Ppp and housing


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Ppp and housing

  1. 1. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responses NIGERIA’S HOUSING POLICY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP) STRATEGY: REFLECTIONS IN ACHIEVING HOME OWNERSHIP FOR LOW-INCOME GROUP IN ABUJA, NIGERIA BY Bawa Chafe Abdullahi Department of Estate Management, Faculty of Built Environment, University of Malaya, 50603, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia bawachafe@gmail.com & Dr. Wan Nor Azriyati Wan Abd Aziz Department of Estate Management, Faculty of Built Environment, University of Malaya, 50603, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia wnorazriyati@gmail.comAbstractThe key objective of Nigeria’s housing policy is the provision of suitable and adequate shelter for all citizens.The challenge of providing housing in Nigeria, particularly to the low-income group (LIG) is assuming taskingto government to address. In such a situation, there is paradigm shift from “provider” to” enabler” approachin housing provision through the strategy of public-private partnerships (PPP). This paper seeks to examine thepractice of PPP in meeting the housing challenge in Abuja, Nigeria. The new approach entails the organisedprivate sector (OPS) will drive housing development for sale at affordable prices to the low and medium incomegroups in the country. From the case study of estates so far developed under the scheme, the findings of thestudy shows that the programme was carried out without adequate planning and implementation, mismatch withthe goals of national housing policy (NHP) and emergence of investors buying over the few units developed andhad by implication excludes the target beneficiaries. The study concludes that this strategy does not translateinto the full achievement of the planned objective of the programme.Keywords: Housing Policy; organised private sector (OPS) Public-Private Partnerships (PPP); low-incomegroup (LIG); AbujaENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  2. 2. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political ResponsesIntroductionOver the years of Nigeria’s historical development, has developed and implemented a number ofhousing policies and strategies, in an attempt to address the housing of its citizens and particularly thelow-income group (LIG). Consequently, plethora of literature has been generated on Nigeria housingpolicy. The scholars adequately present the fatal failure of the public housing scheme to housedNigerians (see Okapala, 1986; Agbola 1990; Awotona, 1987;1990; Ogunshakin & Olayinwola, 1992;Ikeojifor, 1999b; Ogu, 1999). Thereafter, there were writings from the World Bank and allied scholarsin propagating the idea that through supporting policies to the private sector can adequately tackle thepersistent inadequate response from the supply side (see Drakakis-Smith, 1987; World Bank, 1993;Pugh, 1994; Ogu, 1999; Ogu & Ogbuozobe, 2001). By 1980s through 1990s, the developing countrieslike Nigeria have taken the directive dictated on them by the international agencies most especiallyWorld Bank to henceforth refrain from direct role in housing and adopt market driven policies toenable housing provision in their countries (World Bank, 1993; Sandhu & Aldrich, 1998). At thisinstance, many of the opponents of neo-liberalism through the World Bank condemn the strategy onthe grounds of its likely deepening of exclusionist trends it would further generate on the poor andLIGs in the developing countries (Baken & Linden, 1993; Ortiz, 1996; Jones & Ward, 1995; Mukhija,2001,2004).Despite the enthusiasm for enablement approach, specifically in Nigeria, there are few researchesdone on the efficacy of organised private sector (OPS) in achieving the housing of LIGs. Perhapsmight be attributable to the fact that OPS developers presence is not much developed and felt in thecountry (Ogu, 1999).However from the little available in the Nigerian housing literature, the OPS arerecognised to have much concentration on housing the upper-and medium-income groups (Ikeojifor,1997) and generally display the tendency of profit maximisation (Keivani & Werna, 2001a). Theposition of Mukhija (2004) that the impacts of the new strategy is not yet adequately defined,researched and its effectiveness doubtable strengthen the need for this study. With adoption of enablerstrategy, to house Nigerians, particularly the LIG, scholars have begun to express cynicism that thedesired objective might not be achievable from the participation of the OPS (see Keivani & Werna,2001a; Aribigbola, 2008; Ndubueze, 2009). In this paper, we examine the performance of OPS fromthe PPP housing estates developed under Abuja mass housing scheme (MHS). Our purpose is toexamine the practice of PPP and show whether it has improve the LIG in accessing housingdeveloped under the scheme using case study housing estates developed under the scheme in Abuja,the capital of Nigeria. The study also intends to demonstrate the efficiency or otherwise of bothgovernment and its private partners in managing housing production and delivery in the cityAn overview of Nigeria housing policy and its attempt to address the LIGs housing inNigeriaNigeria as a country came into existence in the 20th century during the period of colonialism. It gaineda political independence from British on the October 1st, 1960. The country has a political structurethat comprises of 36 states, 774 local government areas and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja.Nigeria is located in the western part of Africa, considered as the heart of Africa and has a land areaENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  3. 3. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responsesabout 930,000 square kilometres and inhabited by over 150 million. Also more than 50 % of thepopulation live in its urban centres (UN-Habitat, 2008). Economically, according to World Bank(2010) Nigeria is classified as low-middle income country with a gross national income (GNI) ofUS$175.6 billions. And it has GDP growth rate of 3.0 %, per capita income of US$1,160 and about 84% of the population below US$2 a day. Nigeria is an OPEC member country and it occupies 7thposition among these crude oil producing countries (Opec, 2009) and account for a quarter of Africa’scrude oil production (Ogwumike & Ogunleye, 2008). From the crude oil sales, Nigeria has realisedrevenue of over US$350 billion and has proven oil reserve capacity of 30 billion barrels (Ogwumike& Ogunleye, 2008).The introduction of National Housing Policy (NHP) in early 1990s and its subsequent review in early2000s gave a boost to OPS take position in the provision of housing in the country (FGN, 1991;2006). A number of policies, incentives and programmes are designed and implemented over theyears to create vibrant OPS in housing sector of the economy and government to retire to a position ofenabler. These include creation of institutional structures; creation of financial mechanisms;restructuring, strengthening and recapitalisation of the financial institutions; review of laws andstatutes to make them effective and enforceable, creation of new institutions and creation, growth andprofessionalization of the OPS in housing sector (Fortune-Ebie, 2006). These changes began in themajor milestone in NHP 1991 that formally recognised the private sector contribution to housing inthe country.Prior to these changes in Nigerian NHP experiences shows there was overwhelming dominance of theprivate sector provision and little contribution from government. The Federal Government did notrecognised housing as part of its social responsibility until the 3rd (1975- 1980) and the 4th (1981-1985) National Development Plans. The Federal Government carried out a very ambitious housingscheme on large scale, with the ultimate target of boosting the supply to particularly ameliorate theacute housing shortage among the LIGs who were worst affected. In particular, during the period ofnational housing programme embarked upon by the civilian administration earmarked 80 % for thelow-income. However, after expending colossal of resources worth billions of dollars it recorded amiserable failure.However, the government participation in housing was not impressive and in fact it was a failure. InNigeria, scholars have shown that the problems of the policies were lack of political wills,institutionalised policy and continuity, politicisation of the programmes, political corruption, poorfunding and inadequacy of mortgage institutions, poor socio-economic structures, among others havecontributed immensely to the failures (Awotona, 1990; Ikejiofor, 1999b; Aribigbola, 2008; Ndubueze,2009). The failure of provider approach prompted the government to adopt a change in its NHPbeginning from the NHP 1991. The current policies embrace the private sector as the vehicle toaddress the severe shortages of houses in the country. While the government position itself as enablerand facilitator in the housing delivery in the country.ENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  4. 4. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political ResponsesConcept of enablement and public-private partnership (PPP)Over the years in developing countries, the government play the sole or dominant role in all spheresof economy and public service delivery (Njoh, 2006). The enablement came as paradigm shift fromthe ‘provider’ and self-help’ phases, which falls in the third phase from the period of mid-1980s ofhousing policy evolution in the developing countries (Choguil, 2007) to adequately house the LIGs.The self-help and enabler concepts have long history prior to the present time when it is adopted andencouraged by the international institutions on governments of developing countries (Harris, 2003).According to Yeboah (2005) argued the practice and debate on self-help housing is what nurtured theemergence of the concept of ’enablement’ and only became more relevant when the World Bank andother international institutions started pursuing the neo-liberalism policies (Pugh, 1994a,b). Theenablement as the next guiding principles appeared prominently in the United Nations Centre forHuman settlements (UNCHS-Habitat) documents and publications and from which the UNCHS(1990) Global Strategy for Shelter (GSS) (Pugh, 1994a).The strategy entails positioning of privatesector and its market efficiency as the next vehicle for housing delivery, while the governments are toprovide an enabling environment from its reformed institutions and regulations to ensure thesustainability of the market in the difficult task of bridging the polarise gap between demand andsupply of housing and its related infrastructures in the developing countries (World Bank, 1993).The debate that emerge in the literature and which has no conclusive position, whether informal orformal market should be vested with the responsibility and accorded with all the deserve policysupport to work towards the attainment of the enablement objective on the platform of private sectordriven housing delivery(Keivani & Werna, 2001a, b). The opponents of the enablement seem tostrongly oppose the formal housing market to take charge of delivery of housing and enable by thestate (Baken & van der Linden, 1993; Jones & Ward, 1995; Ortiz, 1996; Keivani & Werna,2001b).The general position of these scholars is that the formal private market historically has neverbeing on the vanguard of provision of housing to the LIG in developing countries and the objective ofprofit maximisation would deepen market failures and distortions. Specifically, Keivani & Werna(2001b) declared that the formal private firms should not be the focus of the enablement to meet theLIG housing in the developing countries, because by doing so the attempt to develop new policies andfurther expansion of the existing policies would be stifled.On the other hand, earlier research by World Bank (1993) and Malpezzi (1994) suggested that theformal private market as the strongest element should be enabled in developing countries, because oftheir economies of scale to fulfil the desire result of lasting solution to the problem. Not only that, itwould be a platform to launch a new vision of economic development in the developing countries. Anempirical study of Segupta (2006) in India and Abd Aziz (2007) and Salleh (2008) in Malaysia seemsto support this postulation. For instance the study of Segupta (2006) shows that the formal privatesector has impacted on housing in Kolkata with efficiency in production due to the firms’ technicaland marketing expertise. The accountability and righteousness of the public sector stronglycomplimented to the realisation of the accomplishment. Similarly, Abd Aziz (2007) and Salleh (2008)the wonderful success of the private developers in country shows that the housing provision for LIG issubjected to series of government policy regulations and controls which the private developers wereable perform wonderfully in meeting LIGs dream of home ownership in Malaysia. Given qualityENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  5. 5. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responsesenabling environment coupled with the government consistent policies and incentives the formalprivate sector is capable of meeting the housing of the LIGs in developing countries. There is need tocorrect the misinterpretation of enablement that means complete rolling back of the state fromhousing provision, when in actually sense the enablement requires more of state involvement inhousing delivery (Mukhija, 2001; 2004; Segupta, 2006).From the policy documents of the international institutions that sponsor enablement, suggested thatthe platform of public-private partnership PPP arrangement would be use as the vehicle of market leddelivery of housing in the developing countries (Sengupta, 2006). This perhaps explains theincreasing emphasis in many countries on the use of PPP (Whitehead, 2007) for housingdevelopment. The fundamental goal of PPP is to share responsibilities between the participatingparties. Depending on the agreement, PPP in housing according to the enablement, the private sectoris entrusted with the responsibilities of physical construction, funding, implementation and in somecases the management of the disposal. On the other hand the government contribute by setting thegoals, supervision and monitoring, standardisation and provision of legal, institutional, economicpolicy frameworks (Sengupta, 2006; Tecco, 2008).Research methodologyThe research methodology uses a two pronged approach namely, quantitative and qualitative. Theresearch exploits the primary and secondary data sources to enrich the facts for the analysis. Theactual data collection was conducted between November, 2009 and March, 2010. The semi-structured questionnaires was administered to Directors (or representatives) to the relevantstakeholder departments in the FCDA. However, just like the experience of Mukhija (2004) theresearcher could not administer the instrument to some developers; even though allowed the conductof other research activities in the premises of their gated estates and other bluntly refused same toparticipate in the study. However, because of similarity of the operating environment might not distortthe outcome off the study.Finally, PPP housing estates occupiers/residents constitute the study population and structuredquestionnaires, assistance of research assistants, were administered to sample of 400 residents fromthe six case study PPP housing estates selected. And the unit of study is the head of household, toachieve time saving and reduce expense of the study, as it is recognised as an advantage of using suchin household survey (Fisher, Reimer & Carr, 2010). The head of household respondents were selectedbased on the order of one house from after every five houses, but at a later time, the selection wasconducted according to the willingness of the household to participate in the study, due touncooperative attitude expressed by some of the estate residents. The research survey instrumentswere first were coded and analysed by using the SPSS. The Cronbach’s Alpha reliability test of theinstrument obtained the value of 0.638, falling within the range of acceptable reliability. We suspectthe use of different research assistants perhaps might be the reason for the value we obtained. Theresults of the study are presented in the descriptive format.ENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  6. 6. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political ResponsesAbuja the study areaIt was in 1976 that Federal Military Government led by Late General Murtala Mohammed enactedFederal Capital Territory Act (FCT) established Abuja after it has been chosen to be theadministrative capital of Nigeria (Moore, 1984) and with solely administrative functions. This wasafter the failure of Lagos due to the problems of inadequate land space for future expansion, terribletraffic congestion, poor drainage, acute housing shortage and associated costs, unbearable ethnicinfluence etc. The planned period for the transfer was to be completed in 1986. However, it was on12th December, 1991, the final movement of Federal capital to Abuja became a reality.Abuja is located in the geographical centre of Nigeria (Figure 1a) and lying between latitudes 6degrees 45’ and longitudes 7 degrees 39’ north of the equator. The land of approximately 8,000square kilometres was carved out from the then neighbouring states of Kwara, Niger and Plateau toserve as the FCT and the Federal Capital City (FCC) to constitutes about 250 square metres (IPA,1979).The government vested all the land in FCT in the Federal Government of Nigeria. Thegovernment also created Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), as its agency responsiblefor the spatial planning and development of the FCT.ENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  7. 7. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political ResponsesENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  8. 8. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political ResponsesENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  9. 9. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political ResponsesFigure 1a, b &cMap of Nigeria showing the location of Lagos and the new Federal Capital Territory (Source: Jibril,2006:3)Map of Federal Capital Territory showing the phases of development of AbujaMap of Federal Capital Territory showing the names of districts in Phase III of Federal CapitalTerritoryThe FCDA commissioned an International Planning Associates (IPA) to design the master plan of thecity and its report was submitted in 1979.The city is planned to be developed in four phasesENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  10. 10. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responses(Figure1b). The bulk of PPP MHS project sites fall within the Phase three (Figure 1c). The phase hasa land area of 163 square kilometres.The population of Abuja has over years been growing steadily as several censuses had revealed. In1991 and 2006 National Population Commission (NPC) census the population of FCT of Abuja wasestimated to be 378,671 and 1,406,239 respectively. However, with not up 50 % of planneddevelopment of Abuja attained (Daramola & Aina, 2004); the city is estimated to have a population ofover 6 million, which by far exceeds the original design capacity of 3.2 million when the city iscompleted (Imam, Mohammed, Wilson, & Cheeseman, 2008).This geometric increase is reaffirmedconsidering the figures reported by UN Habitat (2008) that Abuja was the fastest growing city inAfrica with annual growth rate of 8.3 % per annum and much greater than Mega city of Lagos with3.74 %.The failures of the administration of Abuja to implement the recommendations suggested bythe IPA (1979) on the achieving housing delivery are apparent. The souring demand and the inabilityto access formal housing, the unmet demand necessitated the emergence of informal and unplannedsettlements, numbering over 65 in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) as symbol of apparent failureof the city administration (COHRE, 2006). In addition to the stringent policies pursued by the cityadministration have seriously aggravated the housing situation to Abuja residents, most especially tothe poor and LIGs (Daramola & Aina, 2004; COHRE, 2006; Jibril, 2006, 2009).Findings and discussionsMode of implementation of PPP housing in AbujaThe idea of engaging the practice of PPP in housing development in Abuja is traceable to theMabogunje (2001) position paper in 1999. Mabogunje (2001) advocate government to encourage thedevelopment of OPS and made land available to this class of developers in the city. The mass housingscheme (MHS) commenced in the 2000 under the framework of a PPP (FCTA, 2008). Theimplementation of the MHS was first managed by an ad hoc committee and currently under asubstantive department, to effectively co-ordinate the implementation of the scheme (Bamalli,interview 2009).The OPS developers were made to sign a development lease, undertaking to complete thedevelopment within 3 years and 18 months under the first round and MAS accelerated developmentrespectively from the date of signing the agreement. From copies of the agreement made available tous, the agreement specifies the public sector and private developer responsibilities. It requires thedevelopers to comply with the city regulations, standards and specifications in the course ofconstruction of the housing units. The breach of the Development lease agreement was specified inthe document.Similar to Mabogunje (2001) suggestions, the MFCT only grant the OPS developer access to land todevelop, the title to land rest with the authority. It is after the development and sold out to the generalpublic that the developer is expected to submit the list of the beneficiaries. The list is to beaccompanied with site development plan, engineering infrastructure design and ‘as-built’ drawingENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  11. 11. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responseswith survey data for each plot to the FCTA (DMH, 2009). After all the necessary assessment thebeneficiary is to be issued with certificate of occupancy (C of O) on the payment of relevant statutoryrents and charges.At the beginning the land allocation was made to the OPS developers at no cost, apart from themeagre processing fee paid, as government equity contribution to the scheme. Also under the scheme,the FCTA was to provide primary infrastructure whilst the developer was to provide secondary andtertiary infrastructures “compliant with the standard specified by the Master Plan of Abuja” (FCTA,2008:6). However, it was provided in the agreement that where after the completion of the estate, thegovernment fails to provide the primary infrastructures as stipulated, the developers were allowed toprovide such infrastructures as necessary to make the estate habitable.The FCTA prepared and revised guidelines of its mass housing programmes. The new guidelinespecifically stated that maximum allocation of 10 ha and 20 ha for the scheme can be made forhousing developments in the satellite towns and the city respectively. However, violations of theguidelines abounds in allocation of excess of the approved maximum sizes, favouritism, fraud arecommon (DailyTrustonline, 2010a).The level of response of participation generated on the PPP housing in AbujaThe promise of reforms package introduced by the government generally serves as the rally point toattract stakeholders’ participation on PPP housing sector in Abuja. Consequently, there weretremendous responses of the OPS that enlist in the government policy of private sector-driven housingdevelopment. The bulk of participants were from OPS under the umbrella of REDAN (93 %), andremaining is shared between international construction companies, public corporations and formalorganisations staff co-operatives enlisted for participation (Table 2). Although there are otherstakeholders participating, the PPP in Abuja have succeed of attracting bulk of participants from theOPS and corresponds to the original policy document proposal of mobilising and enabling this classof developers to demonstrate on how best to tackle on housing the LIGs in developing countries.Table 2. Distribution of participating developers in PPP housing estates in AbujaS/N Developer Number %1 OPS 122 93.12 Public corporations 6 4.63 Staff cooperative 3 1.54 International company 1 0.8Total 131 100Source: FCTA (2007, 2008)Considering the opportunities offered many OPS developers have sprung up to access the high valuedand privilege Abuja land given at no cost. The trend of events shows that few joined with genuineintentions to contribute to the solution of housing problems of Abuja and many are taking the positionof land grabbing opportunity and after the allocation, with the administration connivance subdividingthe plots allocated and sold to interested developers and making unproductive profit. The OPSENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  12. 12. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responsesdevelopers selling the lands and enjoying unprecedented gains is becoming a popular business inAbuja. This is type of OPS are popularly called “land grabbing merchants” or “brief case companies”firms owned by politicians, proxy civil servants and dubious business men. Paradoxically at the timeof inception there were no guideline principles to ascertain the financial, technical and technologicalcompetence of the participating OPS. According to one official interviewed (Interview,2010) statesthat most of the selections and the subsequent allocations of land were made without due process, butrather based on what he called “man on man relationship” and FCTA (2007; 2008) supported this factthat all land allocations made were without a verifiable list of the beneficiaries. This add strength toan earlier trend observed at the early stage of Abuja development that what matters in securingcontracts and land was “patronage rather than on merit” (Moore, 1984:174).The implication of these developments on PPP housing development, despite the tremendous responseenjoyed, the public sector as major stakeholder of the scheme have displayed absolute incapability ofsteering the programme to one of success story due to the absence of an effective administrativemachinery to build the required commitment, coordination and control. For instance as at 2008 therewere only 32 % OPS on site and only 13 % them carrying out the development with approvedbuilding plans (FCTA, 2008). On the other hand, the participating OPS were busy building highincome and luxury homes for the rich Nigerians all over the PPP housing estates, with little or noconsideration to the low-cost housing that will be affordable to majority of Abuja residents.The land and associated infrastructure provisions under the PPP in AbujaThe literature on Abuja indicates land accessibility and affordability constitute the major constraint tohousing developers (Ikejiofor, 1997; 1998a; Egbu, Olomolaiye & Gameson , 2008). For instance thestudy of Egbu, Olomolaiye & Gameson (2008) shows that formal land acquisition and its requisitedevelopment rights the developer needs to spend 381 days (one year and two weeks) when all therequirements are fulfilled. While according Ikejiofor (1997) 10 % of the small- scale developersrespondents in Abuja secured land from government source. Abuja experience one of highest landprices in the country and of recent the land price has been reviewed by over 900 % (DailyTrustonline,2009). The advent of PPP mass housing scheme (MHS) came as a relief to OPS developers inaccessing land for housing development, where the land is made available as public sector equitycontribution to the partnership.However, the inept management generate a lot of confusion by indiscriminate allocation andrevocation of plots without recourse to due process and even to the extent of allocation of non-existentplots (FCTA, 2007). The report indicate that allocations were made without due recourse to otherstake holder departments. At most times the OPS cannot have a development planning of the projectwith absolute confidence. For instance, 56 OPS developers were affected by relocation amount to landsize of 874 hectares, ranging between 5 and 40 hectares to individual developers (Table 3). Therewere some allocations that were revoked for non-compliance with terms of agreement. But suchdevelopers were reinstated to their plots after been reallocated to other developers. The doubleallocation against on one plot has created conflicts between the developers themselves. Many timesthe reinstatements of such allocations by the PPP unit were not communicated to the other stakeholder departments and agencies for appropriate updating of records, further to add confusion andENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  13. 13. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responsessenselessness of the implementation. The effects of this attitude, the development of the plots wereput off pending the resolution of the conflict.Table 3.Number of OPS affected by relocation and revocation of land (in ha) under the PPP scheme inAbujaS/N District No of OPS for Total land No OPS for Total land size relocation size revocation revoked/withdrawn1 Wumba 22 200 2 152 Kafe 1 100 2 403 Galadimawa 4 85 4 804 Dakwo 11 129 - -5 Lokogoma 8 190 2 306 Mbora 10 170 - -Total 56 874 10 165Source: FCTA (2007: 4-12)The interviews with households and developers (Interviews, 2010) show that the issuance of C of Oswas yet to commence in respect of the PPP housing estates so far completed. On the part of the DMSattributed the delay to the developers, who were yet to make submission of the list of theirbeneficiaries to the relevant department. In any case this negates the whole idea of conferring titles tothe beneficiaries, which they could have use the title document to source for capital or even to arrangefor mortgage to cover the initial cost of acquisition of the houses sold on “cash and carry basis”.The Abuja property market is characterised with uncertainties and the participating OPS are notspared. The property market and development at all times await the announcement of revocations ofland in Abuja as soon as there is change of ministerial appointment. Abuja had 13 ministers from its34 years of history and on the average the ministers spent an average of 2.6 years of governing theministry. Of recent it is reported that the newly Minister of FCTA appointed in April has ordered therevocation of land allocations of the immediate past administration (DailyTrustonline, 2010b). Thereasons at most times given include favouritism, non-compliance of due process and nepotism in theland allocation process.To date there are conflicting records of land allocations to OPS developers from the records of DURP,DCD, AGIS and DMH. On the general note all the stakeholders departments do not have accuraterecords of the OPS developers, development and management, in terms of number of housing unitsunder construction, constructed and disposed. The practice of implementation is absolutely not underthe FCDA/ MFCT supervision, coordination and control.The Abuja Master Plan stipulates that any development to be executed, a detailed site anddevelopment plans and engineering design are compulsory. But the allocations of the MHS weremade “arbitrarily without recourse to neither the detailed site development plan nor engineeringdesign for those districts” (FCTA, 2008:28). The FMFCT/FCDA did not have the detailed preparedland use plans and engineering designs of the districts before the allocations were made to the OPSdevelopers. With this abnormally, the private developers also went into development without equallyENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  14. 14. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responsespreparing their individual estates land use plans and engineering designs. Even the few that submittedthe plans and design, many did not secured the Department of Engineering Services (DES),Development Control Department (DCD) and even the Department of Urban and Regional Planning(DURP) approvals, but all the same went ahead with the developments. When planning was done bythe DURP later, made some private developers lost their allocations and some also lost theirallocations on the ground that their plots were taken over to accommodate the proposedCommonwealth Games village 2010.There were cases of multiple allocations, encroachments anddisputes between the private developers.Another setback experienced in the course of the implementation, the government did not fulfil itspart of agreement of providing the primary infrastructures due to the funding constraints. There aremany of the plots in districts allocated for MHS for more about ten years without the provision ofinfrastructures made. For instance from the records of the DES shows that the FCDA cost ofproviding infrastructure to relatively flat and rough terrains in Abuja was estimated at about N10,000and N17,500 per square metre respectively. Consequently, there were some OPS developers carriedout development without the prerequisite physical infrastructure. It is based on the anticipation thatsuch infrastructures would be provided later. The interview with the private developers (Interview,2010) shows that the failure of the government to provide these infrastructures necessitated them tomake such provision, like access roads, water, electricity main and transformers at their sites to makethe estates habitable and which all add up to the cost of the developments, with serious consequenceto unit price of the houses produced.Institutional setting, regulations and control of PPP housing estates in AbujaOf recent the PPP strategy enables the public sector to consolidate the realisation of building structurehigh standards in the urban areas. This is what the officials in Abuja reiterate that the private partnersmust built “standard housing”. To guarantee this, the operational PPP guidelines set high minimumstandards to which all the OPS must conform and also along the line of Abuja master plan standard.Before now such goal has been criticised by scholars (see Morah, 1993; Ikejiofor, 1999a).Consequently, such urban planning contributes to poor exclusion and part of problem of housing theLIGs (Watson, 2009).Nevertheless such declared goal was far from been realised under the OPS development. Thedevelopers were expected to submit their building and land use plans, drawings and the engineeringdesigns of their internal network of services to relevant stakeholder departments for approvals.Unfortunately, the responsible agencies allowed the private developers went into developmentwithout prior approvals of their developments. For instance, the DES observed the consequence ofsuch development made by the developers in the future would create the situation where the estatesinternal services infrastructures might not be able to integrate with the whole city infrastructures “dueto differences in levels and in some situations , encroachment on the roads right of way”(FCTA,2008:34-35). The records of the DCD prove further the above claims. The FCTA (2008) report showsthat from the 79 private developer’s onsite, only 51 or 64.5 % made applications for developmentapprovals and only 13 private developers’ secured requisite approvals of the DCD. The participatingENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  15. 15. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responsesdevelopers of MHS are carried out without securing the requisite approvals from the relevantauthorities.The observed discrepancies on the way the MHS was implemented, specifically without coordinationand supervision, the report observed that “many of the buildings in the ... sites were poorly executedusing poor materials” (FCTA, 2008:47-48). The poor nature of the workmanship prompts the DCD todemolish 127 structures in one OPS housing estate at Kafe district and in another instance some of theestates have registered cases of building collapse under the scheme (FCTA, 2008). Furtherinvestigations (Interview, 2010) demonstrated that some of the LIG that they bought the houses in theestate not for house per se, but for the sake of the land. These occupants later demolish the house andreconstruct new structures. The implication of these shows that the stakeholder departments were notcarried along to coordinate and monitor the developments and in fact there was no existing standingcommittee that comprises of all the stakeholder departments responsible for the coordination,monitoring and review the performance of the MHS in Abuja, to ensure success of the scheme.The development lease agreement that the developers were made to sign before the commencement ofthe project completely was discarded and disregarded, which ordinarily should have act as guide,standardisation and moderator of the projects between the parties of the contract. However, bothactors were working outside the context of the agreement. There was failure from the relevantdepartments to enforce sanctions from the breaches of the development lease agreement. The endresult shows that the private sectors were producing houses and infrastructures that were not incompliance with the specification of the development agreement signed. The mixed developmentdensities in the form of detached, semi-detached, terraced and block of flats known with Abujadevelopment was apparently ignored and dumped by the private developers. Much of thedevelopment by the private developers concentrates on high and medium costs, with very few units ornone at all of low-cost, in the form of mansions, duplexes, bungalows and few units block of flatstargeting the rich and none for the poor. Even the authorities of FCTA criticised such extensive low-density developments that were not commensurate with values of land in the city, considering thehigh cost of infrastructure provision in the city (FCTA, 2008).Financing and accessibility of PPP housing estates in AbujaUnder the NHP reform, the FMBN opened what it is called “estate development window” to OPSdevelopers and “NHTF loan window” to PMIs, to attract massive participation of both developers andhouse buyers in mass housing delivery in the country. The loan to be accessed by the OPS is to be usespecifically for housing development, excluding the cost infrastructure provision. The loan attracts aninterest rate of 10 % per annum (p.a), half of the prevailing rate in the private financial institutions,limited for a period of 24 months. The plan initially targeted only the NHF contributors. Therefore,the houses units’ prices must be between NGN1.5 million and NGN5.0 Million. If the developerswere to develop outside the cost and housing plan units specified, must then be financed from theirresources. Initially, to ensure that the NHF contributors secured the allocation, the developers wererequired by the FMBN to obtain and present list of such contributors’ commitment, through anaccredited PMI. Perhaps this explained why all the OPS developers have one subsidiary PMI or havea retainer ship PMIs to do the marketing of the estate to the prospective buyers. Other requirementsENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  16. 16. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responsesinclude REDAN membership and the developer must obtained bank guarantee. Only two of our sixOPS developers’ respondents accepted to have access this loan from the FMBN. Others claimed to beusing their company resources and bank loans.Just like land grabbing observed above, many OPS jostle to access the loan, few with good intentionsto use the resources for the purpose it is meant for, other see it as opportunity to grab from the FMBNas their share of ‘national cake’ (Housing, 2005). The result of the implementation shows theinsincerity and fraudulent practice of some OPS have diverted the loan to other uses and some couldnot settle the loan as when due, and the amount could not revolve to other developers to access thefund. In fact from this attitude of OPS developers were indebted to FMBN to the tune of NGN11.24billion (about USD$75 million) (NBFTopicsonline, 2009). And from the list of indebted OPS we canidentify that those three of the OPS respondents that refused to disclose to us whether they haveaccess the loan and are to be found to be indebted to the tune of about NGN2.5 billion (aboutUSD$17 million) accounting for more than one- fifth of the total loan outstanding. The constructionsites of MHS estates at the time of the field work there were very few of the developers on site and thedevelopers attributed the suspension of the construction works to the factor of inadequate funds tocontinue the construction. Lately the REDAN have attributed the abandonment of the projects to theCentral Bank of Nigeria (CBN) bank reform that made the banks weakened to provide funds andguaranteed to secure financing from the FMBN (Guardianonline, 2010).These factorsnotwithstanding, there were no adequate monitoring from the responsible institutions to ensure strictcompliance, which allowed much of the funds to be diverted to other uses other than the purpose forwhich it is meant for. If the scheme had enjoyed the deserved adequate supervision it would haveallowed the system to make adjustments where necessary to ensure success.Housing possesses investment potentials and it is considered as such by many investors. Theresponses obtained indicate that more than 50 % and about 48 % of the respondents as renters andowner-occupiers respectively, and about 90 % source of the houses for rent were from individualowners. These findings suggest that many bought the houses for investment and also serve as theavailable options of cost recovery. More than two-third of the respondents was in occupation of thehouses between 1 and 5 years and renting in Abuja, in most cases are for shorter duration and subjectto renewal. By exploring this opportunity afford the investors to recover part of the money invested,generate income and perhaps to some serve as source of paying back some of the borrowed moneyused to acquire the house at the first instance. Also there are quite a number of studies that reaffirmthe position of house serve as source of income, even among the LIG, that part of their premises asmeans of diversifying their source of income (see Sinai, 1998; Tipple, Korboe, Garrod & Willis,1999). The data suggests that there are emerging investors acquiring the houses developed from theprivate OPS developers in Abuja, and the houses are rent out immediately. Against the background ofhousing shortage among the LIGs in Abuja, there is need to put forward measures to control theemergence of this trend in the interest of equity.The recent study of Ndubueze (2009) finding indicates a ratio of about 3 to 5 Nigerian urban residentswere having housing affordability problem. Also other researchers have shown that income levelprove as the major factor that affect house purchase (Arimah, 1997; Udechukwu,2008) and sourcingof loans from formal financial institutions in Nigeria (Ojo & Ighalo, 2008). From the study data, theENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  17. 17. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responsesannual income of the respondents at the time of house purchase and now obtained shows that majorityof the respondents (84.7 %) earn more than NGN100, 000 p.a and the remaining 15.3 % earned lessthan NGN100, 000. Using the NHP, 2006 bench mark, the result shows this the majority that boughtthe housing units are outside the bracket LIGs. Further details of the data shows only 24 % usedFMBN facilities to purchase the houses. While 43 % source the money from personal saving andassistance from relations, bank loan and employer financing account for 27 and 6 % respectively. Thisshows the interplay of traditional source of housing for most Nigerians through accumulation ofsavings and assistance by borrowing from relations and friends occurring in the acquisition of houseson these estates. Considering the focus of the NHP, 2006 on mortgage financing, the implication ofthe findings indicate that not much has been achieved and perhaps the inadequate accessibility to thistype of financing perhaps might be the explanation for negligible number of LIGs participating anddominance of the market by the emerging group of investors buying over the houses developed by theOPS.Another finding of the study indicate that the developers offer choice of full cash and instalmentpayments, which the purchasers are expected to complete within a maximum period of between 3 and6 months, which varies from the developers. The instalments payment terms regime also varies, butmost common are 70%- 30%; 50%-30% and 20 %; 30 %- 40 % and 30 %. The data shows that morethan 60 % and about 22 % made upfront payment of between 11 and 49 % and more than 50 %respectively. Contrary to Mabogunje (2004a, b) the finding demonstrate that the emphasis on cash andcarry basis housing market has not changed with the housing policy that encourages home ownershipthrough mortgage financing. This study further strength the findings of Struyk & Roman (2008)which shows under nascent mortgage there is low-incidence of mortgage financing with about 25 %and cash payment prevails with about 3 of every 4 house purchase in Cairo.Summary and concluding remarksThe existing literature on the Nigeria housing policy over the years dwelt so much on the failure ofthe public housing scheme and its associated issues and there has being very little study on the PPP,particularly the participation of the OPS. This study examined the public sector and OPS role towardsthe provision of housing to the LIGs through PPP in Abuja, Nigeria. The finding of the study showsthat it is not tenable to posit that the adoption of PPP as a strategy of housing the mass people ofNigeria has solved the problems of accessibility and affordability to housing among the LIGs.Conversely, it can be argued that the strategy of enablement, OPS has become a formidable andvirtually impenetrable barrier to access to majority of Nigerians, despite government support of landand financing. The strategy has succeeded by further marginalising and deepening the exclusionistposture of the housing market to majority of Nigerians and effectively undermined and stunted thegrowth and development of the housing sector/ home ownership to near incapacitation. The spiraleffect of the failure of this scheme has contributed significantly to the further densification of theinformal settlements around the city.Furthermore, this study has provided a number of insights into the institutional failures in an attemptto resolve the challenge of housing. The experience shows some of the procedures spelt were grosslyviolated. Therefore, the MHS scheme in Abuja was executed without proper procedure, adequateENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
  18. 18. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political Responsesplanning and implementation. The scheme also suffered from lack of coordination and monitoringfrom the relevant stakeholder departments of the FCDA and the worst originate from the ad hoccommittee that first administer the scheme. This singular institutional failure brought about theconfusion, lack of focus, coordination and encouraged non-compliance. It has shown the effects ofweak institutional framework to successfully coordinate and monitor the progress of this onerous taskof housing Nigerians. The ultimate goal of the whole exercise has become a mirage to the Abujaresidents, but in particular to the LIGs. The worst outcome from the study shows that the scheme iscompletely disconnected from the overall framework of the country’s national housing policy, thatprioritise to achieve housing for all Nigerians to own or have access to decent, safe, and healthyaccommodation at affordable cost through mortgage financing. The study reiterates the need to furtherconduct in-depth reflections on ways to address this contentious issue of housing the LIG. Also theexisting institutional framework needs to be overhauled and repositioned on ways best to address thischallenge to realise the objective of the NHP, 2006 “to ensure that all Nigerians own or have access todecent, safe, sanitary housing accommodation at affordable cost”.ENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference
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  23. 23. URBAN DYNAMICS & HOUSING CHANGE -Crossing into the 2nd Decade of the 3rdMillenniumWS-06: Social Housing: Societal Changes and Political ResponsesYeboah, I. (2005). Housing the urban poor in twenty-first century sub-Saharan Africa:policy mismatch and away forward for Ghana. Geojournal, 62 , 147-161.ENHR 2010, 4-7 July, ISTANBUL 22nd International Housing Research Conference