President’s National Security Strategy, looks at it from a defense perspective, and says here are the things that we need do that meet those Presidential objectives. The current NDS includes things like counter-terrorism, irregular warfare, defer and defeat aggression, project power, counter weapons of mass destruction, provide a stabilizing presence, conduct stability, and counter insurgent operations, and humanitarian disaster relief and other operations. There's a bunch more in there but broadly it details what the Department of Defense is going to do to meet the President's National Security Strategy. (Slide 20) Then comes the quadrennial defense review (QDR). It’s done every four years. You notice the dates of these are out of sync, because several years goes between each one of them. So one document may be issued in 2015 but we're still operating off one from 2012 another one from 2013 and one
  8. 8. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 8 of 20 more. The quadrennial defense review is really the document that starts to take those strategies and look at them in terms of what can we really afford. The QDR describes what are we really going to do in order to meet the President’s and the Secretary of Defense’s requirements. The document has some very broad statements like, “Protect the homeland” and “Deter and defeat attacks on the United States,” “Build security globally to preserve regional stability.” “Project power and win decisively and defeat aggression.” But underneath there's a nice line that says "At the President's budget level the military will be able to defend the homeland, conduct sustained distributed counter terrorist operations, and deter aggression and assure allied in multiple regions before presence and engagement." You know what it doesn't say anymore? That we're going to fight and win two wars simultaneously. Seriously. At the President's budget level, which means the President's already told him here's what we're going to pay for in terms of defense this year, they determine that these are the best that they can do to meet the key objectives that were set up by the National Defense Strategy in order to meet the President's National Security Strategy. I think you're starting to see the where the gaps might start to appear. As we change one word in one line in the QDR and suddenly the Strategy documents mean something radically different. Are we buying tanks now? Or are we doing more humanitarian operations? More aircraft carriers or more airplanes? Depending on where you sit in that big system it can very rapidly change based on how you perceive the best answer to those problems. What the three documents end up giving us, and what falls out of it, is called the Defense Planning Guides. It really is how we develop the budgets that drive the organization of the military and eventually the activities of these agencies. (Slide 21) In the U.S we have four Military Services: the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. (The Coast Guard gets to act like the fifth service but they actually belong to another government agency.) The military services are responsible for providing people and equipment to combatant commanders. It's their job to raise the army, navy, air force and marines. It's their job to train and equip them. It’s their job to provide trained equipped ready forces to combatant commanders who are the guys out here who actually fight the wars. In between the Military Services we have a number of Defense Agencies. The easy way to know if your talking about an agency is the last word in their name says agency. It's things like the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency. There's only agency who doesn't have the word agency is their name is the National Reconnaissance Office. For some reason they got to be different than everybody else.
  9. 9. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 9 of 20 The agencies out there all have consolidated portfolios of activities that they do at the behest of the rest of the government for DOD, but they're also strategic force providers for the combatant commanders. I'll show you a couple of slides that actually makes this a little easier to understand. Finally, we have a bunch of DOD field activities. It's interesting what shows up as field activities. For example, Washington Headquarters Services is responsible for the military installations of Washington DC. Another example of a field activity is the Defense POW mission personnel office. 60 some odd years after the end of the Korean war we are still looking for persons missing in action or remains that were never recovered. We still have an activity that actually goes to Vietnam, Laos and some other places looking for the remains of service members who never came home. There are lots of other small activities that don't neatly fit anywhere within someplace on that chart up there. Student: I noticed that the Central Intelligence Agency is not on there. Why? Pete Newell: The Central Intelligence Agency is not a DOD activity or agency. Although, I'll talk a bit later about how some of the other government agencies actually have interest that are embedded in DOD. As a deployed brigade commander in Iraq in southern Iraq in 2010 I had members of the CIA, DIA, the NSA, the FBI, the secret service, all who were part of my organization or part of my footprint that I was responsible for ensuring that they could do whatever the government sent them there to actually get done. Student: When there's a group that's made up of DOD personnel and say CIA personnel, how does that work in terms of coordination? Pete Newell: There are first a series of standing inter-agency agreements that account for cross-agency activities. Then there are a series of contingency plans that are a reaction to something, that automatically enact. One example is what happened on 9/11. On 9/11 little known to anybody there was a 1960’s agreement that allows the United States Air Force to take control of all of the air space in the United States. About 30 minutes after the plane hit the second tower, there was a young watch officer at NORAD, which is in Colorado, who reads a one-line sentence over the phone one line sentence. "We at NORAD are enacting ... " and what you heard on the phone was dead silence while people were focused on figuring out what he was talking about. The first guy on the phone is a guy from the FAA who says "So if I understand this right you want us to turn off all the navigational aids in the United States." There was a pregnant pause and this guy's flipping through the book, and says "No I want you to do X, Y, and Z." In some cases these are agreements and rules go back years. In this case there was a staff and decision makers who zeroed in on that regulation who understands what's supposed to happen.
  10. 10. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 10 of 20 Student: To what extent is the structure here embraced by personnel within DOD? Like how easy would it work this time? Pete Newell: What you have to understand is every time an agency gets their name up here on this chart, they have a budget that comes with it from Congress. It takes almost an act of Congress to change one of those things. If you're a new organization and you want to become an official agency, it takes an act of Congress to get your name up here. From a structural context the last major change that was made was based on the Goldwater- Nichols Act that mandated the formation of combat commanders and a number of other things. It changes from time to time, but not frequently. (Slides 22-24) As I mentioned, the services – the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines job is to provide people and equipment to the combatant commanders who are responsible for the world. On the bottom of this chart are the combatant commands. The African Command (AFRICOM) is a command responsible for 53 African countries. The Central Command (CENTCOM) is responsible for the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. They are also responsible for prosecuting one war in Iraq, one in Afghanistan, and also dealing with pirates outside of Yemen. The combatant commanders get all the bad stuff that goes on in the world. To help deal with the world they get people, equipment, assets from all of these Services, and from all of those agencies that listed on the previous slide. Based on their missions they have a series of contingency plans that are developed in response to the strategies, that say, “if this happens we apportion these kinds of forces to you.” Each one of those things also comes with a budget. And the budget come with specific “types of money” called “titles of money.” Title X money belongs to the services. For instances, as the Director of the Army's Rapid Equipping Force, I had a $200 million budget which was title X money. I'll give you a scenario. In Afghanistan, if a Marine element working as part of an Army organization came to us and said “hey we're having a problem and we need to find a solution for,” I couldn't do it. I couldn't give it to them because I couldn't spend title 10 money directed to the Army by Congress to provide equipment to the Marines. However, I could provide that equipment to the Army element that controlled them, who could then assign it down to them. There are titles of money directed at Reserves and National Guard forces strictly for their use in the United States. There are titles of money for combatant commanders. There is a different title of money that's directed to them for their contingency operations to do things and then there's all kinds of colors of money related on what activities they place in the say of things. We’ll come back to talk about the “colors of money” in Slide 27.
  11. 11. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 11 of 20 The key takeaway here is the world's broken up into regions, that are run by combatant commands. And it’s these combatant commands start to identify gaps based on their operations. For example, In Central command, the Army and Department of Defense felt that getting MRAPS into Iraq would save soldiers in Humvees from getting blown up by IEDs. MRAPs were the best thing since sliced butter, but they were as big as an elephant, armored but saved lots of lives. We moved to Afghanistan and MRAPS there were like driving in quicksand. Very shortly afterward the CENTCOM Commander was telling the Department of Defense is the MRAPs they were providing in Afghanistan were inadequate to meet the conditions of the environment and that created a gap. (Slide 25) That gap then, leads us back to that JCIDS process I mentioned on the initial slide. In JCIDs a gap is assigned a priority for somebody then to go figure out how to solve it. That solution then turns into a requirement. The solution in this case was adifferent kind of armored vehicle which were a smaller version of the MRAP. They were lighter, could handle the sand a little better. Here we go. Gaps, not requirements, gaps. Those top three the competition with what these guys say they have to do in order to actually achieve something. So lets take one of the teams in class here, distributed ISR. Is it a gap or a requirement? Student: It is a gap, Pete Newell: Who's gap is it? Student: The gap is lack of a capability to rapidly, to have eyes on most of the domain the 7th Fleet is supposed to be keeping track of, and simultaneously be able to deploy something quickly to, if they wanted to see something rapidly. Pete Newell: Correct. If I'm responsible for hunting Russian nuclear submarines in the Pacific and I can't find them because the ocean's too big, it's a gap. If I am responsible for securing the high speed access to the western coast from drug and illegal people immigration, those kinds of things, that's a gap. Which combatant command is it? It’s PACOM where 7th Fleet is assigned as a Navy component to the command. We'll walk through a little bit, but you can see where from multiple perspectives the same gap may produce different requirements. The gap is still the center, we can't manage to do X, Y, or Z. (Slide 26) Obviously there is friction there. I'll tell you this happens a lot. These guys get a budget and they plan on a five-year cycle. I started building a tank in year 1, we're coming up with a solution
  12. 12. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 12 of 20 that I'm still deploying in year 5. However, in Year 2, the combatant commander comes in and says whatever you were building doesn't solve my problem any more. The guy up at the top says, well if you want me to start over it's going to be another five years before I get your solution to you. In some cases the combatant commands will use their money to actually procure material solutions that fill immediate gaps. When they're done with the material, or when it gets really expensive to maintain, they'll look at the service, because they have all the authorities to maintain that stuff, and say here you go I need the maintenance package that goes with this stuff. There's friction between the two over how they solve those kinds of problems. When it happens it can be really ugly. Student: 8 problems were chosen for the teams in this room to work on. Were any of them requirements, or were they all gaps? Pete Newell: None of them are full-fledged requirements. A lot of people misuse the terminology. I have a “requirement” to fix this problem. The only way you get a requirement is to come out the bottom end of this massive chart up here. We very specifically told our sponsors not to give us requirements. Your gap came from the part of the chart up here under joint operating concepts. Eventually gaps turn into JCIDS recommendations that say we're going buy a tank that requires three people that has to be trained and sustained, and a long list of things that goes with it. Eventually that comes out a list of requirements. Once it comes out as a real requirement it's very, very hard to change because you have to go back through the entire process. In our case, for this class we very specifically vetted some of the problems to ensure that they were more on the gap side, that they hadn't determined what the requirement was going to be and it wasn't well within that process. All of the problems for this class fall within recognized gaps that are out there … Student: What's the authority that certifies that a requirement has been met? For instance, if I have a requirement that's out there and I'd like to be a little bit flexible with it. Who certifies that yes the requirement is met and the way that it's met? Pete Newell: I'll give you the book answer and then I'll tell you the politics. At one time they set a standard for measuring battery usage: 9 people operating for 72 hours away from the base. This makes sense. 72 hours means we carry a lot of weight, a lot of water, food and a lot of batteries. At the time depending upon what mission we were performing in Afghanistan those my guys had to distribute 247 pounds of batteries to operate for 72 hours. The first standard that is set is not really a standard for the requirements. it used for the standard for the measurement of performing effectively for 72 hours. So the first guy says why is it 72 hours and not 120 hours. Nuclear power guys who have it in their heads that they want to deploy small nuclear devices to power this. You know what those nuke dudes
  13. 13. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 13 of 20 have? They have a really good powerful lobbyist. That caused a debate for 18 months over the capabilities manager and the other guys who said 72 hours is standard. They had to go back over 10 years worth of documents to articulate why the standard was 72 not 120 or 24, or something else. Because as soon as you open a can of worms everybody comes in and says well my solution would be perfect if it was 24 hours. But if it's 36 then I'm useless. I've got a lobbyist, I'm going to attack the system to try and get the standard changed. People play a lot of games when it comes to who determines the requirement. Within the Army, the Training and Doctrine Command is responsible for actually training people and determining how many pieces of equipment we need to perform a mission is responsible for writing the initial requirement document. That document then goes to the Pentagon where it goes through a series of boards. The boards then decide that yes is it a valid requirement written correctly, the parameters fit within our priorities, it doesn't violate the law, etc. I can't tell you how many of those boards there are. Eventually it comes out the other end and poof we have a requirement. It depends on what you're touching and how many different complexities there are to it, but if you listen carefully you'll start to hear vendors and other people who have things to sell starting to talk about how their thing does better than something else. They'll start quoting numbers. I've done it with sensors. I'm actually working on a vehicle at one point at Georgia Tech Research Institute validating the sensors placed inside striker vehicles to provide data logging against IED blasts. We wanted to know what happened inside the vehicle. We came up with a set of parameters for that sensor. It was a pounds per square inch reading that it had to withstand. Literally I had a vendor start a Congressional investigation over why it was 10 pounds and not 8 pounds - because it meant his versus another vendor’s sensor. You run into those things all the time. Which is why sometimes somebody is willing to say exactly what it is because as soon as you said it, and you can't retract it. I know that's a long answer but I just want to tell you it's not simple. Student: for a program like space-based radar, led by Air Force, do they consider the needs of other agencies and take requirements from those people? Pete Newell: If they're smart they will. They'll not only consider what those other people need, they'll consider what those people are already doing. If you want to be successful you avoid duplicating something else. Student: Who was the main sponsor of this class? I was just wondering what's their expectation from the outcome of the class. … Pete Newell: Do you mean, “What's the gap that this class meets?” It’s the Lack of DOD/IC innovation. There is a lack of opportunity for young technologist to perform a national public service. There is a massive gap between the military and the civilians that they're charged with protecting. A shrinking military in a very complex world where technology is blowing past them at light speed who has no access to the intellect that you have on a
  14. 14. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 14 of 20 recurring basis. Those are all gaps. Nobody's written a requirement, although they're talking all over the place about how do you deal with those issues. For folks like us that recognize that there's a gap our hope is that we can step in and prototype something to help validate that the gap is real and that there maybe a potential pathway to solving it. This class is exactly what's going to happen. We'll prototype it. It's a pilot. It's going to grow. Somebody in the government is going to decide to put a whole lot of money in it, you know $20-$30 million a year to ensure that it grows into another 30 colleges across the country. Somebody else from another agency says that's really cool I want to connect my program to it. And eventually we'll be at the sustainment mode. … Student: We spoke with some folks from a big system integrator who said said that part of the reason why the sensors are so expensive and hard to deploy is because we have to source everything through the US facilities and assemble in secure facilities, and so on and so forth. If our solution goes down this pipeline, at what point might we be expect for someone to say hey we need to source everything in the US. Jackie Space: You are too early in the process to judge where you need to source it. Because they have to go through the traditional defense industrial base for the most part its true. But I think that there are certainly sensors or other technologies potentially that are being built on the outside. Eventually at some point, if you're going to continue development on something big you will have to consider that. Student: …I guess you're saying in commercial sites their tolerance for sensor error are a lot higher because they're not used to approaching it from the ‘hey we can fix this area.’ They need to have a much lower error. … Pete Newell: I would say there's a fundamental difference when you apply them with public mind that has to be accounted for to the nth level. My experience in dealing with these folks, and it's not because they're bad people but the system creates bad behaviors. It dis-incents people to take risk. Not only are they not rewarded for accepting risk and failing but they're actually punished for not being perfect. So in the goal of trying to perfectly acquire something we tend to fail bigger, more frequently than we would otherwise. Part of the beauty of what Steve Blank has done with Lean LaunchPad is essentially build a framework by which, with a little bit of translating, we've been able to provide a strategy by which we can fail in this system much earlier and much less expensively. At least that's our hypothesis. That's where we're at today. … Jackie Space: There are places in the government that are always going to remain military grade. The billion-dollar satellite that they launch that enables somebody to read a license plate? That's going to stay a military grade system, but there's this awareness now in the military and government that there's a lot of other things out there that are good enough, with a much lower resolution that you can find the private industry.
  15. 15. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 15 of 20 (Slide 27) Pete Newell: One of the things that you have to understand is money has different colors. There's different types of money to say what it was used for. Believe it or not the Department of Defense caused itself this problem. It doesn't have to be this way. If Congress would quite honestly change it if DOD said “we want to change it.” But here's what happens. Operations money is essentially one-year money that is used for everything from buying toilet paper in a barracks to paying for gas for vehicles or for buying things that cost less than $250,000 per item. I can buy something for $200,000, even if it's a piece of equipment, using operational dollars. The problem that you run into with operational money though is on the 30th of September it goes away. It doesn't go back into the government's bank, it doesn't go back into some magic bag to pull out later. It is gone. Disappeared. If you are working on a problem and a guy suddenly shows up in July and says I've got a million dollars I can spend it today, what can I get. My guess is he's probably using end of year money and he's in a panic because he knows it disappears the 30th of September. Here is what happens. The folks in the Pentagon who manage a massive budget say on the 30th of August if you have money left in your account subordinate to us we're taking it all and we're going to spend it on our un-forecasted requirements. So the next layer down, they say “if you have money left in your budget on the 30th of July we're taking it all for our use. On it goes until you have the poor guy, who on the 1st of April, is in a panic because he hasn't spent his money yet. Jackie Space: If you don't spend your money you get your budget slashed the next year. They say oh you didn't spend your money. … another point on these colors of money is that if you have a project that you're working on you should be asking beneficiaries what type of money are you working with. How you end up putting your proposal and projects together can actually fit in all three of those depending on how you write it. Really having an understanding beforehand of what type of money you're working with is very important Pete Newell: Here are the questions you start to ask so you can figure out where they are. First, procurement dollars. I will tell you procurement is not my expertise. I probably violated more rules than not. Procurement process was designed to buy much larger things. That's how we buy tanks. That's how we buy sustainment. The life cycle cost of putting something out there. Unfortunately, you can't use procurement dollars to buy toilet paper or anything like that. So it’s designed to buy major items. It does last for three years. Which means that we're in the middle of 2016 so at the end of September 2016, 2014 procurement money is going to expire. Why is that important to know. If somebody's telling you “hey come do this for us we've got $3 million,” You might want to ask what the expiration year is. Because if something's dragging along and you're
  16. 16. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 16 of 20 about to hit the 30th of September, and you don't know if the contract is going to be signed yet, if it's expiring money you're not going any further. Jackie Space: The smart money manager will have his money spent by July 1st just to avoid losing it or his contracts. A lot of people don't, so another smart manager knows how to go around get money to use in their program from people that can't get their money spent. One of the questions when you're talking to your program sponsor, especially program managers, is how do you handle your end of year budget. You want to know if they are good at planning money at end of year to support your programs. Pete Newell: I'm going to hit the last one, RDT&E money, research, development, testing and evaluation money. With this money you can build prototypes, you can test, etc. Most of you working on your solutions would likely first touch RDT&E money. There are special cases of money starting with purple money which means they can do whatever they want with it. In some of these cases organizations have been given special authorities to allow them to essentially break all the rules. The problem sometimes though is when you're given special authorities you also get special oversight. Those organizations are probably the most scrutinized organizations out there in terms of Congressional oversight. Not that they're going to do something wrong but because Congressmen want to know that that money's being spent where they think it's being spent. The Secretary of Defense has a Rapid Acquisition Authority (RAA). When I was with the Rapid Equipping Force, the Secretary of Defense could authorize the up to $200 million a year in RAA that would allow us to change the way money was used. To use that authority we would simply write a memo that says we are going to use RDT&E money to buy gas or something like that and staff it through the Secretary. If he approved the request we were able to do what we needed to. It wasn’t easy but it wasn’t hard either. It was fairly quick but it also required Congressional notification because we were doing something other than what Congress directed with the money. The following type of money is one you have to pay attention to. Overseas Contingency Operating money. This is the thing they slap on top of the budget every year because we keep having conflicts someplace that weren’t planned for as part of the budget. What you have to know about OCO is that if you're working on something and somebody's offering you OCO money to do something, what you're doing has to be focused on solving a gap overseas. You can't use OCO dollars everywhere, because right now I think OCO is still limited to CENTCOM which means that we can't solve the distributed ISR problem in PACOM using these dollars - even if that's all we have at our disposal. The last thing you ought to pay attention to, continual resolutions (CR’s). For example, if we're not going to pass a defense budget in September because Congress wants to see what how the election turns out first, we will likely end up with a continuing resulution to fund the DoD. What happens with a continuing resolution is that the budget folks will say “you are not allowed to program spending more than 65% of last year's budget.” That poor guy who's supposed to spend all his money by April or if it’s already taken away, is now told
  17. 17. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 17 of 20 you've got to stretch 65% of your budget to last all year. When the budgets finally passed in January, what happens? He suddenly has this massive (influx) of cash and he's got how long to spend it? Two months. Which means he has to figure out what he's going to buy, he has to contract it, he has to do everything in a very short period of time. Student: So they literally cannot spend 35% of that budget on anything over this period? … Pete Newell: No, in fact they have to turn in a budget that does not exceed 65% of the previous year’s budget and show how that will cover them for the entire year. Once there is a Defense budget passed, they have to submit a whole new budget. This means they're always playing with two budgets. This is sometimes what causes expensive programs to triple in expense. Failure of politicians to do their job is one of the biggest expenses we have. (Slide 28) Let’s go back to the mission model canvas; Value propositions, buy in, advocates … according to who? There are a lot of people out here who will tell you they fall in all three of these categories. On this slide is a list of folks you should look for. On it I've also left you some questions you ought to be asking whoever you are talking to. The first one is: • who are you? • Where do you fall in here? Beneficiary, advocate, are you both? • Are you from a service? Are you from a COCOM? • Where do you fit in this massive list of things? • What's your mission? • What are you supposed to do? What are you not supposed to do and not allowed? Make sure you've got that clear in your head, what are they supposed to do, what are they not supposed to do. Where'd your funding come from? What kinds do you have? What are you talking to me about? I would ask about types of contracts if it's appropriate. Finally, who do you work with? Then finally, who else do you know that has this problem that might be working this area? This what I call an asset inventory. Everybody you meet exists in an ecosystem. You're trying to figure out where they belong and how they connect. Here are 8 questions you can ask that will help you clarify where they are. The answers to those questions, or the way they answer them will allow you to figure out where they belong in your ecosystem of things that you might need eventually.
  18. 18. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 18 of 20 (Slide 29) Using one of our teams working on Distributed ISR as an example, the sponsor is the 7th Fleet. The 7th Fleet is part of the US Navy, however 7th Fleet is assigned to PACOM as the Navy component of the Pacific command. So who has the problem? Is it the Navy's problem or is it PACOMs problem? Or is it both? Might they have difference of opinion on how to solve that problem based on how expensive it is to train people and how many people it costs. Do you see where the friction might come from? You can be given conflicting guidance when you're talking to people, one side versus the other side. All these agencies who provide assets to PACOM, probably have some amount of equity in that problem. By equity we mean they have authority and they have budgets to take action against parts of the problem. They may also have five different opinions on the scope of the problem that are different than that of PACOM or 7th Fleet. Now, the CIA, the Coast Guard, other folks. Don’t you think that they might have a vested interest in how this is solved? Are they a user? Are they a capability provider? Are they an advocate? Are they trying to kill the effort? Other services. If the Navy component of PACOM says this is a problem rest assured there's an Army component, there's a Marine component, there's an Air Force component who all think it is as well, but for different reasons. Do you think they might have a vested interest in this? Finally, SOCOM is a combatant command, but SOCOM also provides folks to PACOM. So SOCOM has a vested interest in this right? Slide 28 is what you've got to pay a lot of attention to. Money, contract, strategy and all that other stuff, it's interesting but not necessarily going to help you for the next 8 weeks. Slide 28 will. Slides 30-36 Jackie Space: So Pete just talked about the acquisition system at large and I want to just drill down really quickly into the more practical aspects of what it means for your teams and the program sponsors that you're working with, the problem statements, and how it fits into this. Also for you're beneficiaries and how you should be talking to them as you're working through their problems. (Slide 31) Quickly about me, I'm a systems engineer by trade, I went to the Air Force Academy. I spent the majority of my career doing government acquisitions. I've worked very large programs like GPS and I've also worked very small programs in terms of getting things rapidly fielded into the field from a technology perspective.
  19. 19. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 19 of 20 (Slide 32) The purpose of this slide is to to convey to you that even though you're all working with different government organizations and they all fall under this big system of acquisitions. Every organization is quite different in culture and so when you're working with them you need to figure out, 1) do they move rapidly in how they do business, 2) how they develop technology, 3) how they field them. Are they focused on larger weapons systems and is it's going to be ten years before they actual develop and field capability. When I say rapid I mean like less than 2 years, versus 10-year time lines. Part of your work is to figure out where does your organization program sponsor reside in that time frame. (Slide 33-34) The whole acquisition process is designed to develop big programs - like the F35, ballistic missile defense, helicopters, - that sort of thing. All of this exists to be able to field big weapons programs. A lot of the friction ends up when we have requirements or when we have needs that emerge that don't fit into the time line. On slide 33 we've got the DARPA’s and the Air Force Research Lab and the other labs that exist in the government that are developing technology that will probably never ever leave the lab. Or in some cases it will take 10 years before it actually does anything. On this slide I put some of the organization that the teams in the class are working with to show where they fit in technology maturity and how they're different from both ends of it. If you look at two of the sponsors in this class, the Asymmetric Warfare Group and the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency, they operate differently. They're not concerned about weapon systems or developing things in support of those weapon systems. These guys are on a rapid time line and they want to field capabilities to user requirements in less than 2 years. All of the problem statements for teams in this class fit within this category. This is where the opportunities reside to actually make an impact because you have a shorter time line to fielding and delivery. Then you have other organizations like SOCOM, NSA, CIA, and the service components that play in all parts of the timeline. Even with the team that's working with SOCOM I would bet that they are more on this 2-year time line for fielding a solution. But that's something that you should be asking your program sponsors when you're working with them, “What is your traditional time line for fielding technologies?” (Slide 35) For entities outside of the traditional defense industrial base to engage (ie. Startups), it's really in the R&D area as well as prototype development. One caution, when you talk about government R&D, if you bring a capability you want the
  20. 20. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 20 of 20 government to give you money to help develop, you will eventually have to deal with IP issues. Because anytime the government gives you money to develop something, they now own it. In other cases where you have a capability that's more developed that you bring that to the government and demo it, that's when you can actually maintain the majority of your IP. (Slide 36) I want to talk more about the questions that you should be talking to your beneficiaries about. …Most of you have talked to the potential users of your system and you're getting feedback from them, which is really valuable. However, you need to find the program managers and/or the people that are actually executing a program that is either similar or has parts of the problem that you're dealing with. That’s because the program manager understands the time line it takes to field something, ie. What are all the things that they have to go through to actually bring on a capability like that? How do they engage with industry? How do they actually participate with people outside of their program? Finding that individual or set of individuals is really important will be really important for this class. In terms of the culture, I think it's incredibly important to as you're talking to your sponsors to ask the questions about the track record of their organization in actually getting something like your solution fielded? How long did it take? How many times have they actually attempted this particular technology set? Do you know who the mission partners around you that may be able to contribute to that? To get more information go to FedBizOpps.gov. FedBizOpps.gov is the main mechanism by which the government will post or solicit for industry feedback. They'll post their problems saying, we want a proposal or we want some information around this actual technology that we're looking at. If you go to FedBizOpps.gov and you type in a keyword around your particular problem, what comes up will be really interesting because you might find that there's five or six other organizations that are actually soliciting for the same technology. Thanks, Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space

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