HackingCT - Week 8 Anusha
Balakrishnan, Gloria Chua, Hyeryung Chloe Chung, Jianyang Lum, Vinaya Polamreddi Online communication networks play a huge role in spreading violent extremist propaganda, and these networks are exploited by terrorist groups to recruit fighters. Our goal is to bring together technology, government, and at-risk communities to combat extremist messaging in a bottom- up, community-driven fashion. # Interviews: 12 # Total: 90 Sponsor: CT/CVE Bureau Mentors: Andrew Moore, Tom Bedecarre
Customer Discovery Principles/Hypotheses Who we
talked to New things we learnt Former extremists are a credible source for at-risk individuals to listen to. Radicalization Awareness Network (EU), Oxford DPhil student ‘Formers’ perceived as ‘traitors’ by at-risk individuals Bystanders (e.g. friends and family) have a strong desire to intervene but currently don’t have enough support to do so. Booz Allen Hamilton (security consulting, similar CVE projects), Jeremy, CVE Task Force Shift space into friends/family - possibly easier to reach out to captive audience Hotlines might not be effective for CVE. WORDE, RAN In Austria, the CVE hotline had 115 calls in the first 50 days of launch. Our resources step into tricky liability territories. Booz Allen Hamilton Include Terms of Service that emphasize anonymity and non-liability We can learn a lot from suicide interventions as analogous situations. Lean on Me, RAN, Jeremy Consider peer counsellors as effective messenger, and to scale.
MVP - Redirect peers and
family of at-risk individuals to anonymous, 2-way communication with experts (former extremists, families of radicalized individuals, peer counsellors) to seek help on how to help their peers / family members
Text TALK to +1 (800)
727 8255 Preventing Radicalization Textline - Minneapolis You will not be asked to reveal personal information at any point. how to stop a friend from joining isis
Mission Model Canvas Key Partners
Moonshot CVE, Jigsaw, Google Ads ISD(Institute of Strategic Dialogue)/SCN(Stron g Cities Network) Previous extremists, Families of former/current fighters, former ISIS hostages Key Activities Find previous extremists and other actors (parents of fighters, people held hostage by ISIS, etc.) Establish credibility as a source of unbiased information Key Resources Previous Extremists CVE-specific groups with CVE networks Support staff to update platform and maintain response time and anonymity Mission Budget/Costs Cost of maintaining platform Value Proposition Provide information about effective and safe intervention mechanisms to intervene into their loved one’s life and coping strategies to deal with the process; information given directly from those that have been through similar ordeal Provide thorough information from credible sources to individuals that are considering radicalization to prevent them from continuing down that path. Can understand the questions and perspectives of individuals at risk and empower previous extremists to share their stories and information Deployment: Identify NGOs that have connections to networks of actors Partner with NGOs:to maintain and curate safe spaces, and bridge gap between individuals and actors Repurpose existing platforms Pilot a project in a specific region Deploy in other regions Buy-In/Support CT/CVE Bureau Previous Extremists and CVE groups with strong networks: Quilliam, Hayat-Deutschland, AVE Individuals at risk for radicalization Peer counselling groups Beneficiaries Family and friends of those at risk of recruitment Individuals at risk of recruitment CT/CVE Bureau, S/R of the Muslim Communities in State and other possible sponsors invested in extremism Mission Achievement High clickthrough rate to our service, high usage of service and most importantly how many conversations result in a better than alternative outcome for friends and families of individuals at risk of recruitment.
Critical Resources - Technical: Online
messaging system that connects individuals in an encrypted way - Work with Lean on Me, Crisis Text Line to figure out how they do it - Human: Committed expert pool (e.g. peer counsellors, former extremists, parents of extremists etc.) - If ISIS can engage individuals one-on-one to recruit them to come to Syria, there must be motivation from our side to dissuade them - Human: Staff to coordinate efforts - Filter and redirect relevant questions and monitor harmful narratives - Intellectual: Standard intervention protocol - E.g. in Suicide Prevention, there is Question - Persuade - Refer - Legal: Liability and terms of service
Critical Activities Now +1 mth
+2 mths +3 mths Legal: Terms of Service Messenger: Commit 5 people Technology: Find and test tech platform Protocol: Determine v1 intervention protocol Distribution: Work with Google on white box / ads Pilot: In 2 geographic locations (Minneapolis, Luton) Experiment: Clickthrough rates for fake website/ interest form?
Critical Partners Category Who They
provide We provide Technical Jigsaw & Lean on Me (Tech side) Established anonymous messaging tech + protocol This project - a (possibly) successful CVE effort that aligns with their aims + gives them CSR Human (Committed expert pool) ‘Formers’ + CVE experts Know-hows on deradicalization pathways Targeted channel to push their CVE messaging across SAVE / ISD First-hand experience and they are our deployers Ways to reach out to the vulnerable population Legal State Department Legal Legal advice on terms of service A S/D project that requires support
Next steps: Validate + Secure
Resources - Experiment: Run experiment - Tech + Protocol: Learn from current peer counselling networks - E.g. (Suicide) Lean on Me, Stanford Bridge Peer Counselling - E.g. (CVE) Austrian Deradicalization hotline (115 calls in first 50 days) - Legal: Figure out Terms of Service - Messenger: Convince former extremists, women against violent extremism etc. to provide their help
Other U.S. Government Agencies and
Departments U.S. Government Countering Violent Extremism Efforts Global Engagement Center (GEC) Bureau of Counterterrorism and CVE/ Office of CVE (CT/CVE) Shared Activities: • External Partnerships • Capacity Building to Empower Local Partners to Develop Strategic Messaging Specific Activities: • Data Analytics • Content • Internal Government Coordination on Messaging Mission Statement: Work to address the life cycle of radicalization. Key Differences: • GEC: international CT messaging. It is a pillar of the U.S. government’s Counter-ISIL strategy. It is an interagency body housed in the State Department that reports to R created by (WH) Executive Order. • CT/CVE is focused on international CT and CVE and serves as the central coordination point for CVE within the Department of State and with other agencies as an integral part of the U.S. government’s CT and CVE strategies. It works with local partners to alleviate the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism and focuses on mobilizing international engagement, promoting best practices, and empowering credible, local voices to speak out against violence. Specific Activities: • Expand International Efforts • Encourage Better Policies Globally • Use Foreign Assistance to Address Drivers of Violent Extremism • Empower Credible Voices Against Violent Extremism • Strengthen Partner Capabilities Mission Statement: Leads coordination of U.S. Government-wide communications directed at foreign audiences to counter and diminish the influence of terrorist organizations. U.S. Department of State