The Two Leadership Styles of William Jefferson ClintonAuthor(s): Fred I. GreensteinSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 351-361Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791744Accessed: 27/05/2009 15:03Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ispp.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with thescholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform thatpromotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org. International Society of Political Psychology is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Psychology.http://www.jstor.org
Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1994The Two Leadership Styles of WilliamJefferson ClintonFred I. GreensteinPrinceton University Readers of the governmentpublicationsthat record such official actions ofthe Americanpresidencyas executive ordersand signed legislation will be awareof two PresidentClintons-the chief executive namedWilliam J. Clinton, whosename appearson such documents, and the Bill Clintonwho is picturedregularlyon television in a seemingly endless series of photo opportunities,informalpressinterviews, and formal addresses. My argumentin this accountof the leadershipstyle of PresidentClintonis thattherealso can be said to be two Bill Clintonsat afar more politically significant level-the level of day-to-dayexecutive leader-ship in the arena of governmentand politics. My furtherargumentis that it isnecessary to take account of both Bill Clintons to explain the striking up-and-down performanceof the Clinton presidency. The leadershipstyles of some political leaderstend to be all of a piece. Thisappears to have been the case of PresidentJimmy Carter. As the declassifiedrecordof the Carterpresidencybegins to emerge, one sees a presidentwho in hisprivate counsels appearsto be very similar to the presidentwho was evident insuch public displays as news conferences and addresses to the nation, in bothcontexts showing the same preoccupationwith the technical details of his poli-cies and the same ratherstiff-necked insistence on the correctnessof his ownpositions. Otherleadershipstyles are layered, as in the case of PresidentDwightD. Eisenhower whose nonpartisanand homely outward persona concealed acool, analyticallydetachedpolitical strategist,who typically obtainedresults byindirection(Greenstein, 1982). The leadership style of William Jefferson Clinton appears to be neitherunitarynor layered, but ratherto change over time in an alternation between twobasic modalities-a no-holds-barred style of striving for numerouspolicy out-comes with little attentionto establishingprioritiesor accommodating political torealities, and a more measured,pragmaticstyle of focusing on a limited number 351 0162-895X ? 1994 International Society of Political PsychologyPublishedby Blackwell Publishers,238 Main Street, Cambridge,MA 02142, USA, and 108 CowleyRoad, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.
352 Greensteinof goals and attendingclosely to the politics of selling his program.I speak of analternationin Bill Clintons leadership style ratherthan an evolution becausethere is a strikingsimilaritybetween the course of Mr. Clintonspolitical actionsin the state of Arkansasand his actions duringthe period that has so far elapsedof his first year in the White House. In Arkansas, after being elected in 1978 as the nations youngest governor,Clinton moved too fast and too far for the political temper of his state and wasdefeatedtwo years later, but then spent the next two years stumpingthe state andpromising to remedy his ways. He was returnedto office, and thereafterhispolitical comportmentwas by all accounts far more measuredand responsive topolitical realities, enabling him to remainas governorfor a furtherdecade (Ifill, 1982; Kolbert, 1992). Similarly,the first 100 days of the Clintonpresidencywerean exercise in political excess. Having promised to focus "like a laser" on theeconomy, Clintonconfrontedthe Washington political communitywith a scatter-gun of stimuli-gays in the military,a succession of problematicappointments,and a procession of other distractionswhich negated the positive effects of hisoccasional tour-de-forceperformances,such as the much-acclaimed,ad lib pre-sentationof his economic programto a joint session of Congresson February17. By the 100-daysmarkClintonhad a record-lowapprovalratingin the polls.The press commentaryon his presidencywas suffusedwith the images of failureand whateverpolitical capital his periodic strong performanceshad earned himwas squandered.Then, ratheras if the punditryoccasioned by the arbitrary100-day markhad providedthe same wake-up call furnishedby defeat after his firstas governor, Clinton correctedsharply,moved to the center, signalled his will-ingness to bargain and negotiate, and even conspicuously added to his staffthe former Republican White House aide David Gergen. Ironically, Gergenhad been chargedwith the public relationsaspects of enacting PresidentRonaldReagans 1981 tax cut, which produced the mounting deficit that PresidentClintons 1993 economic programwas designed to combat. Because my concern is with the outer aspects of the Clinton leadership-with his style ratherthan his characterand personality-I will not attempt toarrive at an answer to the puzzling question of why Clinton appearsto requireexternal correction in order to modify his style in ways that are plainly in hisinterest. Rather, I will focus on the particularelements of his leadership thatcombine in different ways at differentperiods to account for his two politicalmodes. CLINTONS LEADERSHIP QUALITIES The account that follows of the components of Bill Clintons oscillatingpolitical style takes the form of nine somewhatarbitrary clustersof observations.While it has something of the atomized, static characterof trait-psychology
Symposium: Two Leadership Styles 353inventories of personal attributes,I will set it forth in the form of a continuousnarrativethat is meant to suggest how these components fit together and comeinto play under varying circumstances. 1. Policy Concerns High on any listing of the qualitiesBill Clintonbringsto his leadershipis hispassionate interestin public policy, more particularly domestic policy. Clinton ispreoccupied with policy not just in the broad sense of having general policyaims, but also in the narrowersense of being fascinatedby the specific details ofparticularpolicies. Beginning in the Trumanyears when the practice of thepresentationby presidentsof an annuallegislative programcame into being, allpresidents have promulgatedpolicies as part of their official responsibilities(Neustadt, 1954). But only a few presidentsappearto have had much intrinsicinterest in the detailed rationalesfor alternativepolicies. Dwight Eisenhowerbroughtto his presidencya deep concernwith the logicof nationalsecurity,which went back to his early careeras a militaryplannerandstaff officer. JohnKennedydevelopeda curiosityaboutthe logic of policies whilehe was in office, largely as a consequence of his interactionswith his morespecialized advisers. And Jimmy Carterwas notable for his preoccupationwiththe details of his own policies. But Clinton is an aficionado of policy in and ofitself, and not just the policies of his own administration,so much so that hisrhetoricon the stump sometimes has more of the ring of the public policy schoolthan of the political arena. Interestingly,for a presidentwho is so deeply fascinatedwith the rationalefor and mechanics of his domestic policies, Clintonseemed for much of his firsthalf-yearin office to be almost oblivious to foreign policy. Neither his formativeexperiences as a Vietnam war protester,nor his dozen years as goveror of asmall Southernstate appearto have led him to addresshimself in any sustainedway to the largerworld. Apartfrom occasional brief periods of intense involve-ment in foreign affairs on the occasions of his meeting with Soviet PresidentBoris Yeltsin and his participationin the Tokyo economic summit, he appearsalmost to have delegated the largerworld to his foreign policy team for much ofhis first year, only stepping into the commander-in-chief role in October, whenevents in Somalia and Haiti made it evident that, like it or not, he is commanderin chief and head of state and he cannot confine himself to leadership in thedomestic sphere. 2. Political Propensity Clinton also stands out in the extent to which he is a political animal,although, in a universe that includes FranklinRoosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and
354 FredI. GreensteinRichardNixon, his preoccupation with politics is less distinctivethanhis passionfor policy. He is political both in the public sense of batteningon the responsesofthe mass public and in the privatesense of reveling in the artsof persuasionandcajolery. Moreover, he seems to have exhibitedthese qualities, at least in antici-patoryform, from his earliestyears. As the editorand compilerof a collection ofreminiscencesof citizens of Arkansaswho knew Clinton at various points in hisdevelopment puts it: Few Americansever had the exteriorgifts of the politician in such abundance.Bill Clinton was handsome, loquacious, and tireless. He always exhibited a boundless opti- mism. He met people with grace and facility, and a prodigious memory never let him forget them. He had what seemed to be a compulsive need to meet people, to know them, to like them, to have them like him. These are the instinctsof the calculatingpolitician, but they long preceded Clintons political impulses. Bill Clintons is the case where a mans deepest human instinct perfectly matched, maybe even gave rise to, his most abiding ambition. (Dumas, 1993, p. xvi) There is no obvious precedentin the moder presidencyfor a chief execu-tive who combines a concern for and interestin politics and policy to the extentthat Clintondoes. It is as if the more cerebralside of JohnF. Kennedysapproachto leadershipwere writ large and amalgamated with LyndonJohnsonsproclivityto press the flesh, find ways to split the difference with his opponents, andotherwise practice the art of the possible. 3. Verbal Facility and Proclivity The link between Clintons policy and political orientations is his intel-ligence and formidable verbal facility. The record abounds with evidence ofClintonsseemingly effortlessabilityto elaborateat length abouthis policies withmodificationsof emphasisfrom audienceto audience. The perfectlygrammatical100-odd-wordsentences Clinton is able to spin out extemporaneously could notbe more unlike the fractured prose of George Bush. Indeed, he sometimes spinsout statementsof extraordinary complexity with seemingly effortlessspontaneity,as in the following vintage utteranceto the WallStreetJournal staff memberstowhom he granted his first interview after taking office, which juxtaposes twopairs of if-then propositions: The people who say that if I want to go to a four-yearphased-incompetition model [in connection with health care reform]and that wont save any tax money on the deficit in the first four years, but will save huge tax money on the deficit in the next four years, miss the main point, which is that if we have a system now which begins to move health care costs down towardinflation, and thereforelowers healthcare as a percentageof the GNP in the years ahead, the main beneficiariesby a factor of almost two to one will be in the private sector. (Clinton, 1992) As exceptional as Clintons verbal intelligence is, however, it is not clearhow able he is to make the kinds of sound, balancedjudgmentsthat commonly
TwoLeadershipSymposium: Styles 355are summarizedin the term"commonsense," and it is not certainwhetherhe hasa fundamentallyanalytic cast of mind that leads him to search for evidence thatwould lead him to accept or reject the assumptionsbehind the formulationshecan verbalize with such facility. (On multiple intelligences, see Gardner,1983.)Moreover,precisely because he is so facile, so well-informed,and so profoundlypolitical, it is difficult for others (and perhaps Clinton himself) to be sure ofwhen and whetherhe is advancinga policy on the basis of its intrinsicmerit andwhen and whether he is trimming. 4. Dynamism and Ebullience Other elements of the Clinton amalgam are an energy, exuberance, andoptimismof trulyremarkable proportions.Even when he was deeply beleagueredat the time of the New Hampshireprimary,Clintonexhibitedan optimism remi-niscent of FDRs capacity to radiate confidence under conditions of extremeadversity.But unlike Roosevelt, he has no war or Depression as a foil for thesequalities, and unlike Roosevelt he is not a naturaldramatist.More fundamen-tally, he appearsto lack a comprehensivestrategic sense about how to presenthimself to the public and advance his policies. Interestingly,Roosevelt, like Clinton, faced a "character issue" during theperiod when he was seeking the presidency.Part of the concern was about hisvery outgoing and cheerful qualities-his critics dismissed him as lacking inpresidentialstature,in large partbecauseof whatEdmundWilson once describedas his "unnatural sunniness." But such skepticism was forgottenin the wake ofhis magisterial assumptionof power in March 1933 (Maney, 1992). Clintonsassumptionof power, however, was anythingbut magisterial.Indeed, duringthetransitionperiod between his election and his inauguration,Clinton received aquite favorablepress for his performancein an economic "summitconference"he convened in Little Rock, Arkansas, and for such initial presentationsas hisinterview with the WallStreetJournal. During that period his support, as mea-sured in public opinion polls, was quite high. But by the time the first pollswere conductedafter he enteredthe White House, his administration exper- hadienced a series of gaffes thatsignificantlylowered his supportlevels (Greenstein,1993). 5. Lack of Discipline; Failure to Focus Related to Clintons energy, enthusiasm,intelligence, and devotion to poli-cy is a cluster of more problematictraits-absence of self-discipline, hubristicconfidence in his own views and abilities, and difficulty in narrowinghis goals,
356 Greensteinordering his efforts, and devising strategies for advancing and communicatingthe ends he seeks to achieve. 6. Insensitivity to Organization Another of Clintons traits is a predilection to take on large numbers ofpersonal responsibilities and to do little to establish structuresof delegationwhich divide the labor of his presidency and avail him with overall strategicadvice. The paradoxicalresult is that it is difficultfor his administration move toon more than one trackat a time, but at the same time he has a Jimmy Carter-liketendency to overload the national political agenda. This is the case in spite ofClintons many statements, during the transition,of his intention to avoid Car-ters difficulties and emulate Ronald Reagan in the single-minded pursuit of alimited numberof major goals. Because Clinton takes on so many responsibilities, his administration hasbeen slow to make appointments,many of which are held up for clearancein theOval Office (Pearl, 1993). In general, Clintons exceptional talents are in greatneed of managementlest he fly off in all directions,but he is not easily managed.Moreover,he appearsnot to have given much thoughtto problemsof creatinganeffective staff. In this, he is a striking contrastwith Eisenhower, who enteredoffice with a well-developed view of the staff needs of the presidency and forwhom effective delegation was an article of faith (Greenstein, 1984). Given his energy and intelligence, Clintonprobablydid not need to be veryattentiveto staffingin Little Rock, but he plainly does in Washington.He is saidto be a student of the presidency and of American history, but he shows littleawarenessof the uses some presidentshave made of well-designed formal orga-nization (Burke, 1992). Indeed, he has acknowledgedthat he enteredthe WhiteHouse with no plan for White House organization,whetherat the informalor theformal level, and initially peopled his staff with aides who had little Washingtonexperience and who lacked the statureto help him to control his own centrifugaltendencies (Nelson & Donovan, 1933; Watson, 1993). This, of course, was theearly story of his White House. Then he turned(with seemingly good results) tosuch Washingtoninsidersas veteranRepublicanWhite House aide David Gergenfor staff assistance (Frisby, 1993). 7. The Not-So-Great Communicator As articulateas Clinton is, his record of communicatinghis aims to thepublic has been poor. Paradoxically, fluency serves him poorly. He finds it all histoo easy to deluge the public with details, and it appearsto be difficult for him totranscendpolicy mechanics and convey the broadprinciples and values behind
Symposium: Two Leadership Styles 357his programs. Here, of course, he is the antithesisof Ronald Reagan, who wasnotoriously innocent of policy specifics, but gifted at evoking larger themes. 8. Personal Charm At the personal level, Clinton appearsto be one of the more ingratiatingincumbentsof the Oval Office. In spite of being ratherthin-skinnedand having aquick temper,which occasionally is evident in public, he is fundamentallyamia-ble, sometimes to the point where this is counterproductive. Thus, like FranklinRoosevelt, his congeniality sometimes leaves those who consult with him thefalse impression that he has accepted their views, when he intends only toacknowledge that he has heard them. Clintons impulse to be agreeablefeeds the familiarcharge that he seeks tobe all things to all people and reinforcesthe "Slick Willie" epithet that is turnedagainst him by his enemies. Yet he made surprisinglylimited use of his charmand persuasive powers in the early months of his presidency,perhapsbecause,like many bright, self-confident people, he is impatientwith those who do notshare his views and ill-disposed to take them seriously. Thus, he overestimatedhis ability to win support by appealing directly to the public through cabletelevision and failed to cultivatethe press. And he did little duringthe transitionto win over such key Washingtonactors as Senators Sam Nunn and DanielPatrick Moynihan. And once in office, he was slow to do much to enlist thesupportof Republicanmoderatesand Democraticconservatives. 9. Resilience; Capacity to Take Correction I have left for last what seem to me to be Clintonsmost redeemingtraits-ones that bode favorablyfor his leadershipin the long, if not the short, run:hisremarkable capacityto reboundin the face of adversity,his fundamentalpragma-tism and his capacity (in spite of his thin-skinnedtendencies) to admit his ownfailings. This cluster of traitshelps accountfor the commonly made observationthat he is incapable of sustainederror. THE CLINTON SYNTHESES Most of the componentsof Clintonsleadershipstyle are not distinctive, butthe magnitude of some of them and the way they fit together are. As I havesuggested, there appearto be two Clinton syntheses. Under some circumstanceshis traits combine to form an undisciplined, have-it-all approach, and underothers they converge in a more focused, accommodatingstyle. When he is in the
358 Greensteinfirst mode, as he was in his initial termas governorof Arkansas,as well as in hisfirst months in the White House, Clinton is animatedby his policy enthusiasm,his boundless energy, and his impatience with the views of those who do notshare his policy vision. Even when he is in the first mode, however, he is noWoodrow Wilson, capable of bringing his own programto defeat by insistingthat the Congress take its medicine. But when he pulls back after overreachinghimself, his compromises are likely to have a disheveled, rear-guard quality, aswas the case of his prolonged negotiationsover gays in the military. As I noted earlier, Clintons second, more pragmaticand focused mode ofoperationappearsto come intoplay only afteroutsideforces haveconstrained him.It is not clear why such an intelligent, politically awareleader, who knows in hisheartthathe shouldbe laser-likein his focus, begins his presidencyin a scatteredfashion, or why he is so dependenton externalcorrection.My task of examiningClintonsstyle does not requirethatI reacha settledconclusionaboutthis andotherquestions that bear on his inner workings, including questions bearing on thecontinuinguncertainty over who the "real"Bill Clintonis. Some answersareverylikely to be found in his upbringing.Clintonand his aides have themselves drawnattentionto his alcoholic stepfather,suggesting that his almost unsettling goodcheer reflects the exaggeratedneed to be agreeablefound in children (and step-children) of alcoholics (Kaufman& Pattison, 1982; Cruse, 1989). It is also thecase that his younger step-brother had a substanceabuse problem. Clintons backgroundin a family in which addictionsplayed a significantparthas an obvious bearingon his tendency to leave people with the misleadingimpression that he accepts their views. But his lack of self-discipline wouldappearto have other roots. At a minimum, Clinton, whose outwardcharacteris-tics seem almost to have been custom-madeto illustrateJames David Barbersactive-positive charactertype, shows the difficulty of categorization, in thatmuch of what is puzzling about him stems from inner complexities that do notfigure in Barbers(and perhapsany other) classification (Barber, 1992). More to the point may be the political psychology of RichardNeustadt, inwhich the accent is on "political"ratherthan "psychology."Neustadts 1960book nicely anticipatesmany of Clintonsproblems. Neustadt, it will be remem-bered, stressed the fundamental weakness of the Americanchief executive in anera in which the nations problems are huge, but there is little readiness on thepart of the other members of the Washingtoncommunity, whose support isneeded to bring the presidentsprograminto being, to transcendpolitical advan-tage and rally around him. The president, Neustadt argues, has two basic re-sources with which to accomplish his purposes above and beyond his executivepowers and his ability to use these to bargain-his reputationwith other policy-makers as a skilled, determined player and their perception that he has thesupportof the public. (Neustadts1960 accountremainsfundamentally unalteredin its 1990 incarnation.See also the elaborationon Neustadts formulationbySperlich, 1975.)
Symposium: Two Leadership Styles 359 WHITHER THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY? In the early monthsof his presidency,Bill Clintonmanagedto diminishbothof the resources Neustadt sees as the levers of presidentialpower. His politicaland policy propensitiesoften convergedin a mannerthatled him to be perceivedby othermembersof the political communityas inconstantand disingenuous,notonly because he departedfrom previously held positions, but also because hisdepartures often seemed effortless. It would not mattermuch to membersof theWashingtoncommunitythat a presidentseemed insincere("Whatelse is new?"),if he were seen as havingthe public behindhim. But Clintonwas conspicuousforhis failure to capturethe imaginationand enthusiasmof the American people. Before he modified his style, Clinton was more Carter-likethan JimmyCarterin his seeming assumptionthat once elected he could put politics behindhim. In fact, he made even less effort than Carterto establish a favorablepublicpersona. Once in office, his tendency was to confine himself to impersonalanddistinctly noninspirationalmessages on such themes as the need to "grow theeconomy," and he and his associates did little to humanizehis presidency. (Fordiscussions of what citizens appear to expect of their presidents and of the ofpresidentas interpreter public aspirations,see Greenstein, 1977, and Stuckey,1991.) Then, at aboutthe mid-pointof his first year in office, he enteredinto thetransformation noted above. Once he moved to his second, more strategic mode in the summer of hisfirst year in office, Clinton not only became more focused and accommodating,but also appearedto have realized that he needed to find ways to simplify anddramatizehis appeals to the public. Strikingdeals with dissident Democrats, hebrokeredthrough a deficit reductionmeasure in the summer of 1993 and thendepartedon a vacation that some felt was as needed by the Washingtonpolicycommunityas by the presidentand his staff. He returned from vacationwith whatseemed to be an impossiblydemandingpolitical agenda-comprehensive reformof the nations health system, the controversial North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA), and the gimmicky sounding"reinventionof government"proposals. But he used the latterfor a remarkably effective set of well-publicizedphoto opportunities, that for once showed his administration a favorablelight; inhe made a tour-de-forcepresentationof his health programto a joint session ofCongress, shrewdly associatinghimself more with its general aims than with itsspecific provisions. And he largely delegatedthe promotionof NAFTA to othersuntil almost the eleventh hour, when he engaged in a whirlwindof promotionaland bargainingactivity, achieving a victory in the House of Representativesthatfor the momentput to rest the view thatClintonwould never be able to adapthisleadership skills to the complexities of politics in the nations capital. The Clinton presidency seemed emphaticallyto be on a roll by the end ofNovember 1993, reinforcing accounts in the media two months earlier of aremarkable"turn" Clintonsfate (e.g., Barnes, 1993). Such claims had barely in
360 Greensteinbeen made on the earlieroccasion, however, when Clintonencountereda succes-sion of blows from the international environment-media images of the bodiesof Americansoldiers being draggedby mobs on the streetsof Mogadishuand ofsimilarly ominous mob action preventingthe landingof Americanpeace keepersin Haiti-reminders that the jury is still out on the Clinton presidency. Still, there was little doubt that, whether by dint of his own far-reachingpolicy aspirationsor the very power of the modernpresidentto shape the nationspolitical agenda, the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton had directed thenation, at least in its domestic policies, toward ends which would probablynoteven have been envisioned if the electorate had returnedGeorge Bush for asecond term in November 1992. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT My work on this paperwas supportedby grantsfrom the Lynde and HarryBradleyFoundationand the JohnJ. Sherrerd Oliver LangenbergFundsof the andCenter of International Studies, PrincetonUniversity. REFERENCESBarber, J. D. (1992). The presidential character: Predictingperformance in the WhiteHouse. 4th ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Barnes, F. (1993). The turn. New Republic, October 18, pp. 10-12.Burke, J. P. (1992). The institutionalpresidency.Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.Clinton, W. J. (1992). Excerptsfrom the interviewwith president-electClinton. WallStreetJournal, December 18.Cruse, S. W. (1989). Another chance: Hope and healthfor the alcoholic family. Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books.Dumas, E. (1993). The Clintons of Arkansas:An introductionby those who knew them best. Fay- etteville, AR: University of ArkansasPress.Frisby, M. K. (1993). Communicationguru Gergen works his alchemy on Clinton to improve chemistry with the press. WallStreetJournal, August 16.Gardner,H. (1983). Frames of Mind: The theoryof multipleintelligences. New York:Basic Books.Greenstein, F. I. (1977). What the presidency means to Americans:presidential"choice" between elections. In J. D. Barber(Ed.), Choosing the president. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Greenstein, F. I. (1982). The hidden-handpresidency: Eisenhower as leader. New York: Basic Books.Greenstein, F. I. (1984). "Centralization the refuge of fear":A policy-makersuse of a proverbof is In administration. R. T. Golembiewski& A. Wildavsky(Eds.), The costs offederalism: Essays in honor of James W. Fesler (pp. 117-39). New Brunswick, NJ: TransactionBooks.Greenstein, F. I. (1993). The presidential leadership style of Bill Clinton: An early appraisal. Political Science Quarterly108, 589-601.Ifill, G. (1982). Man in the news: William JeffersonClinton, New YorkTimes, July 16.Kaufman, E. and Pattison, E. M. (1982). The family and alcoholism. In E. M. Pattison & E. Kaufman (Eds.), Encyclopedic handbookof alcoholism (pp. 663-72). New York:Gardner Press.
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