1. Synergy in Joint Cyber Ops
Policy, Org. Reference & the Way Forward
Indian National Defence University
March 15, 2019
Pukhraj Singh
www.pukhraj.me

2. 0.001% of my actual body of work & experience

3. In cyber:
Institutional memory is institutional capability

4. The Hacker Who Co-opted the Military

5. Russian
Cyber
Doctrine
Indian Cyber
Doctrine
US Cyber
Doctrine
Dedicated to Brig. Singh

6. Part 1: The Physics of Cyber Operations
Part II: Jointness in Offensive Toolchains
Case Study: The Valery Gerasimov of South Asia
Part III: Intelligence-Operations Synergy

7. Part I
The ‘Physics’ of Cyber Operations
From Doctrine to Operations
From Operations to Doctrine

8. Four dimensions of state-sovereignty not working in cyberspace:
Territoriality, Causality, Proportionality & Legality

9. “Cyberweapons are power projection tools” – Dave Aitel, NSA

10. “I was looking for [a set of] tools that had broad range capability, had no regard really
for strategic depth and could be used in a way that would make a more logical
transition, may even avoid the use of kinetic force to RESET DIPLOMACY, reestablish
the ability to negotiate with whoever you’re working with.”
-- Gen. James Cartwright, USSTRATCOM

11. A cyberweapon is “anything which changes the terrain of cyberspace”
-- Gen Michael Hayden, NSA & CIA

12. Where the generals are going wrong:
Not asymmetric
Not non-kinetic
Not attributable

13. Rebecca Slayton, Cornell Uni

14. “I cannot change the reality that all security tools are dual-use”
-- Mike Walker, DARPA

15. “Defence & offence really were one team, we eventually realised”
- Richard “Dickie” George, NSA

16. -- Matthew Monte, CIA

17. The three first-principles of offence:
Humanity, Access & Economy
-- Matthew Monte, CIA

18. Part II
Jointness & Offensive Toolchains

19. This is your offensive toolchain
Only 5% of it actually manifests on adversarial infrastructure
An exploit is just this

20. Operation Slingshot
USSOCOM’s toolchain

21. The Valery Gerasimov of South Asia
Cyber Jointness: A Case Study

22. Part III
Int-Op Synergy

23. Please understand:
Ambiguity is the mother of all cyber operations
All cyber operations are pre-positioning
All pre-positioning is pre-emptive war

24. Observe > Orient > Decide > Act
Sensing > Sense Making > Deciding > Acting
NTRO+DCA
Targeting Framework
PMO
NSA
JIC
IDS
MAC
NTRO+DCA
NTRO+DCA DCA
Some other ideas:
Targeting is 50% of effort, money & accountability
Shared targeting infrastructure with access control & authorisations (via a toolchain)
Joint or inter-placed mission teams

25. Indian Cyber Doctrine?
Minimum Credible Baseline:
Situational Awareness in the Fog of War
The US cannot allow the insecurity of our cyber systems to reach a point
where weaknesses in those systems would likely render the US unwilling
to make a decision or unable to act on a decision fundamental to our
national security
-- Richard Danzig

26. Indian Cyber Strategy?
Cyber as a Counter-insurgency
“The cyber environment displays characteristics of a classical insurgent force”
-- Maj G.B. Parisien, Canadian Armed Forces
- What you own, you necessarily do not control
- Perpetually contested territory
- Embrace constant adversarial contact

27. Proportional Response
“Espionage & warfighting in cyberspace can be indistinguishable until the denouement”
- Col. Gary D. Brown, USCYBERCOM
- Attributability does not lead to intent, it’s a function of national security strategy
- Intent doesn’t have much bearing on impact
- Proportional response is power projection
- Proportional response is escalatory dominance
- Sony attack, backfiring of US deterrence in the Russia hack

28. Discrepancies in the Indian cyber escalatory matrix

29. Our Commander-in-Chief & Head of State need to think like Hacker-in-Chief now
-- Take away from Jacquelyn Schneider’s seminal study on the US Naval War
College’s wargames