Télécharger

251 views

Published on

0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total views
251
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
2
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
2
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide
  • One of our challenges in this Global Forum process is to see aid in the context of other development finance flows and to look at the functioning of development finance as a system. Of course, if you have been following global forum discussions throughout the past year you may agree that we are talking more about a non-system than a system.
  • Relevance: That reveals the influence of analysts’ recommendations on investors’ behaviour. The information provided by banks to investors could depend on their own objective that sometimes could differ from those of investors. The interaction between politics and capital markets in emerging countries is probably changing. That reveals the influence of analysts’ recommendations on investors’ behaviour. The information provided by banks to investors could depend on their own objective that sometimes could differ from those of investors. The interaction between politics and capital markets in emerging countries is probably changing.
  • These recommendations are assimilated to the cases of buying, maintaining and selling with respect to a portfolio (the index EMBI+ calculated by JP Morgan)
  • “ Push factors” or global factors literature: First half of the 90s Fernandez-Arias (1996) and Calvo et al (1993) “ Pull factors ” or local factors : Taylor and Sarno (1997), World Bank (2001), Alfaro et al (2005),… Most of the results conclude that local factors combined with external factors explain capital flows (FDI, foreign banks lending, bond and equity flows,…). Impact of information and distance on capital flows: Ghosh and Wolf (1999), Savastano (2000), Papaioannou (2004) and Portes and Rey (2005). In particular Portes and Rey (2005) develop an empirical model in which international information flows are a significant aspect to explain international equity flows.
  • We have used the following two panel data regressions models. OLS and FE estimation. Since OLS estimation are known to deal inadequately with time series and cross-section heterogeneity, we reported also Fixed Effects estimates (FEM estimators).
  • OECD countries: Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) and Womack and Michaely (1999). Results suggest that there is a conflict of interest between investment banking and research department. Emerging Countries: Seasholes (2000), Bae et al (2005): Accuracy of local vs foreign forecast analysis. Bacmann and Bollinger (2001): Boom of the stocks covered by analysts between 1993 and 2000.
  • Recommendations given by banks that have been underwriters for Latin American sovereign bond issues.
  • Objective of the sell side business: to sell portfolios to a large variety of financial intermediaries. The percentage invested in these portfolios increases relative to the size of each country. Credit risk is not a relevant variable to determine the recommendations.
  • Some of the comments given by banks months before the crisis were unrealistic:
  • Recommendations given by banks that have been underwriters for Latin American sovereign bond issues.
  • Recommendations given by banks that have been underwriters for Latin American sovereign bond issues.
  • We have used the following two panel data regressions models. OLS and FE estimation. Since OLS estimation are known to deal inadequately with time series and cross-section heterogeneity, we reported also Fixed Effects estimates (FEM estimators).
  • Venezuela in the same box of Chile
  • Venezuela in the same box of Chile
  • Télécharger

    1. 1. Banco de España Investment Banks’ Recommendations and Emerging Markets: The Usual Suspects  Madrid - January 2008  Javier Santiso Chief Economist and Acting Director OECD Development Centre
    2. 2. Overview Objective 1 Capital Flows and Research Publications 2 Determinants of Banks’ Recommendations 3 Conclusions and Policy Lessons 4
    3. 3. Two core questions <ul><li>Do recommendations given by investment banks have an impact on the allocation of portfolio flows in the emerging markets? </li></ul><ul><li>What is behind investment banks’ recommendations? A work in process: </li></ul><ul><li>- Recommendations and the business of investment banks (i.e. bond issuances by sovereigns). </li></ul><ul><li>- Financial Markets’ analysts and political events in emerging democracies. </li></ul>
    4. 4. Overview Objective 1 Determinants of Banks’ Recommendations 2 Capital Flows and Brokers Publications 3 Conclusions and Policy Lessons 4
    5. 5. Recommendations Database <ul><li>Construction of a unique database containing the recommendations given by the major investment banks to the Latin American bond markets: </li></ul><ul><li>- Over 3 800 observations. </li></ul><ul><li>- 12 Major Investment Banks. </li></ul><ul><li>- Covering the period 1997-2007. </li></ul><ul><li>- Direct and strict link between financial intermediaries and investors (not public information). </li></ul>
    6. 6. Recommendations Database <ul><li>We have taken the recommendations given by 12 investment banks. All of them important players in the emerging bond markets, i.e. market makers. </li></ul>
    7. 7. Recommendations Database
    8. 8. Recommendations Database <ul><li>Example: Average of the recommendations given to Brazil by the investment banks (lhs) with respect to the weight of Brazil in the EMBI Global index (rhs). </li></ul>
    9. 9. Recommendations Database <ul><li>We have taken 11 Latin American countries that represent nearly 95% of the GDP of the region. </li></ul><ul><li>The total number of recommendations is over 3,800. </li></ul>
    10. 10. Capital Flows to Emerging Countries <ul><li>A large body has studied the determinants of capital flows: </li></ul><ul><li>“ Push factors” or global factors. </li></ul><ul><li>Fernandez-Arias (1996) and Calvo et al (1993). </li></ul><ul><li>“ Pull factors” or local factors. </li></ul><ul><li>Taylor and Sarno (1997) and Alfaro et al (2005). </li></ul><ul><li>Information and distance. </li></ul><ul><li>Savastano (2000), Papaioannou (2004) and Portes and Rey (2005). </li></ul>
    11. 11. Determinants of capital flows <ul><li>Impact of recommendations on capital flows (Bond flows and Equity flows respectively): </li></ul><ul><li> (i) </li></ul><ul><li> (ii) </li></ul><ul><li>where and : percentage allocated by funds in country i with respect to the total amount invested in emerging economies. </li></ul><ul><li>: the average of the investment banks’ recommendations given to country i . </li></ul><ul><li>: Pull macroeconomic variables defined by capital markets (exchange rate, spread of sovereign bonds and rate of return of equity). </li></ul>
    12. 12. Determinants of capital flows <ul><li> : Pull macroeconomic variables that are strongly influenced by real sector (economic activity, inflation rate and interest rate). </li></ul><ul><li> : country invariant variables which capture global factors (US nominal rates and US industrial production). </li></ul><ul><li>Period of the analyses: 1997-2005 for equity flows </li></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li> 2002-2006 for bond flows </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><li>Frequency: Monthly. </li></ul><ul><li>Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. </li></ul>
    13. 13. Determinants of bond flows
    14. 14. Determinants of equity flows
    15. 15. Determinants of capital flows <ul><li>Three results: </li></ul><ul><li>The impact of investment banks’ recommendations on capital flows is positive and significant. </li></ul><ul><li>The impact of the recommendations given to external public debt goes beyond sovereign bond flows. Indeed, although their influence is minor, these recommendations also affect private equity flows. </li></ul><ul><li>3. This new microeconomic variable improves the fit of capital flows regressions more than some traditional macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, economic growth and inflation rate. </li></ul>
    16. 16. Overview Objective 1 Determinants of Banks’ Recommendations 2 Capital Flows and Brokers Publications 3 Conclusions and Policy Lessons 4
    17. 17. Recommendations and Research Literature <ul><li>Variety of results: </li></ul><ul><li>Analysts are confronted with a trade-off between sending true signals and optimistic signals. Jackson (2005). </li></ul><ul><li>Larger number of buy recommendations than sell recommendations. Barber et al (2001). </li></ul><ul><li>Market reaction to upgrades is less pronounced than the market reaction to downgrades by analysts. Asquith et al (2005). </li></ul><ul><li>Impact of the measures introduced by the NYSE and NASDAQ, but also the sanctions established by the SEC in 2002. Madureira (2004), Boni and Womack (2002) and Unger (2001). </li></ul>
    18. 18. Recommendations and Research Literature <ul><li>Empirical studies of the relationship between the recommendations and underwriters are concentrated to OECD countries. </li></ul><ul><li>Agrawal et al (2008), Lin et al (1998), Krigman et al (2001), Dechow et al (2000) and Michaely and Womack (1999). </li></ul><ul><li>Research literature concentrated in emerging markets is scarce and exclusively concentrated in the equity market. </li></ul><ul><li>Bacmann and Bollinger (2001), Seasholes (2000 and 2004) and Chang et al (2000). </li></ul>
    19. 19. Investment banks’ business <ul><li>Banks are faced with a trade-off concerning recommendations: </li></ul><ul><li>While sell side business could have the incentive to build reputation by giving accurate information in the long term …. </li></ul><ul><li>… . in the short term recommendations could be biased in order to obtain short term profits. </li></ul><ul><li>Additionally, investment banking activities could be motivated to recommend optimistically the assets which they are participating as underwriters in an IPO. </li></ul>
    20. 20. Underwriters’ recommendations <ul><li>- 90% of the underwriters recommend at the issue date to buy or to maintain in their portfolio the bonds issued by the countries where they are acting as underwriters. </li></ul>
    21. 21. Size of the Market and Recommendations <ul><li>As the size of the market increases, the recommendation tends to become increasingly favourable: “too big to underweight”. </li></ul>
    22. 22. The Argentinean Case <ul><li>67 per cent of the recommendations were to maintain the positions in Argentinean External Debt (prior 2001). Two examples: </li></ul><ul><li>Morgan Stanley : “We are maintaining our Market Perform recommendation on Argentine bonds….Relaxation of fiscal targets and an innovative IMF-led financial package from creditors both improve Argentina’s credit outlook. Argentina needs to raise an estimated $2.6 billion to fulfil its first quarter financing requirements. New issues are expected to total $5.6 billion in 2001. Growth and fiscal performance are becoming the focus of investors’ attention.” January 26, 2001. </li></ul><ul><li>Salomon Smith Barney (Citigroup) : “The successful implementation of the IMF support package — with the associated debt management transactions — and the change in the global outlook probably increases the chances that economic activity will pick up in the second half of the year. We therefore recommend a neutral position in external bonds and local currency instruments.” January 17, 2001 . </li></ul>
    23. 23. Underwriters’ Recommendations <ul><li>Structure of the Underwriting Market: Few number of participants. </li></ul>
    24. 24. Underwriters’ Recommendations <ul><li>The probability that a government continues at state t+1 with the same lead manager used in the previous period (t) is reduced. </li></ul>
    25. 25. Underwriters’ Recommendations <ul><li>Given the structure of the market, there is an incentive for non-underwriters to give an equal or better recommendation than underwriters. </li></ul>
    26. 26. Underwriters’ Recommendations <ul><li>A possible variable that represents the conflict of interest of banks could be the countries’ participation in the banks’ primary bond markets business (by using a long run analysis). </li></ul><ul><li>Two years… </li></ul>
    27. 27. Underwriters’ Recommendations <ul><li>3 years… </li></ul>
    28. 28. Underwriters’ Recommendations <ul><li>and 4 years. </li></ul><ul><li>Moreover, some investment banks have specialized the origination business in small countries. </li></ul>
    29. 29. Political and Financial Crisis N ominal exchange rate depreciation and government c hange 0,94 0,96 0,98 1 1,02 1,04 1,06 1,08 1,1 1,12 1,14 1,16 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Sourc e: Frieden, Ghezzi y Stein, 2001 Country`s Total Elec t ions 1 Colombia 13 1989 17 2 Costa Rica 11 1990 14 3 Guatemala 11 1991 3 4 Ecuador 10 1992 0 5 Chile 10 1993 10 6 Peru 10 1994 18 7 Honduras 10 1995 6 8 Paraguay 9 1996 8 9 Brazil 9 1997 7 10 El Salvador 9 1998 15 11 Republica Dom. 9 1999 12 12 Uruguay 9 2000 11 13 Mexico 9 2001 4 14 Argentina 8 2002 13 15 Nicaragua 8 2003 8 16 Panama 8 2004 6 17 Venezuela 8 2005 5 18 Bolivia 7 2006 11
    30. 30. Political and Financial Crisis Some countries achieved to decouple both cycles: Mexico in 2000. Source: Jorge Blázquez and Javier Santiso, 2004. Timing of Presidential Elections and Exchange Rate Depreciations in Mexico, 1975-2000 Election Year Election Year Election Year Election Year Election Year
    31. 31. Political and Financial Crisis Others have overcome the test of fire more recently: Brazil in 2006 Source: Based on Juan Martínez and Javier Santiso, 2003.
    32. 32. Political Events and Bond Recommendations <ul><li>Over the course of 2006, all the most important Latin American Countries (by excepting Argentina) elected their head of the state. </li></ul>
    33. 33. Political Events and Bond Recommendations <ul><li>In comparison to previous election periods, the elections of 2006 point to a markedly improved confidence. </li></ul>
    34. 34. Political Events and Bond Recommendations <ul><li>The Brazilian Case (2002 vs. 2006): “Da Lula Preta (2002)… </li></ul>
    35. 35. Political Events and Bond Recommendations <ul><li>The Brazilian Case (2002 vs. 2006). </li></ul><ul><li>… A Lula de Mel” (2006). An Ex- Emerging Market? </li></ul>
    36. 36. Political Events and Bond Recommendations <ul><li>Chile: Political event is not an issue. An Ex-Emerging Market? During the presidential elections of 2000 and… </li></ul>
    37. 37. Political Events and Bond Recommendations <ul><li>Chile: Political event is not any more an issue </li></ul><ul><li>… the Presidential elections of 2006. </li></ul>
    38. 38. Political Events and Recommendations <ul><li>Mexico: A risk country before the election date. </li></ul><ul><li>In 2000 due to the risk of transparency of the election process. </li></ul>
    39. 39. Political Events and Bond Recommendations <ul><li>Mexico: A risk country before the election date. </li></ul><ul><li>In 2006 due to the risk of AMLO (López Obrador) . </li></ul>
    40. 40. Political Events and Bond Recommendations <ul><li>Are financial markets becoming less sensitive to Latin American Election Cycles? Probably YES, although Ecuador.. . </li></ul>
    41. 41. Determinants of the recommendations <ul><li>Impact of political events on investment banks’ recommendations : </li></ul><ul><li> </li></ul><ul><li>where : is the average of the investment banks’ recommendations given to country i . </li></ul><ul><li>: Pull macroeconomic variables defined by capital markets: Exchange rate, spread of sovereign bonds, equity return, investment value and the weight of the country i in the EMBI Global index ( proxy of conflict of interest) . </li></ul>
    42. 42. Determinants of the recommendations <ul><li> : Pull macroeconomic variables that are strongly influenced by real sector (industrial production, inflation rate and interest rate). </li></ul><ul><li> : country invariant variables which capture global factors (US nominal rates, US industrial production and US High Yield spread). </li></ul><ul><li> : is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during presidential elections (3 months before and after the month of the election). </li></ul><ul><li>Period of the analyses: 1997-2007 </li></ul><ul><li>Frequency: Monthly. </li></ul><ul><li>Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. </li></ul>
    43. 45. Determinants of the recommendations <ul><li>The investment value of sovereign bonds and the conflict of interest are significant explanatory variables behind banks’ recommendations. </li></ul><ul><li>The Political Cycle is a determinant variable in explaining investment banks’ recommendations. More than some standard macro variables. </li></ul><ul><li>The temporal horizon of investment banks’ recommendations is short term depending more on the continuity of macro policies than on structural reform. </li></ul><ul><li>The credibility and stability of economic policies has improved in the eyes of Capital Markets analysts. Political risk however still remains an important consideration requiring further efforts on behalf of governments and political parties. </li></ul>
    44. 46. Overview Objective 1 Determinants of Banks’ Recommendations 2 Capital Flows and Research Publications 3 Conclusions and Policy Lessons 4
    45. 47. Investment banks’ recommendations <ul><li>The impact of investment banks’ recommendations on capital flows is positive and significant. </li></ul><ul><li>What are the determinants of investment banks’ recommendations? Investment banks’ business and political events could be important factors. </li></ul>
    46. 48. Policy Lessons <ul><li>There is a need for more detailed information disclosure by investment banks : Push for financial markets transparency. </li></ul><ul><li>Government agencies should do a strategic monitoring on what financial market are writing about their respective country vulnerabilities: Monitor markets cognitive regimes. </li></ul><ul><li>Given that banks’ recommendations and portfolio flows are related, an international co-operation scheme needs to be established to encourage Market Makers to cover more countries: A Public –Private Patnership in emerging markets finance? </li></ul>
    47. 49. Policy Lessons <ul><li>Emerging Markets Covered by Financial Institutions in 2006 </li></ul><ul><li>(% of total brokers) </li></ul><ul><li>Note: Countries most frequently analysed by Emerging Markets Analysts or covered by leading financial institutions. The percentage represents the average presence in their analysis. Only countries analysed by more than 25 per cent of the selected financial reports appear on the graph. </li></ul><ul><li>Source: Nieto and Santiso (2007), calculation according to 10 selected investment banks 3 relevant emerging market indices 1 global association of financial Institutions. </li></ul>
    48. 50. <ul><li>Thank you! </li></ul><ul><li>Presentation based on: </li></ul><ul><li>Nieto Parra and Santiso (2007). “The Usual Suspects: A Primer on Investment Banks’ Recommendations and Emerging Markets”. OECD Development Centre Working Paper , 258. Nieto Parra and Santiso (2008). “Enter the Matrix: Wall Street and Elections in Emerging Democracies”. OECD Development Centre Working Paper , Forthcoming . </li></ul><ul><li>http://www.oecd.org/dev </li></ul>

    ×