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John Blackburn on Integrated Force Design: The Case of IMAD

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On the occasion of the April 17, 2017 Williams Foundation Seminar on integrated force structure design, John Blackburn briefed the findings of the integrated air and missile defense study which was done in preparation for the seminar. The IMAD study was done to illustrate an approach, not provide a definitive set of answers to the problem narrowly considered.

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John Blackburn on Integrated Force Design: The Case of IMAD

  1. 1. Multiple re-entry vehicles deployed by one LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile 0 The Sir Richard Williams Founda4on INTEGRATED AIR & MISSILE DEFENCE STUDY The Challenge of Integrated Force Design April 2017 Air Vice-Marshal John Blackburn AO (Retd) http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au
  2. 2. 1 Williams Founda4on IAMD Study The Williams Founda4on Integrated Air and Missile Defence Study addressed five ques4ons : •  What is IAMD? •  What threats are promp4ng an increased priority for IAMD in the US? •  What is the US doing about IAMD? •  What is Australia doing about IAMD? •  What are the lessons for Program level capability design from the US experience?
  3. 3. 2 What is IAMD ? Australia’s IAMD Program has component capabili4es listed in the DIIP; however, it is not a narra4ve or vision of what IAMD is and how we will operate to address the threat. US Joint IAMD Vision 2020 If deterrence fails, neutralising an adversary's offensive air and missile assets prior to use con4nues to be the preferred method to negate them, and with the increasing growth in numbers, is the only prac4cal means to defeat large threat inventories. All capabili4es, defensive, passive, offensive, kine4c, non-kine4c are melded into a comprehensive Joint and combined force capable of preven4ng an adversary from effec4vely employing any of its offensive air and missile weapons. IAMD is comprised of integrated offensive and defensive opera4ons and that it must be designed from the beginning to be interoperable.
  4. 4. Graphics Courtesy of the CSIS Missile Defense Project What threats are promp4ng an increased priority for IAMD in the US? Never has the United States faced a more complex or comprehensive global challenge in this area, and the forecast for 2020 and beyond is no more op4mis4c … a dire and growing air and missile threat to the United States and its interests around the world. Success in nega4ng it will take no less than a bold, holis4c reimagining of America’s IAMD. The future IAMD environment will be characterized by a full spectrum of air and missile threats—ballis4c missiles, air-breathing threats (cruise missiles, aircra^, UAS), long-range rockets ar4llery, and mortars—all u4lising a range of advanced capabili4es—stealth, electronic a`ack, maneuvering reentry vehicles, decoys, and advanced terminal seekers with precision targe4ng.
  5. 5. Graphics Courtesy of the CSIS Missile Defense Project Never has the United States faced a more complex or comprehensive global challenge in this area, and the forecast for 2020 and beyond is no more op4mis4c … a dire and growing air and missile threat to the United States and its interests around the world. Success in nega4ng it will take no less than a bold, holis4c reimagining of America’s IAMD. The future IAMD environment will be characterized by a full spectrum of air and missile threats—ballis4c missiles, air-breathing threats (cruise missiles, aircra^, UAS), long-range rockets ar4llery, and mortars—all u4lising a range of advanced capabili4es—stealth, electronic a`ack, maneuvering reentry vehicles, decoys, and advanced terminal seekers with precision targe4ng. The gap between the threat and the ADF’s IAMD capability is growing and is likely to be larger in a decade than it is now, despite the significant level of investment the Government has commi`ed to in the DIIP. What threats are promp4ng an increased priority for IAMD?
  6. 6. WHAT IS THE US DOING ABOUT IAMD? are there lessons we can learn ? Vision 2020 Impera4ves: Ø  Incorporate, fuse, exploit, and leverage every bit of informa4on available regardless of source or classifica4on, and distribute it as needed to U.S. Forces and selected partners. Ø  Make interdependent Joint and Combined force employment the baseline. Ø  Target development, moderniza4on, fielding, and science and technology efforts to meet specific gaps. Ø  Focus passive defense efforts on addressing poten4al capability and capacity shordalls in air and missile defense. Ø  Establish and pursue policies to leverage partner contribu4ons. Ø  Create an awareness of the IAMD mission and the benefits of its proper u4liza4on. The US Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defence Organisa4on (JIAMDO) has been set up to manage the US IAMD pordolio, and to iden4fy and coordinate requirements to support efforts to develop IAMD solu4ons for the warfighter.
  7. 7. 7 JIAMDO
  8. 8. 8 JIAMDO
  9. 9. Vision 2020 Impera4ves: Ø  Incorporate, fuse, exploit, and leverage every bit of informa4on available regardless of source or classifica4on, and distribute it as needed to U.S. Forces and selected partners. Ø  Make interdependent Joint and Combined force employment the baseline. Ø  Target development, moderniza4on, fielding, and science and technology efforts to meet specific gaps. Ø  Focus passive defense efforts on addressing poten4al capability and capacity shordalls in air and missile defense. Ø  Establish and pursue policies to leverage partner contribu4ons. Ø  Create an awareness of the IAMD mission and the benefits of its proper u4liza4on. The US Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defence Organisa4on (JIAMDO) has been set up to manage the US IAMD pordolio, and to iden4fy and coordinate requirements to support efforts to develop IAMD solu4ons for the warfighter. Despite the US’s clear vision and applied resources, there are s4ll difficul4es in building a shared understanding of their way ahead …. as Joint staff, the JIAMDO IAMD Roadmap remains a recommenda6on, but not a direc6ve. WHAT IS THE US DOING ABOUT IAMD? are there lessons we can learn ?
  10. 10. The United States’ ability to develop field-robust yet affordable missile defense is, in a word, challenging. 1. Cost per kill 2. Target discrimination 3. Left of launch COST ?
  11. 11. March 2017 - General David Perkins, the commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) - spoke about the necessity for commanders to address threats holistically. “The gut instinct was,” he explains, “that’s an air defense problem, because they’re in the air … A fly swatter is a better solution than a shotgun.” This is about Integrated Force Design http://www.theverge.com/2017/3/16/14944256/patriot-missile-shot-down-consumer-drone-us-military
  12. 12. The report summarises some of the lessons gleaned from the US experience: Ø There needs to be an IAMD Roadmap, built by an integrated Defence team, that is a DirecLve and not just a recommendaLon. Ø An IAMD Program cannot be built purely boQom-up if it is to be both effecLve and affordable; a top-down direcLon and focus is essenLal. Ø Formal US cerLficaLon of the kill chain will be required to assure interoperability / integraLon with US Forces where appropriate. Ø An integraLng CONOPS is essenLal. Ø The early adopLon of an OSA standard, or standards, cognisant of the OSA systems we already have in service or are acquiring, will be essenLal for our IAMD Program. Ø It is criLcal to recognise that Cybersecurity requires a ‘systems of systems’ approach that is managed architecturally and cannot be addressed separately by each Project. Ø AspiraLon vs Reality – Feasibility check? Ø There is no “5th Gen” C4ISR system in service - they are all in development. Ø Reality / impact of stove-piped placorm development prioriLes. WHAT IS THE US DOING ABOUT IAMD? are there lessons we can learn ?
  13. 13. PLATFORMS / SENSORS WEAPONS C4ISR ++ IAMD CANNOT BE DRIVEN FROM JUST ONE COMPONENT OR ONE SERVICE … IT MUST BE INTEGRATED IAMD DESIGN – Components ? “innova4ons must be paired with valid concepts of opera4on to make them effec4ve in the expected opera4onal environment” BGen Alex Grynkewich USAF - Air Superiority 2030 Team Lead CONOPS JOINT FIRES ? JBM ? ABM ? AMPHIB OPS ?
  14. 14. 5th Gen Time Capability 4th Gen PLATFORMS / SENSORS IAMD - What is Feasible ? ASPIRATION VS REALITY
  15. 15. 5th Gen Time Capability 4th Gen F/A-18F PLATFORMS / SENSORS IAMD - What is Feasible ? ASPIRATION VS REALITY
  16. 16. 5th Gen Time Capability 4th Gen PLATFORMS / SENSORS F/A-18F C4ISR / IAMD C2 vs PLATFORM LAG MORE COMPLEX THREAT IAMD - What is Feasible ? ASPIRATION VS REALITY
  17. 17. Who can we follow? Ø There are clear leaders in the US in terms of IAMD systems thinking that can provide a path for Australia to follow, if we are prepared to accept a degree of developmental risk. Ø The alterna4ve is acquiring current technology IAMD components that are not suitable for the future threat environment, resul4ng in greater opera4onal risk for the future force. WHAT IS THE US DOING ABOUT IAMD? are there lessons we can learn ?
  18. 18. Defence has a budgeted IAMD Program with some $2B-$3B allocated for an IAMD Program to be delivered in the period 2018-2030. Ø The initial IAMD related Projects are closely coordinated and are focused on integrated outcomes rather than purely individual Project goals. This is a good example of CAF’s strategic intent - “I would like Air Force in a joint context to begin to put the joint effect before our own Air Force requirements…” Ø The approach being adopted for the initial IAMD related Projects is laudable, so why change anything? There are two reasons: Ø Firstly - the gap between the threat and the ADF’s IAMD capability gap is likely to be larger in a decade than it is now; we will need to do something different if we are to achieve the required level of IAMD capability. Ø Secondly, the experience of the US is that an IAMD capability cannot be built purely bottom-up from a Project perspective; however, Defence is yet to define an IAMD Program-level design that addresses the complexity of IAMD as a “System of Systems,” as has been done in the US. Ø A top-down approach will afford the opportunity to maximise our IAMD capability and address the growing threat-capability gap. WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD?
  19. 19. The main recommendation that emerged from the initial study research was that an IAMD Program-level design needs to be developed as a matter of priority in order to provide a top-down, integrated design across all IAMD component and related Projects. Ø This recommendation implies, at first glance, the development of an IAMD narrative, CONOPS guidance, and architectures. Ø Whilst the US IAMD vision and resulting JIAMDO guidance provides a good template for Australia, it needs to be adapted for Australia’s specific needs and circumstances. Ø The Australian IAMD Program needs to develop a Roadmap for IAMD that addresses issues such as who we follow and what level of acquisition risk is appropriate given the operational risks we may face in the future. Ø Such a Roadmap should identify initial Project steps and how we will eventually integrate with the future US IAMD Program. WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD?
  20. 20. “5th Gen” Time Capability “4th Gen” PLATFORMS F/A-18F C4ISR C2 vs PLATFORM LAG ASPIRATION VS REALITY IAMD - What is Feasible ? IAMD ROADMAP ISSUES
  21. 21. “5th Gen” Time Capability “4th Gen” PLATFORMS F/A-18F C4ISR ASPIRATION VS REALITY 1 2 IAMD ROADMAP ISSUES 1 2INITIAL PROJECT PATH IAMD PROGRAM INTEGRATION PATH IAMD - What is Feasible ?
  22. 22. The IAMD study also identified a number of key questions and issues that should be addressed in addition to CONOPS, C4ISR++, Platforms and Weapons. Examples include: Ø  Integration versus Interoperability Ø  People Ø  Acquisition and Sustainment Ø  Timing Imperative Ø  Most, if not all, of the issues and questions that arose in the IAMD study apply to the majority of the Defence Programs and not just to IAMD. WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD? So, how do we address IAMD Program design without over-complicating the issue? Ø CAF’s town plan Ø CAF portrayed Projects as “streets” in a town; they need an overall town plan which guides how the streets are aligned and how they integrate with the common services, power, water, sewerage, that all "streets" need and that cannot be installed afterwards without significant costs and disruptions.
  23. 23. WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD?
  24. 24. WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD?
  25. 25. The IAMD study also identified a number of key questions and issues that should be addressed in addition to CONOPS, C4ISR++, Platforms and Weapons. Examples include: Ø  Integration versus Interoperability Ø  People Ø  Acquisition and Sustainment Ø  Timing Imperative Ø  Most, if not all, of the issues and questions that arose in the IAMD study apply to the majority of the Defence Programs and not just to IAMD. So, how do we address IAMD Program design without over-complicating the issue? Ø CAF’s town plan Ø CAF portrayed Projects as “streets” in a town; they need an overall town plan which guides how the streets are aligned and how they integrate with the common services, power, water, sewerage, that all "streets" need and that cannot be installed afterwards without significant costs and disruptions. Ø What could the town plan look like? Can there be a town plan just for IAMD? Ø Is the Defence Program structure suitable for integrated force design by individual Programs? WHAT IS AUSTRALIA DOING ABOUT IAMD?
  26. 26. Program Structure WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FOR PROGRAM-LEVEL CAPABILITY DESIGN?
  27. 27. Program Structure WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FOR PROGRAM-LEVEL CAPABILITY DESIGN? There are 40 Programs listed in the Defence Program structure … the DIIP also refers to more than 200 “Programs” in the tables of key investment decisions, the majority of which are, in fact, Projects. An IAMD Program is certainly a useful construct to discuss how a group of Projects, integrated by a common design, could address a growing air and missile threat. An IAMD Program would also be of assistance in over- sighting a group of Projects that are in the acquisition process, to ensure that they remain integrated. However, it is difficult to see how an IAMD Program can be designed by itself … The reality is that an IAMD Program incorporates component capabilities of many other Programs. To achieve an integrated force by design, you need an integrated Program structure … In fact there is one, if it is used.
  28. 28. Program Structure WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FOR PROGRAM-LEVEL CAPABILITY DESIGN? The DIIP states “… the six capability Streams in the framework that are used in the Integrated Investment Program to better represent the key force elements – how they are typically employed and their planned enhancements. This was a deliberate move away from describing our capability investment plans in a stove-piped structure. It would therefore seem sensible to start design by Streams with each Program then integrating the detailed Stream design attributes where appropriate; i.e. the Stream design must be undertaken prior to the individual Program design. This approach would reduce the integrated design start point to 6 Streams vice 40 Programs. Do the Stream leads have a design role? If we are to achieve an integrated force, we need to stop “driving” Programs as if they were Projects … They are different beasts.
  29. 29. TIME TECHNOLOGY : CAPABILITY & THREAT CURRENT TECHNOLOGY CURRENT POLICY 10 Years CURRENT LAWS 15 Years TECHNOLOGY DISRUPTIONS THE LIMITATIONS OF UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE TECHNOLOGY CONOPS DOCTRINE AND A LACK OF IMAGINATION CAPABILITY DEFICIT
  30. 30. 30 2024 2022 2020 2018 2016 IAMD Program Roadmap… Key Questions / Issues to address
  31. 31. 31 2024 2022 2020 2018 2016 IAMD Program Roadmap… Key Questions / Issues to address People – Defence / Industry ? Design as a SoS vice discrete elements – USN NIFC-CA example ? JIFC + Weapons ? Kinetic / Non-K Left of Launch ? NOT OPTIONAL Threat Cyber C2 changes ? EW IMD Space Integrated Training ? T&E Lessons from US Experience ? Lead indicators ? JBM / ISR Implications ? CONOPS ? Logistics Design Considerations ? Acquisition / Sustainment? Future Intel Concepts ?
  32. 32. 32 CONCLUSIONS Ø  IAMD is a complex issue; building a shared understanding of what IAMD is, is the first step in understanding what we must do to address what is assessed as a growing threat. Ø  We need an IAMD narrative or vision to provide the context of, and focus for, our IAMD Program. Ø  The IAMD Program cannot be built purely bottom-up by Projects if it is to be both effective and affordable; a top-down direction and focus is essential. Ø  If the Australian Governments of the next decade wishes to have the option of deploying forces into the Indo-Pacific region; we will need to approach the IAMD challenge somewhat differently than we have done to date. This will necessitate revised thinking around concepts of operation, integrated design, acquisition, sustainment, processes and people.
  33. 33. 33 RECOMMENDATIONS Ø  Defence should commence the design of the integrated force at the Capability Stream level. Ø  The subsequent design of an IAMD Program should be a priority. Ø  The IAMD Program Roadmap needs to be a Directive vice a recommendation. Ø  The IAMD roadmap should identify initial Project steps and how we will eventually integrate, where necessary, with the emerging US IAMD Program. Ø  The Program design function needs to catch up with Projects underway and not impede them.
  34. 34. 34 Integrated Force Hypotheses Ø  We must operate as an integrated team from the design, through delivery to the operation of the force; failure to act as such will incur unacceptable risk in future operations. Ø  If we don’t “design” the integrated force we are committed to “after-market” integration Ø  We can’t acquire and operate an integrated force using business models developed for acquiring stand-alone, stove-piped capabilities. Ø  “Design” is about more than just platforms and systems … it is about how we design, acquire, operate and sustain an integrated force in a more complex interconnected global context. Ø  If we over-complicate the “design” process we will stall our efforts and get the same results we have had over the past 20 years – stove-piped capabilities. Ø  We must however recognise that the task load of the three Services in their raise, train, sustain and Capablity Manager roles means that simply delivering a large volume of Force Design guidance to the three Services will not work. Ø  Cultural change, as reflected in CAF’s strategic plan narrative, is required to prioritise the integrated force outcomes over the individual force priorities where appropriate.
  35. 35. 35 SPONSORS The Williams Foundation thanks the IAMD Study sponsors: Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. The Williams Foundation thanks Dr Gary Waters and Jacobs for their support.

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