HeatherNow that we’ve introduced what a GPN is in general we are now going to talk about the Soccer Ball Manufacturing GPN that was described in the caseThe ILRF highlighted many issues with the soccer ball manufacturers specifically in these four countries. While all four suffer with some of the same issues there are key issues for each:Pakistan suffers from the majority of its workforce being casual workers and not being eligible for all labour rightsIndia’s labour laws do not apply to any workforce below 20 people.China has issues with overtime as workers are either paid little or not at allThailand struggles with low wage issues as well as health and safetySignificant progress has been made to rectify some of these issues. In particular the Atlanta agreement has been sucessful with the issue of child labour. This has led to child labour being diminished in both India and Pakistan which in the past was one of the worst offenders of child labour.
Heather – This diagram shows the Soccer ball manufacturing GPN.State actors, Firms, and society combined promote International Labour Standards (ILS) in this GPN in order to address the existing labour abuses.
We now move on to discussing the government part in the GPN. Government plays a key role in the promotion of ILS. China: 1994 Labour Law set out regulations in terms of working hours and holidayIndia: 1948 Factories Act – give workers rights about labour contracts and overtime payThailand 1998 Labour Protection act sets out maximum working hours and minimum working age.Pakistan – 1968 Industrial Commercial Employee Ordinance set out guidelines about permanent workersCriticismThere are examples of criticism of some of these government actions such as the World Bank’s assessment of Indian labour laws (ILRF, 2010), however there are clear foundations for effective ILS being promoted
An example of Government and business coming together is that of Thailand. The Ministry of Labour created the Labour standards in 2006Companies manufacturing for US and European companies were asked to voluntarily follow these standards While regulation enforcement was already increased. The government encouraged businesses to participate in following these standards as well as labour laws to help with their attractiveness to foreign companies.
KateGlobal ‘first tier’ companies: observed by the public --- corporate image.
KateImprovements – in a box or something
Dave- DIAGRAM no wordsHow these three actors collectively address abuses of labour rights successfully
Significant degree of unison in relation to challenging issues, facilitated by the GPN. Economy (business produced within firm)State (business governance)Civil society (legitimises business).
Dave‘Hegemonic bloc’ (Gramsci 1971) two dimensions. Organisational structure, comprises alliances and hierarchical relations among actors Specific alignment: that stabilises and reproduces relations of production, meaning and power (Levy, 2008). A hegemonic bloc occurs when “the synchronisation of various elements achieves a degree of stability and consent grounded in the construction of common interests” (Levy, 2008).
DaveHegemony within the soccer ball GPN: Subordinate (Pakistani manufacturers) consent to higher ILS imposed by superordinates (‘first tier’ firms/NGO’s) (Bohm et al 2008); Resulting in improved working conditions. Labour standard organisations are able to ‘win’ concessions from capital Raising the distributive profile of a region Positively impacting a firm’s ability to achieve strategy and competitiveness (Selwyn, 2012).
DaveContinual global concern Gradual improvementILS improvements facilitated through the GPN Independent and collaborative efforts of governments, corporations and civil society, opening communication paths and improving transparency. The case evidence indicates the contrasting range of incentives and influences within the dynamic nature of the GPN on the three key actors.The concept of hegemony supports the idea that GPNs can indirectly and directly create unity in relation to economic, political, intellectual and moral issues (Levy 2008) as contingent stability and consent is found.
Case study presentation 8
International Organisational Behaviour Case Study Presentation Missed the Goal for Workers: The Reality of Soccer Ball Stitchers in Pakistan, India, China, and Thailand Dave Sutcliffe Heather Newton Kate Maley Leah Collison
How the creation of International Labour Standards, promoted jointly by governmental, non-governmental and corporatebodies, and monitored by NGOs significantly addresses abuses of labour rights in Global Production Networks.
Agenda • Introducing the case of soccer ball stitchers • Governmental Promotion • Non-governmental and Corporate promotion • NGO Monitoring Activities • Actors collectively address abuses of labour rights
Introducing the case of soccer ball stitchers Global Production Network - GPN International • Defining a GPN (Levy 2008) Agreements • Direct and indirect relationships National • Coordination Regulations • Organisational capacity Corporate Internal Regulations • Geographic reach • Significant FDI and international trade Supply Chain Coordination • Economic and political nature of the GPN: • Is regulated by complex forms of governance at multiple levels (Levy 2008) • Enables a dialectical approach to labour within global capitalism environments (Selwyn 2012) • Facilitates international changes such as the creation and implementation of ILS
Context of the case Soccer Ball Manufacturing GPN• The International Labour Rights Forum (2010) highlight issues within soccer ball manufacturers in: Pakistan India China Thailand• The Atlanta Agreement (1997) • Child Labour
Global Production Network States International Firms Labour Standards Society& NGOs
Governmental Promotion Government plays a key role in promotion of ILS, ILRF (2010). • China: 1994 Labour Law • India: 1948 Factories Act • Thailand: 1998 Labour Protection Act • Pakistan: 1968 Industrial Commercial Employee Ordinance• Criticisms States
Government and Business An example: Thailand • Thai Ministry of Labour in collaboration with Private Sector • Thai Labour Standards (TLS-8001) 2006 (Suttawet and Yawichian 2008) • Company Engagement • Voluntary participation from companies engaged with US and States European organisations. • Increased regulation enforcement • Encouraging firms to meet international labour laws and Firms standards to increase their attractiveness (ILRF 2010).
NG and Corporate Promotion Society& NGOs • Global „first tier‟ companies • Ethical and Social Scrutiny • Corporate Image • Incentive to improve ILS through the GPN • Code of Conducts and Compliance Systems Firms • The Value Chain (Porter 1985) • Maximising Value-adding activities and minimizing value-extracting activities = Increased Competitive Advantage Promoting ILS Improved Labour Conditions throughout GPN Low-value Exploitative Activities High Value-adding activities
NG and Corporate Promotion Value Chain examples Firms • Nike • Saga Sport key supplier in Pakistan • Termination of contract 2006 • Resumed production in 2007 • Silver Star adhered to strict labour conditions • Atlanta Agreement Effectively regulated Nike‟s Value Chain Improved working conditions Simplified monitoring Process
The Soccer Manufacturing industry in Jalandhar, India Value Chain StrugglesSoccer Manufacturers inJalandhar, India:• Value Chain Struggles in GPN• Combination of work structure formsPressures:• Increased demand• Reduce Child Labour violations• Technology upgrades Lund-Thomsen, P., & Khara, N. (2011)
Other NG Promoters Society& NGOs• FIFA • Quality marks • Financial contributions • Assist rights violations prevention• World Federation of Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI) • Ethical consulting services • Facilitates collaboration of different actors- members: Adidas and Nike.• Additional Collaboration e.g. South Asia Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS).
NGO Monitoring Activities Society& Monitoring Associations NGOs • The Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labour (IMAC) • Training so manufacturers could effectively monitor child labour • The Sports Goods Foundation of India (SGFI) • looks to eradicate the roots of child labour completely
NGO Monitoring Activities Monitoring Certifications• The Social Accountability International (SA8000) • manufacturers who meet voluntary standards surrounding „workers‟ rights, workplace conditions, and management systems‟.• Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) • Certifications to manufacturers who are concurrent with labour standards• FIFA Society& NGOs
Further Monitoring Case Example: Thailand International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC 2007) • Thailand: 5 out of 8 core ILO Labour Conventions Improvements are required Issues Freedom of Associations Financial Independence Collective Bargaining Rights to Strike Sustainability Child Labour Transparency Migrant Workers Human Capacity Discrimination • Overall monitoring by NGO‟s through GPN is successfully addressing the implementation of ILS
Collaboration of Actors States International Firms Labour Standards Society& NGOs
Collaboration of Actors Concept of Hegemony-(Bohm et al 2008) Sustained through three „spheres‟: • Economy • State • Civil Society.
Collaboration Hegemonic Bloc • „Hegemonic bloc‟ (Gramsci 1971) • Two Dimensions. • Organisational Structure • Specific Alignment • A hegemonic bloc occurs when “the synchronisation of various elements achieves a degree of stability and consent grounded in the construction of common interests” (Levy, 2008).
Collaboration Within Soccer Ball GPN• Subordinate (Pakistani manufacturers) consent to higher ILS imposed by superordinates („first tier‟ firms/NGO‟s) (Bohm et al 2008); • Resulting in: • Improved working conditions. • Concessions from capital
Conclusion • Continual global concern • GPN facilitates promotion and enforcement • Hegemony supports the idea that GPNs can indirectly and directly create unity (Levy 2008)
References• Böhm, S., A. Spicer, and P. Fleming (2008) „Infra-political dimensions of resistance to International business: A Neo-Gramscian approach.‟ Scandinavian Journal of Management 24(3): 169–182.• Gramsci, A. (1971). „Selection from prison notebooks.‟ London: Lawrence & Wishart.• ITUC (2007) „Internationally recognised core labour standards in Thailand. Report for the WTO general council review of the trade policies of Thailand‟ [online] Available at: <http://www.ituccsi.org/IMG/pdf/Thailand_report_final.pdf > [Accessed 26 February 2012]• ILRF (2010) Missed the Goal for Workers: the Reality of Soccer Ball Stitchers in Pakistan, India, China and Thailand, International Labor Rights Forum, 7 June 2010• Kaplinsky, R., Morris, M. (2001) „A Handbook for Value Chain Research.‟ Available at: <http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/fisheries/docs/Value_Chain_Handbool.pdf> [Accessed February, 2012].• Levy, D. (2008) “Political Contestation in Global Production Networks.” Academy of Management Review 33(4): 943–963• Lund-Thomsen, P., & Khara, N. (2011). Making A Last Minute Save?: Value Chain Struggles, Work Organization, and Outcomes for Labor in the Football Manufacturing Industry of Jalandhar, India. (Working Paper; 02-2011). Frederiksberg: Center for Corporate Social Responsibility, CBS.• Porter, M. E. (1985). „Competitive advantage: Creating and sustaining superior performance.’ New York: Free Press.• Selwyn, B. (2012) Beyond firm-centrism: re-integrating labour and capitalism into global commodity chain analysis. Journal of Economic Geography 12(1): 205–226• Spicer, A. and S. Böhm (2007) „Moving Management: Theorizing Struggles against the Hegemony of Management‟ Organization Studies 28(11): 1667-1698• Suttawet, C. and Yawichian, S. (2008). “Around the World: Thailand. Current Situation of Labour Standards for Trading in Thailand” [online] Available at: <http://www.udel.edu/fiber/issue2/world/LaborStandards-Thailand.html> [Accessed 26 February 2012]