Pattern Recognition
and Applications Lab
Is Data Clustering in Adversarial Settings Secure?
Ba#sta
Biggio
(1),
Ignazio
Pillai
(1),
Samuel
Rota
Bulò
(2),
Davide
Ariu
(1),
Marcello
Pelillo
(3),
and
Fabio
Roli
(1)
(1)
Università
di
Cagliari
(IT);
(2)
FBK-­‐irst
(IT);
(3)
Università
Ca’
Foscari
di
Venezia
(IT)
Berlin,
4
November
2013
University
of Cagliari, Italy
Department of
Electrical and Electronic
Engineering

Motivation: is clustering secure?
•
Data clustering increasingly applied in security-sensitive tasks
– e.g., malware clustering for anti-virus / IDS signature generation
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Carefully targeted attacks may mislead the clustering process
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Samples can be added to merge
(and split) existing clusters
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Samples can be obfuscated
and hidden within existing
clusters (e.g., fringe clusters)
(1) D. B. Skillicorn. Adversarial knowledge discovery. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 24:54–61, 2009.
(2) J. G. Dutrisac and D. Skillicorn. Hiding clusters in adversarial settings. In IEEE Int’l Conf.
2
Intelligence and Security Informatics, pp.185–187, 2008.

Our work
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Framework for security evaluation of clustering algorithms
1. Definition of potential attacks
2. Empirical evaluation of their impact
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Adversary’s model
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Goal
Knowledge
Capability
Attack strategy
Inspired from previous work on adversarial learning
– Barreno et al., Can machine learning be secure?, ASIACCS 2006
– Huang et al., Adversarial machine learning, AISec 2011
– Biggio et al., Security evaluation of pattern classifiers under attack, IEEE Trans.
Knowledge and Data Eng., 2013
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Adversary’s goal
•
Security violation
– Integrity: hiding clusters / malicious activities without compromising
normal system operation
• e.g., creating fringe clusters
– Availability: compromising normal system operation by altering the
clustering output
• e.g., merging existing clusters
– Privacy: gaining confidential information about system users by
reverse-engineering the clustering process
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Attack specificity
– Targeted: affects clustering of a given subset of samples
– Indiscriminate: affects clustering of any sample
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Adversary’s knowledge
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The adversary may know:
INPUT DATA
•
FEATURE
REPRESENTATION
CLUSTERING
ALGORITHM
ALGORITHM
PARAMETERS
e.g., initialization
Perfect knowledge
– upper bound on the performance degradation under attack
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Adversary’s capability
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Attacker’s capability is bounded:
– maximum number of samples that can be added to the input data
• e.g., the attacker may only control a small fraction of malware samples
collected by a honeypot
– maximum amount of modifications (distance in feature space)
• e.g., malware samples should preserve their malicious functionality
x2
Feasible domain
(e.g., L1-norm)
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http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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x1
x − x " ≤ d max
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Formalizing the optimal attack strategy
Attacker’s goal
Knowledge of the data, features, …
max Eθ ~µ "g ( A!;θ )$
#
%
A!
s.t. A! ∈ Ω(A)
Capability of manipulating the input data
Perfect knowledge:
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
Eθ ~µ "g ( A!;θ )$ = g ( A!;θ 0 )
#
%
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Poisoning attacks (availability violation)
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Goal: maximally compromising the clustering output on D
Capability: adding m attack samples
max g ( A!;θ 0 ) = dc (C, fD (D ∪ A!))
A!
m
s.t. A! ∈ Ω p = {{ai!}i=1 ⊂ R d }
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C = f (D)
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Heuristics tailored to the clustering
algorithm for efficient solution!
A’
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f (D ∪ A") x
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Single-linkage hierarchical clustering
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Bottom-up agglomerative clustering
– each point is initially considered as a cluster
– closest clusters are iteratively merged
– single-linkage criterion dist(Ci , C j ) = min
a∈Ci , b∈C j
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C = f (D)
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d(a, b)
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Dendrogram cut
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Poisoning attacks vs. single-linkage HC
max g ( A!;θ 0 ) = dc (C, fD (D ∪ A!))
A!
s.t. A! ∈ Ω p
#
%
For a given cut criterion:
…
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T
T
dc (Y, Y !) = YY − Y !Y ! ,
Y =%
F
%
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Sample 5
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Sample 1
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# 1 0
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We assume the most advantageous criterion for the clustering algorithm:
the dendrogram cut is chosen to minimize the attacker’s objective!
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Poisoning attacks vs. single-linkage HC
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Heuristic-based solutions
– Greedy approach: adding one attack sample at each iteration
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Local maxima are often found in
between clusters
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Close to connections (bridges)
that have been cut to obtain the
final k clusters
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Can be obtained directly from
the dendrogram!
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k-1 Bridges
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Poisoning attacks vs. single-linkage HC
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Heuristic-based solutions
1. Bridge (Best): evaluates the objective function k-1 times, each time by
adding an attack point in between a bridge
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http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Requires running the clustering
algorithm k-1 times!
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2. Bridge (Hard): estimates the
objective function assuming that
each attack point will merge the
corresponding clusters
Does not require running the
clustering algorithm
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Poisoning attacks vs. single-linkage HC
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Heuristic-based solutions
3. Bridge (Soft): similar to Bridge (Hard), but using soft clustering
assignments for Y (estimated with Gaussian KDE)
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Clustering
output
aVer
greedily
adding
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aXack
points
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Experiments on poisoning attacks
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Banana: artificial data, 80 samples, 2 features, k=4 initial clusters
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Malware: real data(1), 1,000 samples, 6 features, k≈9 initial clusters
(estimated from data minimizing the Davies-Bouldin Index)
– Features:
1.
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number of GET requests
number of POST requests
average URL length
average number of URL parameters
average amount of data sent by POST requests
average response length
MNIST Handwritten Digits: real data, 330 samples per cluster, 28 x
28 = 784 features (pixels), k=3 initial clusters corresponding to
digits ‘0’, ‘1’, and ‘6’
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
(1) R. Perdisci, D. Ariu, and G. Giacinto. Scalable fine-grained behavioral
clustering of http-based malware. Computer Networks, 57(2):487-500, 2013.
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Experiments on poisoning attacks
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Attack strategies: Bridge (Best), Bridge (Hard), Bridge (Soft),
Random, Random (Best)
– Random (Best) selects the best random attack over k-1 attempts
– Same complexity as Bridge (Best)
Banana
Malware
Digits
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Random
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Random (Best)
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Bridge (Best)
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Bridge (Soft)
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Bridge (Hard)
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0% 2% 5% 7% 9% 12% 15% 18% 20% 0%
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0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0%
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5% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0%
Fraction of samples controlled by the attacker Fraction of samples controlled by the attacker Fraction of samples controlled by the attacker
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
Objective Function
Objective Function
Num Clusters (k)
Num Clusters (k)
Num Clusters (k)
Objective Function
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Experiments on poisoning attacks
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Some attack samples obtained by the given attack strategies on
the MNIST Handwritten Digits, at iterations 1, 2, and 10.
Random
Random
(Best)
Bridge
(Best)
Bridge
(Soft)
Bridge
(Hard)
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http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Obfuscation attacks (integrity violation)
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Goal: hiding attacks A without compromising clustering of D
Capability: bounded manipulation of attack samples
max g ( A!;θ 0 ) = −dc (C t , f (D ∪ A!)), where π D (C t ) = f (D)
A!
{
s.t. A! ∈ Ωo (A) = {ai!}|A| : ds (A, A!) = max ai − ai! 2 ≤ dmax
i=1
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A!
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Obfuscation attacks vs. single-linkage HC
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Heuristic-based solution
– For each attack sample a in A
– Select the closest sample d in D from the cluster to which a should
belong to, and define a’ as
( d − a) ,
a! = a + α
d−a
2
α = min ( dmax , d − a
2
)
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a! x
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http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Experiments on obfuscation attacks
MNIST Handwritten Digits
Objective Function
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Initial clusters ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘6’, ‘3’
Attacker modifies ‘3’s to have them clustered with ‘6’
Attacker minimizes distance from the desired clustering
Clustering minimizes distance from the initial clusters (where ‘3’s are
not manipulated)
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Clustering
Attacker
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http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Num Clusters (k)
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d max
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Clustering
Attacker
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Num Clusters (k)
Objective Function
Experiments on obfuscation attacks
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d max
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Why the attacker’s objective increases here?
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Bridging!
This may suggest a more effective heuristic, based on modifying only a subset of attacks!
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Conclusions and future work
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Framework for security evaluation of clustering algorithms
Definition of poisoning and obfuscation attacks
Case study on single-linkage HC highlights vulnerability to attacks
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Future work
– Extensions to other algorithms, common solver for the attack strategy
• e.g., black-box optimization with suitable heuristics
– Connections with clustering stability
– Secure / Robust clustering algorithms
http://pralab.diee.unica.it
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Thanks
for
your
aXenon!
?
Any
ques*ons
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