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Se seminar rapport_houston_lores

  1. 1. Safety WorkshopREQUIREMENTS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT IN 21ST CENTURY OPERATIONS Oceaneering Space Systems, Houston, 1 May 2012
  2. 2. ESA/NASA Back to Houston Content THE OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE (OTC) in Houston is, together with the Introduction to this document 5 Offshore Northern Seas (ONS) in Stavanger, two of the world’s leading meeting places for the global energy industry. Introduction to Space & Energy Safety Workshop 7 This year Greater Stavanger organized a delegation visit to Houston and OTC for the The Programme 8 22nd time! Lead by the Mayor of Stavanger, nearly 200 delegates from more than 70 companies and institutions visited OTC2012. This Space & Energy workshop was The Participants 9 part of the delegation program. Requirements for Risk Management in 21st Century OTC is held annually at Reliant Center in Houston. Each year, OTC attracts more than 70,000 attendees and 2,000 exhibiting companies representing more than 110 Operations 11 countries. The 2012 edition of the Conference ended with a record 89,400 attendees. Afterword by Ron Westrum 15 Way Forward 17 2 3
  3. 3. Introductionto this documentSpace & Energy is a network of technologycompanies, knowledge and research institutionsfocusing on the parallel challenges and oppor-tunities within the space and energy sectors.We believe the intersection and interaction between these twolarge industries will reveal a vast potential for competence andtechnology transfer that will generate new solutions and new busi-ness opportunities.This document describes the Space & Energy Safety Workshop:Requirements for Risk Management in 21st Century Operationsthat we arranged during the OTC in May 2012 in Houston. It is nota scientific paper; it is more for inspiration and energy for furtherwork in this exciting field.The Space & Energy teamStavanger, June 2012 SUPPORTED BY :www.spaceandenergy.no   5
  4. 4. ESA/NASA Introduction to Space & Energy Safety Workshop The Space & Energy Safety Workshop: Requirements for Risk Management in 21st Century Operations was hosted by Oceaneering Space Systems in Houston, close to Johnson Space Center, 1 May 2012. Especially invited were companies and individuals we knew could contribute to a discus- sion in the parallel universes of the space and energy sectors. SAFETY AND RISK MANAGEMENT is at the Despite the successes, accidents still strategies & systems for breakfast.” core of human development and well- happen and Challenger and Columbia However, technical systems, context and being. It is literally the basement of the are both cases to draw a lot of learning social factors are all necessary to pursue pyramid of Maslow, which describes the from. a successful integrated risk management. needs that must be fulfilled to grow and evolve as individuals, groups and society. The oil and gas industry has worked I would also like to mention that the The same counts for business. The man- intensively with risk management for opening of the Arctic regions will agement of risk is an integrated process decades, but still serious incidents happen. strengthen the relations and inter- in all operations, but there are numerous These last few years we have seen some dependencies between the space and approaches to the subject and even more of the biggest blow-outs; Macondo in energy sectors because arctic operations techniques of implementation resulting the Mexican Gulf (BP), Funiwa Deep-A will be even more dependent on space in different outcomes and quality. The outside Nigeria (Chevron) and Elgin in services such as satellite communica- learning experience across industries is the UK part of North Sea (Total). This is tions, earth observation, monitoring, one of the reasons we meet at this work- the serious background for today’s work- forecasts and technologies for remote shop. shop. operations. NASA Johnson Space Center has the motto The presentations today will focus both A goal for this workshop is finding oppor- “Failure is not an option”. The iconic scene on a technical approach with advanced tunities for competence and technology that demonstrates this slogan is from and sophisticated software systems transfer across industries in the approa- Apollo 13 and the famous quote “Hou- along with work process re-design and ches to safety and risk management. ston, we have a problem.” A combination training, as well as a cultural approach of competence, training, simulations, 1:1 underlining the importance of leader- models, 24/7 work and passionate com- ship and values that should and must be mitment saved the lives of the crew of lived by all employees and vendors. To Brage W. Johansen Apollo 13 that returned safe back to Earth. rephrase a popular quote: “Culture eats Chairman Space & Energy 6 7
  5. 5. ESA/NASA Program of the workshop Links to the main presenters 09:00 Registration and coffee Oceaneering Space Systems Proactima 09:15 Welcome and introduction (Michael Bloomfield, Vice President and General Manager Oceaneering www.oceaneering.com www.proactima.no Space Systems and Brage W Johansen, Chairman of the Board Space & Energy) 09:30 Setting the scene NASA Intrapoint • Finishing the Space Shuttle Program – Safety and Leadership (Bob Doremus, Associate Director, www.jsc.nasa.gov www.intrapoint.com Safety and Mission Assurance NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center) • Enterprise Resilience (Idar G. Voldnes, President and CEO Intrapoint) SEROS UiS IRIS seros.uis.no www.iris.no 10:00 Mismatch between skills and technology (Prof. Ron Westrum, University of Stavanger) • Man Unlimited: Technology’s Challenge to Human Endurance • Human Envelope: What is it, and how adequate is it? • Contemporary Examples of High Reliability Systems 10:30 Risk Management and Corporate Governance (Hermann S Wiencke and Richard Heyerdahl, co-founders Proactima AS) • Barriers • Management of technical and organizational changes Participants • Handling uncertainty Brage W Johansen IRIS Rune H Rosnes Oceaneering AS 11:00 Coffee break Preben Strøm Oceaneering AS Aina M Berg IRIS Birger Haraldseid Greater Stavanger Vegard Gunnarson IRIS 11:30 Brainwork and dialogue Katrine Vetlesen Prekubator TTO Egil Hagir Bitmap AS (facilitated by Kenneth A. Pettersen, PhD and prof. Ole A. H. Engen, SEROS, University of Stavanger) Kenneth A Pettersen University of Stavanger Eyolf Bakke-Erichsen Offshore Media Group • Based on the above; what projects and opportunities could be designed across the Space Ole Andreas Engen University of Stavanger Kristoffer Skjelbred Royal Norwegian Consulate & Energy sectors? Hermann Wiencke Proactima Trygve Brekke Greater Stavanger Richard Heyerdahl Proactima Mayor Stanley Wirak City of Sandnes 12:30 Summary and way forward (SEROS, University of Stavanger) Ron Westrum University of Stavanger Mayor Ole Ueland Sola municipality Michael Bloomfield Oceaneering Space Systems Deputy Mayor 13:00 Lunch Michael Whitey Oceaneering Space Systems Bjørg Tysdal Moe City of Stavanger Brian Krolczyk Oceaneering Space Systems City Counselor Mark Gittleman Oceaneering Intervention Jon Peter Hernes City of Stavanger 14:00 Presentation of Oceaneering Space Systems Engineering City Counselor (Michael Bloomfield, Vice President and General Manager) Robert Doremus NASA Anja Berggård Endresen Sola municipality Christopher Hoftun Mars Institute Ingrid Nordbø Sola municipality 14:20 Guided tour David Alexander Rice Space Institute Nina Othilie Høiland City of Sandnes Idar G Voldnes Intrapoint Anne Berit Berge Ims Randaberg municipality Bill Nelson DNV Stein Racin Grødem Forus Næringspark Bjørn Tore Bjørsvik Petro Media News THE WORKSHOP WAS SPONSORED BY : 8 9
  6. 6. Requirements for 1 Risk Management in 21 Century st Operations The aim of the workshop was bringing together professionals from the energy and space sectors with a mindset on safety and managing risk. The two sectors have comparable challenges working with autonomous systems and remote operations in harsh environments. Are there opportunities for competence and technology transfer in the approaches to safety and risk management? SUMMARY BY Kenneth Pettersen and Ole Andreas Engen, University of Stavanger, Norway Presentations BOB DOREMUS is Associate Director for Safety SSP SAFETY CULTURE LEGACY2 3 and Mission Assurance at NASA. He joined the • Engage the entire community in risk assessment Space Shuttle Program in 2004 and served • Assess risk thoroughly & utilize full set of tools 1) Tour of Oceaneering Space Systems several years as Manager of the Space Shuttle • Balance compliance with engineering judgment 2) Vice President and General Manager Michael Bloomfield Program Safety Office. Prior to that he was in- • Encourage Dissenting opinions 3) Mayors and politicians from Rogaland on tour of OSS volved in the Orbital Space Plane Project and • Support a challenging schedule 4) Michael Whitey demonstrating OSS technology worked 19 years as flight controller in Mission Operations in the Mechanical Systems Group, supporting more When the risk is understood – be willing to: than 50 missions as a flight controller. • Proceed with acceptable risk or • Stand down and mitigate unacceptable or poorly Doremus highlighted political, fiscal, scheduling and human understood risk capital challenges the industry has to deal with when working towards safety. Morover, in order to safely complete space mis- QUESTIONS A MANAGER CAN ASK TO DETERMINE EFFECTIVE- sions, he underlined four key points: NESS OF SAFETY PROCESSES • Maintaining a mission focus – how do you achieve this? Are issues being debated in the Program? Is there a healthy • Perseverance tension? • Integration. Large part of job nurturing communication • Is there trust across the Technical Organizations? • Look for negative trends • Do the Technical Authority organizations have sufficient resources and a sufficient voice? The safety foundation of the mission builds on: • When decisions are made, who does the talking? • Technical excellence • Leadership Are lines of authority and communication clear and well under- • Process rigor stood across the program? >> 10 11 4
  7. 7. RON WESTRUM is an Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Eastern Michigan University and WHERE ARE THE LESSONS THAT INDUSTRIES NEED TO Adjunct Professor at the University of Stavanger, LEARN? Norway. He is a recognized expert on organiza- If other industries have lessons we need, what are the tional dynamics in the aviation field. He has mechanisms by which our own industry can learn from made many presentations to international scien- them? tific groups such as NATO Advanced Research Institutes, FAA and NTSB-sponsored seminars, the World Bank CONCLUSIONS seminar on Systems Safety, etc. He also served for two years on a 1. Our safety science is pretty good. National Research Council panel to evaluate NASA’s program on 2. Our safety practice leaves a lot to be desired. Engineering Complex Systems, and on an advisory council to 3. We need to learn from other industries by listening Human and Organizational Risk Management activities in NASA. so we don’t have to learn by experience. Westrum highlighted that although high-risk industries are overall doing better there are still gaps. We keep doing things we shouldn’t do: • Cutting safety resources RICHARD HEYERDAHL is co-founder and chair- • Putting undertrained people in charge man of the board of Proactima AS. Richard has • Failing to learn from experience more than 20 years of experience with risk man- • Taking risks we shouldn’t agement and HSE management in a variety of activities. He has through his career held a num- Westrum also highlighted three areas that are a challenge ber of management positions including Head of across industries and which may be further developed through Safety and environmental advisory services and space-energy: Risk Management Director. Richard is lecturing in areas of risk>> • Requisite imagination analysis, risk management, audit, accident investigations and • Hearing faint signals emergency response.• Are there debates on technical and risk issues or debates • Are we resolving issues rigorously and thoroughly and learn- • Follow through and fix problems over authority, roles, responsibilities? ing from them? HERMANN S. WIENCKE is co-founder and man-• Are people communicating? aging director of Proactima AS. He is engaged in Am I trending effectively? SAFETY MATURITY? several R&D projects related to the area of riskAre we using a good combination of Process/Compliance and • What are my trends in non conformances/Processes/Escapes? management and societal safety and he alsoEngineering Judgment? Why? lectures at the University of Stavanger (UiS) in• Is there an unhealthy focus of one over the other? • What are my trends in the safety of my personnel? Why? courses related to risk management methods• Are we trying to develop Flight Rationale before we have • Are my trending and Non Conformance systems useful for and tools. Hermann has more than 20 years of sufficient technical understanding? my projects and contractors? experience as consultant and manager and has been engaged• Are we testing and analyzing to anchor our rationale in physics? in projects within the oil and gas industry, transportation and Are my requirements clear and effective? health sector.Are we framing risks effectively and understandably? Do I under- • Are there debates over what the requirements mean?stand the bottom line, fundamental risk associated with decisions? • Am I being asked to waive requirements frequently? – Why, Richard and Hermann talked about how we can improve the way Offshore Aviation Medical Nuclear Spcae• Are different risk assessment methods being utilized? technical issue or requirements issue? we manage risk. A large number of risk assessments are being• Do I understand where my margins are? performed to understand the risk, but the interaction between the technical and organization factors are often poorly understood.How do my highest risks, as identified through my risk assessment IDAR G. VOLDNES is President and Chief Executivetools (Top Risk review, PRA, Reliability, Hazard analysis)compare? Officer Intrapoint. He held positions of President How can industries learn from each other? Westrum pointed at Key messages from their presentation were:• Are they the same in each case? Why or why not? and Senior Vice President of the Wireline and four possible mechanisms: • Experience from major accidents shows that root causes often• Do I understand the assessment tools and their strengths Emerging Markets division at Convergys Corpo- • Transfer people are a combination of technical and organization factors. Inter- and weaknesses? ration, he was President of Geneva Technology, • Transfer principles action between these must be evaluated in risk assessments.• Is there commonality and communication across the program Inc., Vice President at American Management • Transfer key techniques • Managers are making decisions without fully understanding in risk assessment? Systems, Inc., and Chief Engineer at Telenor, • Joint conferences the effect these decisions have on i.e. major accidents risk.• Am I allocating resources appropriately in accordance with Norway’s largest telecommunications provider. Voldnes is also a • Managers state that they are using Key Performance Indictors my risk assessment? board member of Wise Online Services, Inc. Can you have the same accident twice? to monitor the major accidents risk (such as ”zero outstand- • Challenger (1986) and Columbia (2003) shuttle explosions ing maintenance on safety critical equipment”), but experi-How are In Flight Anomalies and Process escapes perceived? Voldnes talked about the experiences of Intrapoint from work- • Columbia: “Eerie echoes of Challenger” (Dr. Sally Ride) ence from accidents show us that major accidents are also• Are they viewed as opportunities to improve the System and ing with approaches to risk and safety within the oil and gas • Different Accidents, similar causes? caused by technical issues outside the teem “safety critical”. Learn or opportunities for punishment? industry and aviation. His presentation focused on the potential • Similar cutbacks to safety staff Do we have good enough KPI’s?• Are they viewed as black marks and do projects oppose for enterprise resilience and supportive software delivering crisis • Similar confusion of authority • Managing risk should be as important for a manager than accepting them? management solutions. • Similar “groupthink” about safety issues managing budget. >>12 13
  8. 8. ESA/NASA>>• Business performance management is a “top-down” approach, Risk management in 21st century operations requires the ability to: risk management is a “bottom-up”. The entire organization • Go from visions and goals to safe operations must be involved • Have an holistic approach to barrier management and be• Need a holistic approach to barrier management and be able able to handle management of change. to identify changes and manage these efficiently HOLISTIC APPROACH TO BARRIER MANAGEMENT Afterword STEP I by Ron Westrum STEP II Barrier element 1 Loss of Barrier element 2 control Barrier element 3 Barrier element 4 Identify all hazards and accident situations In the process of putting together the presentation “Ready for Prime Time? – 21st Century Safety Science” I had a number of thoughts, many of which were reinforced by the experience of the workshop itself. So here they are: STEP III 1) ONE OF THE THINGS THAT I NOTICED 2) ONE OF THE QUESTIONS my talk posed tween the two industries. Bob Helmreich MAIN STEPS/ASSESSMENTS AND EVALUATIONS TO PERFORM GOOD BARRIER MANAGEMENT was that each of the industries that has was how one industry learns from an- (aviation psychology) took his “crew STEP I: Assess and evaluate the overall barrier strategy for each defined situtions of hazardas accidents. developed a safety science needs a good other. Since I was directly involved in the resource management” training from STEP II: Assess and evaluate the robustness, functionality and integrety for each barrier (barrier elements and barrier functions). history of its own efforts in developing process of aviation safety teaching medi- aviation to medicine, and directly taught STEP III: Assess the technical integrity/conditions of the barriers elements safer operations. I thought I knew some- cine some of its “lessons learned” it may people working on this in (for instance) thing of the history of aviation and medi- be useful to reflect on that experience. the Bern Kantonsspital in anesthesiology cal safety, but actually I found that my Much of the transfer of ideas was affect- and elsewhere. James Reason spent time own knowledge had huge gaps, and was ed by scholars or practitioners from one talking to Lucien Leape and others even less adequate in regard to nuclear, area who deeply immersed themselves involved in medical safety, as well as ana-Key points from the discussions offshore and space operations. It might in the culture of another industry. For lyzing 200 incidents for the National be useful to gather such histories using instance, Jan Davies, MD, an anesthesiol- Institute of Medicine, then wrote an• What is the relationship between minor accidents/incidents • Space systems safety analysis (mission assurance – that all graduate students, a conference, and ogist, actually was given an office in the interdisciplinary textbook setting forth and major accident? systems are to succeed) failure mode effects analysis) the putting together a basic bibliography. building that housed the Australian his results. I personally was involved in• What gets measured get’s done. We have not been assess- same mode of logic applies to both. These histories in turn could prove inter- accident investigations bureau. Davies two of the meetings of the United States ing major accident risks which is something different from • Organizational redundancy may be a prerequisite for trans- esting for the other industries. then became a kind of ambassador be- Committee on Blood Safety and Availa- workplace health and safety fer of knowledge and people. How do the market conditions• KPI are used for financial objectives not for safety management affect these possibilities?. >>• The oil and gas industry has a lot to learn from the NASA • The setting up of across industrial board of directors for processes on companies responsible for safety critical systems. • Integrating new technologies • There seems to be an increasing tendency also to recruit • Facilitating communication personnel into oil and gas industry from other technical do- • Simulating technologies mains. One example is Halliburton Technology Centre, Hou-• Higher level mistakes can be said to have dominated both ston who now has recruited two of their senior leaders from sectors outside the oil and gas industry.• How much emersion into another industry does it take in • The space & energy network is aiming for an annual intern- order to achieve a level of maturity? ship for Norwegian students visiting NASA.1414 15
  9. 9. ESA/NASA>> Way forwardbility, under the Surgeon General, to help perhaps) impression that offshore safety and not published. (I was told I could con- SAFETY AND RISK REMAINS A KEY THEMATIC AREA of high importance for both thetransfer some of the key findings and was a world of its own, with relatively little sult a copy out at NASA/Ames, but not space sector and the energy industry. Following from the workshop discussion there isintroduce the key aviation safety person- sharing from other industries. take it home) NASA in recent years killed no doubt that enhanced competence and technology transfer is an idea that could con-nel to the medical community. A similar a program that was studying space acci- tribute to better risk management and safer practices.presentation was done by three of us Now the professors in universities are dents, and which had $50 million funding.from the aviation safety community to not similarly limited, and e.g. Reason, Flin, Both industries have immaturities related to their approaches to risk and safety thatthe National Association of Blood Banks. Helmreich, Gaba, Robert Bea, etc. all have This is not to say that there are not ongo- underlines a need to learn from other industries by listening so we don’t have to learnEventually, under David Gaba, MD (UC interests that are very wide. But how ing efforts, such as a web magazine and by experience. The presentations given during the event highlighted generic challengesBerkeley?) was developed a “clinical re- many people not in the nuclear industry an annual conference on “Space safety linked to among other regulatory issues, financial questions, leadership approaches,source management” program in anes- have heard of the role of the Institute of and rescue” to focus on safety in space human capital management and innovations and technological development.thesiology and I seem to remember a Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and its and in space operations. Does the Humantextbook in this was written. This was role in spreading safety knowledge across Factors and Ergonomics Society have a In order to implement learning across industries there is the need to understand theobviously the analogue to “cockpit re- the nuclear industry in the USA? In my space section? I don’t know. mechanisms by which one industry can learn from the other. The workshop indentifiedsource management “ from aviation. talk I noted an example of how crew four main categories that may facilitate cross industry learning. These are: resource management (“sterile cockpit”) What role in space safety could Norway • The transfer of peopleThese intensive efforts may represent might well have averted a collision be- take? Should there be a Scandanavian • The transfer of ideasthe kind of cross-disciplinary sharing tween a US submarine and a Japanese space safety institute, with Sweden and • The transfer of principles and systems andthat one needs to do, since there is a school ship. Where the relevant lessons Denmark as partners? (I don’t know what • The transfer of techniquescommon tendency to see one’s own are may not be obvious. the Germans or the French are doing.industry in some way as “unique” and There is, of course, the International Space THE SUCCESS OF ANY ONE OF THESE MECHANISMS depends on dealing with a range oftherefore other industries’ experiences 3) THE SPACE INDUSTRY in particular has University, in Strasbourg, France, but I inter-industrial issues, some of which were discussed during the workshop.may not be seen as relevant. Prof. Rhona unique problems related to safety and don’t know what they offer in terms of • To what extent there exists a high degree of common concepts and thinking withinFlin (Univ. of Aberdeen) told me that mission success, but so far has not at- safety courses or programs.) Should one risk and safety across industriesmostly oil-oriented safety people were tracted the stellar intellectual talent de- of the Norwegian universities (Stavan- • The degree of comparable challenges technologically and organizationally betweennot interested in, e.g. Crew Resource voted to aviation. So, for instance, while ger?) develop a space safety program? the industriesManagement, and that she had had little each of the shuttle explosions has led to I am pleased to find out there will be • The degree of similarities or difference related to goals and industrial values (eco-success in selling CRM ideas to them. an intense intellectual ferment (e.g. NASA interns from Norway. But when nomically, politically and socially)I also feel that energy and space them- Vaughan’s The Challenger Launch Deci- they return, will there be a program for • The degree of similarity concerning market conditions (e.g. oil and gas highly privat-selves need not limit their search for sion and Starbuck and Farjoun’s Organi- them? Should there be a European Union ized and a complex landscape of actors with challenging contractual relations,good safety ideas to each other, but zation at the Limit), the best discussion project on space safety, if there is not one space historically more homogeneous with more stable contractual relationships)should open themselves up to lessons of the Hubble Space Telescope fiasco now? Should Stavanger have a confer- • To what extent there are similarities or differences concerning expectations on howfrom other industries. was an investigation by a team from the ence? A course? A professor? Where does future market conditions will influence implementation and development of risk Hartford Courant, a local newspaper. The this fit in with the Norwegian space and safety management systems.So maybe we should concentrate on government report on Hubble, for in- center and the Norwegian space pro-moving people rather than just moving stance, was far less informative. Yet the gram?ideas. I noted, in talking to safety-oriented Hubble screw-up was a multi-billion dol-firms at the OTC 2012, that the “Swiss lar accident that required a second shut- 4) ALL THESE THOUGHTS could be furtherCheese Model” (for instance) had not tle mission. When NASA did a study on elaborated, through further in-house dis-even been heard about in Offshore safety the causes of space accidents, for in- cussions and mini-conferences.discussions. And it was my (superficial stance, the study was kept proprietary16 17
  10. 10. muskatdesign.noESA/NASA *think outside the planet We welcome you to Think Outside The Planet! spaceandenergy.no thinkoutsidetheplanet.com 18

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