Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.

Case study presentation 8


Published on

  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

Case study presentation 8

  1. 1. International Organisational Behaviour Case Study Presentation Missed the Goal for Workers: The Reality of Soccer Ball Stitchers in Pakistan, India, China, and Thailand Dave Sutcliffe Heather Newton Kate Maley Leah Collison
  2. 2. How the creation of International Labour Standards, promoted jointly by governmental, non-governmental and corporatebodies, and monitored by NGOs significantly addresses abuses of labour rights in Global Production Networks.
  3. 3. Agenda • Introducing the case of soccer ball stitchers • Governmental Promotion • Non-governmental and Corporate promotion • NGO Monitoring Activities • Actors collectively address abuses of labour rights
  4. 4. Introducing the case of soccer ball stitchers Global Production Network - GPN International • Defining a GPN (Levy 2008) Agreements • Direct and indirect relationships National • Coordination Regulations • Organisational capacity Corporate Internal Regulations • Geographic reach • Significant FDI and international trade Supply Chain Coordination • Economic and political nature of the GPN: • Is regulated by complex forms of governance at multiple levels (Levy 2008) • Enables a dialectical approach to labour within global capitalism environments (Selwyn 2012) • Facilitates international changes such as the creation and implementation of ILS
  5. 5. Context of the case Soccer Ball Manufacturing GPN• The International Labour Rights Forum (2010) highlight issues within soccer ball manufacturers in: Pakistan India China Thailand• The Atlanta Agreement (1997) • Child Labour
  6. 6. Global Production Network States International Firms Labour Standards Society& NGOs
  7. 7. Governmental Promotion Government plays a key role in promotion of ILS, ILRF (2010). • China: 1994 Labour Law • India: 1948 Factories Act • Thailand: 1998 Labour Protection Act • Pakistan: 1968 Industrial Commercial Employee Ordinance• Criticisms States
  8. 8. Government and Business An example: Thailand • Thai Ministry of Labour in collaboration with Private Sector • Thai Labour Standards (TLS-8001) 2006 (Suttawet and Yawichian 2008) • Company Engagement • Voluntary participation from companies engaged with US and States European organisations. • Increased regulation enforcement • Encouraging firms to meet international labour laws and Firms standards to increase their attractiveness (ILRF 2010).
  9. 9. NG and Corporate Promotion Society& NGOs • Global „first tier‟ companies • Ethical and Social Scrutiny • Corporate Image • Incentive to improve ILS through the GPN • Code of Conducts and Compliance Systems Firms • The Value Chain (Porter 1985) • Maximising Value-adding activities and minimizing value-extracting activities = Increased Competitive Advantage Promoting ILS Improved Labour Conditions throughout GPN Low-value Exploitative Activities High Value-adding activities
  10. 10. NG and Corporate Promotion Value Chain examples Firms • Nike • Saga Sport key supplier in Pakistan • Termination of contract 2006 • Resumed production in 2007 • Silver Star adhered to strict labour conditions • Atlanta Agreement Effectively regulated Nike‟s Value Chain Improved working conditions Simplified monitoring Process
  11. 11. The Soccer Manufacturing industry in Jalandhar, India Value Chain StrugglesSoccer Manufacturers inJalandhar, India:• Value Chain Struggles in GPN• Combination of work structure formsPressures:• Increased demand• Reduce Child Labour violations• Technology upgrades Lund-Thomsen, P., & Khara, N. (2011)
  12. 12. Other NG Promoters Society& NGOs• FIFA • Quality marks • Financial contributions • Assist rights violations prevention• World Federation of Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI) • Ethical consulting services • Facilitates collaboration of different actors- members: Adidas and Nike.• Additional Collaboration e.g. South Asia Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS).
  13. 13. NGO Monitoring Activities Society& Monitoring Associations NGOs • The Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labour (IMAC) • Training so manufacturers could effectively monitor child labour • The Sports Goods Foundation of India (SGFI) • looks to eradicate the roots of child labour completely
  14. 14. NGO Monitoring Activities Monitoring Certifications• The Social Accountability International (SA8000) • manufacturers who meet voluntary standards surrounding „workers‟ rights, workplace conditions, and management systems‟.• Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) • Certifications to manufacturers who are concurrent with labour standards• FIFA Society& NGOs
  15. 15. Further Monitoring Case Example: Thailand International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC 2007) • Thailand: 5 out of 8 core ILO Labour Conventions Improvements are required Issues Freedom of Associations Financial Independence Collective Bargaining Rights to Strike Sustainability Child Labour Transparency Migrant Workers Human Capacity Discrimination • Overall monitoring by NGO‟s through GPN is successfully addressing the implementation of ILS
  16. 16. Collaboration of Actors States International Firms Labour Standards Society& NGOs
  17. 17. Collaboration of Actors Concept of Hegemony-(Bohm et al 2008) Sustained through three „spheres‟: • Economy • State • Civil Society.
  18. 18. Collaboration Hegemonic Bloc • „Hegemonic bloc‟ (Gramsci 1971) • Two Dimensions. • Organisational Structure • Specific Alignment • A hegemonic bloc occurs when “the synchronisation of various elements achieves a degree of stability and consent grounded in the construction of common interests” (Levy, 2008).
  19. 19. Collaboration Within Soccer Ball GPN• Subordinate (Pakistani manufacturers) consent to higher ILS imposed by superordinates („first tier‟ firms/NGO‟s) (Bohm et al 2008); • Resulting in: • Improved working conditions. • Concessions from capital
  20. 20. Conclusion • Continual global concern • GPN facilitates promotion and enforcement • Hegemony supports the idea that GPNs can indirectly and directly create unity (Levy 2008)
  21. 21. •Any Questions?
  22. 22. References• Böhm, S., A. Spicer, and P. Fleming (2008) „Infra-political dimensions of resistance to International business: A Neo-Gramscian approach.‟ Scandinavian Journal of Management 24(3): 169–182.• Gramsci, A. (1971). „Selection from prison notebooks.‟ London: Lawrence & Wishart.• ITUC (2007) „Internationally recognised core labour standards in Thailand. Report for the WTO general council review of the trade policies of Thailand‟ [online] Available at: < > [Accessed 26 February 2012]• ILRF (2010) Missed the Goal for Workers: the Reality of Soccer Ball Stitchers in Pakistan, India, China and Thailand, International Labor Rights Forum, 7 June 2010• Kaplinsky, R., Morris, M. (2001) „A Handbook for Value Chain Research.‟ Available at: <> [Accessed February, 2012].• Levy, D. (2008) “Political Contestation in Global Production Networks.” Academy of Management Review 33(4): 943–963• Lund-Thomsen, P., & Khara, N. (2011). Making A Last Minute Save?: Value Chain Struggles, Work Organization, and Outcomes for Labor in the Football Manufacturing Industry of Jalandhar, India. (Working Paper; 02-2011). Frederiksberg: Center for Corporate Social Responsibility, CBS.• Porter, M. E. (1985). „Competitive advantage: Creating and sustaining superior performance.’ New York: Free Press.• Selwyn, B. (2012) Beyond firm-centrism: re-integrating labour and capitalism into global commodity chain analysis. Journal of Economic Geography 12(1): 205–226• Spicer, A. and S. Böhm (2007) „Moving Management: Theorizing Struggles against the Hegemony of Management‟ Organization Studies 28(11): 1667-1698• Suttawet, C. and Yawichian, S. (2008). “Around the World: Thailand. Current Situation of Labour Standards for Trading in Thailand” [online] Available at: <> [Accessed 26 February 2012]