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Vanet by Sujata Tiwari

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Vanet by Sujata Tiwari

  1. 1. Security in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) Sujata Tiwari B.Tech (ICT) 2nd year
  2. 2. Acknowledgements  Presentation based on:  Maxim Raya and Jean-Pierre Hubaux, “The security of vehicular ad hoc networks”, SASN 2005.  Bryan Parno and Adrian Perrig, “Challenges in securing vehicular networks”, SECON 2005.  Some slides courtesy above authors.
  3. 3. Presentation outline  What is a VANET?  VANET applications  Adversaries  Security threats and attacks  Security primitives for attack prevention or handling strategies
  4. 4. A modern vehicle F o r w a r d r a d a r C o m p u t i n g p l a t f o r m E v e n t d a t a r e c o r d e r ( E D R ) P o s i t i o n i n g s y s t e m R e a r r a d a r C o m m u n i c a t i o n f a c i l i t y D i s p l a y (GPS) Human-Machine Interface A modern vehicle is a network of sensors/actuators on wheels !A modern vehicle is a network of sensors/actuators on wheels !
  5. 5. What is a VANET (Vehicular Ad hoc NETwork)? • Communication: typically over the Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) (5.9 GHz) • Example of protocol: IEEE 802.11p
  6. 6. Motivation for VANET  Increase safety Hundreds of thousands of people are killed world-wide due to road accidents yearly. Many more are injured.  Traffic optimization Congestion/traffic jams cost time and fuel. Both these problems can be solved or mitigated by giving timely information to the drivers!
  7. 7. Differences from MANET  Large scale – potentially billion  Fleeting contact with other vehicles  Nodes not as constrained in terms of energy, storage and computation.
  8. 8. VANET applications 1. Safety alerts a. Requirement: Bounded latency b. Primary Issue: Broadcast storm 2. Congestion warning a. Requirement: Message persistence b. Primary Issue: Disconnected network 3. Infotainment a. Requirement: End-to-end connectivity b. Primary Issue: Disconnection due to high mobility
  9. 9. Application-1 : Congestion Detection  Vehicles detect congestion when: # Vehicles > Threshold 1 Speed < Threshold 2  Relay congestion information Hop-by-hop message forwarding Other vehicles can choose alternate routes
  10. 10. Application-2 : Deceleration Warning  Prevent pile-ups when a vehicle decelerates rapidly
  11. 11. Attackers  Insider or outsider  Insider – valid user  Outsider – Intruder, limited attack options  Malicious or rational  Malicious – No personal benefit, intends to harm other users  Rational – seeks personal benefits, more predictable attack  Active or passive  Active: Generates packets, participates in the network  Passive: Eavesdrop, track users
  12. 12. Security Attacks Goals ExecutionActions Congestion Creation/ avoidance Cause accidents or pile-ups Track individuals Denial of service Insert bogus congestion warnings Misrepresent Location of accident Message suppression Aggressive insertion of messages/jamming Single Single, multiple Entities (Sybil) Multiple Independent Colluding
  13. 13. Security Requirements  Authentication:  React only to legitimate events. Authenticate senders of messages.  Verification of data consistency  Legitimate senders can send false data (attack/unintentional). Can cause immense damage even fatalities.  Availability  Network should be available under jamming attacks  Non-repudiation  Drivers causing accidents should be reliably identified  Privacy (conflicts with authentication)  Privacy of drivers against unauthorized observers.  Real-time constraints  High speed means constraints on time
  14. 14. Security Architecture
  15. 15. Key Management  Key distribution How will the key be distributed ?  Key certification Who will certify the keys ?  Key revocation When the key is compromised, what is the revocation procedure ?
  16. 16. Tamper-proof device  Each vehicle carries a tamper-proof device  Contains the secrets of the vehicle itself  Has its own battery  Has its own clock (notably in order to be able to sign timestamps)  Is in charge of all security operations  Is accessible only by authorized personnel Tamper-proof device Vehicle sensors (GPS, speed and acceleration,…) On-board CPU Transmission system ((( )))
  17. 17. Digital signatures  Symmetric cryptography is not suitable: messages are standalone, large scale, non-repudiation requirement  Hence each message should be signed with a DS  Liability-related messages should be stored in the EDR
  18. 18. VPKI (Vehicular PKI)  Each vehicle carries in its Tamper-Proof Device (TPD):  A unique and certified identity: Electronic License Plate (ELP)  A set of certified anonymous public/private key pairs  Before a vehicle sends a safety message, it signs it with its private key and includes the CA’s certificate.  Mutual authentication can be done without involving a server  Authorities (national or regional) are cross-certified
  19. 19. The CA hierarchy: two options Country 1 Region 1 Region 2 District 1 District 2 Car A Car B Car A Car B Manuf. 1 Manuf. 2 1. Governmental Transportation Authorities 2. Manufacturers  The governments control certification  Long certificate chain  Keys should be recertified on borders to ensure mutual certification  Vehicle manufacturers are trusted  Only one certificate is needed  Each car has to store the keys of all vehicle manufacturers
  20. 20. Key revocation  All cryptographic material of a vehicle is compromised: CA sends revocation message to the TPD.  A particular key is compromised: CA sends revocation message to the TPD for each revoked key. High overhead. Short key certificate lifetimes. Large storage required.
  21. 21. Security primitives  Authenticated localization of message origin Option 1:  Beacons broadcast location with timestamp and signature. Include this packet in all messages.  Requires infrastructure. Option 2: Use relative localization
  22. 22. Security primitives Contd.  Anonymization service Attempt to balance authentication and privacy Option 1:  Key changing algorithm that adapts to vehicle speed  A large set of keys needs to be stored in the vehicle and periodically renewed (during regular vehicle maintenance visits) Option 2:  Drivers authenticate to a service with their permanent Id and receive a temporary Id that cannot be traced back to the driver.  Infrastructure required.
  23. 23. Security primitives Contd.  Secure aggregation Vehicle count the number of vehicles it passes and reports the sum. Receiving vehicle authenticates the information and is able to estimate the amount of traffic ahead.
  24. 24. Questions?

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