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IronSAP

  1. 1. IronSAP
  2. 2. Who Am i Prasanna Kanagasabai Work @ MNC in Bangalore India Pen tester in the DAY, Programmer by NIGHT @prasannain
  3. 3. Scenario My BOSS wants me to test our internal SAP servers and report findings… PROBLEM I have never seen a SAP system I have no knowledge of SAP vulnerabilities Were is the documents available People who deploy and maintain SAP have poor knowledge of security
  4. 4. Solution Download documents on SAP from various sites. Understand the architecture Understand SAP security vulnerabilities Test each vulnerabilities manually Try some of the Open Source SAP testing tools: 1. Bizsploit (http://www.onapsis.com/research-free-solutions.php) 2. Metasploit Modules (http://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/2012/04/27/mwr-sap-metasploit- modules/) 3. ERPScan's SAP Pentesting Tool (http://erpscan.com/products/erpscan-pentesting-tool/) Buy and run a commercial SAP security scanner
  5. 5. This was case till today
  6. 6. Fortunately it changes tomorrow Introducing "IronSAP" Open Source SAP Security Scanner
  7. 7. Identification via banner Server Header could provide information what the underlying infrastructure is hosted on “Server: SAP J2EE Engine/7.00” Sap systems are no different IronWASP has a passive plug-in that automatically picks these and raises it as a finding
  8. 8. Error Messages SAP Error messages could revel a big deal of critical information. “Errorcode: ICF-NF-http-XXXX_EAZ_00-…………” XXXX -- > Hostname EAZ -- > SAPSID 00 -- > System Number IronSAP can detect this information, it will raise a finding with the pages and critical information found
  9. 9. ICF There are 1500 ICF services that are shipped They behave like any normal server side pages do. They receive web input, process, and output the results Services are divided into Public Services Private Services
  10. 10. ICF Public services are responded without any authentication Private services can request authentication as configured… Most services require authentication
  11. 11. ICF & IronSAP IronSAP can find all the services that respond to a request. (200 OK) If the response was 200 it continues to check If it is a login page or has some interesting content If login is Basic authentication it launches a brute force attack. Automatically checks all HTTP(s) ports and finds interesting pages.
  12. 12. ICF - Info Service A dangerous Public ICF service Found @ /sap/public/info Returns SAP internal information as a XML ironSAP: Icf Finger printer scans and finds the info service and raises a finding in the system.
  13. 13. ICF 2 – SOAP RFC RFC is a protocol to call ABAP programs Not available on the internet ICF service allows access to the underlying RFC If enabled the malicious user can run RFC programs as present in the local network IronSAP: fingerprint finds presence of this ICF service and raises the finding.
  14. 14. Admin Pages SAP has web administration page that has in store real time information on SAP infrastructure. Can be found without authentication IronSAP: fingerprint finds presence of this ICF service and raises the finding
  15. 15. Verb Tampering Web.xml defines if a request should challenge a with a authentication for a given HTTP method A faulty implementation can allow a user to bypass the authentication. IronSAP: attempts to access the resource using “HEAD” for all requests that challenged with a request, records positive outcome.
  16. 16. REMOTE_USER SAP EP can use web access manger for authentication The user contacts the WAM with his credentials The WAM verifies his identity The WAM forwards the user to the SAP EP with a HTTP header with the username of the successful logged in user EP checks its database if the user exists EP sets the SSO logged in cookie
  17. 17. REMOTE_USER The problem is if a request is sent to the SAP EP with the correct header a user could be logged in without having credentials. IronSAP: on finding a portal login it would try to login to the system with different users in REMOTE_USER header.
  18. 18. SAP Start Service SAP management Console found on the SAP system on port 5<instance id>13/14 Installed by Default Remote management of users Information Disclosure No or basic Authentication IronSAP: Queries this web service and retrieves the information from the SAP system and raises the finding
  19. 19. Next For IronSAP Database Security RFC SAP Client attacks SAP Transactions Passwords ABAP
  20. 20. Thank You IronSAP automates the process discovery of the SAP attacks found by the following researchers: Mariano Nuñez DiCroce Chris John Riley Alexander Polyakov Dave Hartley I would also like to thank: Lavakumar (Author of IronWASP) Pavan Kumar (I bugged him nearly every night for information on SAP) Garrage4Hackers (I got a lot of resources from here)
  21. 21. Prasanna Kanagasabai Prasanna.in@gmail.com @prasannain

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