Kevin Behr: Integrating Controls and Process Improvement

Integrating Controls and Process
Improvement

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Kevin Behr - Integrating Controls and Process Improvement
3- 1A
© SANS Institute 2003 No copying, electronic forwarding or posting All Rights Reserved

Agenda

The Problem : Are we smoking more and enjoying it less?

d.
What we did about it. Control is possible!

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How we did it.

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Blood, Sweat and VisibleOps

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Measuring the results. The IMCA and other useful metrics

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What we have built

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We invest in redundancy and have smart engineers. Why is our
03

infrastructure so unreliable?
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Key fingerprintthere are best 2F94 998Dfor security and audit butA169 4E46
I know = AF19 FA27 practices FDB5 DE3D F8B5 06E4 what about
the ops guys?
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These best practice volumes read like the tax code. How do I go
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about implementing substantive change when all I have to go by
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is a picture of utopia?
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3- 2A

The Problem

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3- 3A

The Problem

IDC, Meta etc say that security incidents cause less
than 3 percent of down time.

d.
IDC Meta etc say that Hardware and environmental

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issues cause less than 6% of down time.

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Why aren’t our production systems more reliable?

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Why are our Ops people so busy and why are

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service levels getting worse? Our Data Center is
always on fire!

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3- 4A

The Problem - Humans

Changes that authorized, tasked and directed IT
people make cause 78%of all system outages!

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Our current way of working does nothing to address

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this.

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Many companies spend millions on change

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management systems – only to have them

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circumvented and never know it.

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IDC reports that authorized change by humans represents almost 80
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percent of all IT outages.
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3- 5A

The Problem - Humans

Many companies have developers maintaining
production servers because of downsizing.

d.
In many companies Security and Operations have

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an adversarial relationship. Ops undoes what

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security puts in place. Security breaks what Ops

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provisions trying to minimize risk.

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Much of the critical knowledge on how things
“Really work” lives in a few very busy minds.

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3- 6A

The Problem- The way we work it

Studies show that up to 80% of problem resolution
time is spent determining the nature of the problem.

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The balance is spent actually correcting or

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bypassing the problem.

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Ops is so consumed with fighting fires that there is
little or no accurate documentation of existing

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systems.

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There are no accurate golden builds – New servers
are like snowflakes – No two are exactly the same.

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3- 7A

The Problem – Integrity Drift

The purpose of deployed infrastructure “drifts” or
changes over time. Suddenly a mail server is now

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also a DNS server, a DHCP server .

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Security is reduced to using detective controls to

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figure out what ops is deploying after the fact.

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New services deployed instantly become mission

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critical but there is no way to re-create the server
that has evolved over time..

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What we did about it

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3- 9A


Used a twelve step program to determine that we
were powerless over our propensity to “light and

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fight” ops fires.

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We came to the conclusion that we needed a higher

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power (ITIL) and that if we worked the program we
could find our way to Serenity and many nines of up

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time.

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We vowed to share our experience with others
along the way.

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What we did – The Higher Power

We needed a framework to put all of our activity
into. So we could understand what it was we were

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supposed to be doing.

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The framework we chose was the Information

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Technology Infrastructure Library or ITIL (eye-til)

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Pros – Very Large and comprehensive

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Cons- Very Large and very descriptive (what it looks
like) – we needed Prescriptive (what to do)

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What we did about it - What is ITIL?
British Office of the Crown Government authors many well-
known documents, including ISO17799 (BS7799) Created
They realized Ops best practices have never been

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documented, and created ITIL (IT Infrastructure Library) and

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BS15000 to describe how world-class Ops processes
Extremely widely used in Europe, but gaining acceptance in

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the U.S.

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HP OpenView, CA UniCenter, and IBM Tivoli are all basing their EMS
products on ITIL terminology

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ComputerWorld 10/7/2002: Proctor & Gamble reports saving $125
million per year on IT cost savings (10-15% of their annual IT

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budget)

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IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is the only consistent and
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comprehensive documentation of best practice for IT Service
Management. Used by many hundreds of organizations around the
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world, a whole ITIL philosophy has grown up around the guidance
contained within the ITIL books.
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ITIL consists of a series of books giving guidance on the provision of
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quality IT services, and on the accommodation and environmental
facilities needed to support IT. ITIL has been developed in
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recognition of organizations' growing dependency on IT and
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embodies best practices for IT Service Management.
The ITIL Online : http://www.ogc.gov.uk/itil/
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The Office of Government and Commerce (owners of ITIL)
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http://www.ccta.gov.uk/
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BS15000 / BS 15000 is the world's first standard for IT service
management. The standard specifies a set of inter-related
management processes, and is based heavily upon the ITIL (IT
Infrastructure Library) framework. The BS15000 Site
http://www.bs15000.org.uk/

3 - 12 A

What Is “Visible Ops?”
A closed-loop process methodology, aimed at increasing
Operational efficiencies and increasing service levels
Based on studying “best in class” enterprise operations

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Visible Ops goals

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A small subset of ITIL and BS15000 frameworks, for terminology,

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processes, and future improvements

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Intended to 80% of the benefits at 20% of ITIL effort
A “step by step” approach to three fundamental service management

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disciplines
Methodology authors:

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Gene Kim, CTO, Tripwire, Inc.

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Kevin Behr, CTO, IP Services, Inc.

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What we did about it – VisibleOps

Gene Kim and I studied many enterprise operations
(A major trading company, The largest wireless

d.
carrier, a major stock exchange) and we began to

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note that these organizations had successfully

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implemented and benefited from preventive and

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detective control combinations.

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These controls were used to create audit points that
made it easy to understand known good states.

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3 - 14 A


We also began to see that if the infrastructure state
was understood early on in the problem

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management cycle the time it took to accurately

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determine the nature of the problem could

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drastically be reduced.

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We would be able to stop many inappropriate and

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costly over-escalations if we could rule out change
as early as possible.

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When examining Problem resolution reports it was noticed that if
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change could be ruled out early the time it took to close the ticket
was reduced.
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Most every organization has a star quarterback in operations, and
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security. Many groups thought that everything wound up escalating
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to this person because the overall environment had grown so
complex that only a few people could solve what used to be simple
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problems. This often results in a serious moral problem for the
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brightest staff. We needed to put them in to an advisory role where
they coach and consult instead of fighting fire full time on the front
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lines. The ultimate goal is to free up enough their time to turn them
loose on creating additional operational efficiencies and process
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improvement.
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3 - 15 A


Best in class operations had bounded remediation
times for critical infrastructure.

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In order to have valid golden builds to accomplish

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this the change management process must have

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more teeth than just the “honor system”.

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These organizations also displayed the earliest

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integration of security in to the Ops lifecycle

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We spoke to many large IT groups and heard them complain about
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the ineffective nature of their change management systems. One
CTO even complained that his engineers were often so busy and
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backlogged in firefighting that they didn’t feel like they had enough
time to even work through the Change Management processes.
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This meant that changes made during firefighting were never even
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documented!
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Security would be completely on their own to detect and respond to
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these ad-hoc changes. They would certainly never know who made
the changes let alone if they were made by friend or foe (although
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the odds are with “friend”)!
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3 - 16 A

Best In Class Ops and Security
Best in class Ops and
Security organizations
have:
•Highest

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Server/sysadmin ratios

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•Lowest Mean Time To
Repair (MTTR)

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-Highest Mean Time

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Between Failures
(MTBF)

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•Earliest integration of
Security into Ops
lifecycle

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How we did it

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Where Is The Leverage?
Ensure that I can control
Ensure that I have predictability changes in my world in the
around what goes into production production environment

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Help me learn to do this in an
automated fashion. Equip me to deal with problems

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efficiently and feed the results
back into my environment

© 2003 Tripwire, Inc. 19
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Shift resources from fire fighting to implementing release
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management, controls and resolution processes.
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3 - 19 A

Process Area Objectives
Release Management
Ensure that provisioned systems match the “known, good build”
Promote repeatable builds for all configurations

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Control Processes

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Ensure that changes can be traced to a valid business reason

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Create a control point, where Ops, Dev, or Security can so stop a
change from occurring

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Control configuration drift and uncontrolled changes

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Incident Management / Resolution
Decrease MTTR (mean time to resolve) outages

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Increase “culture of causality,” allowing better diagnosis and problem

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3 - 20 A

How we did it – Stabilize the patient

Attack the 80%. Stop the bleeding caused by:
change drive-bys ,integrity drift and changes made

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during firefighting.

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We used the combination of a preventive control

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(don’t touch that fence it’s electric!) and a detective

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control (why did you touch the fence at 2:11 am on

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March 3rd?) to get a handle on the state of every
piece of critical infrastructure.

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Audit change and configuration controls
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Tools: Tripwire, Tivoli auditing components, reports from
change management tools
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Audit configuration 998D FDB5 ensure compliance
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Map all changes to authorized work order
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End-of-shift audit requires Ops managers to handover data
center in the same state as they received it
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3 - 21 A

How we did it – Catch and Release

We caught and foot-print audited all critical
infrastructure configurations in the wild.

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We created golden builds for these devices.

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We tested and set bounded remediation times for

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all critical infrastructure.

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We determined audit frequency and methods

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necessary to support these times .

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Create repeatable builds
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Tools: Tivoli Configuration Manager, Tivoli Remote Control
and others (Norton Ghost, InstallShield AdminStudio, Linux
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QuickStart, Sun Jumpstart)
Automated provisioning of OS, configuration files,
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applications, and business rules
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Create acceptance process
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Tools: Tripwire
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Ensure that provisioned servers matches “known, good build”
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3 - 22 A

How we did it – Manage the Change

Instituted a Change Advisory Board- Stake holders
include: Security Lead ,Ops Systems Engineering

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Lead, VP of Operations , Service Desk Manager,

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Director of Network Operations, and Internal Audit.

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Made weekly change management meetings

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mandatory for all CAB members.

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Implemented a Change Transaction Process to
make the correct path : Request For Change (RFC)

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Create change transaction workflow
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Control points to document, authorize, schedule or deny, and
audit change requests
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Create change control meetings (include Security)
Tools: Tripwire, reports from change management tools (such
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as trouble ticketing system)
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3 - 23 A

How we did it – Managing Change

All RFC are categorized based on a 1-4 severity
system. Anything above a 2 goes to the CAB for

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review and comment.

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Changes can only be administered during

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maintenance windows and must be approved and

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scheduled by the CAB.

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Urgent changes trigger an emergency CAB
meeting.

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Simple Change Management Meeting Agenda:
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Discussion of:
Failed Changes, backed-out Changes, or Changes that may have
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circumvented the CAB
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RFCs to be assessed by CAB members
Requests For Change that have been assessed by CAB members
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Change reviews
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The Change Management process, including any amendments
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made to it during the period under discussion, as well as proposed
Changes
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Change Management wins/accomplishments for the period under
discussion, i.e. a review of the business benefits accrued by way of
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the Change Management process.
Review of Next Action assignments based on the above discussion.
Dismiss.
Meetings should have minutes taken and distributed to the CAB
following the meeting.

3 - 24 A

How we did it - First Response

Modified the problem management process to
eliminate change as early as possible by identifying

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the assets directly involved in the ticket and auditing

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them against their configuration baseline for the last
72 hours. All changes found are attached to the

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ticket.

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If no changes are found the circle is widened to

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include changes made to infrastructure supporting
the target systems.

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Create inventory of all relevant evidence around issue or outage
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Tools: Remedy/ CA Service Desk /Tivoli Configuration
Manager and Tripwire; Configuration and asset management
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information
All relevant scheduled and authorized changes
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Actual changes on target system
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Formalize post-incident assessment and reconciliation of changes
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Tools: Tripwire, reports from Tivoli, reports from ticketing
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system
Ensure that changes are understood
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Ensure that changes are incorporated into documentation and
propagated to other systems, as appropriate
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3 - 25 A

Measuring the results

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3 - 26 A

Measuring the results - The IMCA
Based on IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) / BS 15000
standards and the Visible Ops methodology
An interview-fueled process with a standardized scoring

d.
methodology

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Focuses on high leverage areas:

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Release Processes

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Control Processes
Resolution Processes

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3 - 27 A

Measuring the results – IMCA Questions

All questions are answered with a number, “from zero to
four”

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0: Strongly disagree

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4: Strongly agree
Sample questions

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“Our IT department is understaffed to meet current workloads.”

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“Our Service levels are spiraling downwards.”

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“We can enforce a standard build across all our devices.”
“We have a library of automated build systems for all our critical

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devices.”

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“We have a clearly defined change control policy.”

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Measuring the results- IMCA report

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This organization has no Request for Change process. Not having a
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correct path for changes to follow assures that they will go the path
of least resistance and least documentation. Creating more gasoline
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to throw on the fire.
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3 - 29 A

Measuring the results- IMCA report

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This represents a pretty tight shop with some room for improvement.
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They need to build on their strengths in audit and process to shore
up their change transaction processes. Some detective control
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would certainly help their ailing rollback capabilities.
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3 - 30 A

Reliability and Validity of IMCA

Validity measures
Based on IT best practices frameworks of ITIL and

d.
BS15000

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Questions are scored on the integrity of three key ITIL
processes

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Reliability measures

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All answers are subjective, and can vary from day to day

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All answers do not have any quantitative significance (i.e.,
arithmetic operations cannot be done on the answers)

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3 - 31 A

Measuring the results- Other Metrics

Number of changes made in data center
Number of changes that map to authorized business

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reason

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Number of times change management system was

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circumvented

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Percent of outages caused by change

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Number of changes that obsolete repeatable builds
Ops “clean shift handover” success rate

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Time to provision known, good build
Number of fixes/turns to match known, good build

d.
Percentage of deployed systems that match known,

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good build

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Percentage of deployed systems that have security

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sign-off

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3 - 33 A


Outage and issue Mean Time To Repair (MTTR)
Aggregate outage downtime

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Number of inappropriate escalations

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Increased change success rate

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Increased systemic Mean Time Between Failure

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Smile to frown ration on Ops, Security and Audit
staff

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3 - 34 A

What you have built - You Can Now:
Enforce change management process integrity
Decreased firefighting and increase proactive
controls

d.
Avert revenue loss due to unplanned outages

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Decrease Mean Time To Repair by efficient problem

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management processes

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Create hard organizational change boundaries for

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accountability and responsibility
Establish a beach head for operational best

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practices, allowing future process improvement

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3 - 36 A

What you have built

You now can measure and articulate the business
benefit of process improvement efforts

d.
You can target weak areas for quick wins

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Regain the confidence of the business by showing

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off your new and improving metrics

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Fend off IT Budget Jenga with your CFO and CEO

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by showing where money needs to be invested and
why.

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3 - 37 A

Contact Information

Gene Kim, CTO, Tripwire, Inc.
genek@tripwire.com

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Kevin Behr, CTO, IP Services, Inc.

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kevin.behr@tcpipservices.com

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3 - 38 A

Kevin Behr: Integrating Controls and Process Improvement

Kevin Behr: Integrating Controls and Process Improvement

Kevin Behr: Integrating Controls and Process Improvement

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