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The Gen. K.S. Thimayya Lecture 2009


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The General Thimayya Lectures are constituted by a few Old Boys of Bishop Cotton Boys’ School, Bangalore to pay tribute to General Kodandera Subayya Thimayya, Padma Bhushan, DSO, Chief of the Army Staff, May 7, 1957 to May 7, 1961, and Old Cottonian (1918-22).

Published in: News & Politics
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The Gen. K.S. Thimayya Lecture 2009

  1. 1. Presentation by ShriGopal K. PillaiUnion Home Secretary & Secretary (Justice) on“India’s Internal Security : Challenges and Responses”General K.S. Thimayya Memorial Lectureat Bishop Cotton Boys School, Bangalore 31st October, 2009<br />1<br />
  2. 2. India – Historical evolution<br />Accession of Kashmir<br />Ethnic identities in the North-East<br />2<br />
  3. 3. A vibrant functioning democracy<br />Centre-State relations<br />73rd and 74th Constitution Amendments.<br />3<br />
  4. 4. Complex Internal Security concerns<br /> (i) Externally Sponsored threats<br /> (ii) Secessionist and Ethnic identity movements<br /> (iii) Internal Armed movements.<br />4<br />
  5. 5. Externally Sponsored Threats<br />Pakistan Sponsored Terrorism<br /> - Let / HM / Al Badr, etc.<br />Impact of Global Terrorism<br />Al Qaida, Taliban, etc.<br />5<br />
  6. 6. TERRORISM IN JAMMU & KASHMIR<br /><ul><li>Despite significant CT successes, terrorist groups still active.
  7. 7. Increased infiltration.
  8. 8. Also, transit through Bangladesh, Nepal, etc.
  9. 9. Possible increase in foreigner content of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.</li></ul>6<br />
  10. 10. TERRORISM IN JAMMU & KASHMIR(1988 – 2009)<br />379<br />156<br />2009 (Extrapolated for full year)<br />7<br />
  11. 11. TERRORISM IN JAMMU & KASHMIRTARGETTING OF POLICE / SF PERSONNEL<br />& SPOs<br />(Extrapolated for full year)<br />2009<br />% of total casualties<br />8<br />
  12. 12. 9<br />
  13. 13. TERRORISM IN JAMMU & KASHMIR<br />INFILTRATIONS<br />(upto August 31)<br />10<br />
  14. 14. TRAINING CAMPS AND LAUNCHING DETTS <br />IN PAKISTAN, POK & NORTHERN AREAS<br />2004<br />2005<br />2006<br />2007<br />2008<br />11<br />
  15. 15. JAMMU & KASHMIR <br />TERRORIST STRENGTH, 2009<br />Decrease<br />since<br /> 2007<br />65%<br />46%<br />81%<br />66%<br />63%<br />46%<br />12<br />
  16. 16. Jammu & Kashmir<br />Talks with mainstream and separatist groups<br />Development initiatives<br />The rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits<br />Healing of wounds.<br />13<br />
  17. 17. North-East<br />Situation in Mizoram peaceful<br />Meghalaya and Tripura stable<br />Ceasefire in Nagaland<br />Assam and Manipur continue to experience significant violence<br />Elevated sensitivity of Siliguri corridor<br />14<br />
  18. 18. Nagaland<br />History of conflict in Nagaland<br />Ceasefire with NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) groups since 1997 and 2000<br />Reconciliation process on<br />Sovereignty and integration of Naga inhabited areas<br />Freedom and autonomy<br />Counter offer<br />15<br />
  19. 19. Assam<br />Illegal migration<br />Rise of ULFA<br />Ethnic identities – Bodo – Karbi Anglong – North Cachar<br />16<br />
  20. 20. Manipur<br />History of Manipur<br />Accession of Manipur<br />Rise of Meiti nationalism<br />Integrity of State and language agitation<br />State in collective depression<br />17<br />
  21. 21. SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTH EASTERN STATES<br />Assam<br />Nagaland<br />Manipur<br />(Extrapolated)<br />(Extrapolated)<br />(Extrapolated)<br />18<br />
  22. 22. SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTH EASTERN STATES<br />Meghalaya<br />Tripura<br />Arunachal Pradesh<br />(Extrapolated)<br />(Extrapolated)<br />(Extrapolated)<br />19<br />
  23. 23. NORTH EASTERN STATES <br />GROUP WISE VIOLENCE, 2009<br />Assam<br />Nagaland<br />Manipur<br />20<br />
  24. 24. Left-Wing Extremism<br />Naxalism – Naxalbari<br />Merger of CPI(ML) and People’s War Group in 2004<br />Birth of CPI(Maoist)<br />21<br />
  25. 25. CPI (MAOIST)<br /><ul><li>Most dominant group: Extremely well organised
  26. 26. Commands loyalty of 86% of Naxal cadres
  27. 27. Responsible for 90% of Naxal incidents
  28. 28. Responsible for 94% of Naxal killings
  29. 29. Replete with weapons
  30. 30. Adept at deployment of IEDs
  31. 31. Mobilization through front organizations</li></ul>22<br />
  32. 32. <ul><li>Incidents and killings on the increase – nearing peak level of 1971
  33. 33. 11 States witnessing Naxal violence
  34. 34. Mobilization in 8 other States, which could translate into violence in due course</li></ul>23<br />
  35. 35. LEFT WING EXTREMIST VIOLENCE<br />2232<br />827<br />(Extrapolated for full year)<br />24<br />
  36. 36. 25<br />
  37. 37. TERRORISM IN THE HINTERLAND<br /><ul><li>Pak-based groups active.
  38. 38. Trend that began one decade ago has got entrenched.
  39. 39. Wide range of targets – besides prominent personalities and iconic establishments, elements of India’s sensitive sectors in the crosshairs.</li></ul>26<br />
  40. 40. TERRORISM IN THE HINTERLAND ..2<br /><ul><li>Improved ‘maritime’ capability of LeT.
  41. 41. New footholds in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Maldives.
  42. 42. Increasing sophistication in communication. </li></ul>27<br />
  43. 43. TERRORISM IN PUNJAB<br /><ul><li>Collaboration between Babbar Khalsa International and Khalistan Zindabad Force.
  44. 44. Resultant elevation of ‘profile of terrorism’.
  45. 45. Foreign funding and support significant.
  46. 46. Some signs of new recruitment. </li></ul>28<br />
  47. 47. Management of India’s Borders<br />15106.7 kilometers of land border.<br />Fencing and flood-lighting of Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangladesh borders.<br />The management of India-Nepal, India-Myanmar and India-Bhutan borders.<br />29<br />
  48. 48. Responses<br />Strengthening of intelligence apparatus, including setting up of Multi Agency Centre to coordinate intelligence inputs.<br />Setting up National Intelligence Grid.<br />National Counter Terrorism Centre (on the anvil).<br />Setting up regional hubs of NSG at Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Hyderabad.<br />30<br />
  49. 49. Responses<br />Setting up of Quick Reaction Teams.<br />Setting up of Counter Insurgency and Terrorism Schools for training security forces.<br />Sanctioning 29 new battalions of BSF, 38 new battalions of CRPF, 12 new battalions of ITBP.<br />Sanctioning of 145 no. of IRB in the States.<br />31<br />
  50. 50. Responses<br />Modernising the State Police Force through better weapons, equipments, etc.<br />Augmenting Coastal security through purchase of high speed interceptor boats and issuing identity cards to all residents of coastal villages (ongoing).<br />Procurement of ALH helicopters for CPMFs.<br />Safe Mega City policy.<br />32<br />
  51. 51. Responses<br />Setting up of National Investigation Agency. <br />Strengthening State Police Forces and augmenting their capacity to tackle terrorism and armed movements.<br />Media Management.<br />Laying down Standard Operating Procedures for different situations.<br />33<br />
  52. 52. Non-Militancy Internal Security concerns:<br />Governance issues<br />Population migration<br />Cyber Terrorism<br />Environmental Degradation<br />Climate Change<br />Organised Crime<br />Fake Indian Currency Notes<br />34<br />
  53. 53. Thank You<br />35<br />