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Design     Violence       Out of       Schools         Russell James, J.D., Ph.D.         Associate Professor         Texa...
CPTED in Schools CrimePreventionThroughEnvironmentalDesign General                           School       Making itConcept...
CPTED in Schools        General       Concepts
Greater perceived risk of getting caught…(CPTED Premise)         (Anti-CPTED Premise)decreases anti-         shifts the lo...
Research predominantly supports the pro-CPTED premise(CPTED Premise)        (Anti-CPTED Premise)decreases anti-        shi...
Educational CPTED is important either way(CPTED Premise)        (Anti-CPTED Premise)decreases anti-        shifts the loca...
Perceived risk of being caught isbased upon SAT    scores…
S urveillance  (Will I be seen?)A ccess  (Who can get in and out)?T erritoriality  (Does anyone care what   happens here?)
S urveillance  (Will I be seen?)
“burglarizedhouses hadless visualaccess toimmediatelyneighboringhouses thandid non-burglarizedhouses”Brown, B. (University...
Most burglaryentries do notoccur throughthe front door,often becauseof naturalsurveillance
Open accessto side orrear entrypoints wherethere is nonaturalsurveillancemake formoreattractiveburglaryentrances
“Convenience storesexperienced meanannual robbery ratereductions afterinstallation of CCTVsystems (-23%);installation of v...
Office beveragesavailable withpayment on an“honor” system.Picture abovepaymentinstructionsrotated weekly.Payments werehigh...
Two groups with two computer backgrounds. Eachperson receives $10. Computer question: Do you want toshare any of it with a...
Normal                                   Eyes Screen              Screen                                                  ...
In London double-decker buses, far morevandalism to seats farther away from hightraffic stairwell areas and driverSturman,...
What natural surveillance issue best    predicted convenience store robberies?C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000...
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmentaldesign (CPTED) in red...
C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmentaldesign (CPTED) in red...
A ccess  (Who can get in and out)?
“Burglarized houses had fewerfences and locked gatessurrounding the yard than didnon-burglarized houses”                  ...
Preventing access by adding chain link fencingand lighting to lower levels of this parkinggarage led to 50% drop in report...
Cul-de-sacs may limit access and  make visiting cars more noticeableHelpful in a law-abiding community, butHarmful in a ga...
T     erritoriality(Does anyone care what happens here?)
“burglarized houses had fewer symbolic                barriers characteristic of primary                territories (i.e.,...
“Broken windows”        theory: signs of disorder likebroken windows, litter,  and graffiti induce       other types of   ...
Visible violation ofgraffiti prohibitionled to violatinglitter prohibitionwhere Dutchexperimentersposted bicyclefliers and...
When letter with money was hanging outof a post office box theft occurred 13%normally but 27% if box had graffitiK Keizer ...
In a study of 400 convenience store robberies, one     significant difference between robbed and non-     robbed stores wa...
No maintenance implies no one   cares what happens there
Better toremove it, than    leave it  vandalized
All three CPTEDprinciples mustwork together
Access barriersalone can beovercomeSurveillance +Access +Territorialitywork together
Territoriality impacts AccessIf no one cares what happens here, is itless risky to try opening the door witha crowbar or b...
Some high fencescontrol access, but(1) Blocking    surveillance(2) Sending a    territoriality    message that    the area...
An opaque chain link fence blocks surveillanceand permits graffiti showing a lack of externalterritoriality
With proper design  and maintenance,   high fences canlimit access without      damaging   surveillance or     territorial...
A high fence blocking access withoutdamaging surveillance or territoriality
Stark window bars limit access, but mayalso send a negative territoriality message        about neighborhood safety
Glass block can createsecurity similar to windowbars but without the stigma
Closed stairwells have low natural surveillance   and easy access for both entry and escape
Combined with territoriality deficiencies,stairwells can create CPTED problem areas
Design solutionscan improve the     naturalsurveillance for   stairwells
Open stairwells have strong   natural surveillance  properties
CPTED in Schools    School  Applications
School CPTED concepts          are the same…S urveillance   (Will I be seen?)A ccess   (Who can get in and out)?T erritori...
S urveillance  (Will I be seen?)
A study of fiveMidwestern highschools found of166 violentincidents, nonetook place whenadults were presentAstor RA, Meyer ...
Adding openings or windows in solid walls                                Photo examples from:                             ...
Blocking access tohidden areasPhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guide...
convex mirrorsfor visibilityaround corners
Electronic surveillance                          Photo examples from: Florida                          Department of Educa...
Promote surveillance and prevent hiding bykeeping bushes below 1.5 feet and treelimbs above 8 feetPhoto examples from: Flo...
Design signage to prevent concealmentPhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Desig...
“replacing bathroom entrance doors        with right-angle entrances permit the        warning sounds of crime to travel m...
Bathroomareasallowingsound andsmoke totransmitto hallwayPhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florid...
45 degree tapered  angles   allow  seeing  around   blind corners    andexpanding scope of   visionPhoto examples from: Fl...
moving the staff lunch area    or office locations                     Photo examples                     from: Florida   ...
A    Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education    (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies    t...
Photo examples                             from: Florida                             Department of                        ...
A ccess(Who can get in and out)?
Effectiveand subtle  Too much   obvious    access control can undermine    schoolenvironment
Attractive windowgrates or separatedsmall windowsprevent access
Converting most exteriordoors to emergency exitsimproves access control
Avoid pull downladders or utilityboxes that allow   roof access
Territoriality  (Does anyone care what   happens here?)
Gangs use graffiti to establish theirterritory; schools take it backthrough repainting, following upwith ongoing, vigilant...
Any generally neglected exterior area will    also seem ideal for misbehavior
Landscape buffers may   reduce access to  graffiti prone walls
Consider the use ofinspirational or student-   created  artwork      Photo examples      from: Florida      Department of ...
In progress results from my  fMRI research  shows greater  fear reduction from public artthan from visiblesecurity cameras
Combining  Access Control        andNatural Surveillance
Access Control + SurveillanceA secure bicycle  rack                              Photo examples from: Florida             ...
Access Control + Surveillancewrought  ironfencinginsteadof solid wallsPhoto examples from:Florida Department ofEducation (...
Access Control+ SurveillancePhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003)Florida Safe School Design Guidelin...
CPTED in Schools       Making it       Happen
The frontal approach      Suggest that the    school hire a CPTED        specialist to   complete an analysis   of campus ...
Did you just say,“let’s spend money so we can create aneed to spend more      money?”
The “what I think”        approachExamine thebuildings and makerecommendationsbased on what yousee
Why should we spendmoney based  on your subjective opinions?
What if neither  of these approaches   work?
Campus Risk Assessment Algorithm Maps                    Russell James, J.D., Ph.D.                      Associate Profess...
Input three objective scores for each space1. Panorama Viewing Area (PVA)      The total area* from      which a person in...
Hot Spot Type 1: Crimesof Opportunity (Minor)    High activity/low supervision reflected by     a high level of           ...
Hot Spot Type 2:     Concealed Criminal      Activity (Major)      Low activity/low  supervision reflected by  an accessib...
1. Paste outline into Excel templateObtain / create a line drawing floor plan (orcampus map) picture with a transparentbac...
2. Insert data into Excel template                       Insert number                     of blocks visible              ...
3. Results              Color coded               maps with               percentile              rankings for            ...
Time Series CRAA     Maps    Completeprevious analyses   for each 20  minute block during a school       day
Publish CRAAMaps,with suggestions foraddressing hot spots• Physical changes to  increase visibility• Camera placement• Sta...
Prove theproblemTrack exactlocation of  campus  conduct violationsand overlay  against CRAAMs
Prove the solution    Place                    but not at atreatment(s)                 comparison at one hot             ...
CPTED in Schools General     School       Making itConcepts   Applications   Happen
If you found these         useful, CLICK onReady       this slide and for     leave your name         and institution tomo...
Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. is associate                      professor in the Department of Applied                      a...
CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools
CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools
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CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools

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An application of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) concepts to a school context

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CPTED: Designing Violence out of Schools

  1. Design Violence Out of Schools Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor Texas Tech University
  2. CPTED in Schools CrimePreventionThroughEnvironmentalDesign General School Making itConcepts Applications Happen
  3. CPTED in Schools General Concepts
  4. Greater perceived risk of getting caught…(CPTED Premise) (Anti-CPTED Premise)decreases anti- shifts the location ofsocial activity anti-social activity
  5. Research predominantly supports the pro-CPTED premise(CPTED Premise) (Anti-CPTED Premise)decreases anti- shifts the location ofsocial activity anti-social activity
  6. Educational CPTED is important either way(CPTED Premise) (Anti-CPTED Premise)decreases anti- shifts the location ofsocial activity anti-social activity
  7. Perceived risk of being caught isbased upon SAT scores…
  8. S urveillance (Will I be seen?)A ccess (Who can get in and out)?T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
  9. S urveillance (Will I be seen?)
  10. “burglarizedhouses hadless visualaccess toimmediatelyneighboringhouses thandid non-burglarizedhouses”Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space andresidential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
  11. Most burglaryentries do notoccur throughthe front door,often becauseof naturalsurveillance
  12. Open accessto side orrear entrypoints wherethere is nonaturalsurveillancemake formoreattractiveburglaryentrances
  13. “Convenience storesexperienced meanannual robbery ratereductions afterinstallation of CCTVsystems (-23%);installation of videocameras with monitors(-54%)”C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention throughenvironmental design (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of PreventativeMedicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
  14. Office beveragesavailable withpayment on an“honor” system.Picture abovepaymentinstructionsrotated weekly.Payments werehigher whenpicture of eyeswas posted.M. Bateson, D. Nettle & G. Roberts (2006). Cuesof being watched enhance cooperation in a real-world setting. Biology Letters 2, 412–414.
  15. Two groups with two computer backgrounds. Eachperson receives $10. Computer question: Do you want toshare any of it with another (anonymous) participant? A BK. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosityin an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256
  16. Normal Eyes Screen Screen Not Sharing 12% Not Sharing 45% Sharing 55% Sharing 88%K. J. Haley (UCLA), D.M.T. Fessler (UCLA). 2005. Nobody’s watching? Subtle cues affect generosityin an anonymous economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 26, 245–256
  17. In London double-decker buses, far morevandalism to seats farther away from hightraffic stairwell areas and driverSturman, A., (1980). Damage on buses: The effects of supervision. In Clarke R., and Mayhew, P.(Eds.) Designing out crime (31-38). London: Her Majasty’s Stationery Office.
  18. What natural surveillance issue best predicted convenience store robberies?C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmentaldesign (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110
  19. C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmentaldesign (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110 Visibility from outside the store to insidethe store was the most important sight line
  20. C. Casteel (UCLA) & C. Peek-Asa (UCLA). 2000. Effectiveness of crime prevention through environmentaldesign (CPTED) in reducing robberies. American Journal of Preventative Medicine, 18, 99-115, p. 110Visibility from outside the store to inside the storewas a more significant predictor of convenience srobberies than the number of clerks or the proximto drug traffic, gangs, or subsidized housing
  21. A ccess (Who can get in and out)?
  22. “Burglarized houses had fewerfences and locked gatessurrounding the yard than didnon-burglarized houses” Brown, B., Altman, B. (1983). Territoriality, defensible space and residential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
  23. Preventing access by adding chain link fencingand lighting to lower levels of this parkinggarage led to 50% drop in reported crimeTseng, C.-H. (Ohio State U.), Duane, J. (Ohio State U.), &Hadipriono, F. (Ohio State U.). 2004. Performance ofCampus Parking Garages in Preventing Crime. Journal ofPerformance of Constructed Facilities, 18(1), 21-28.
  24. Cul-de-sacs may limit access and make visiting cars more noticeableHelpful in a law-abiding community, butHarmful in a gang-controlled community
  25. T erritoriality(Does anyone care what happens here?)
  26. “burglarized houses had fewer symbolic barriers characteristic of primary territories (i.e., fewer markers depicting the identity of the territory owners)”Brown, B. (University of Utah), Altman, B. (University of Utah). 1983. Territoriality, defensible space andresidential burglary: an environmental analysis, Journal of Environmental Psychology, 3(3), 203-20.
  27. “Broken windows” theory: signs of disorder likebroken windows, litter, and graffiti induce other types of disorder and petty crime
  28. Visible violation ofgraffiti prohibitionled to violatinglitter prohibitionwhere Dutchexperimentersposted bicyclefliers and addedgraffiti K Keizer et al. Science 2008;322:1681-1685Published by AAAS
  29. When letter with money was hanging outof a post office box theft occurred 13%normally but 27% if box had graffitiK Keizer et al. Science2008;322:1681-1685Published by AAAS
  30. In a study of 400 convenience store robberies, one significant difference between robbed and non- robbed stores was distance from nearest graffitiS. A. Hendricks, D. P. Landsittel, H. E. Amandus, J. Malcan, & J. Bell. (1999) A matched case-control study of convenience store robbery risk factors. Journal of Occupational andEnvironmental Medicine, 41(11), 995-1004
  31. No maintenance implies no one cares what happens there
  32. Better toremove it, than leave it vandalized
  33. All three CPTEDprinciples mustwork together
  34. Access barriersalone can beovercomeSurveillance +Access +Territorialitywork together
  35. Territoriality impacts AccessIf no one cares what happens here, is itless risky to try opening the door witha crowbar or bolt cutter?
  36. Some high fencescontrol access, but(1) Blocking surveillance(2) Sending a territoriality message that the area is dangerous and no one cares what happens outside the wall
  37. An opaque chain link fence blocks surveillanceand permits graffiti showing a lack of externalterritoriality
  38. With proper design and maintenance, high fences canlimit access without damaging surveillance or territoriality
  39. A high fence blocking access withoutdamaging surveillance or territoriality
  40. Stark window bars limit access, but mayalso send a negative territoriality message about neighborhood safety
  41. Glass block can createsecurity similar to windowbars but without the stigma
  42. Closed stairwells have low natural surveillance and easy access for both entry and escape
  43. Combined with territoriality deficiencies,stairwells can create CPTED problem areas
  44. Design solutionscan improve the naturalsurveillance for stairwells
  45. Open stairwells have strong natural surveillance properties
  46. CPTED in Schools School Applications
  47. School CPTED concepts are the same…S urveillance (Will I be seen?)A ccess (Who can get in and out)?T erritoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
  48. S urveillance (Will I be seen?)
  49. A study of fiveMidwestern highschools found of166 violentincidents, nonetook place whenadults were presentAstor RA, Meyer HA, Behre WJ. 1999. Unowned places andtimes: Maps and interviews about violence in high schools.Am Educ Res J 36:3–42.
  50. Adding openings or windows in solid walls Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edf acil/safe_schools.asp
  51. Blocking access tohidden areasPhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to EnhanceSecurity and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  52. convex mirrorsfor visibilityaround corners
  53. Electronic surveillance Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe _schools.asp
  54. Promote surveillance and prevent hiding bykeeping bushes below 1.5 feet and treelimbs above 8 feetPhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to EnhanceSecurity and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  55. Design signage to prevent concealmentPhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to EnhanceSecurity and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  56. “replacing bathroom entrance doors with right-angle entrances permit the warning sounds of crime to travel more freely and reduce the sense of isolation”Sommer, R. (1983). Social design: Creating buildings with people in mind. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
  57. Bathroomareasallowingsound andsmoke totransmitto hallwayPhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to EnhanceSecurity and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  58. 45 degree tapered angles allow seeing around blind corners andexpanding scope of visionPhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to EnhanceSecurity and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  59. moving the staff lunch area or office locations Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldo e.org/edfacil/saf e_schools.asp
  60. A Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  61. Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldo e.org/edfacil/saf e_schools.aspcoaches’ offices should have direct visual and auditory surveillance
  62. A ccess(Who can get in and out)?
  63. Effectiveand subtle Too much obvious access control can undermine schoolenvironment
  64. Attractive windowgrates or separatedsmall windowsprevent access
  65. Converting most exteriordoors to emergency exitsimproves access control
  66. Avoid pull downladders or utilityboxes that allow roof access
  67. Territoriality (Does anyone care what happens here?)
  68. Gangs use graffiti to establish theirterritory; schools take it backthrough repainting, following upwith ongoing, vigilant maintenance
  69. Any generally neglected exterior area will also seem ideal for misbehavior
  70. Landscape buffers may reduce access to graffiti prone walls
  71. Consider the use ofinspirational or student- created artwork Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe .org/edfacil/safe _schools.asp
  72. In progress results from my fMRI research shows greater fear reduction from public artthan from visiblesecurity cameras
  73. Combining Access Control andNatural Surveillance
  74. Access Control + SurveillanceA secure bicycle rack Photo examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003) Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to Enhance Security and Reduce Vandalism; available online at http://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/ safe_schools.asp
  75. Access Control + Surveillancewrought ironfencinginsteadof solid wallsPhoto examples from:Florida Department ofEducation (2003)Florida Safe SchoolDesign Guidelines:Strategies to EnhanceSecurity and ReduceVandalism; availableonline athttp://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  76. Access Control+ SurveillancePhoto examples from: Florida Department of Education (2003)Florida Safe School Design Guidelines: Strategies to EnhanceSecurity and Reduce Vandalism; available online athttp://www.fldoe.org/edfacil/safe_schools.asp
  77. CPTED in Schools Making it Happen
  78. The frontal approach Suggest that the school hire a CPTED specialist to complete an analysis of campus buildings and make recommendations on improvements
  79. Did you just say,“let’s spend money so we can create aneed to spend more money?”
  80. The “what I think” approachExamine thebuildings and makerecommendationsbased on what yousee
  81. Why should we spendmoney based on your subjective opinions?
  82. What if neither of these approaches work?
  83. Campus Risk Assessment Algorithm Maps Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor Texas Tech UniversityA free Excel template to generate hot spot maps available at goo.gl/h3KVY or http://www.encouragegenerosity.com/maps.xlxs
  84. Input three objective scores for each space1. Panorama Viewing Area (PVA) The total area* from which a person in the space can be viewed2. Student PVA Typical student population of the PVA over time3. Staff PVA Typical staff population of the PVA over time*a more precise model would incorporate a discounting function by multiplying each area block by 1 where, d = meters to the target space if greater than 7, else d=1 k*(1.1d/7) k=2 if area is separated from target space by glass or video, else k=1
  85. Hot Spot Type 1: Crimesof Opportunity (Minor) High activity/low supervision reflected by a high level of * Student PVA Percentile- Staff PVA Percentile **percentiles are relative rankingacross all occupied areas
  86. Hot Spot Type 2: Concealed Criminal Activity (Major) Low activity/low supervision reflected by an accessible area with low total score of Student PVA Percentile*+ Staff PVA Percentile**percentiles are relative ranking across all occupied areas
  87. 1. Paste outline into Excel templateObtain / create a line drawing floor plan (orcampus map) picture with a transparentbackground to paste and resize in Excel
  88. 2. Insert data into Excel template Insert number of blocks visible from each block [PVA tab] X the student [StudentPVA tab] or staff [StaffPVA tab] population during target period in cells underlying map
  89. 3. Results Color coded maps with percentile rankings for PVA, PVA- Student, PVA- Staff, Hot Spot Type 1, and Hot Spot Type 2
  90. Time Series CRAA Maps Completeprevious analyses for each 20 minute block during a school day
  91. Publish CRAAMaps,with suggestions foraddressing hot spots• Physical changes to increase visibility• Camera placement• Staff location changes• Access restriction (for low activity areas)
  92. Prove theproblemTrack exactlocation of campus conduct violationsand overlay against CRAAMs
  93. Prove the solution Place but not at atreatment(s) comparison at one hot hot spot spottrack violations compared to in one the other
  94. CPTED in Schools General School Making itConcepts Applications Happen
  95. If you found these useful, CLICK onReady this slide and for leave your name and institution tomore? show my bosses that I should make more! (Plus, get info on other free videos/slides)
  96. Russell James, J.D., Ph.D. is associate professor in the Department of Applied and Professional Studies at Texas Tech University. He is the most frequently published author in ISI-ranked academic journals on the topic of residential satisfaction. His research in residential satisfaction led to his interest in environmentally-influenced perceptions of safety. He has presented his urban studies related research nationally and internationally at conferences including The Environmental Design ResearchAssociation, The Housing Educators Research Association, andThe European Network of Housing Researchers. He workedbriefly in the U.S. Attorneys Office (narcotics division) inKansas City and later served over five years as president ofCentral Christian College in Moberly, Missouri during whichtime several new buildings were constructed. His currentresearch involves the use of fMRI brain scanning to uncoverneural correlates of financial and environmental satisfaction.

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