A case of GROSS, GRAVE and GRIEVOUS negligence. Death was 0n 14/12/2004.

1. 1394/2013. i i ,,-1,
ll
have been aware of the same. The materials now before the
court show that the petitioner was called at a time when the
patient had gone into the morbjd condition and the!"e js no
marerial or any report of any committee suggesting that the
petitioner had omitred to do something which he could have
done to save the petitioner or he had done something which
ought not to have been done. There is nothinq to show that
the patient could have been managed in such a (ritical
condition by any method except putting the patient on
ventilator. Of course, there is materials. to show that she
should have been given adrenalin tnjunction, since respiraroty
problem had developed as a result of ampicillin iniunction.
There is an allegation that proper test dose was not taken
before ampicillin injunction was given to Smt.Lakshmi
Santhosh" Whatever that be, the materiais do not disclose that
Dr.Ravikumar had ever treated the patient or attencled her or
had prescribed any medicines for her. His role is confined ro

2. CrI.M.C. 1394/2013.
14
the last stage when Smt.Lakshmi Sanrhosh had gone inio
morbid stage which is noticed by the various committees
constituted and the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum.
I l. lt is surprising to note that the apex body was
very casuar in its approach and seems to be infruenced by the
birds of the same feather syndrorne and was keen to
exonerate the doctors who had actually attended to and
treated the patient" .fhe
statement of C.W.g, the charge
witness, would indicate that the calarnity occurred due to the
administration of ampicillin injunction^ C.W.g is a CarrJiologist
attached to VSM Hospital, Mavelikkara. C.W.7 has opined rhat
a patient who is administered with ampicillin, if reacts to the
same, is administered Diazepam, it will be counter produetive.
On the other hand, when the patient develops acute
respiratory problem due to ampicillin injunction, life 5aving
medicine Adrinal should be admrnrstered to her rnstead of
diazepam. He is of the opinion that when a patient has

3. Crl.M.C. i3941201i.
15
developecJ reaction to arnpicillin injunction, ua ri, irtriit,i.of
diazepam was faral. lI is significant to notice that Annexure
A7 which is the report of the apex body, is totally silent about
this aspect. ln the findings recorded by the body, it is seen
stated that cause of death is anaphylactic shock due to
ampicilin injunction. significantry enough the report is sirent
about the act of Dr.Ajith, who is the first accused herein, who
adm,nistered diazepam injunction to Smt.Lakshmi Santhosh
who had shown acute reaction to ampicillin injunction" More
curiously enough, the said report draws the conclusion that
there was no negligence on the part of any particular doctor,
but there was coiiective negligence.
12. There is ronsiderable substance tR the
grievance voiced by the petitioner that exeept for Annexure
47, there is absolutely no material to connect the petitioner r.l
the death of Smr.Lakshmi Santhosh.
Y-"'

4. Crl.M.at 1394/2013 . :,., li
l6
13. The next c
':i.,.
is whether this court
Juestion that arises for consideration
circumstances
o, ,nu .u.'"'
be iustified in the facts and
against the peritioner. an,u
'n
o"tn'ng the proceedings
as
4g2 of r_, D /_ :- ,
e power of thjs court under Section
.-.., .L. rs rndeed Ve
be exercised onry sparingry
wide However, that. power is to
I
'ln fact a perusai of section
in exceptional circumstances
scope is considerabry rimite
of cr'P c' would show that its
follows:
d. The said provision reads as
"482. Saving of ir
Norhins , ,0, ,.,,!1,y,::wer
or Hish couft._
atfee the inherento:-to"o
be dee'med b limtt or
make such oro"r, ,oo*""
o1" the High cotJrt tu
etfect b any order:: ,''"'
be necessary ro qtve
abuse of the pror"r'!d"'
this code' or to prevent
secure rhe oro, orrurl!"":'
court or otherwise ro
l4_ A reading of
uRder the said section .the
provision shows that the power
!:ontrngencies,
they are, (i) t
be exercised under three
*/
o give effect to an order under the

5. Cr|M.C. t394/2013.
17
secure the ends ofjustice. Among the three, (ii) and (iii) work
in both ways^ While rhey deal with prevention of harassment
of innocent persons, they also ensure that a just cause is not
thrown out. Even though the power is wide, it is.ir.umscribel
I
by self irnposed reslrictions. Norrnally, the courts will not
interfere at the stage of inv
there are compering .,r.ut''"t''n
or filing of charge unress
providedbytheCode,theirUsually,inmatters
rherent powers are not invoked. ln
the decision reported in R.
r960 sc 866) some of the c
Kapur v' state of Puniab (AlR
ategories of iases where inherent
jurisdiction io quash proceedings is exercised are noticed.
They are
"(i) htnere it manit'est/y ,
bar pg6i7757 ,t,r ,rurirullpuars
thar there is a legar
crimina/ prrsceet.ring ;:' " rontinuance of the
alleged. Ab.sence of the'
respect of the offence
iostance, fitrntsh tases ;;:::; :::;tnav,
fbr

6. Cr|.M.C. t)94/2013.
l8
(lD l,lthere the al/ega t
1.'.
Report or rhu ,o.rrrr'rnt
in the First tnrormaiiion
their face va/ue and
"'rt
"'"o tt' they are hken at
not constitute ,ou or*n',1"""0
in their entirety' do
question or uppruci"l)
al/eged in such cases no
mafter mere,ly or uo*u1
evidence arises, it is a
First hrormaro, ;:;:::
at rhe comp/ainr or the
. orrence a/tes,o ,, ,;:;;:o:,
dectde whether the
(iir) lUhere the a//egation.s
person do cons tute un
"'"'u
against the accused
either no rega/ evidence
'ffence al/eged but there i.t
case or the evidence ,,r;,''"u,
in support or, the
rai/s to prove ,o; ;;,;;:":"o
c/ear/v or manires y
or ca.ses tr is importan,/n
dealing with this class
distincton u"r.."i|, i"!,
ttt bear in mind trte
evtdence or where ,o"o
*!"r:.l!"o is no legal
mainfesrly
"ro r,")r,r'-,'_1.-_.ll*"'*
which is
accusatian rnade and case
consistent with the
evidence which on _; ,:;;
wttere there is /esat
:,uppott the arcusarion,
n)"""on
may or may not
jurirdiction under s' ,'u',llut'-n
/n exerci.sinq rs
nor embark upon an urrr,llu _''no
(:ourr Lvourd
e vicle n c e . o,
"
r, i u''iJ,ir:,:;_':, : r'::" :, ::

7. Crl.M.C. 1394/2013.
i.t ' '', ,n'.: ,.'r.ti.
function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarii/. ii,
would not be open to any party to invake the Hlgh
Coart's inherent .lurisdictlon and contend that on a
reasonable apprectation of the evidence the
accusation made against the accused would not be
sustained."
ln the decision reported in Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Admn.)
(ArR r 980 SC 25S), was observed as follows:
"10. The first question is as to whether the
inherent power of the High Court under Section 4g2
stands repelled when the revisional power under
Sec.. 397 overlaps.The opening words ofSection 4g2
contradict this contention because nothing in the
Code, not even Section jgZ can affect the amplitude
of the inherent power preserved in so nany terms
by the language of S. 482. Even so, a genera!
principle pervades this branch of law,. when a
specific provlsion is made easy resort to inherent
power is not right' except under compelting
circumstances. Not that there is absence of
jurisdiction but that inherent power should not
invade areas set apart for specific power under tlrc
19

8. Crl.M.C 1394/201i
20
same Code.ln Madhu Lir
th is Co urt h a s
"
- r r r r;;:;;:;::;,Xr':; r:7;great respect, correctl!,, discussed ana aemeatte,a
the law beyond mistuke.
482 is pervasive it s,whi/e
it is true that sec'
interdicts written inb
hou/d not subvert /egal
instance, in section ,riortirri"li";r:;::; I
arise in some sirua ons b
and a happy solution..
etween the two provisions
"wou/d be b say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397
of the revisrona/ power oroo""'"t
only in exercise
thereby that the High ,or'ou ''no
court meaning
re t ts io n in re /a tio n rr r rrt; ::: ::;:r' :;: :;::in accordance wth ctne
enunciated above, the inher
the other principre
o/1r, there betns no
"r;";;:::rt::,::::#::,the redress of the grievance
Eut rhen ir th. ora*, ;:r::r::":';,r";:;":,
,l.r:r^.**, character which could be corrected inexercke ol the revisional power of the High Courtunder the lggg Code, the High Court L,tti/l refuse toexerclse ib inherent potyer. gut in case the

9. Crl.M.C. 1394/201i
" .....
impugned order clearly brings about a situatLit
which is an abuse of the process of the Court or far
the purpose of securing the ends of justice
interference by the Hlgh Court is absolutely
necessary, then nothing contained in Section 3gZ
(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent
power by the High Court. But such cases would be
few and far between. The High Court must exercise
the inherent power very sparingly. One such case
would be the desirability of the quashing of a
criminal proceeding inltiated illegal/y, vexatiou.sly ctr
;ts being without jurisdiction.,, (at p. S t )
/ shorl, there is no total ban on the exercise of
inherent power where abuse of the process of the
coart or other extraordinary situation excites thp
court's jurisdiction. The llmitation is self-restraint,
nothing more. The poticy of the law is clear that
interlocutory orders, pure and sintple, should not be
taken up ta the High Court resultlng in unnec.essary
litigatlon and delay.. Ar the other extreme, final
orders are clearly capable of beinq consdlered in
exercise af inherent power, if glaring injusrice
stares the court in the face. ln between is a tertium

10. cd.M.( I
',to4
20t I
!#; .:
"h
; .
,. ftY'qutd, as untwalia, J. has
'r . r' ., i.
where ir is more,r,,
"'i#iii!":;:';.:;:::,t"and /ess than a final disposa/" The present case falts
under that category where the accused tomp/ain of
harassment rhrough the court,-s process. Can we
state that in this thtrd c,
can be exercised? ln rhef::::;'I;::' "*'
"fhe answer ls obvious that the bar will not operate
to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court
. and/or to secure the ends ofjustice. The label ofthe petition filerl by an dggrieved party is im_
materia/. i.he Hiqh Court can examine the mafter in
an appropriate ca.te under the inherent powers" fhe
present case undoubtedly falls for exercise ol_ the
power of the High Court i
482 0f the /97-? code,
";r':::::;;::;;:;:;'::,accepting, that invoking the revisiona/ power of the
High Court rs imperrnisstble.,,
/ am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent
power is not rebuffed in the case situation before
us. Counse/ on borh sides, senst vely rcsponding tuour pllprgy tor legalisiics, rightty agreetl thaf the
fana tal tn.sistence on the formal tiling of a e opy of

11. F
crl.tr4.C. 139412013. ;,ar
z; f{qit+
the order under tassat;^- -- tt,
courtb me. or, *rrrirriii':::;:";;':: "
concession of counsel t
because a copyof the
"::"rt::;::;":';r:i::Jdespite its presence in th
not possible for me ro o',,"
'"'o"t in the (ourt' it is
power shnds ,rrruu*i'o
that the entire revisory
stu/tified.,, 'nd the inherent potver I
. 15. What at worst could be said as against the
petitioner is that he hatj failed to give supportive treatment"
But there is no material to show as to what is meant by failure
on the part of the petitioner to give supportive treatment.
Except for the collective negligence as stated by the apex body
in its order as Annexure AZ, there is no material to show as to
what omission or commissic
petitioner to murct r,i, *,rrr'
had occurred on the part of the
liability. Of course, rhe facr that
he had given a wrong information to the relatives of
Smt.Lakshmi Santhosh after vising the patient in VSM Hospital
is there.

12. a
Crl.N,l.C. I3941201i.
24
16. Bur thar by itself may not
to proceed against him and to direct
trial.
be a s ufficient ground
the petitjoner to face
i 7. Thouqh not of much relevance and significance,
one cannot omit to note that the Consumer Disputes Redressal
Forum had exonerated the petitioner. ln fact, one would have
expected the pelitioner to be cited as the prosecution witness
who could have deposed wtlat had transpired in the hospital
and under what (ireumstance he was compelled to refer the
patient to VSM Hospital. Of course, the prosecution may have
a justification that the apex body has s.tated that .the death
was due to the collective negligence on the part of the doctors
who had treated and attended to the patient. But thal vague
statement by itself is not sufficient to proceed against the
petifioner.

13. Cri.M.C. 1394/2013.
25
lg. As already stated, as of now, there is no
material to show that the petitioner had treated or prescribed
medicines to the patient, or attended to her before he saw her
in a morbid stage. There is also nothing to show that the
petitioner had failed to take steps that should have been
immediately taken considering the state of affairs of the I
patie n t.
' 19" Under these circumstances, there is
considerable .justification in the complaint voi(ed by the
petitioner that he is being unnecessarily prosecuted for the
offence under Section 304 of lndian penal Corje.
20. One can only say that as per the materials now
available, there is nothinE to show that the petitioner had
contributed in any manner to the death of Sm;.Lakshmi
Santhosh. ln fact, the defacto complainant does not seem
to have much grievance against him. Her wrath is directed

14. Crl.M.C. 1394/2013.
26
against the first and second accused.
that she is a Nurse with vast experience.
:,i'fF:*!'
{,.
"
One must remember
21. Under these circumstances, it is felt that the
prosecution of the petilioner for the offence under Section 304
of l.P.C. will not be justified and as rightly pointed our by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, it is only harassing the
petitioner. However, it may so happen that during the
evidence it may come out that the petitioner had a role, in
which case, the court concerned has ample powers under
Section 319 of Cr.P.C-. to proceed against the petitioner.
ln the result, this petition is allowed and the
proceedings as far as the petitioner is'concerned in S.C.'1 675
of 20'l I on the file of the First Additional Sessions Court,
Kollanr, inclr:ding that portion of the charge laid as against
him stands quashed reserving the liberty of the trial court to
proceed against the petitioner if situation so demands under
Seetion Jl9 of er"P.C. and also enabling the trial courr to

15. Ctl.M.C. 1394/2013.
examine the petitio ner
prosecutio n choose not to
rt
t.. '
:r
witness in case
as their witness.
lD.
27
as a court
examine him
'[he
a{l
P. BHAVADASAN,
JUDGE
lnuc rr-,tr,
Ps<

16. CRlyc, I,iO. .,394/2orJ
APPENOX
PEflIOTER S ANNEXURES
E. -Att,' A,-
ifii"ifrii*lt$#i5r{l'*F:i"T,,Ti.!.Tiiff
f tr"i,}t"i,liH:i,$r
ff; ffior rre rsr rNFoRMATr,
d3;f""IJs[ ]1."*1#r." o. *o'
*t"o*t rN cRrME No 378/2004 uts' '174oF
fi ,-*si#is^r-ix*,,-,::::: ;;;'":'.T;;"'-- "'
jfi 33[,",T,I11.,8[i3Ht?
;?i..f,:,",:;y,:?
",,". ;,:;,", ;"*$rri.#!pi,lif sigEsoF rHE sArD ri{EE,Nc oF rHE MEDrcAr ExpERr
f/;ffi o. rr.
^.poRr
Dro. NIL oc ,.- .._-
- -'-"tuar EXPERT
ff;;Exry oF rHE wp ,", ,roorrou,,no'
"E
MEDI.AL B.ARD coNvEhtED
ory
35,,51,1tril;#;ifrffi'iH,::.":J.ffi
NIL
tss
IRUE COPY
P.A" fO JUDGE

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