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CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools

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CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools

  1. Design Violence Out of Schools Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor Texas Tech University
  2. CPTED in Schools CrimePreventionThroughEnvironmentalDesign General School Making it Concepts Applications Happen
  3. CPTED in Schools General Concepts
  4. Greater perceived risk of getting caught… (CPTED Premise) (Anti-CPTED Premise) decreases anti- shifts the location of social activity anti-social activity
  5. Research predominantly supports the pro- CPTED premise (CPTED Premise) (Anti-CPTED Premise) decreases anti- shifts the location of social activity anti-social activity
  6. Educational CPTED is important either way (CPTED Premise) (Anti-CPTED Premise) decreases anti- shifts the location of social activity anti-social activity
  7. Perceived risk of being caught is based upon SAT scores…
  8. S urveillance (Will I be seen?) A ccess (Who can get in and out)? T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
  9. S urveillance (Will I be seen?)
  10. “burglarized houses had less visual access to immediately neighboring houses than did non- burglarized houses” Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
  11. Most burglary entries do not occur through the front door, often because of natural surveillance
  12. Open access to side or rear entry points where there is no natural surveillance make for more attractive burglary entrances
  13. “Convenience stores experienced mean annual robbery rate reductions after installation of CCTV systems (-23%); installation of video cameras with monitors (-54%)” C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
  14. Office beverages available with payment on an “honor” system. Picture above payment instructions rotated weekly. Payments were higher when picture of eyes was posted. M. Bateson, D. Nettle & G. Roberts (2006). Cues of being watched enhance cooperation in a real- world setting. Biology Letters 2, 412–414.
  15. Two groups with two computer backgrounds. Each person receives $10. Computer question: Do you want to share any of it with another (anonymous) participant? A B K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256
  16. Normal Eyes Screen Screen Not Sharing 12% Not Sharing 45% Sharing 55% Sharing 88% K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosity in an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256
  17. In London double-decker buses, far more vandalism to seats farther away from high traffic stairwell areas and driver Sturman, A., (1980). Damage on buses: The effects of supervision. In Clarke R., and Mayhew, P. (Eds.) Designing out crime (31-38). London: Her Majasty’s Stationery Office.
  18. What natural surveillance issue best predicted convenience store robberies? C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
  19. C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110 Visibility from outside the store to inside the store was the most important sight line
  20. C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110 Visibility from outside the store to inside the store was a more significant predictor of convenience s robberies than the number of clerks or the proxim to drug traffic, gangs, or subsidized housing
  21. A ccess (Who can get in and out)?
  22. “Burglarized houses had fewer fences and locked gates surrounding the yard than did non-burglarized houses” Brown, B., Altman, B. (1983). Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
  23. Preventing access by adding chain link fencing and lighting to lower levels of this parking garage led to 50% drop in reported crime Tseng, C.-H. (Ohio State U.), Duane, J. (Ohio State U.), & Hadipriono, F. (Ohio State U.). 2004. Performance of Campus Parking Garages in Preventing Crime. Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, 18(1), 21-28.
  24. Cul-de-sacs may limit access and make visiting cars more noticeable Helpful in a law-abiding community, but Harmful in a gang-controlled community
  25. T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
  26. “burglarized houses had fewer symbolic barriers characteristic of primary territories (i.e., fewer markers depicting the identity of the territory owners)” Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
  27. “Broken windows” theory: signs of disorder like broken windows, litter, and graffiti induce other types of disorder and petty crime
  28. Visible violation of graffiti prohibition led to violating litter prohibition where Dutch experimenters posted bicycle fliers and added graffiti K Keizer et al. Science 2008;322:1681-1685 Published by AAAS
  29. When letter with money was hanging out of a post office box theft occurred 13% normally but 27% if box had graffiti K Keizer et al. Science 2008;322:1681-1685 Published by AAAS
  30. In a study of 400 convenience store robberies, one significant difference between robbed and non- robbed stores was distance from nearest graffiti S. A. Hendricks, D. P. Landsittel, H. E. Amandus, J. Malcan, & J. Bell. (1999) A matched case- control study of convenience store robbery risk factors. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 41(11), 995-1004
  31. No maintenance implies no one cares what happens there
  32. Better to remove it, than leave it vandalized
  33. All three CPTED principles must work together
  34. Access barriers alone can be overcome Surveillance + Access + Territoriality work together
  35. Territoriality impacts Access If no one cares what happens here, is it less risky to try opening the door with a crowbar or bolt cutter?
  36. Some high fences control access, but (1) Blocking surveillance (2) Sending a territoriality message that the area is dangerous and no one cares what happens outside the wall
  37. An opaque chain link fence blocks surveillance and permits graffiti showing a lack of external territoriality
  38. With proper design and maintenance, high fences can limit access without damaging surveillance or territoriality
  39. A high fence blocking access without damaging surveillance or territoriality
  40. Stark window bars limit access, but may also send a negative territoriality message about neighborhood safety
  41. Glass block can create security similar to window bars but without the stigma
  42. Closed stairwells have low natural surveillance and easy access for both entry and escape
  43. Combined with territoriality deficiencies, stairwells can create CPTED problem areas
  44. Design solutions can improve the natural surveillance for stairwells
  45. Open stairwells have strong natural surveillance properties
  46. CPTED in Schools School Applications
  47. School CPTED concepts are the same… S urveillance (Will I be seen?) A ccess (Who can get in and out)? T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
  48. S urveillance (Will I be seen?)
  49. A study of five Midwestern high schools found of 166 violent incidents, none took place when adults were present Astor RA, Meyer HA, Behre WJ. 1999. Unowned places and times: Maps and interviews about violence in high schools. Am Educ Res J 36:3–42.
  50. Adding openings or windows in solid walls Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edf acil/safe_schools.asp
  51. Blocking access to hidden areas Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  52. convex mirrors for visibility around corners
  53. Electronic surveillance Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe _schools.asp
  54. Promote surveillance and prevent hiding by keeping bushes below 1.5 feet and tree limbs above 8 feet Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  55. Design signage to prevent concealment Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  56. “replacing bathroom entrance doors with right-angle entrances permit the warning sounds of crime to travel more freely and reduce the sense of isolation” Sommer, R. (1983). Social design: Creating buildings with people in mind. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
  57. Bathroom areas allowing sound and smoke to transmit to hallway Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  58. 45 degree tapered angles allow seeing around blind corners and expanding scope of vision Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  59. moving the staff lunch area or office locations Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldo e.org/edfacil/saf e_schools.asp
  60. A Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  61. Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldo e.org/edfacil/saf e_schools.asp coaches’ offices should have direct visual and auditory surveillance
  62. A ccess (Who can get in and out)?
  63. Effective and subtle Too much obvious access control can undermine school environment
  64. Attractive window grates or separated small windows prevent access
  65. Converting most exterior doors to emergency exits improves access control
  66. Avoid pull down ladders or utility boxes that allow roof access
  67. Territoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
  68. Gangs use graffiti to establish their territory; schools take it back through repainting, following up with ongoing, vigilant maintenance
  69. Any generally neglected exterior area will also seem ideal for misbehavior
  70. Landscape buffers may reduce access to graffiti prone walls
  71. Consider the use of inspirational or student- created artwork Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe .org/edfacil/safe _schools.asp
  72. In progress results from my fMRI research shows greater fear reduction from public art than from visible security cameras
  73. Combining Access Control and Natural Surveillance
  74. Access Control + Surveillance A secure bicycle rack Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/ safe_schools.asp
  75. Access Control + Surveillance wrought iron fencing instead of solid walls Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org /edfacil/safe_schools. asp
  76. Access Control + Surveillance Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  77. CPTED in Schools Making it Happen
  78. The frontal approach Suggest that the school hire a CPTED specialist to complete an analysis of campus buildings and make recommendations on improvements
  79. Did you just say, “let’s spend money so we can create a need to spend more money?”
  80. The “what I think” approach Examine the buildings and make recommendations based on what you see
  81. Why should we spend money based on your subjective opinions?
  82. What if neither of these approaches work?
  83. Campus Risk Assessment Algorithm Maps Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor Texas Tech University A free Excel template to generate hot spot maps available at goo.gl/h3KVY or http://www.encouragegenerosity.com/maps.xlxs
  84. Input three objective scores for each space 1. Panorama Viewing Area (PVA) The total area* from which a person in the space can be viewed 2. Student PVA Typical student population of the PVA over time 3. Staff PVA Typical staff population of the PVA over time *a more precise model would incorporate a discounting function by multiplying each area block by 1 where, d = meters to the target space if greater than 7, else d=1 k*(1.1d/7) k=2 if area is separated from target space by glass or video, else k=1
  85. Hot Spot Type 1: Crimes of Opportunity (Minor) High activity/low supervision reflected by a high level of * Student PVA Percentile - Staff PVA Percentile * *percentiles are relative ranking across all occupied areas
  86. Hot Spot Type 2: Concealed Criminal Activity (Major) Low activity/low supervision reflected by an accessible area with low total score of Student PVA Percentile* + Staff PVA Percentile* *percentiles are relative ranking across all occupied areas
  87. 1. Paste outline into Excel template Obtain / create a line drawing floor plan (or campus map) picture with a transparent background to paste and resize in Excel
  88. 2. Insert data into Excel template Insert number of blocks visible from each block [PVA tab] X the student [StudentPVA tab] or staff [StaffPVA tab] population during target period in cells underlying map
  89. 3. Results Color coded maps with percentile rankings for PVA, PVA- Student, PVA- Staff, Hot Spot Type 1, and Hot Spot Type 2
  90. Time Series CRAA Maps Complete previous analyses for each 20 minute block during a school day
  91. Publish CRAAMaps, with suggestions for addressing hot spots • Physical changes to increase visibility • Camera placement • Staff location changes • Access restriction (for low activity areas)
  92. Prove the problem Track exact location of campus conduct violations and overlay against CRAAMs
  93. Prove the solution Place but not at a treatment(s) comparison at one hot hot spot spot track violations compared to in one the other
  94. CPTED in Schools General School Making it Concepts Applications Happen
  95. If you found these useful, CLICK on Ready this slide and for leave your name and institution to more? show my bosses that I should make more! (Plus, get info on other free videos/slides)
  96. Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. is associate professor in the Department of Applied and Professional Studies at Texas Tech University. He is the most frequently published author in ISI-ranked academic journals on the topic of residential satisfaction. His research in residential satisfaction led to his interest in environmentally-influenced perceptions of safety. He has presented his urban studies related research nationally and internationally at conferences including The Environmental Design Research Association, The Housing Educators Research Association, and The European Network of Housing Researchers. He worked briefly in the U.S. Attorneys Office (narcotics division) in Kansas City and later served over five years as president of Central Christian College in Moberly, Missouri during which time several new buildings were constructed. His current research involves the use of fMRI brain scanning to uncover neural correlates of financial and environmental satisfaction.

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