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Cross Context Scripting attacks & exploitation

Roberto Suggi Liverani
Roberto Suggi LiveraniPentester/Reseacher
From alert(‘xss’) to Meterpreter with a single click
Roberto Suggi Liverani
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
HackPra 2012/2013
1
Who am I?
 A guy who likes to find bugs 
 Speaker at various cons:
 DefCON, EUSecWest, HITB, OWASP
 Twitter: @malerisch
 Research blog: blog.malerisch.net
2
Outline
 Cross Context Scripting (XCS)
 Past research
 Recent discoveries
 Further attack surface
3
Cross Context Scripting (XCS)
4
Some concepts
 Same origin policy (SOP)
 Policy designed to govern interaction between
different web sites
○ Domain name
○ Application protocol
○ Port
 W3C definition
 Although the same-origin policy differs between
APIs, the overarching intent is to let users visit
untrusted web sites without those web sites
interfering with the user's session with honest
web sites
5
Cross Context Scripting (XCS)
 XCS or Cross-zone scripting
 Cross Zone Scripting coined for IE
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-zone_scripting
 XCS coined for Firefox and injection in chrome://
 What is XCS?
 An XSS in a privileged browser zone
 An indirect Same-Origin Policy (SOP) bypass ?
 Each browser has a trusted/privileged zone:
 FF - chrome://
 Chrome - chrome://
 Opera - opera://
 Maxthon - mx://
 Avant - browser://
6
7
XCS
 Browser privileged/trusted zone
 Access to internal API interfaces:
○ Browser
 Browser settings
 Bookmarks, storage, etc.
○ OS
 File system – I/O
 Example
○ Firefox model
 Firefox addons can run privileged code
8
FF Addon Example - FireFTP
9
Google Chrome – Settings
Page
10
Opera History
11
XCS exploitation
 XCS exploits are 100% reliable
 No memory corruption
 Trusted zone
 Allows possible direct or indirect invokation of
special functions/objects
 Challenge
 1st - find injection point in trusted zone
 2nd - make use of privileged functions/object to
achieve code execution
12
Past Research
13
Past research
 Pioneers
 2005 - Mark Pilgrim - Greasemonkey bug
 2006 - Pdp & Michael Daw – publishing Sage
xss
 2008 - Kuza55 & Stefano Di Paola – Attacking
rich internet applications – Tamper Data XSS
demo
 My research
 Opera XSS found in opera:history
○ RCE exploit in opera:config (Kuza55 / Stefano Di
Paola / Aviv Raff)
 Firefox extensions research with Nick Freeman
○ Multiple RCE exploits released in FF extensions
14
Opera XSS history (1/3)
 Opera XSS history – CVE 2008-4696
 Metasploit - 'egypt', # msf module
 Step 1 - Injection in opera:history via the
fragment part
15
Opera XSS Exploit (2/3)
 Step 2 - Force redirection to
opera:history to trigger execution
 Note : SOP bypass
16
Opera XSS Exploit (3/3)
 Step 3 – Execute exploit payload
17
DEMO
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFejbd03
jls
18
Firefox extensions
 Firefox and extensions security model
 Extension code is fully trusted by Firefox
 No security boundaries between extensions
 Extensions vulnerabilities are platform
independent
 Lack of security policies to allow/deny Firefox
access to internal API, XPCOM components,
etc.
 After 3 years…
 No much change
 A vulnerable extension can still be used to
compromise a system
19
Cool Previews
 Vulnerable version: 2.7.2
 Injection point:
○ Add to stack function (right-click)
 Exploit:
 Link with a data: uri + base64 encoded
payload
○ <a
href=‘data:text/html,base64;payload’>A</a>
20
Remote Code Execution
 Invoking cmd.exe
21
DEMO
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7dJPOR
acvXg
22
FireFTP
 Vulnerable version: <1.1.4
 Injection point:
 Server’s welcome message
 Exploit:
 Simple HTML and JavaScript payload
directly evaluated in chrome://
23
Feed Sidebar
 Vulnerable version: 3.2
 Injection point:
 RSS feed
 Exploit:
 Use of data: uri + base64 encoded payload
○ &lt;iframe
src=&quot;data:text/html;base64,base64enco
dedjavascript&quot;&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt;
24
Sage
 Vulnerable Version: <=1.4.3
 Injection point:
 RSS feed <description> and <link> tags
 Exploit:
 Use of HTML encoded JavaScript payload
○ <description>&lt;script&gt;dosomethingbad();&lt;sc
ript&gt;</description>
 Use of data: uri + base64 encoded payload
○ <link>data:text/html;base64,payload</link>
25
InfoRSS
 Vulnerable version: <= 1.1.4.2
 Injection point:
 RSS feed <description> tag
 Exploit:
 Use of data: uri + base64 encoded payload
○ &lt;iframe
src=&quot;data:text/html;base64,base64enco
dedjavascript&quot;&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt
26
Yonoo
 Vulnerable Version: 6.1.1
 Injection point:
 Drag & dropping a malicious image into the
preview window
 Exploit:
 Use event handler e.g. onload
○ <img src=‘http://somewebsite.tld/lolcatpicture.jpg’
onLoad=‘evilJavaScript’>
27
Password stealing
28
Local File Disclosure
29
Compromising NoScript
 Whitelisting malicious site
30
Reverse VNC using XHR
31
Recent Discoveries
32
Maxthon – case study
 Developed by: Maxthon International
(China)
 Architecture
○ Supports Trident and Webkit layout engines
○ Focus on performance and extra features
 Some stats - according to Maxthon
 130 million users
 Users spread over 120 countries
 500,000,000 downloads in 2k10
33
Maxthon: XCS via location.hash
 Status: UNPATCHED!
 Maliciouspage.html – performs redirection
 Injected payload executes in about:history
34
Maxthon: XCS via RSS
 Status: UNPATCHED!
 Injection via <title>, <link>,
<description> tags
35
Exploitation issues
 Maxthon major changes
 DOM Program object removed in latest
versions
○ Cannot invoke exe directly anymore
○ Can only read/write files via maxthon.io
 Personal exploit challenge
 No user interaction
 Targets: Windows XP and Windows 7
36
XCS Exploit – Windows XP
 Windows XP
 Overwrite any exe which can be directly
invoked via HTML/Javascript
○ e.g. Outlook express (wab.exe)
 Then use window.location=“ldap://blabla”
 Works perfectly! 
37
XCS Exploit – Windows 7
 In Windows 7 (universal approach)
 User is prompted using WinXP approach
 Overwrite registry hives?
 Touch registry?
 Dirty approach but effective:
○ Overwrite one of the exe when Java applet is
rendered
○ jp2launcher.exe is a good candidate
 Then point to an iframe with a java applet =
WIN! 
38
Metasploit modules
 https://github.com/malerisch/metasploit-
framework/blob/maxthon3/modules/exploits/windows/browser/maxt
hon_history_xcs.rb
 https://github.com/malerisch/metasploit-
framework/blob/maxthon3/modules/exploits/windows/browser/maxt
hon_rss_xcs.rb
39
DEMO
Maxthon – about:history
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N-
5BkgJX8sI
40
Demo
Maxthon XCS – RSS
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-
55asVLqNI
41
Maxthon: Trusted site over
HTTP
 Status: PATCHED
 i.maxthon.com
 sets
privileged DOM
objects
○ runtime
○ maxthon
42
Exploit
 Leveraging XSS in a trusted “internet” page
 Design Issues
 i.maxthon.com = trusted domain
 i.maxthon.com allows direct access to privileged APIs
 No control on resolution of IP address
 No use of SSL
 MiTM Bug
 DNS poisoning
○ Force resolution of i.maxthon.com to a controlled IP address
 HTTP MiTM
○ i.maxthon.com served over HTTP – malicious proxy which alters
page content
 Other implications
 XSS in real i.maxthon.com site
43
DEMO – i.maxthon.com (DNS
compromised)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1IqZBS0
O2Hs
44
Avant Browser
 Avant Browser - Avant Force (China)
 Custom web browser application
 Designed to expand services provided by IE
 Two versions: lite (only IE) & ultimate
(IE, FF, Chrome)
 More downloads than Chrome, IE and
Opera in CNET
45
A bit about Avant (1/3)
Firefox
wrapped
version Arguments
passed to
firefox.exe
Avant.exe
- parent of
firefox.exe
46
A bit about Avant (2/3)
 Interesting files
 "C:Program FilesAvant Browserres" folder:
 Observations
 home.tpl is rendered at browser:home
 rss.tpl is rendered at browser://localhost/lst?url/path/to/rss/feed
 Such pages use privileged JavaScript function
window.AFRunCommand()
 Pages provided examples on how to call privileged functions and
aided exploitation
47
A bit about Avant (3/3)
 Testing AFRunCommand()
 Undocumented Avant browser function
 Try{}/Catch{} no output
 Bruteforce only option – passing a single parameter:
○ 60003 - window.external.HistoryUrls() - [used in exploit]
○ 60011 - prompt for download
○ 10021 - add to ad block specified site
○ 3 - spawns an empty tab
○ 10010 - reloads the page
○ 10013 - search for keywords
○ 10014 - pop up blocker
○ 10016 - download a video (argument passed as URL)
○ 10017 - add task for download scheduler
○ 10025 - search keywords
48
Avant Browser – SOP Bypass
 Status: UNPATCHED!
 Works if Firefox is set as the rendering
engine
49
Avant BeEF Module
https://github.com/malerisch/beef/tree/ava
nt_browser/modules/exploits/avant_steal_
history
50
DEMO – BeEF Module In Action
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I4LiSfT
muM0
51
Avant Browser – XCS in
browser:home
 Status: UNPATCHED
 Injection via <title> HTML element
 Cross Site Scripting Payload Rendered In
browser:home Privileged Zone
52
DEMO – Avant Browser – XCS in
browser:home via <title>
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHHtsO
pYGH4
53
Avant Browser – Stored XSS
via RSS
 Injection via <title>, <link> and
<description> tags
54
DEMO – Avant Browser – RSS Stored
XSS
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
mShxsspxy8
55
Further attack surface
56
Injection in bookmarks
 Attack based on:
 Origin inheritance – injection using javascript: uri
 Input validation – injecting into bookmark trusted zone
 Injection via bookmarks using javascript:
 Ancient bug reported in 2k5 by M. Krax
 User is lured into bookmarking a malicious javascript: URI +
payload
 User clicks on malicious bookmark
 Focus on standard web page – Impact: XSS
 Focus on privileged browser zone – Impact: XCS
 Many ways to fool users:
 Security controls on status bar can be partially fooled
 JavaScript can be compressed and obfuscated
57
javascript:
 I invented the javascript: URL along with JavaScript in
1995, and intended that javascript: URLs could be used
as any other kind of URL, including being bookmark-able.
In particular, I made it possible to generate a new
document by loading, e.g. javascript:'hello, world', but also
(key for bookmarklets) to run arbitrary script against
the DOM of the current document,
e.g.javascript:alert(document.links[0].href). The difference
is that the latter kind of URL uses an expression that
evaluates to the undefined type in JS. I added the void
operator to JS before Netscape 2 shipped to make it easy
to discard any non-undefined value in a javascript: URL.
 —Brendan Eich
58
Firefox Case
 Firefox 10.0.2 vulnerable
 Malicious bookmark clicked while using an
extension (from chrome://)
 Payload will execute in chrome://
 Issue fixed in FF >11
59
Demo – Firefox XCS via bookmark
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSuLV9
RjhGQ
60
Opera
 Opera 12.10
 javascript: can be bookmarked
 Origin inheritance - opera:config vulnerable
to XCS if javascript:// bookmarklet is
triggered
 Mail app handler can be set with a UNC
path e.g. myremotemeterpreter.exe
61
Demo – Opera XCS via Bookmarks
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWtLHi
4Imr4
62
Maxthon - XCS in bookmarks
63
Demo – Maxthon XCS in bookmarks
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YR0RQ
z45t3M
64
Conclusions
 More browser capability/functionality
 increased attack surface for XCS
 Untrusted content - rendering options
 about:blank
 Security model for extensions/addons
 Sandbox
65
Questions?
Roberto Suggi Liverani - @malerisch
blog.malerisch.net
66
References
 Blog – Roberto Suggi Liverani
 http://blog.malerisch.net/
 Twitter account - @malerisch
 https://twitter.com/malerisch
 Security-Assessment.com Research
 http://www.security-
assessment.com/page/archive.htm
 Nick Freeman – Publications
 http://atta.cked.me/publications
67
References
 Cross Context Scripting with Firefox -
http://malerisch.net/docs/cross_context_scr
ipting/cross_context_scripting_with_firefox.
pdf
 Opera - XCS in opera:history
http://malerisch.net/docs/advisories/opera_
stored_cross_site_scripting.html
 Firefox addon Coolpreviews – XCS -
http://malerisch.net/docs/advisories/coolpre
views_chrome_privileged_code_injection.h
tml
68
References
 Firefox addon Update Scanner - XCS -
http://malerisch.net/docs/advisories/updatesca
nner_chrome_privileged_code_injection.html
 Exploiting XCS in Firefox - http://www.security-
assessment.com/files/whitepapers/Exploiting_
Cross_Context_Scripting_vulnerabilities_in_Fir
efox.pdf
 HITB2012AMS - Browser Bug Hunting in 2012
- http://www.security-
assessment.com/files/documents/presentation
s/window_shopping_browser_bug_hunting_in
_2012_roberto_suggi_liverani_scott_bell.pdf
69
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Cross Context Scripting attacks & exploitation

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Cross Context Scripting (XCS) is a type of XSS (Cross Site Scripting) injection which occurs from an untrusted zone, typically a web page on the Internet into the context of a trusted browser zone. XSS injection in a trusted browser zone can be 'lethal', as injected payload runs as privileged code. No SOP (Same-Origin Policy) restrictions are enforced and direct interfacing with the underlying OS is possible. To exploit such bugs, there is no need to use ROP gadgets, spray the heap or attempt other complex techniques. At the opposite, only few elements are required for a successful exploit, such as the right injection point and a tailored exploit payload. This presentation will examine XCS in details and will provide a demonstration of XCS exploits of both unpatched and patched vulnerabilities in Firefox, Opera, Maxthon and Avant browsers.

Roberto Suggi Liverani
Roberto Suggi LiveraniPentester/Reseacher

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Cross Context Scripting attacks & exploitation

  • 1. From alert(‘xss’) to Meterpreter with a single click Roberto Suggi Liverani Ruhr-Universität Bochum HackPra 2012/2013 1
  • 2. Who am I?  A guy who likes to find bugs   Speaker at various cons:  DefCON, EUSecWest, HITB, OWASP  Twitter: @malerisch  Research blog: blog.malerisch.net 2
  • 3. Outline  Cross Context Scripting (XCS)  Past research  Recent discoveries  Further attack surface 3
  • 5. Some concepts  Same origin policy (SOP)  Policy designed to govern interaction between different web sites ○ Domain name ○ Application protocol ○ Port  W3C definition  Although the same-origin policy differs between APIs, the overarching intent is to let users visit untrusted web sites without those web sites interfering with the user's session with honest web sites 5
  • 6. Cross Context Scripting (XCS)  XCS or Cross-zone scripting  Cross Zone Scripting coined for IE http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-zone_scripting  XCS coined for Firefox and injection in chrome://  What is XCS?  An XSS in a privileged browser zone  An indirect Same-Origin Policy (SOP) bypass ?  Each browser has a trusted/privileged zone:  FF - chrome://  Chrome - chrome://  Opera - opera://  Maxthon - mx://  Avant - browser:// 6
  • 7. 7
  • 8. XCS  Browser privileged/trusted zone  Access to internal API interfaces: ○ Browser  Browser settings  Bookmarks, storage, etc. ○ OS  File system – I/O  Example ○ Firefox model  Firefox addons can run privileged code 8
  • 9. FF Addon Example - FireFTP 9
  • 10. Google Chrome – Settings Page 10
  • 12. XCS exploitation  XCS exploits are 100% reliable  No memory corruption  Trusted zone  Allows possible direct or indirect invokation of special functions/objects  Challenge  1st - find injection point in trusted zone  2nd - make use of privileged functions/object to achieve code execution 12
  • 14. Past research  Pioneers  2005 - Mark Pilgrim - Greasemonkey bug  2006 - Pdp & Michael Daw – publishing Sage xss  2008 - Kuza55 & Stefano Di Paola – Attacking rich internet applications – Tamper Data XSS demo  My research  Opera XSS found in opera:history ○ RCE exploit in opera:config (Kuza55 / Stefano Di Paola / Aviv Raff)  Firefox extensions research with Nick Freeman ○ Multiple RCE exploits released in FF extensions 14
  • 15. Opera XSS history (1/3)  Opera XSS history – CVE 2008-4696  Metasploit - 'egypt', # msf module  Step 1 - Injection in opera:history via the fragment part 15
  • 16. Opera XSS Exploit (2/3)  Step 2 - Force redirection to opera:history to trigger execution  Note : SOP bypass 16
  • 17. Opera XSS Exploit (3/3)  Step 3 – Execute exploit payload 17
  • 19. Firefox extensions  Firefox and extensions security model  Extension code is fully trusted by Firefox  No security boundaries between extensions  Extensions vulnerabilities are platform independent  Lack of security policies to allow/deny Firefox access to internal API, XPCOM components, etc.  After 3 years…  No much change  A vulnerable extension can still be used to compromise a system 19
  • 20. Cool Previews  Vulnerable version: 2.7.2  Injection point: ○ Add to stack function (right-click)  Exploit:  Link with a data: uri + base64 encoded payload ○ <a href=‘data:text/html,base64;payload’>A</a> 20
  • 21. Remote Code Execution  Invoking cmd.exe 21
  • 23. FireFTP  Vulnerable version: <1.1.4  Injection point:  Server’s welcome message  Exploit:  Simple HTML and JavaScript payload directly evaluated in chrome:// 23
  • 24. Feed Sidebar  Vulnerable version: 3.2  Injection point:  RSS feed  Exploit:  Use of data: uri + base64 encoded payload ○ &lt;iframe src=&quot;data:text/html;base64,base64enco dedjavascript&quot;&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt; 24
  • 25. Sage  Vulnerable Version: <=1.4.3  Injection point:  RSS feed <description> and <link> tags  Exploit:  Use of HTML encoded JavaScript payload ○ <description>&lt;script&gt;dosomethingbad();&lt;sc ript&gt;</description>  Use of data: uri + base64 encoded payload ○ <link>data:text/html;base64,payload</link> 25
  • 26. InfoRSS  Vulnerable version: <= 1.1.4.2  Injection point:  RSS feed <description> tag  Exploit:  Use of data: uri + base64 encoded payload ○ &lt;iframe src=&quot;data:text/html;base64,base64enco dedjavascript&quot;&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt 26
  • 27. Yonoo  Vulnerable Version: 6.1.1  Injection point:  Drag & dropping a malicious image into the preview window  Exploit:  Use event handler e.g. onload ○ <img src=‘http://somewebsite.tld/lolcatpicture.jpg’ onLoad=‘evilJavaScript’> 27
  • 33. Maxthon – case study  Developed by: Maxthon International (China)  Architecture ○ Supports Trident and Webkit layout engines ○ Focus on performance and extra features  Some stats - according to Maxthon  130 million users  Users spread over 120 countries  500,000,000 downloads in 2k10 33
  • 34. Maxthon: XCS via location.hash  Status: UNPATCHED!  Maliciouspage.html – performs redirection  Injected payload executes in about:history 34
  • 35. Maxthon: XCS via RSS  Status: UNPATCHED!  Injection via <title>, <link>, <description> tags 35
  • 36. Exploitation issues  Maxthon major changes  DOM Program object removed in latest versions ○ Cannot invoke exe directly anymore ○ Can only read/write files via maxthon.io  Personal exploit challenge  No user interaction  Targets: Windows XP and Windows 7 36
  • 37. XCS Exploit – Windows XP  Windows XP  Overwrite any exe which can be directly invoked via HTML/Javascript ○ e.g. Outlook express (wab.exe)  Then use window.location=“ldap://blabla”  Works perfectly!  37
  • 38. XCS Exploit – Windows 7  In Windows 7 (universal approach)  User is prompted using WinXP approach  Overwrite registry hives?  Touch registry?  Dirty approach but effective: ○ Overwrite one of the exe when Java applet is rendered ○ jp2launcher.exe is a good candidate  Then point to an iframe with a java applet = WIN!  38
  • 39. Metasploit modules  https://github.com/malerisch/metasploit- framework/blob/maxthon3/modules/exploits/windows/browser/maxt hon_history_xcs.rb  https://github.com/malerisch/metasploit- framework/blob/maxthon3/modules/exploits/windows/browser/maxt hon_rss_xcs.rb 39
  • 41. Demo Maxthon XCS – RSS http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d- 55asVLqNI 41
  • 42. Maxthon: Trusted site over HTTP  Status: PATCHED  i.maxthon.com  sets privileged DOM objects ○ runtime ○ maxthon 42
  • 43. Exploit  Leveraging XSS in a trusted “internet” page  Design Issues  i.maxthon.com = trusted domain  i.maxthon.com allows direct access to privileged APIs  No control on resolution of IP address  No use of SSL  MiTM Bug  DNS poisoning ○ Force resolution of i.maxthon.com to a controlled IP address  HTTP MiTM ○ i.maxthon.com served over HTTP – malicious proxy which alters page content  Other implications  XSS in real i.maxthon.com site 43
  • 44. DEMO – i.maxthon.com (DNS compromised) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1IqZBS0 O2Hs 44
  • 45. Avant Browser  Avant Browser - Avant Force (China)  Custom web browser application  Designed to expand services provided by IE  Two versions: lite (only IE) & ultimate (IE, FF, Chrome)  More downloads than Chrome, IE and Opera in CNET 45
  • 46. A bit about Avant (1/3) Firefox wrapped version Arguments passed to firefox.exe Avant.exe - parent of firefox.exe 46
  • 47. A bit about Avant (2/3)  Interesting files  "C:Program FilesAvant Browserres" folder:  Observations  home.tpl is rendered at browser:home  rss.tpl is rendered at browser://localhost/lst?url/path/to/rss/feed  Such pages use privileged JavaScript function window.AFRunCommand()  Pages provided examples on how to call privileged functions and aided exploitation 47
  • 48. A bit about Avant (3/3)  Testing AFRunCommand()  Undocumented Avant browser function  Try{}/Catch{} no output  Bruteforce only option – passing a single parameter: ○ 60003 - window.external.HistoryUrls() - [used in exploit] ○ 60011 - prompt for download ○ 10021 - add to ad block specified site ○ 3 - spawns an empty tab ○ 10010 - reloads the page ○ 10013 - search for keywords ○ 10014 - pop up blocker ○ 10016 - download a video (argument passed as URL) ○ 10017 - add task for download scheduler ○ 10025 - search keywords 48
  • 49. Avant Browser – SOP Bypass  Status: UNPATCHED!  Works if Firefox is set as the rendering engine 49
  • 51. DEMO – BeEF Module In Action http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I4LiSfT muM0 51
  • 52. Avant Browser – XCS in browser:home  Status: UNPATCHED  Injection via <title> HTML element  Cross Site Scripting Payload Rendered In browser:home Privileged Zone 52
  • 53. DEMO – Avant Browser – XCS in browser:home via <title> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHHtsO pYGH4 53
  • 54. Avant Browser – Stored XSS via RSS  Injection via <title>, <link> and <description> tags 54
  • 55. DEMO – Avant Browser – RSS Stored XSS http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=- mShxsspxy8 55
  • 57. Injection in bookmarks  Attack based on:  Origin inheritance – injection using javascript: uri  Input validation – injecting into bookmark trusted zone  Injection via bookmarks using javascript:  Ancient bug reported in 2k5 by M. Krax  User is lured into bookmarking a malicious javascript: URI + payload  User clicks on malicious bookmark  Focus on standard web page – Impact: XSS  Focus on privileged browser zone – Impact: XCS  Many ways to fool users:  Security controls on status bar can be partially fooled  JavaScript can be compressed and obfuscated 57
  • 58. javascript:  I invented the javascript: URL along with JavaScript in 1995, and intended that javascript: URLs could be used as any other kind of URL, including being bookmark-able. In particular, I made it possible to generate a new document by loading, e.g. javascript:'hello, world', but also (key for bookmarklets) to run arbitrary script against the DOM of the current document, e.g.javascript:alert(document.links[0].href). The difference is that the latter kind of URL uses an expression that evaluates to the undefined type in JS. I added the void operator to JS before Netscape 2 shipped to make it easy to discard any non-undefined value in a javascript: URL.  —Brendan Eich 58
  • 59. Firefox Case  Firefox 10.0.2 vulnerable  Malicious bookmark clicked while using an extension (from chrome://)  Payload will execute in chrome://  Issue fixed in FF >11 59
  • 60. Demo – Firefox XCS via bookmark http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gSuLV9 RjhGQ 60
  • 61. Opera  Opera 12.10  javascript: can be bookmarked  Origin inheritance - opera:config vulnerable to XCS if javascript:// bookmarklet is triggered  Mail app handler can be set with a UNC path e.g. myremotemeterpreter.exe 61
  • 62. Demo – Opera XCS via Bookmarks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWtLHi 4Imr4 62
  • 63. Maxthon - XCS in bookmarks 63
  • 64. Demo – Maxthon XCS in bookmarks http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YR0RQ z45t3M 64
  • 65. Conclusions  More browser capability/functionality  increased attack surface for XCS  Untrusted content - rendering options  about:blank  Security model for extensions/addons  Sandbox 65
  • 66. Questions? Roberto Suggi Liverani - @malerisch blog.malerisch.net 66
  • 67. References  Blog – Roberto Suggi Liverani  http://blog.malerisch.net/  Twitter account - @malerisch  https://twitter.com/malerisch  Security-Assessment.com Research  http://www.security- assessment.com/page/archive.htm  Nick Freeman – Publications  http://atta.cked.me/publications 67
  • 68. References  Cross Context Scripting with Firefox - http://malerisch.net/docs/cross_context_scr ipting/cross_context_scripting_with_firefox. pdf  Opera - XCS in opera:history http://malerisch.net/docs/advisories/opera_ stored_cross_site_scripting.html  Firefox addon Coolpreviews – XCS - http://malerisch.net/docs/advisories/coolpre views_chrome_privileged_code_injection.h tml 68
  • 69. References  Firefox addon Update Scanner - XCS - http://malerisch.net/docs/advisories/updatesca nner_chrome_privileged_code_injection.html  Exploiting XCS in Firefox - http://www.security- assessment.com/files/whitepapers/Exploiting_ Cross_Context_Scripting_vulnerabilities_in_Fir efox.pdf  HITB2012AMS - Browser Bug Hunting in 2012 - http://www.security- assessment.com/files/documents/presentation s/window_shopping_browser_bug_hunting_in _2012_roberto_suggi_liverani_scott_bell.pdf 69

Editor's Notes

  1. http://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/cross-context-scripting-with-sage/ http://mozdev.org/pipermail/greasemonkey/2005-July/004022.html
  2. Split in two slides
  3. Increase font size for each screen shot
  4. Bug id 288164 -> in the thread, no one mentions about the fact that chrome:// is used by addons too and not just within the bookmark zone Ref: https://bug338459.bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=222524 http://www.agarri.fr/op00.html