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Synergy in Joint Cyber Operations - Indian National Defence University & HQ IDS - Pukhraj Singh


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In 2012, I led the first joint cyber operations with the Indian Air Force. Seven years too late, we have started talking about cyber jointness.

“Synergy in Joint Cyber Operations” presented at an Indian National Defence University event. The first time ever that jointness was discussed in the Indian context. Not very verbose for obvious reasons – I flagged politics and turf wars. Some shakeups are happening; the Defence Cyber Agency is up. Winds of change…

Published in: Technology
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Synergy in Joint Cyber Operations - Indian National Defence University & HQ IDS - Pukhraj Singh

  1. 1. Synergy in Joint Cyber Ops Policy, Org. Reference & the Way Forward Indian National Defence University March 15, 2019 Pukhraj Singh
  2. 2. 0.001% of my actual body of work & experience
  3. 3. In cyber: Institutional memory is institutional capability
  4. 4. The Hacker Who Co-opted the Military
  5. 5. Russian Cyber Doctrine Indian Cyber Doctrine US Cyber Doctrine Dedicated to Brig. Singh
  6. 6. Part 1: The Physics of Cyber Operations Part II: Jointness in Offensive Toolchains Case Study: The Valery Gerasimov of South Asia Part III: Intelligence-Operations Synergy
  7. 7. Part I The ‘Physics’ of Cyber Operations From Doctrine to Operations From Operations to Doctrine
  8. 8. Four dimensions of state-sovereignty not working in cyberspace: Territoriality, Causality, Proportionality & Legality
  9. 9. “Cyberweapons are power projection tools” – Dave Aitel, NSA
  10. 10. “I was looking for [a set of] tools that had broad range capability, had no regard really for strategic depth and could be used in a way that would make a more logical transition, may even avoid the use of kinetic force to RESET DIPLOMACY, reestablish the ability to negotiate with whoever you’re working with.” -- Gen. James Cartwright, USSTRATCOM
  11. 11. A cyberweapon is “anything which changes the terrain of cyberspace” -- Gen Michael Hayden, NSA & CIA
  12. 12. Where the generals are going wrong: Not asymmetric Not non-kinetic Not attributable
  13. 13. Rebecca Slayton, Cornell Uni
  14. 14. “I cannot change the reality that all security tools are dual-use” -- Mike Walker, DARPA
  15. 15. “Defence & offence really were one team, we eventually realised” - Richard “Dickie” George, NSA
  16. 16. -- Matthew Monte, CIA
  17. 17. The three first-principles of offence: Humanity, Access & Economy -- Matthew Monte, CIA
  18. 18. Part II Jointness & Offensive Toolchains
  19. 19. This is your offensive toolchain Only 5% of it actually manifests on adversarial infrastructure An exploit is just this
  20. 20. Operation Slingshot USSOCOM’s toolchain
  21. 21. The Valery Gerasimov of South Asia Cyber Jointness: A Case Study
  22. 22. Part III Int-Op Synergy
  23. 23. Please understand: Ambiguity is the mother of all cyber operations All cyber operations are pre-positioning All pre-positioning is pre-emptive war
  24. 24. Observe > Orient > Decide > Act Sensing > Sense Making > Deciding > Acting NTRO+DCA Targeting Framework PMO NSA JIC IDS MAC NTRO+DCA NTRO+DCA DCA Some other ideas: Targeting is 50% of effort, money & accountability Shared targeting infrastructure with access control & authorisations (via a toolchain) Joint or inter-placed mission teams
  25. 25. Indian Cyber Doctrine? Minimum Credible Baseline: Situational Awareness in the Fog of War The US cannot allow the insecurity of our cyber systems to reach a point where weaknesses in those systems would likely render the US unwilling to make a decision or unable to act on a decision fundamental to our national security -- Richard Danzig
  26. 26. Indian Cyber Strategy? Cyber as a Counter-insurgency “The cyber environment displays characteristics of a classical insurgent force” -- Maj G.B. Parisien, Canadian Armed Forces - What you own, you necessarily do not control - Perpetually contested territory - Embrace constant adversarial contact
  27. 27. Proportional Response “Espionage & warfighting in cyberspace can be indistinguishable until the denouement” - Col. Gary D. Brown, USCYBERCOM - Attributability does not lead to intent, it’s a function of national security strategy - Intent doesn’t have much bearing on impact - Proportional response is power projection - Proportional response is escalatory dominance - Sony attack, backfiring of US deterrence in the Russia hack
  28. 28. Discrepancies in the Indian cyber escalatory matrix
  29. 29. Our Commander-in-Chief & Head of State need to think like Hacker-in-Chief now -- Take away from Jacquelyn Schneider’s seminal study on the US Naval War College’s wargames