Malaysia Territorial Disputes - Sipadan Ligitan

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Malaysia Territorial Disputes - Sipadan Ligitan

  1. 1. UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA COLLAGE OF LAW GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES GFPP 2223: FOREIGN POLICY MALAYSIA TERITORIAL DISPUTES: SIPADAN – LIGITAN (INDONESIA) Decision Rendered On Dec 17, 2002 PRIDHIVRAJ NAIDU (127445)
  2. 2. <ul><li>Territorial dispute is a disagreement over the possession or control of land between two or more states or over the possession or control of land by one state after it has conquered it from a former state no longer currently recognized by the occupying power. </li></ul>
  3. 3. <ul><li>Pulau sipadan and ligitan is a very small islands in the Celebes Sea of the northeast coast of the islands of borneo, which divided between Indonesia and Malaysia </li></ul>
  4. 6. BACKGROUND OF CASE <ul><li>The dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia, sticking out in 1967 </li></ul><ul><li>Malaysia and Indonesia held several meetings to delineate their CSB from September 9 to September 22, 1969 in Kuala Lumpur </li></ul><ul><li>The problem was discussed by the Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn and Indonesian President Suharto in a meeting on March 26, 1980 </li></ul>
  5. 7. <ul><li>In 1976, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, or TAC (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia) in the first ASEAN Summit in Bali Island </li></ul><ul><li>In October 1991, established the Joint Working Group (JWG) </li></ul><ul><li>The JWG met on July 6, 1992, January 26-27, 1994 and on September 8, 1994 respectively. All meetings broke down. </li></ul><ul><li>On September 14, 1994, following the failure of JWG, Tun Mahathir proposed to Indonesia to have the dispute referred to the ICJ. </li></ul>
  6. 8. Cont.. <ul><li>During his visit to Kuala Lumpur on October 7, 1996, President Soeharto finally approved the proposal of Prime Minister Mahathir to bring the case to ICJ. </li></ul><ul><li>On November 2, 1998, Indonesia and Malaysia submitted their intention to the ICJ by notifying its Registrar of the compromise signed by both countries on May 31, 1997 in Kuala Lumpur. </li></ul><ul><li>It entered into force on May 14, 1998. </li></ul>
  7. 9. EFFECTIVE OCCUPATION <ul><li>SIPADAN DIVE RESORT </li></ul><ul><li>(60% GOVT OWNED) </li></ul>
  8. 10. <ul><li>*On 17 December 2002 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed down its final and binding judgment on the case concerning, </li></ul><ul><li>*Sovereignty over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan finding by 16 votes to one that Malaysia has sovereignty over the islands. </li></ul>
  9. 11. PERSPECTIVE OF ANALYSIS <ul><li>RATIONAL ACTOR MODAL </li></ul><ul><li>The model adopts the state as the primary unit of analysis, and inter-state relation as the context for analysis. </li></ul><ul><li>The state is seen as a monolithic unitary actor, capable of making rational decisions based on preference ranking and value maximization. </li></ul><ul><li>According to the rational actor model, a rational decision making process is used by a state. </li></ul>
  10. 12. BASIC UNIT OF ANALYSIS <ul><li>TERITORIAL INTERGRITY </li></ul><ul><li>ECONOMIC IMMPORTANCE </li></ul>
  11. 13. ORGANISING CONCEPTS <ul><li>NATIONAL ACTOR </li></ul><ul><li>- Malaysia (Tun Mahathir) </li></ul><ul><li>- Indonesia (President Soeharto) </li></ul><ul><li>THE PROBLEM </li></ul><ul><li>- Territorial dispute </li></ul><ul><li>STATIC SELECTION </li></ul><ul><li>- Dialogues </li></ul><ul><li>- Compromise by both states (1997) </li></ul><ul><li>- ICJ </li></ul>
  12. 14. ACTION AS RATIONAL CHOICE (INSTRUMENTS OF FP) <ul><li>GOALS & OBJECTIVES </li></ul><ul><li>TERRITORY: SOVEREIGNITY IS TERRITORIAL IN NATURE </li></ul><ul><li>BOTH COUNTRIES ARE SAFEGOURDING THEIR TERRITORIAL INTERGRITY </li></ul>
  13. 15. ACTION AS RATIONAL CHOICE <ul><li>OPTIONS </li></ul><ul><li>MILITARY (EFFECTIVE OCCUPATION) </li></ul><ul><li>ECONOMIC </li></ul><ul><li>DIPLOMATIC (BILATERAL) </li></ul><ul><li>PROPAGANDA </li></ul><ul><li>INTELLIGENCE (REGARDING ACTIVITIES OF THE PLAINTIF) </li></ul>
  14. 16. ACTIONS AS RATIONAL CHOICE <ul><li>CONSEQUENCES </li></ul><ul><li>EACH DECISIONS MADE BRINGS EFFECT, CONCERNS OF THE OTHER PARTY </li></ul><ul><li>LARGELY DIPLOMATIC </li></ul><ul><li>LIMITED MILITARY INVOLVEMENT </li></ul><ul><li>THIS CASE TOOK IN TO ACCOUNT THE OTHER PARTIES MIGHT & CAPABILITY TO RETALIATE IN ALL ASPECTS </li></ul>
  15. 17. ACTIONS AS RATIONAL CHOICE <ul><li>CHOICE </li></ul><ul><li>RATIONAL CHOICE IS MADE IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE VALUE/OUTCOME </li></ul><ul><li>CONSIDER </li></ul><ul><li>DIPLOMATIC MEANS & ICJ </li></ul>
  16. 18. DOMINANT INFERENCE PATTERN <ul><li>An action took by a state is presumed to have assurance over the result at its favor. This assures the action is value maximizing means. </li></ul><ul><li>Action taken by Malaysia in this case, it is assured by the legal means it pursued in the international court of justice (ICJ) </li></ul>
  17. 19. CONCLUSION <ul><li>Through this paradigm of foreign policy we could see the systematic and rational decisions made by the states as the primary actor of analysis. </li></ul><ul><li>Also gives a clear picture on how decisions are made in a complete and professional manner at national levels. </li></ul>
  18. 20. THANK YOU

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