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Mf in inia 2007

  1. 1. Conference Version
  2. 2. Microfinance in India A State of the Sector Report, 2007 By Prabhu Ghate Sai Gunaranjan Vijay Mahajan Prasanth Regy Frances Sinha Sanjay Sinha Microfinance India 28 Hauz Khas Village, New Delhi 110 016This report represents the personal views of the chapter authors. It does not represent theviews of Microfinance India, or of its sponsors, or of the Microfinance India Advisory Group. 1
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  4. 4. ContentsChapter Page NoForeword 5Preface and Acknowledgments 6Abbreviations 81 Overview 11 Prabhu Ghate2 Progress Under the SHG Bank Linkage Programme 35 Prabhu Ghate3 SHG Federations: Financiers or Nurturers? 49 Prabhu Ghate4 MFI Performance: Efficiency with Growth 73 Sanjay Sinha5 Urban Microfinance 83 Prabhu Ghate6 Social Performance in Indian Microfinance 105 Frances Sinha7 Micro Insurance 119 Sai Gunaranjan8 Microfinance and Technology 131 Prasanth V Regy and Vijay Mahajan9 Regulation: The Microfinance Bill: An Opportunity Being Lost? 149 Prabhu GhateList of Tables Page NoTable 2.1 Growth trends in the SBLP 36Table 2.2 Growth of linked SHGs in 13 Priority States 37Table 2.3 Growth trends in the SBLP for 2006-07, by state 43Table 2.4 Growth of linked SHGs in the regions 38Table 2.5 Agency- wise number of SHGs financed 38Table 4.1 Regional distribution of Indian MFIs rated by M-CRIL 74Table 4.2 Distribution of sample Indian MFIs by microfinance model 75Table 4.3 Distribution of sample MFIs by legal form 75Table 4.4 Operating expense ratios of Indian MFIs 78Table 4.5 Capital adequacy ratios of Indian MFIs 80Table 4.6 Portfolio yield relative to APR 81Table 4.7 Outreach of efficient microfinance institutions 82Table 9.1 Successive versions of the microfinance bill 163Table 9.2 MFOs and MFIs 164 3
  5. 5. Appendix Tables Page NoTable A.1 Fact Sheet on coverage and growth of India microfinance, 2006-07 179Table A.2 Information on 129 MFIs covered in Sa-Dhans Quick Report 2007 180Table A.3 Lending by selected apex financing institutions and banks to MFIs 188Table A.4 Salient features of India-oriented equity investors 189Table A.5 Insurance coverage by selected MFIs 191Table A.6 List of selected transformations 192List of Boxes Page NoBox 1.1 Cashpor: Stoppage of Partnership Funding 14Box 1.2 The challenges of raising capital: Inside the entrepreneur’s mind 26Box 3.1 “The SHG Revolution: What Next?” 50Box 3.2 MYRADA’s Community Managed Resource Centres (CMRCs) 53Box 3.3 DHAN Foundation federations: changing with the times 55Box 3.4 Making non-financial federations viable: PRADAN’s experience 57Box 3.5 Roshan Vikas: An urban SHG federation 62Box 3.6 Swayanshree at the crossroads: To borrow or to facilitate direct linkages? 63Box 5.1 The uses and abuses of moneylenders 86Box 5.2 The ubiquity of moneylenders in Bangalore 87Box 5.3 Mobility in a Delhi slum 89Box 5.4 Segmentation by loan purpose 90Box 5.5 Ujjivan’s approach to urban housing microfinance: helping customers climb the housing ladder 92Box 5.6 Individual loans and product diversification at SEWA Bank 94Box 6.1 Dimensions of social performance 106Box 7.1 Providing sustainable and competitive insurance products to rural customers 121Box 7.2 SEWA and rainfall insurance 127Box 8.1 The evolution of MIS in Basix 135Box 8.2 A hosted solution: FINO 137Box 8.3 TAFI: Putting mobile phone technology to work as a BC for remittances 145Box 9.1: The microfinance bill: a case study in dilution 162Box 9.2 Misunderstandings about savings 165Box 9.3 Grameen II and flexible, voluntary savings 166Box 9.4 Sa-Dhan’s Voluntary Mutual Code of Conduct 167Box 9.5 A bit of history: Self-regulation backed by legal sanctions 168List of Figures Page NoFigure 4.1 Membership of sample MFIs 76Figure 4.2 Average savings per member by model 77Figure 4.3 OER by loan size 78Figure 4.4 Relationship of portfolio size with efficiency 79Figure 4.5 Sources of funds for microfinance operations 79Figure 6.1 Assessing social performance 1084
  6. 6. ForewordThis is the second of a series of Annual Reports on the microfinance sector in India, prepared for presentationto the annual Microfinance India conference organized by ACCESS Development Services. The MicrofinanceIndia Conference, over the last four years, has become established as perhaps the most recognized sectorevent, and attracts large-scale interest from diverse stakeholders from the sector, and interested observersfrom within and outside the country, and has become known for insightful discussions and debates of keyissues challenging the sector. This years conference, the fourth in the series, is being held on October 9-10. Among others, a specific significant contribution of Microfinance India, in addition to the conference,has been the publication of the State of the Sector Report annually released at the time of the Conference.Like last year, the State of the Sector Report contains two chapters on progress under each of the two mainmodels of microfinance in India viz. linkage banking and MFIs. These two chapters are proposed to becarried every year and carry the most updated review of how the two models have progressed during theyear. In addition, the Report includes five chapters on "new" topics and themes that could not be coveredin the last State of the Sector Report, but continue to be of current and future significance to the Sector.These topics relate to SHG federations, evaluation of social performance, urban microfinance, developmentsin technology, and perspectives on regulatory issues, including the pending microfinance bill. A fewtopics such as developments in commercial bank lending to MFIs, equity investments, and issues relatingto the mounting challenge of the growing need for quality human resource for the sector could not becovered again in this years report for reasons of space, but are proposed to be taken up in subsequentyears. In future years, we also hope to include themes, which have yet to be covered, such as livelihoodsfinance, financial inclusion, financial literacy, et al. The abundance of additional information collated bythe author may necessitate a second edition of the report.In order to broad-base participation in preparation of the report and take fullest advantage of the richexpertise available in the sector, four of the chapters contained in this years report have been contributedby well known sector experts. I am personally grateful to them for taking valuable time off from theirother responsibilities. I acknowledge support extended for one of these chapters, that on the MFImodel, by the MIX. All of them have been equally ambitious to continue to support this ACCESS -Microfinance initiative to make the State of the Sector Report as valuable to the sector as possible.To ensure widespread distribution of last years State of the Sector Report, it has been brought out asbook under the title of Microfinance in India: The Challenges of Rapid Growth. The book has beenpublished by Sage Publications as a paperback so as to enhance affordability.I am also grateful to our sponsors Swiss Development Cooperation and Ford Foundation and the closeassociation of both Adrian and Ajit at all stages of the Reports progress. And finally, I am immenselygrateful to Prabhu, who, exhausted from the first effort, with some persuasion, agreed to author the2007 report. I also would like to thank my team at ACCESS for the support provided to this effort. Mostimportantly, I am grateful to the sector at large for their very positive response to last years report,which encouraged us to raise our ambition for the current years report, and to persist with the idea ofbringing it out annually.I hope the sector will find the State of the Sector Report 2007 equally valuable as last year and continueto support the effort through sharing information, contributing experiences from the field and bringingin their perspectives on the sector. Vipin Sharma CEO, ACCESS Development Services, New Delhi 5
  7. 7. Preface and AcknowledgementsLike last years report on the state of the Indian microfinance sector, this years seeks todocument developments, clarify issues, publicize studies, stimulate research, identify policychoices, generate understanding, and enhance support for the sector. Given the increasingcomplexity and diversity of the sector, each annual edition of the report can try, but isunlikely to succeed, in being a comprehensive record of everything that happened during theyear. In its choice of topics this years report tries to complement last years. Thus it coversfive topics not covered last year, two of them contained in chapters by practitioners (thoseon technology and social performance) and three of them in chapters by the lead author(those on SHG federations, urban microfinance, and regulation). A third chapter on insuranceis also by a practitioner. I am grateful to Vijay Mahajan, Sai Gunaranjan and Prasanth Regy forgiving the report a more practical flavour by drawing on the experience of BASIX, an industryleader in the adoption (and adaptation) of both technology and micro insurance. FrancesSinha leads M-CRILs pioneering efforts in introducing social performance assessment to India(and indeed to many other countries), and Sanjay Sinha is one of Indias leading analysts ofthe MFI model through M-CRILs rating work and the periodic M-CRIL Reviews.Many of the people whose help I gratefully acknowledged last year were generous again insharing their time and understanding. I hope they will understand if I do not thank themindividually again. Among those I had not managed to contact last year but were an invaluablesource of information and guidance this year were Vikram Akula, Ramesh Arunachalam, AnjaliBanthia, Mukti Bosco, Arabdha Das, T Dhanaraj, BR Diwakar, Malini Eden , Aloysius Fernandez,Suvarna Rani Gandham, Aseem Gandhi, Chandra Shekhar Ghosh, Samit Ghosh, Gita Goel, Marie-Luise Haberberger, Pradeep Jena, Mohd Ali Karim, KG Karmakar, Jugal Kataria, S. Kathiresan,Manish Khera, Sudha Kothari, Aparna Krishnan, Ajit Kumar Maity, Veena Mankar, Jan Meissner,Amulya Mohanty, Nayana Mohanty, R Murali, Ravi Narasimhan, Venky Natarajan, Anant Natu,Parashuram Nayak, LB Prakash, Vidya Ramachandran, RV Ramakrishna, S Ramamurthy, AbhijitRay, Chinappa Reddy, Rama Reddy, Suma Reddy, Shubhankar Sengupta, HP Singh, Jaipal Singh,Usha Somasundaram, Girija Srinivasan, Mark Straub, Yusuke Taishi,Usha Thorat, and Srikrishna.My apologies to the many others who have been left out. My thanks to all of you.I would like to thank the following institutions for their support: Sa-Dhan for coming out insuch timely fashion with this years "Quick Report 2007: A Snapshot of MFIs in India" whichforms the basis of an important table in the statistical appendix; the Center for Micro Finance,Chennai, for useful interactions over the year: and M2i through Deepak Alok and Avishek6
  8. 8. Sarcar, who helped put together the statistical appendix, brief though it is because of thepaucity of time and the scattered nature of the data available.I would like to thank the sponsors for giving me this opportunity to immerse myself foranother year in a sector peopled by so many creative and inspiring individuals. I am gratefulalso to Vipin Sharma of ACCESS India for his encouragement, and the freedom and flexibilityhe gave me while I tried to put together the various pieces of the complicated puzzle that isIndian microfinance; to his team consisting of Nishant Tirath and Yeshu Bansal and othercolleagues for help provided; and to Malcolm Harper and Brij Mohan, two of our resourcepersons, for being on tap once again with a constant flow of good advice and stimulatingcomments.In order to establish continuity and avoid duplication, I refer back frequently to "last yearsreport", which is now conveniently available as a paperback. While I have attempted to consultas many sector participants as possible, I am conscious that a number of significantdevelopments and materials relevant to the topics covered may have escaped my attention. Iwould request readers to bring them to my attention, as well as any other comments orcorrections, so that they can be taken into account while preparing the report for finalpublication. I am sure the other chapter authors would also welcome feedback. The intentionis to make these reports as collaborative an effort as possible. Needless to say, the viewsexpressed in our respective chapters are entirely our own. Prabhu Ghate 7
  9. 9. AbbreviationsAIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency SyndromeALW A Little WorldAMMACTS Acts Mahila Mutually Aided Cooperative Thrift SocietyAMUL Anand Milk-producers Union LimitedAP Andhra PradeshAPMACS Andhra Pradesh Mutually Aided Cooperative SocietiesAPMAS Andhra Pradesh Mahila Abhivruddhi SocietyAPR Annualised Percentage RateASP Ankuram Sanghamam PoramATM Automated Teller MachineAWA Assistant Anganwadi WorkerAWW Anganwadi WorkerBC Business CorrespodentBDS Business Development serviceCASHE Credit and Savings for Household EnterpriseCASHPOR Credit and Savings for the Hardcore PoorCBHI Central Bureau of Health IntelligenceCBMFI Community Based MFICBO Capacity Building OrganisationCBS Core Banking SolutionCDF Cooperative Development FoundationCGAP Consultative Group to Assist the PoorCIF Community Investment FundsCM Computer MunshiCMF Center for MicrofinanceCMRC Community Managed Resource CentresCRAR Capital to Risk Weighted Assets RatioDCCB District Central Cooperative BankDF DHAN FoundationDFID Department for International Development+B1DRDA District Rural Development AuthorityDWCD Department of Women and Child DevelopmentEIR Effective Interest RateEWI Equated Weekly InstallmentFAMIS Financial Accounting and Management Information SystemFGD Focussed Group DiscussionFINO Financial Information Network & Operations LtdFLDG First Loss Deficiency GuaranteeFWWB Friends of Women’s World Banking8
  10. 10. GCC General Purpose Credit CardsGNI Gross National IncomeGRADES G stands for governance, R for resources, A for asset quality, D for design of systems, E for efficiency and profitability, and S for services to member SHGs and their performance.GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische ZusammenarbeitHDFC Housing Development Finance CorporationHIV Human Immunodeficiency VirusHO Head OfficeHR Human ResourcesHUDCO Housing Urban Development CorporationIB Individual BankingICT Information Communication TechnologyIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIGS Indian Grameen ServicesIKP Indira Kranti PathamILO International Labour OrganisationIPO Initial Public OfferingIRDA Insurance Regulatory and Development AuthorityIT Information TechnologyJLG Joint Liability GroupKBSLAB Krishna Bhima Samruddhi Local Area BankKDFS Kalanjiam Development and Financial ServicesKSDF Kalighat Society for Development FacilitationKVK Krishi Vigyan KendrasKYC Know Your CustomerLAB Local Area BankLAN Local Area NetworkLSS "Lights and Shades" StudyMACS Mutually Aided Cooperative SocietyMBT Mutual Benefit TrustMCRA Micro Credit Regulatory AuthorityM-CRIL Micro-credit Ratings International LtdMFDC Microfinance Development CouncilMFDEF Micro Finance Development and Equity FundMFI Microfinance InstitutionMFO Microfinance OrganisationsMIFOS Microfinance Open SourceMIS Management Information SystemMIX Microfinance Information ExchangeMSDF Michael & Susan Dell FoundationNABARD National Bank for Agriculture and Rural DevelopmentNABFINS Nabard Financial ServicesNBFC Non-Banking Financial CompanyNBJK Nav Bharat Jagriti KendraNCAER National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAERNDA National Democratic AllianceNDDB National Dairy Development BoardNE North EastNFC Near Field CommunicationNGO Non Governmental OrganizationNOF Net Owned FundNPA Non Performing Assets 9
  11. 11. NREGA National Rural Employment Guarantee Act NSSO National Sample Survey Organisation OER Operating Expense Ratio OSS Operating Self Sufficiency PACS Primary Agricultural Credit Societies PAR Portfolio At Risk PC Personal Computer PDA Personal Digital Assistant PHC Public Health Centre PLR Prime Lending Rate POS Point of Sale PPP Purchasing Power Parity PRADAN Professional Assistance for Development Action PSS Pragathi Sewa Samithi PWMACTS The Payakaraopta Women’s Mutually Aided Cooperative Thrift And Credit Society Ltd RBI Reserve Bank of India RGVN Rashtriya Grameen Vikas Nidhi RMK Rashtriya Mahila Kosh RRB Regional Rural Bank RSRO Recognised Self Regulatory Authority RV Roshan Vikas SBLP SHG Bank Linkage Program SC Scheduled Caste SCB State Cooperative Bank SEEP Small Enterprise Education and Promotion SERP The Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty SEWA Self-Employed Womens Association SGSY Swarna Jayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojna SHG Self Help Group SHPA Self Help Promotion Agency SHPI Self Help Promoting Institution SIDBI Small Industries Development Bank of India SIM Subscriber Identity Module SKDRDP Shri Kshetra Dhamrmasthala Rural Development Project SKS Swayam Krishi Sangam SNFL Sarvodaya Nano Finance Limited SPM Social Performance Management SPMS Sri Padmavathy Mahila Abyudaya Sangh SPOT Specified Point of Transaction SQL Structured Query Language SRO Self Regulatory Authority ST Scheduled Tribe STEP Strategies and Tools against social Exlusion and Poverty SWAWS Sharadas Women’s Association for Weaker Section TAFI Technology Assisted Financial Inclusion TNCDW Tamil Nadu Corporation for the Development of Women UCB Urban Cooperative Bank UNDP United Nations Development Program UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply USP Unique Selling Proposition VO Village Organization VWS Village Welfare Society NOTE: 1 CRORE = 10 MILLION, 1 LAKH = 10,000, US$1 = RS 40 APPROXIMATELY10
  12. 12. CHAPTER 1 Overview CHAPTER 1 OverviewGrowth of the sector continues to be rapid...The SHG-Bank Linkage Programme (SBLP) covered a further 9.6 million persons in 2006-07, over 90percent of them women, and about them half of them poor (Fact Sheet, Table A.1). The total number ofSHG members who have ever received credit through the programme has grown therefore to 41 millionpersons. Microfinance Institutions, (MFIs), the other model of microfinance in India, grew even morestrongly, and added an estimated 3 million new borrowers to reach a total coverage of about 10.5million borrowers. Both programmes taken together have therefore reached about 50 million households.Only 36.8 million of these are being currently being served, however. (Table A.1)However, not all microfinance borrowers are poorAbout half of SHG members, and only 30 percent of MFI members are estimated to be below the Indicate thepoverty line.1 Thus about 22 percent of all poor households (about 75 million) are currently sector continues toreceiving microfinance services, or at least microcredit. Given limitations in the data base make strongthat continue to afflict the sector, these are only rough estimates, but they indicate the progress towards thesector continues to make strong progress towards the goal of extending financial inclusion to goal ofthe roughly fourth-fifths of the population who do not receive credit from the banks, although extendingthere is still a long way to go. Slower progress is being made in reaching out to poor households.2 financial inclusion to the roughly fourth-MFI borrowers receive larger first loans than SHG members, but since (i) the average duration fifths of theof MFI loans is shorter (generally one year instead of two), (ii) MFIs have been expanding population who do not receiverapidly, bringing down average MFI loan size (Chapter 4), and (iii) the size of repeat loans to credit from theSHGs has been growing even faster than first loans (Chapter 2), the difference in average loans banks, althoughoutstanding per borrower in the two models no longer appears to be significant.3 there is still a long way to go. Slower progressThe sector needs to pay more attention to depth of is being made in reaching outoutreach and other quality issues to poor householdsBoth models continue to do relatively well on loan repayment performance4 and on empoweringwomen by improving their economic status in the household. The SHG model has the additionalempowerment benefit of bringing almost a million SHG leaders into direct contact with thebanks, and in a few states giving them an opportunity to represent their groups in SHGsfederations at the village and higher levels. While SHG federations are still being formed in 11
  13. 13. most states, in a few states such as AP they have started playing an increasingly active role in delivering economic and social services (Chapter 3). Last years report made the point that now that the goal of making a significant dent on the challenge of financial inclusion seems attainable, the sector should pay more attention to quality issues. It expressed the concern that growth in the SBLP in particular was running ahead of the programmes capacity to ensure quality. The programme has decelerated only slightly this year in terms of new groups linked, and not at all in respect of loans disbursed (which now amount to a cumulative amount of Rs 18,000 crores (Chapter 2). Indeed the SBLP is now growing under its own momentum. There is of course a need to accelerate growth in the underserved states which are mostly in Although there the central and eastern regions, and slower growth in the programme as a whole will not in are some well known itself lead to higher quality in terms of depth of outreach (the proportion of SHG members exceptions, below the poverty line), or in book-keeping capacity, which is crucial for a whole range of including MFIs performance variables such as the drop-out rate, the equity of loan distribution within groups, who rely on methods such and indeed of the longevity of groups themselves. There have been no reported new approaches as an easy-to- by NGOs promoting SHGs, or by NABARD, in tackling the phenomenon of self-exclusion, by use housingindex to target introducing lower and more flexible monthly savings requirements in keeping with the variablethe poor, most and uncertain incomes of the poor. Assistance to promoting NGOs remains inadequate to MFIs, while enable them to provide training inputs for long enough to ensure group sustainability. Studiescontributing to the financial show that groups promoted by field level government functionaries who are given targets in inclusion addition to their regular duties, tend to be the weakest, and receive the lowest hand-holding objective, are inputs after the groups have been formed. While progress is being made in expanding the making no special efforts programme in 13 priority states as discussed in Chapter 2, it is being achieved on the basis of to target the government-promoted groups, since these are the states where good NGOs tend be thinnest poor on the ground. It would enhance quality consciousness at all levels of the programme if NABARD could include in its annual report on the programme, information on the quality of groups. A grading system has already been prescribed for purposes of loan appraisal by the banks, but it is not being used in monitoring of the programme. Grading would of course have to be done on a sample basis given the immensity of the task of grading all groups. Increasing the depth of outreach is equally urgent for MFIs,5 although it could be argued that as the SHG programme expands to all parts of the country SHGs should attempt to meet the demand for household consumption and emergency loans and for relatively small investment loans for income generation activities, while allowing MFIs to cater to the market for larger loans, which is growing rapidly in the rural areas. The emergence of some such division of labour will help reduce MFI transactions costs and therefore interest charged to MFI borrowers. SHGs are designed to internalize these costs. Although they do so, they end up charging their borrowers about the same rates as MFIs, in order to build up group capital. The modal SHG charges 2 percent per month, or 24 percent per annum, as against average MFI rates for the country as a whole of 21 percent as self-reported by 129 MFIs in Sa-Dhan 2007, or about 25 percent according to a smaller M-CRIL sample (Chapter 4).6 However, until some such division of labour takes place it would be unfortunate if MFIs in their urge to expand and reduce unit costs increasingly neglect the poorest borrowers, as seems to be already happening. Although there are some well known exceptions, including MFIs who rely on methods such as an easy-to-use housing index to target the poor,7 most MFIs, while contributing to the financial inclusion objective, are making no special efforts to target the poor. For many of them, lending to the poorest borrowers is increasingly becoming 12
  14. 14. CHAPTER 1 Overviewa niche activity, assigned to special projects. Many of them are increasingly describing theirtarget group in such terms as the "the sub-prime market", the "missing middle", "low incomegroups" etc.8Depth of outreach is one of the social performance variables that the new social rating toolsbeing developed in India and elsewhere seek to monitor (Chapter 6). Client satisfaction andclient protection issues are other social performance quality variables that have come to thefore in India after last years Krishna district episode (Chapter 4 of last years report).The on-lending funds constraint makes a reappearanceAs last years report points out, there was a time when MFI managers had to devote most oftheir time and energy to dealing with the uncertainty of where the next loan for on-lendingfunds was going to come from. However the rapid expansion of commercial bank lending tothe sector from 2004 led to the happy situation in which this was no longer the case. MFIlending grew rapidly, both through the expansion of existing MFIs and the incubation of newones, and the Indian microfinance sector became one the most highly leveraged in the world(Chapter 3, last years report).However, developments during the year have made it more difficult to be as sanguine as before The partnershipthat the onlending funds constraint on continued growth of MFIs has for once and all been model in effectremoved. The rapid expansion of lending to MFIs was due largely to the introduction by ICICI removed bothBank of its "partnership model", under which loans to borrowers remained on the books of the the equity and the on-lendingbank, off the balance sheet of the MFI partner, which only undertook loan origination, monitoring fundsand collection services for a fee. Thus the MFI performed the role of a social intermediary, while constraints atcredit risk was borne largely by the bank, although the MFI had to share the risk of default up to one stroke... This majora specified level, by providing a "first loss guarantee". This greatly reduced the amount of equity innovationwith which an MFI required to support its borrowings, and the partnership model in effect unfortunately came unstuckremoved both the equity and the on-lending funds constraints at one stroke. during the yearThis major innovation unfortunately came unstuck during the year, initially due to the APcrisis in March 2006 and regulatory concerns about KYC (Know Your Customer) requirements,but thereafter because ICICI changed its own requirements under the partnership model, andindeed its whole vision of the nature of the relationship it wants to have with its partners. ByMarch 2006, ICICI Banks lending had grown to constitute about two-thirds of total lendingto the sector, with about 60 percent of its lending coming under the partnership model.9However, instead of increasing sharply again as in previous years, ICICIs lending has declinedin 2006-07, and is likely to stay relatively low in the current year. One of the concerns raisedby the AP crisis was the possibility of multiple borrowing by MFI customers from both themajor MFIs in the district concerned, both of who were major partners of the bank under thepartnership model. While there is no evidence that this led to over-lending as reflected in aninability to repay loans,10 ICICI was urged by the RBI to strengthen its KYC procedures nowthat the loans were on the banks own books and not on those of the partner.11It took some time for ICICIs partners to furnish the relevant information, during which timefresh lending under the partnership model was suspended. It was partly substituted by termloans, but not in sufficient amounts to alleviate the stress being experienced by partners whowere now strapped for funds. While other banks increased their lending, it was mostly to 13
  15. 15. existing partners, although some switching may have taken place. Box 1.1 describes the loan fund stringency caused to a major partner of the bank, an experience not untypical of that undergone by a number of former partners, especially the smaller ones.12 Box 1.1 Cashpor: Stoppage of Partnership Funding This was an unexpected and major challenge for the Company during the last Fiscal. Funds stopped flowing, suddenly and without notice, from our major off-balance sheet funder in early September. As about half (47%) of our total portfolio was under Partnership, and it amounted to Rs. 29.2 crore, danger signals started flashing. To make things worse, we could not get a clear explanation from the Bank, nor any indication as to when the funds would flow again. Normally under Partnership, our portfolio grows over-time according to demand from clients, as the funds are on tap. For efficient fund management the practice is to contra due repayments against new loan disbursement. If there are no longer any funds for new disbursement, however, due repayments still have to be made - taking funds out of circulation in the field. With the stoppage of funds, not only did we have to find new funds for new clients but also for subsequent loans of existing clients. Suddenly we needed about Rs.6 crore of new funds, every month! Fortunately we had been negotiating with two other banks to provide funding under Partnership, so as to diversify our sources of that important category of funding. They agreed to start funding under Partnership, and we transferred 4 of the 6 Districts funded under partnership to them. One of them got cold feet, however, at the last moment, as there were rumours circulating that the RBI was not happy with Partnership funding, and had directed the major bank involved to stop it. Similar rumours have continued to circulate and have even appeared in the press; but RBI has not issued any public clarification. Meanwhile, after a month and a half, our original Partner Bank, offered a term loan to replace its Partnership funding, which the Company accepted. Then in December, funds started flowing again under Partnership. Then, just as suddenly and without notice, the flow stopped again in early January. It had not resumed by end of the Fiscal; but the Bank has made an additional term loan available. Nevertheless, the irregularity and uncertainty over the flow of Partnership funds have caused considerable delay and confusion on the ground among clients and staff of the Company. The continuing failure of the Bank and RBI to inform the MFIs and the public as to the reasons for the stoppage and if and how the flow of funds could be resumed is creating uncertainty which is unhealthy for the financial system…Partnership funding was a break- through to reaching increasing numbers of BPL households with financial services. Its stoppage removes economic opportunity from them. Informally we have discovered that the proximate reason for the stoppages in Partnership funding last Fiscal was strict new guidelines that RBI insisted for it. It seems that the main Bank involved was slow to meet these requirements, did not inform its partner MFIs clearly about them and their deadlines, and finally was instructed by their own legal department that they were in violation and had to stop. We are now clear that Partnership funding can resume when RBI KYC (Know Your Client) requirements are fully-met and compliance is maintained, and when the banks involved receive day-end transaction information for clients under Partnership. KYC requirements are being fully complied with by CMC; and we will soon test the FINO technological solution for providing day-end transaction information to the banks. Partnership funding is expected to resume as the new technology spreads. It might be asked as to why the Company wishes to resume Partnership funding, when it and the main Bank involved have been unreliable? The answer is simple. Our overriding objective is increase in our outreach to BPL households. Partnership funding, as imperfect as it has been, enables us to expand that outreach twice as much as we could without it. Extract from "Highlights from the Chairman", in "CASHPOR Annual Report, 2006-07: Crossing Two Lac BPL Clients", CASHPOR, Varanasi, 200714
  16. 16. CHAPTER 1 OverviewAnd technology makes an entryDuring this period it seems ICICIs own thinking underwent a change as it gained a betterunderstanding of the limitations of the MIS systems of most of its partners. Many MFIs are stillputting in place computerized information systems that can track ever-larger number oftransactions and branch accounts. MIS systems are the foundation of other technologyapplications, and are discussed in Chapter 8. It came around to the view that without majorreliance on technology (and renewed inputs of capacity-building) most partners would not beavailable to furnish KYC (Know Your Customer) information in a timely fashion, and certainlynot by the "end of day", as required under the guidelines of the business correspondent model(see below). However, there was an even more important reason for why ICICI Bank came tofeel the need to reflect all transactions in its books on a real time basis, which had to do withthe banks own rethinking of its stance towards microfinance.The bank has always been interested in developing what it has called the "missing markets" of Many MFIs arecomplementary infrastructure, including shared borrower information systems. It is making a still putting in placemajor effort to introduce smart cards bearing unique ID numbers and biometric information computerized(finger prints) that will help identify customers, track service usage, and build up customer information systems thathistories. In the longer term this will be an essential element in the creation of credit information can track ever-systems such as credit bureaus. The "front-end" technology will have to be supported however larger numberby "back-end" "core banking" infrastructure consisting of "hosted" or centralized software, of transactions and branchwhich can be shared by several customers, and which can communicate with hand held devices accounts. MIS(or POS or "point of sale" terminals) in the field, which read and record transaction information systems are the foundation ofon the customers smart cards. If internet connectivity is available, the smart cards can be otherused on a real time basis, enabling real-time sharing of credit information across the branch technologynetwork. ICICI is supporting such a system through FINO, a company which seeks to provide applicationsa core banking solution, not just to MFIs but to other banks and financial institutions andeven state governments (Chapter 8).13Partnership loans are being extended only to existing or new partners who are willing to signup for FINO, or any alternative core banking system.14 Only a small proportion of the banksformer 100 odd partners are reported to have joined so far.15 As we have seen, for those formerpartners who have decided not to join, lending flows have declined because term loans arenot intended to fully substitute for the former level of partnership flows.While ICICI Bank continued to make term loans as an interim measure to alleviate distress, ithas veered around to a strong preference for partnership lending supported by technology forthe long-term advantage the combination of partnership lending and ICT holds out of beingable to generate customer information, not just on credit, but also on savings, insurance,remittance and other transactions, built up through the use of smart cards. Smart cards arebeing issued through partners to all borrowers. ICICI has also launched pilots to collectsavings through smart cards and point of sale devices through several partners around thecountry under the business correspondent scheme, and expects eventually to be able to makeindividual loans to the same customers on the basis of the customer information built up.16Conversely it has lost interest in making term loans to MFIs conducting group lending alongtraditional minimalist lines.Given the radically changed perspective on the part of the major lender it is possible we are 15
  17. 17. Given the likely to be in the midst of at least a temporary hiccup in the growth rate of lending under the radically MFI model, especially to medium sized and small MFIs, until other banks and bulk lenders such changed perspective on as SIDBI, FWWB, and others can step in to fill the breach.17 While banks other than ICICI havethe part of the been increasing their lending quite sharply, they are doing so from a relatively small base.18major lender it Independently of these developments, the World Bank is reported to be considering making a is possible weare likely to be loan to SIDBI which would enable SIDBI to further step up its lending, and make longer termin the midst of loans with the grace periods necessary to finance MFI deficits in the initial years. Demand for at least a temporary such loans is certainly likely to strengthen, especially on the part of smaller MFIs who may not hiccup in the be able to attract the equity investments which could temporarily alleviate credit stringency growth rate of for larger MFIs. A greater diversity of lenders will reduce unhealthy dependence on a single lending underthe MFI model, large lender. Another possible source of funds are member savings which in Bangladesh especially to contribute about a third of the funding base, while lowering at the same time the average medium sizedand small MFIs, cost of funds (Chapter 9). However this option is not proposed to be made available to the until other bulk of the sector consisting of NBFCs and S 25 companies by the emerging regulatory regime banks and bulk for the sector, as discussed below.lenders such as SIDBI, FWWB, and others can step in to fill Private equity also makes an entry, but what are the the breach implications? Two landmark private equity investments in Indian MFIs took place in the first part of the year; a $ 11.5 million investment in SKS, led by Sequoia Capital, at the end of March, followed soon after by a $25 million investment in SHARE, by Legatum Capital. Hyderabad-based SKS is the third largest MFI in India (Table A.2), and is growing perhaps the most rapidly, hoping to end the current financial year with an outreach of about 1.5 million borrowers in 11 states. Sequoia was joined by Unitus equity fund, which already has 2 equity investment partners in India and 8 other "capacity building" partners through an associated foundation with offices in Bangalore, as well as by Vinod Khosla and other investors. This infusion of fresh equity enabled SKS to leverage a Rs 180 crore financial arrangement with Citibank India to finance its expansion plans. Under the deal, Citibank will purchase loans originated by SKS under a limited guarantee provided by US-based Grameen Foundation, which also has an office in India.19 SHARE is Indias largest MFI with over 1 million clients and has plans to grow to 6 million over the next five years. When lending under ICICI Banks partnership model was suspended at the beginning of the year until partners could fulfill KYC requirements SHARE found itself strapped not just for lending funds, but short of the equity capital with which to borrow them as term loans from the banks. Legatums investment gives it majority control of SHARE. It was accompanied by a $2 million investment by Aavishkaar Goodwell Microfinance Development Company, an Indo-Dutch joint venture,20 which becomes the fifth social venture capital company to have a presence in India (Table A.4, and Chapter 7B, last years report). The size of these investments is unusual even by Latin American standards. One came just before, and the other just after Banco Compartamos, a Mexican bank specializing in microfinance, that had started life as an NGO, made an initial public offering of 30 percent of its stocks on Wall Street, in April. The success of the Compartamos floatation, and the size of the SKS and SHARE private placements occasioned considerable excitement world-wide. These were investments by mainstream commercial (as opposed to socially-motivated) investors, whose support would accelerate the mobilization of private capital for massive expansion of 16
  18. 18. CHAPTER 1 Overviewoutreach. They were seen as heralding the beginning of large private placements in microfinanceas "investors now have a clear line of sight towards an exit" (Satterthwaite 2007).However, the huge profits made by the shareholders of Compartamos also stirred world-widedebate about "whether this was what microfinance was all about". The IPO was oversubscribed13 times and the share price surged by 22 percent on the first day of trading alone. Two-thirds of the shares were held by public-purpose institutions and a third were held by privateindividuals, including the co-founders of the NGO.21 The issues raised by Compartamos havebeen discussed comprehensively in a CGAP study. It points out the extremely high profitabilityof Banco (resulting in a return to equity of over 50 percent a year) was based on interest ratesthat were high even by Mexican standards (CGAP 2007). The study felt that that as long asCompartamos was an NGO, its strategy of funding growth on the basis of unusually high profits The study feltand retained earnings so as to expand coverage rapidly to new borrowers, was justified. But that that as long asonce it commercialized in 2000,22 and private investors stood to benefit, it should have Compartamosfunded further growth by tapping into the rapidly expanding flow of funds from socially- was an NGO, its strategy ofminded investors and development-oriented lenders. This would have enabled it to decrease funding growthinterest rates considerably. As the report says "it seems to us at CGAP that after 2000 there on the basis ofwas a direct conflict between the profits of private investors and the financial interest of unusually high profits andCompartamos borrowers. We dont think that Compartamos and its pro-bono majority retainedshareholders gave enough weight to borrowers when setting its prices" earnings so as to expand coverageIt pointed out further that the high IPO prices sets in place expectations and alters the rapidly to newownership structure of Compartamos in such a way that will make it even harder for the borrowers, wascompany to balance social and commercial objectives in the future. The not-for-profit justified. But once itinstitutional shareholders are now in a minority by a tiny margin, although they can still commercializedexercise effective control if they vote together. However, the "…practical implication is that in 2000, and privatenew purchasers cannot realize a respectable return on their investment unless future profitability investors stoodis considerably higher than it already was in 2006…new investors…will have little sympathy to benefit, itfor interest rate policies that do not stretch profits to the maximum …" should have funded further growth byThe report is candid enough to admit that "those of us who are involved in MFI transformations tapping intomay need to be clearer about the inevitable governance consequences of those transformations… the rapidlysince our founding in 1995, CGAP has been vocal about the need for interest rates that are high expanding flow of funds fromenough to cover costs, but we have been less emphatic about the loss to clients when interest socially-mindedrates are driven by inefficiency or exorbitant profits. We never made concrete predictions about investors and development-how quickly competition would fix these problems, but we were probably too optimistic on this orientedscore. The Compartamos IPO gives all of us an opportunity to take another look at these questions." lendersSome of the issues raised in the Compartamos debate were reflected in India too, for examplein the debate carried by Microfinance Insights, a quarterly publication by Intellecap, themicrofinance consultingancy company, between the founders of SKS, SHARE and the Basixgroup of companies. The flavour of the debate is conveyed by extracts in Box 1.2. The keyquestion is what is the impact of large commercial investments likely to be on the Indianmicrofinance sector and the borrower? India already has a group of microfinance venturecapital funds driven by a mix of social and commercial objectives23 and they have been activeduring the year, investing both in "transformees" (see below) and start-ups. As a group, theyhave longer time horizons and probably lower-return expectations than the new private equityinvestors.24 However, they cannot hope to match the scale of investments required by the 17
  19. 19. larger MFIs or the sector as a whole, especially after the sharp decline in the number of MFIs under the partnership model. The pressure to maximize returns by the new PE investors is unlikely to result in upward pressure on interest rates, as was the case with Compartamos, although it could dampen the decline of rates that should come with further growth. Public, political and regulator acceptability will not allow high rates in India. With this option cut off, the pressure to maximize returns is likely to take the form of the desire to reach massive scale. This portends well for financial inclusion, and for better regional balance of MFI lending, since the large MFIs are stepping out of their base in Andhra, but it does not portend as well for the quality of growth. The problems in AP in 2006 were caused by "the rush to grow". Moreover, since organic growth yields slower increases in scale than mergers and acquisitions, it is widely expected that the sector will witness mergers between MFIs.25 Further large investments by private equity are also expected, with the possibility of IPOs.26The pressure to Recent developments on the equity front have been welcomed by most observers as the only maximizereturns is likely means of meeting the huge equity requirements of a rapidly expanding, but increasingly to take the capital inadequate sector (Chapter 4). The Indian sector is now seen to be attracting the form of the whole spectrum of funding from purely commercial private equity at one end to grants at the desire to reach massive scale. other, although the latter are much less important than in other countries. It is too early to This portends say whether the concerns of the pessimists will materialize. There is little doubt that there is well for financial considerable interest among new investors in entering the sector, despite declining margins inclusion, and being squeezed by rising costs and limits to acceptable interest rate increases (Chapter 4).27 for better There is no dearth of potential investees either, as more and more non-profits are lining up to regional balance of MFI transform to NBFCs, a phenomenon driven primarily by capital adequacy concerns, but also by lending, since the enhanced sense of vulnerability induced by the AP crisis. The new bill which seeks to the large MFIs confer a modicum of legitimacy to non-profits does not seem to be stemming the flow of non- are stepping out of their profits voting with their feet. An active market has developed in NBFC licenses not being usedbase in Andhra, by the original owners which are being brought up for a premium by transforming NGOs.28 Thus but it does not portend as well the chain of consequences set in motion by the Andhra crisis is still playing itself out. By for the quality putting an end to partnership lending in the form we knew it, it has increased the demand for of growth term loans, which in turn have increased the demand for equity, and have led to a spate of transformations to NBFC status. The new microfinance bill is out of tune with these developments, as discussed next. The new microfinance bill takes a small but important step forward in allowing NGO-MFIs to mobilize savings, but limits savings to "thrift" The absence of savings in Indian microfinance has distinguished it till now from microfinance in most other countries, and has been likened to "walking on one leg" since without savings microfinance is not microfinance at all but microcredit. There is a widespread misconception that the poor are too poor to save, and that they need credit, not savings facilities. On the contrary, as Chapter 9 points out, savings is probably a more widely felt need than credit, and takes place through a variety of savings mechanisms and institutions in the informal sector.29 Like the rest of us, the poor are looking for savings services which are convenient, safe, liquid, and can preferably be used to leverage loans. 18
  20. 20. CHAPTER 1 OverviewBy allowing at least what it call micro finance organizations (MFOs) to meet this need, thedraft microfinance bill takes an important step forward. However, ironically, it is this aspectof the bill that has been the most widely misunderstood by critics. Indias attitude tosavings mobilization by non-banks has been more restrictive than elsewhere, an attitudeinfluenced by exaggerated perceptions of fraud in the informal and cooperative sectors,and strengthened by periodic scams which affect the savings of the urban middle classesand which therefore receive widespread publicity in the press. Most of the countries ofSouth Asia, which share the same legal heritage, now expressly allow savings to registeredMFIs in their microfinance legislation. Bangladesh, where conditions are closest to India,and where the MFI model originated, has recently passed the Micro Credit Regulatory Authority(MCRA) Act 2006, which allows the MCRA to allow registered MFIs to offer savings withdrawableon demand.Unfortunately, the bill limits permissible savings to what it calls thrift, or the small, Indeed, recognizing thecompulsory savings of uniform size for all members. While the proposal to allow thrift is liquiditywelcome and long overdue, it is important to note it is only the first small step forward in preference ofintroducing savings. While many savers welcome the discipline of compulsory savings, the poor for many althoughthey tend to belong to the better-off among the poor, or to the "near-poor" above the not all savingspoverty line. On the other hand many of the poorer members of SHGs (and most of the purposes, several MFIs inself-excluded non-members), who have highly uncertain and variable incomes, would prefer Bangladesh, andto save small variable amounts, with variable frequency. Several surveys have found that the indeed world-main reason for why only half the members of SHGs are below the poverty line is the wide, who have the requisiteinability of BPL persons to commit themselves to the required mandatory savings amounts accountingand periodicities. Uniform mandatory savings are also the most frequent reason cited by systems, aredrop-outs for leaving SHGs. moving to a system of voluntaryA concomitant of mandatory savings products is their illiquidity. While illiquid savings protect savings inthe savings of the poor from daily demands, and are suited to accumulating lump-sums for which the saver has some choiceexpected purposes such as life-cycle events or school fees or adding a new room to the hut, over the timingthey are unsuited to coping with unexpected emergencies including sickness and disease, or and amount ofconsumption smoothening in the lean season, or replacing a leaky roof in the middle of the savings and withdrawalsmonsoons. Indeed, recognizing the liquidity preference of the poor for many although not allsavings purposes, several MFIs in Bangladesh, and indeed world-wide, who have the requisiteaccounting systems, are moving to a system of voluntary savings in which the saver has somechoice over the timing and amount of savings and withdrawals. It is not being suggested thatmost small Indian NGO-MFIs have developed the requisite systems to be able to able to offersuch a savings product yet, or that mandatory savings do not have their advantages forcertain purposes.However, provision should be made for the day when a larger number of NGO-MFIs have developedthe requisites systems and capacity to offer voluntary savings. Also, there is a possibility thatthe bill may be amended to include NBFCs and S 25 companies, who do have such capacities.Since voluntary savings are more conveniently offered as individual savings (because voluntarysavings amounts and frequency will always vary from individual to individual), it would seemessential to allow the regulator the option to approve individual, voluntary, savings productsin appropriate cases after due diligence by the regulator on a case by case basis. 19
  21. 21. Moreover, the microfinance bill excludes the larger, and more rapidly growing part of the sector One of the major omissions in the bill is that it excludes MFIs registered as NBFCs and S 25 companies, which account for nearly all the large MFIs, and the larger part of total microcredit in the country. Their number is steadily increasing, as more and NGO-MFIs transform themselves into companies for the reasons discussed above. The argument usually adduced for keeping NBFCs outside the purview of the bill is that they are already regulated by the RBI. However, the argument applies equally to district, state and urban cooperative banks which are governed by the Banking Regulation Act in respect of banking activities, while conforming to the cooperative law in other respects. Like them, NBFCs would be governed by the microfinance bill in respect of thrift activities, without any dilution of their capital, reserve, or liquidity requirements as NBFCs. There is The irony is that not only can NBFC-MFIs not accept public deposits, by virtue of being understandable excluded from the bill they will not be able to accept the savings of their own borrower- reluctance to allow MFIs to members either,30 who will continue to have to rely on less convenient, riskier lower yielding, mobilize public and often socially less productive savings instruments (such as ornaments). There is deposits,without putting understandable reluctance to allow MFIs to mobilize public deposits, without putting in place in place the the necessary safequards, for sound prudential reasons. But the vast majority of MFI members necessary are net borrowers of the MFI at any one time. They borrow to finance their larger investment safequards, for sound requirements, but simultaneously save small amounts regularly to finance their liquidity prudential requirements, provide for emergencies, build up a cushion to tide over the lean season when reasons. But the vast agricultural wage employment is scarce, and aggregate savings into amounts large enough tomajority of MFI make useful investments, repair the hut, send a daughter to high school, or a son to the big members are city to look for work. Since they are net borrowers, prudential concerns are much less pressing. net borrowers of the MFI at any one time So are we missing an important opportunity with the microfinance bill? In excluding NBFCs and S 25 companies, the act will also deprive more than half of borrowers from the protection of the ombudsman envisaged under the bill, and the sector as a whole from the benefits of universal performance standards in respect of microfinance activities, and a much needed data base. The bill confers a modicum of legitimacy on the most vulnerable part of the sector, the NGO-MFIs, but is careful not to step on the toes of the states by failing to assert that the principle of cost-recovering interest rates takes precedence over caps on interest rates under state moneylender acts. The bill violates the spirit and intent of the new MACS acts in reducing the role of government in cooperation. It is true that the registrars under the new acts are not performing supervisory, data gathering and consumer protection functions any better than the old ones, but will the new regulator be able to do a better job for thousands of thrift cooperatives all over the country? In any case cooperation is a state subject, and the states will have to sign on, unless the courts take the narrow view that accepting thrift even from ones own member- borrowers constitutes "banking", which is a central subject. The bill does not provide the sector with a form of registration uniquely suited to microfinance. 20
  22. 22. CHAPTER 1 OverviewIt leaves NGO-MFIs with no alternative between remaining NGOs and having to raise enough the envisaged Microfinancecapital to become NBFCs. Societies and trusts were not designed as vehicles for financial Developmentoperations, and although NGO-MFIs are non-profits, they have a hard time convincing the Council will be a governmentlocal income tax authorities that their surpluses are intended for expansion and leverage of dominated bodyborrowed funds. "Special-window" MFIs, with lower entry capital but higher capital adequacy with a purelyrequirements, as a unique legal form under the act, would have constituted a valuable advisory role. Given the factintermediate stage of incorporation between remaining an NGO and becoming a full-fledged that theNBFC. microfinance sector, like the IT sector, hasFinally, as Chapter 9 points out, the envisaged Microfinance Development Council will be a grown so rapidlygovernment dominated body with a purely advisory role. Given the fact that the microfinance and in manysector, like the IT sector, has grown so rapidly and in many ways creatively, precisely because ways creatively, preciselyit was outside the government, one would have thought that sector representation on the because it wascouncil would be higher, and that it would be given much greater autonomy. For all these outside thereasons, discussed at greater length in Chapter 9, the bill, as it presently stands, may be government, one would havemissing an important opportunity. thought that sectorWhy has commercial microfinance been excluded from representation on the councilthe bill? Three alternatives views of the role of would be higher, and that itmicrofinance would be given much greater autonomyThe exclusion of MFIs has brought into sharper focus three different visions of the role of thesector. The first accords an important place to financial intermediation as a means of offeringsavings as an essential financial service to the poor, since MFIs under the group lendingmodel meet their borrowers once a week anyway, and therefore enjoy economies of scope inbeing able to collect savings cheaply and conveniently along with loan repayment installments.Most savers at any one time remain net borrowers of the MFI, which fund the bulk of their on-lending requirement initially from donors and apex financial institutions with access to softfunds, and then from more commercial sources. As NGO-MFIs strengthen their capacity andprofitability and transform into for-profit entities they apply for licenses to mobilize thesavings also of non-members, or the public. This is essentially the path along which microfinancehas developed in most countries where the Grameen bank group lending model is dominant, asit is Asia and in countries in many other regions.In India, however, MFIs have not been allowed to mobilize savings even from their borrowermembers. They have had to rely exclusively on borrowings to fund their growth, acting asretailers of whole sale funds borrowed from the banks and financial institutions. They havebeen valued primarily as retailers of "last mile" services in delivering credit to borrowers thebanks are not in a position to reach directly. The microfinance bill seeks to allow NGO-MFIs toconduct limited financial intermediation but only in the form of thrift or small, weekly,compulsory savings. By excluding NBFC and S 25 companies from the purview of the bill itdenies this limited savings opportunity to their members, as well as cheaper funds to the MFIsthemselves, which might enable them to reduce their interest rates.However there is a third view of the role of MFIs purely as facilitators of credit and other financialservice,s and providers of credit-plus services. The partnership model as noted above has alwaysenvisaged the MFI as playing the role of a social intermediary, identifying and monitoring 21
  23. 23. borrowers and servicing collections for a fee. The major lender to the sector seems to be veering round to the view that new developments in technology have strengthened the suitability of the model to the extent that in the long run it may be able to dispense with the services of MFIs altogether, relying instead on a range of business facilitators and correspondents such as internet kiosks, post offices, merchant vendors (when the guidelines allow it) or even trustworthy local individuals, to provide essential local knowledge and information on borrowers, and enable it, on the basis of credit histories on such borrowers built up through their savings and other behaviour, to eventually lend to them directly (just as MFIs do, with graduates of group lending). This third view, which might be called the facilitator or agent view, is also the view that the RBI seems to be veering around to. It was first articulated in the RBIs business facilitator and business correspondent circular of January 2006.31 The Deputy Governor of the RBI responsible for regulatory issues enunciated it most recently at a Sa-Dhan meeting when she envisaged financial inclusion depending not just on technology but also on the "credit plus services that community based organizations are able to provide because of enjoying the trust of local persons, having knowledge of the local community and being able to facilitate financialThis third view,which might be literacy, credit counseling, and garner credit information…" (Thorat 2007). This view of the role of MFIs was expressed even more explicitly in a recent speech in which she said "… the called the facilitator or real value of NGOs and MFIs lies in their role as providing "credit plus" services and not just agent view, is also the viewfunctioning as an intermediary for onlending. Banks with their resources and scale have that the RBI greater cost advantages, but linking with local community based organizations and local seems to be veering around persons/entities would help them get over the information gap and access barriers" (Thorat to 2007). Efforts at extending financial inclusions by the banks in India have focused so far largely on savings products. The greatest progress had been made in opening "no-frills" zero-balance savings accounts which numbered 6 lakhs by March 2007. In mobilizing savings, banks have an advantage over MFIs in that the savings are insured. In her Sa-Dhan speech the Deputy Governor referred to another advantage bank savings have over MFI savings, that of "being able to obtain access to the national payments systems through bank accounts - or in countries where the regulatory system allows, through electronic accounts with such service providers facilitated by mobile phones. In South Africa and Brazil, for example, efforts at financial inclusion are targeted at enabling easier and low cost access to payments systems for money transfers, utility payments, and other daily transactions" (Thorat 2007). The financial inclusion movements seeks to remove the disadvantages the banks have traditionally suffered from in respect of access, and the liquidity of their savings for the poor.32 However until it succeeds in doing so, it is the regulatory prohibition that restricts MFIs in India to contributing to financial inclusion through the remaining three financial services - credit, insurance and money transfers. Credit, with the contraction of the partnership model, has reverted for the time being to being provided by MFIs almost entirely as intermediaries retailing funds wholesaled by the banks. Insurance services however are being provided mostly in an agency role (Chapter 7). The provision of remittance services has been rudimentary so far, but for regulatory reasons will also have to be provided in the agency role.33 An example of a pilot project being implemented by BASIX in partnership with Axisbank and the technology provider, A Little World, that provides a remittance service using mobile phones, is described in Box 8.3. 22
  24. 24. CHAPTER 1 OverviewMFIs have not succeeded (or shown much interest for that matter) in providing credit underthe BC scheme because of the interest rate cap on small loans which has rendered the BCscheme dysfunctional as far as credit is concerned (Chapter 9)34 Even if there were no caphowever, and even after the full development of the ICT applications discussed above, there isno presumption that the BC role is more suited to MFI credit than the financial intermediaryor last-mile retailer role.35 MFIs will always have a comparative advantage over banks in beingable to originate, monitor and collect micro loans. This advantage also derives form technology,but from a technology of a softer kind, the technology of group lending pioneered by theGrameen Bank. While group lending does have well known disadvantages, and while alternativechannels to reach the borrower will and should develop, it is difficult to see how MFIs, withtheir field presence, will lose their comparative advantage in identifying creditworthy borrowers,providing them with hand-holding support, and dealing with delinquencies. This advantagecan be put to use in any of the three roles, but MFIs have shown a distinct preference so farfor the first two. This may be for non-financial reasons as much as financial.36 It is perhaps no MFIs will alwayscoincidence that even in Brazil the services that are being provided by agents (including have amerchant outlets such as shops, who are not eligible under Indias BC scheme) are mostly comparative advantage overremittances, bill payments, and savings services, but not credit. The stance the RBI appears banks in beingto be developing on the other hand is that in the long run MFIs should function as banking able to originate,correspondents and agents for all services, including credit, although last mile retailing will monitor andcontinue to be allowed. It is this vision of the long run role of MFIs that appears to explain collect microthe exclusion of NBFCs MFIs from the microfinance bill, even more than concerns about dual loansregulation of microfinance NBFCs.Early experience with the new urban microfinanceA major development during the last couple of years has been the upsurge of interest in urbanmicrofinance (Chapter 5). The urban areas have remained virtually uncharted territory, except bya few prominent exceptions such as SEWA Bank, despite the prospects of (i) huge loan demand,(ii) larger average loan size and higher population density making for lower costs, (iii) the needto reach the growing numbers of the urban poor, and (iv) the example of Latin America wheremicrofinance is predominantly urban. The rate of urbanization in India has increased sharply inthe 1990s to almost twice the rural population growth rate, the difference being driven bymigration from the rural areas.37 Moreover, while urban poverty is declining in relative terms, itis increasing in absolute terms.38 Indias metros and large towns have some of the most congestedslums in the world and are "home" to some of the worst living conditions anywhere.39One of the main reasons why MFIs were reluctant to initiate operations in the urban areas wastheir apprehension that the Grameen-style group lending model, which was proving so successfulin the rural areas, was too dependent on peer-pressure and mutual trust, based on long-standing neighbourhood and kinship ties, to be successful in the urban slums. Also the one-size-fits-all standardization (of loan size and duration) and the borrower- time requirements(attendance at weekly meetings) of the group-lending model might prove a handicap in themuch more heterogenous and time-constrained environment of urban slum-dwellers.However mobility and transience have proved to be much less of a problem than was originallyfeared, and the new urban MFIs are finding that many slum dwellers have been living in the samelocation for a generation or more, and that even if they go home to their villages for a couple ofmonths a year they come back to the same area because of proximity to a known livelihood. 23
  25. 25. More of a problem it turns out is that as many as a third of borrowers have no formal documentation to establish either identity or address. More of a problem, also, than mobility per se, is what might be called "involuntary mobility", caused by the ongoing drive in many cities to demolish slums and relocate them elsewhere, and by the widening of roads, etc. Also, even in slums where a significant proportion of residents are transient, MFIs have to achieve a very high level of penetration before running out of prospective borrower from among permanent residents. The trick, they are learning, is a high success rate in spotting them. As with many other generalizations, the obstacle posed by mobility and transience depends on which income segment and location one is looking at. Many of the new urban MFIs intend to cater primarily to the vast majority of permanent urban residents who are still unserved by the banks, and depend largely on the informal sector for their financial needs. Reaching the transient poor is not a primary goal, at least initially. For example, while MFIs in Kolkata would like to serve the huge population of mostly day visitors who flood into the middle-class areas of South Kolkata from the rural hinterland as day labourers and maids etc, or rickshaw drivers who park by the wayside to sleep in their rickshaws at night, they are unlikely to be able to do so unless they extend their operations to the peripheral rural areas, as many of them are in fact doing. It is well It is well accepted that microfinance is best suited to reaching the economically active poor. It is accepted that ill-suited to solving the problem of chronic income deficits. However it is also the case that there microfinance is best suited to are many potential borrowers whose income deficits could be removed by credit if they were reaching the combined with other inputs.40 The challenge is to identify such persons, and arrange for the economically active poor. It provision of the other inputs by some other agency if necessary. While urban MFIs are cognizant of is ill-suited to the need to offer a full set of financial services including savings, insurance and remittances, they solving the intend to meet non-financial needs such as health and vocational training through partnerships problem of chronic income with NGOs, other civil society organizations, and socially minded corporations. deficits. However it is Some of the recent start-ups in the metros are promoted by professionals who have a proven also the case that there are track record of successful careers in banking and other fields. Their backgrounds have been many potential very successful in attracting lenders and investors. The new urban start-ups are growingborrowers whose particularly strongly in Bangalore and Kolkata, but are still nascent in Mumbai and Delhi. In income deficits could be locations such as Hyderabad and other towns across the country existing rural MFIs are removed by moving into contiguous urban and peri-urban areas. They are being joined by several NBFCs credit if they who have already been operating in the urban areas but are now experimenting with were combined with other "downscaling" to smaller loans. Banks in India have in effect been excluded from the small inputs loans market by regulatory fiat. They are not allowed to make loans of less than Rs 200,000 at a rate any higher than their PLR (their lending rate to prime customers) for the loans to qualify as priority sector loans. Despite this cap, Yes Bank is pioneering individual loans in urban microfinance. The Microsate branch of Indian Bank is successfully doing SHG-bank linkage in Chennai (Chapter 5). While the MFI human resources challenge - not just training, but attracting and retaining staff - has been engaging the attention of the MFI community generally in the last few years (Chapter 6 of last years report), its severity in the urban areas has taken the new urban MFIs by surprise. Nearly all of them are finding it difficult to recruit and retain staff in conditions of a tightening job market, especially in cities like Bangalore where attrition rates are as high as 20 to 30 percent a year. The skills field workers acquire are turning out to be in high demand in other parts of the financial sector, and in marketing. 24
  26. 26. CHAPTER 1 OverviewThe sectors infrastructure of support services isgradually strengtheningGiven its rate of growth, the human resource challenge remains the most important facing thesector. It has not been possible to include a chapter this year on developments in trainingand capacity building, but apart from the activities of the older, more established serviceproviders, the year saw several new initiatives, such as Intellecaps Microfinance Franchise Packagewhich seeks to incubate start-ups by providing training, manuals, and a complete businessplan and financial model combined with operational exposure in group formation, lendingprocesses, and branch and head office management at CASHPOR in Varanasi.41With a view to channeling start-up and capacity building support to MFIs in underservedregions, MicroSave relocated itself in the North, with a view to creating a centre of excellencein microfinance at the IIM-Lucknow with links to SIDBI. In line with its plans to create acadre of 50-60 "low cost-high capacity" consultants spread out across India, it continued toimpart training in specialized areas such as loan portfolio audits, process mapping and newproduct development. Work on running training workshops, and developing action researchpartnerships and toolkits continued.The amount of timely information and analysis on the sector on the sector is increasingthrough publications such as Intellecaps quarterly Microfinance Insights which devoteseach issue to a special topic, and online publications such as the monthly Microfinance Focus.Sa-Dhan achieved a major breakthrough by publishing “Quick Report 2007: A Snapshot ofMicrofinance Institutions in India”, within just over four months of the closing of the financialyear. The report carries core data on the bulk of its membership. Although it based on self-reported data prepared without waiting for audited annual reports, the report greatly enhancesthe cause of transparency and timely public reporting.A few, but not enough, extremely educative MFI annual reports are also being prepared which A few, but not enough,convey more than just the numbers but deal with the nitty-girtty issues facing the sector.42 extremelyThe MIX continues to contribute to the cause of transparency by expanding its reporting on educative MFIthe performance indicators of the larger Indian MFIs in collaboration with M-CRIL. One of the annual reports are also beingmost useful developments in the last year has been UNDPs email-based Solutions Exchange prepared whichservice which carries an active, high quality and widely-used exchange of views and information convey moreon Indian microfinance. There is still a need however for greater timeliness and coverage in than just the numbers butthe reports of some of the financial institutions, and for a timely annual statistical compendium, deal with thewhich perhaps the new regulator will bring out. There continues to be a dearth of good case nitty-girttystudies, and the research effort remains insufficient to the needs of the sector. Here too the issues facing the sectornew regulator will hopefully make a difference.Finally, although it is not part of the infrastructure of support services, a new productintroduced recently by MFIs deserves special mention, and that is participation in UTIsRetirement Benefit Pension Fund which accepts monthly contributions of as low as Rs 50 amonth for individual retirement accounts. The fund is approved to invest up to 40 percent ofcollections in the Indian stock market. SEWA and SHEPHERD (in Trichy, Tamil Nadu) are thefirst two MFIs to have distributed participation to their members. Subscribers are not requiredto pay any initiation fees, and are sent monthly statements. Monthly pension payments startat the age of 58, and are paid into bank accounts. In the event of the death of a memberaccumulated contributions with interest are paid to a nominee. 25