Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.

Saharia_ARI_2Aug13

210 views

Published on

  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

Saharia_ARI_2Aug13

  1. 1. The Seeds of Change: The Role of State Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Combating Child Labor in the Hybrid Cottonseed Industry in India
  2. 2. Agenda • Introduction to hybrid cottonseed industry • Theory & hypotheses • Research design • Case study 1-Andhra • Case study 2-Rajasthan • Summary • Q&A
  3. 3. Introduction to the hybrid cottonseed industry
  4. 4. Background to Hybrid Cottonseed Industry • Bt cotton introduced in 2002 • Transformed cotton production in India • Led to emergence of hybrid cottonseed industry • Hybrid cottonseed industry is single largest employer of child labor in India (0.4 million) • Estimates on child labor vary in India. (0.8 million to 3.2 million) • Highest numbers of child labor in the world.
  5. 5. 25% 43% 32% Adults Adolescents (15-18 yrs) Children below 15 Age-distribution of Labor in the Hybrid Cottonseed Industry, 2008
  6. 6. A child laborer cross-pollinating a cottonseed plant in Gujarat, India
  7. 7. Reasons for choosing cottonseed industry • New trend in child labor • Highlights problems of implementation of India’s child labor law. • Snapshot of statewise variation
  8. 8. Child Work in India 60% 26% 7% 7% Agriculture Services Industry Others Child Labor (Prohibition and Regulation)Act, 1986
  9. 9. The Puzzle of State-wise Variation 10% 6% 4.70% 3.90% 4.20% 7.80% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 1991 2001 2010 Over-time variation in child labor in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat Andhra Pradesh % child labor Gujarat % child labor
  10. 10. Economic growth does not explain change in child labor rates Gujarat Andhra Annual Per capita income in 2010 USD 756 USD 570 Average rate of growth of per capita income 14.9% 9.7% 1991-2010 Child labor increasing Child labor decreasing
  11. 11. My central thesis Educational Child Labor deprivation
  12. 12. Theory
  13. 13. Bureaucratic Effectiveness in the Delivery of Elementary Education Social Consensus on Education Theory
  14. 14. Bureaucratic Effectiveness • Poor Infrastructure (2012) -32.4% schools don’t have a toilet -23.4 % schools don’t have drinking water -63.7% don’t have electricity • Teacher-truancy -Average teacher absenteeism = 24% • Poor Learning Outcomes Dropouts (Grade I-VIII) 42%
  15. 15. Effect of Bureaucratic Effectiveness on Parental Motivation Bureaucratic Effectiveness in the Delivery of Elementary Education Parental Motivation to Send A Child to Work/School Quality of Education
  16. 16. Social Consensus on Education Bureaucratic Effectiveness in the Delivery of Elementary Education Parental Motivation to Send A Child to Work/School Social Consensus On Education Quality of Education
  17. 17. Direct Effect of Social Consensus on Parental Motivation Bureaucratic Effectiveness in the Delivery of Elementary Education Parental Motivation to Send A Child to Work/School Social Consensus On Education Quality of Schools Peer Pressure & Demonstration Effect
  18. 18. Indirect Effect of Social Consensus on Parental Motivation Bureaucratic Effectiveness in the Delivery of Elementary Education Parental Motivation to Send A Child to Work/School Social Consensus On Education Quality of Schools Peer Pressure & Demonstration Effect Accountability
  19. 19. Going beyond economic factors to explore institutional and socio- cultural factors affecting child labor Bureaucratic Effectiveness Social Consensus on Education Parental Motivation Child Labor Household Poverty Quality of Education Accountability Peer Pressure & Demonstration Effect INSTITUTIONAL SOCIO-CULTURAL ECONOMIC Civil Society Organizations
  20. 20. Empirical analysis • Findings • Empirical analysis gives broad patterns but does not explain – causal mechanisms – Over-time variation – Role of civil society organizations (CSOs)
  21. 21. Purpose of Case Studies i) Role of Civil Society Organizations ii) Over-time variation iii) Causal mechanisms
  22. 22. Hypotheses
  23. 23. Hypothesis: CSOs that are proactive in creating a social consensus on education should be more successful in reducing child labor than those that focus narrowly on withdrawing children from the labor force.
  24. 24. CSOs Mobilizing parents on education Mobilizing groups on education If the hypothesis is see correct, this is what I would expect to see (1/2)
  25. 25. CSOs Creating accountability mechanisms Collaborating with bureaucracy If the hypothesis is see correct, this is what I would expect to see (1/2)
  26. 26. Research Design
  27. 27. Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan are the two Indian states selected for my case studies
  28. 28. Why Andhra and Rajasthan ? # Parameters for case selection Andhra Pradesh Rajasthan 1. Child Labor in the Hybrid Cottonseed Industry Yes Yes 2. Rural per capita income USD 571 USD 405 3. Bureaucratic Effectiveness Moderate Moderate 4. Social Consensus on Education Low Low 5. Civil Society activity Present and reduction in child labor Present but no reduction in child labor
  29. 29. Over-time variation of child labor in the hybrid cottonseed industry in Andhra and Rajasthan 57.4% 42.7% 29.8% 34.9% 32.7% 24.6% 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 2003 2007 2010 Andhra Pradesh - % Child Labour below 14 years Rajasthan - % Child Labour below 14 years
  30. 30. 82,875 70,400 31,200 91,000 85,340 91,200 14,000 16,000 12,000 26,000 25,100 38,000 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000 2003 2007 2010 CottonseedAcreage ChildLaborAbsoluteNumbers Andhra Pradesh - Total child labour Gujarat - Total child labour Andhra Pradesh - Cotton seed Acreage Gujarat - Cotton seed Acreage
  31. 31. Within-state variation Andhra Pradesh Uyyalawada Dornipadu Rajasthan Kotra Jhadol
  32. 32. Testing my hypotheses in each of the four blocks Parents Community BureaucracySchool
  33. 33. Case Study 1- Andhra Pradesh
  34. 34. Uyyalawada – MV Foundation
  35. 35. Achievements of MV Foundation • 0.6 million children withdrawn from the child labor force and admitted into schools. • 6,000 volunteers at village level. • MVF model replicated in other states and countries. • Innovations integrated into state and national policy
  36. 36. Former child laborers at a Residential Bridge Course (RBC) Camp, Andhra Pradesh
  37. 37. MVF starts social mobilization on education in Uyyalawada in 2006 Uyyalawada Dornipadu
  38. 38. Social mobilization strategies of MV Foundation in Uyyalawada (1/2) Parents -Awareness -Appeal -Facilitation -Sanction Community Community Tying up with local groups
  39. 39. Social mobilization strategies of MV Foundation in Uyyalawada (2/2) School Creating Institutional mechanisms of accountability Bureaucracy Bureaucracy -Providing information & logistical support -Bureaucracy provides legitimacy to MVF - Spread to other blocks
  40. 40. Correlating Causal Mechanisms to Theory Bureaucratic Effectiveness in Elementary Education Social Consensus on Education Parental Motivation (Work/School) Child Labor Household Poverty Quality of Education Accountability Peer Pressure & Demonstration Effect INSTITUTIONAL SOCIO-CULTURAL ECONOMIC
  41. 41. Impact of MV Foundation’s social mobilization in Uyyalawada • Between 2007-10: • Retention rate in schools increased from 30% to 85% • Cottonseed acreage reduced from 1067.5 acres to 653 acres. • Child laborers in cottonseed has declined from 3336 to 405.
  42. 42. Dornipadu-No CSOs
  43. 43. Dornipadu: No NGOs Responses of stakeholders (1/2) Parents: ---- “We hide the children” –Cottonseed farmer Community:
  44. 44. Dornipadu: No NGOs Responses of stakeholders (2/2) School Bureaucracy “I am struggling to keep children in school” ~ Dornipadu principal of government school. “There are no child labor in Dornipadu”~ Block Revenue Officer, Dornipadu
  45. 45. Impact on child labor in Dornipadu • Total cottonseed acreage has increased to 4386.5. • Child labor in Dornipadu=1577 • “Dornipadu is a new area in which cottonseed farming has been started. Both cottonseed acreage and child labor is increasing in Dornipadu” ~Davuluri Venkateswarlu, Independent Researcher.
  46. 46. Case study 2: Rajasthan
  47. 47. Block 3 Jhadol - Dakshini Rajasthan Mazdoor Union (DRMU)
  48. 48. Children being trafficked across the Rajasthan-Gujarat border to work in hybrid cottonseed farms.
  49. 49. DRMU action and government response • Registering migrant workers. • Stopped child labor from going to Gujarat. • Widespread media attention • Diverse institutional measures by the government – Anti trafficking cell – Special Protocol – District Task Force – Special child labor schools – Reality on the ground different – DRMU Movement died down
  50. 50. Impact of DRMU’s strategies on stakeholders Parents: No interaction with parents Competition with other NGOs Community:
  51. 51. Impact of DRMU mobilization on stakeholders School Bureaucracy “It is not our job” ~DRMU member Antagonistic relationship with the bureaucracy
  52. 52. Correlating Causal Mechanisms to Theory Bureaucratic Effectiveness in Elementary Education Social Consensus on Education Parental Motivation (Work/School) Child Labor Household Poverty Quality of Education Accountability Peer Pressure & Demonstration Effect INSTITUTIONAL SOCIO-CULTURAL ECONOMIC
  53. 53. Impact of DRMU’s action on child labor in Jhadol 834 households surveyed in 2012: Out of 845 children, 77 migrated. 9% children migrated in Jhadol
  54. 54. Block -4 Kotra (Rajasthan) –Aastha Foundation
  55. 55. Impact of Aastha Foundation’s strategies on stakeholders Parents: -Individual follow-up with parents -Tribal Development Forum -Ekal Nari Shakti Sangathan -Rajsamand Women’s Forum Community:
  56. 56. Impact of DRMU mobilization on stakeholders School Bureaucracy Monitoring of 257 schools in 25 villages No collaboration with the bureaucracy
  57. 57. Correlating Causal Mechanisms to Theory Bureaucratic Effectiveness in Elementary Education Social Consensus on Education Parental Motivation (Work/School) Child Labor Household Poverty Quality of Education Accountability Peer Pressure & Demonstration Effect INSTITUTIONAL SOCIO-CULTURAL ECONOMIC
  58. 58. Impact on child labor in Kotra Decline in few villages like Maldar but effort hasn’t spread to other villages.
  59. 59. Summary
  60. 60. Andhra Pradesh Rajasthan Uyyalawada (MV Foundation) Dornipadu X Kotra (Aastha Foundation) Jhadol (DRMU) √ X √ X √ X √ X √ X √ X √ X X X IMPACT -Decline in child labor -Decrease in cottonseed acreage -Effort spreads to other blocks -Increase in child labor. -Increase in cottonseed acreage -Child labor declines in a few villages. -Effort remains very loclized 9% children migrating for cottonseed work. - Decline in blocks covered by DRMU
  61. 61. Conclusions: • If India does not pass a child labor law that banishes all forms of child labor, bureaucratic effectiveness and social consensus on education will be mandatory for India to achieve universal literacy. • If India passes a child labor law that banishes all forms of child labor, a social consensus on education would still be necessary for such a law to be made effective because it is unlikely that any law in India will impose penalty on parents if they fail to send them to school.

×