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12 Institutionalinvestors 110622163401 Phpapp01


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Institutional Shareholders and
Activist Investors

Professor David F. Larcker

Corporate Governance Research Program
Stanford Graduate School of Business

Published in: Economy & Finance, Business
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12 Institutionalinvestors 110622163401 Phpapp01

  1. 1. Institutional Shareholders and<br />Activist Investors<br />Professor David F. Larcker<br />Corporate Governance Research Program<br />Stanford Graduate School of Business<br />Copyright © 2011 by David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan.  All rights reserved.  For permissions, contact:<br />
  2. 2. The “shareholder-centric” view holds that the primary purpose of the corporation is to maximize wealth for owners.<br />From this perspective, an effective governance system is one that aligns the interests of managers and shareholders, thereby reducing agency costs and increasing value.<br />However, deciding on what elements or features will result in an “effective” system is not always easy. <br />Disagreements arise because investors themselves are not a homogenous group and do not always agree about how to improve governance quality.<br />The Role of Shareholders<br />
  3. 3. Investment horizon. Long-term investors might tolerate volatility if they believe value is being created. Short-term investors might prefer that management focus on quarterly earnings and stock price.<br />Objectives. Mutual funds might care primarily about economic returns. Other funds might emphasize how results are achieved and the impact on stakeholders.<br />Activity level. Passive investors might focus on index returns and pay less attention to individual firms. Active investors might care greatly about individual outcomes.<br />Size. Large funds can dedicate significant resources to governance matters. Small funds lack these resources.<br />Not All Shareholders Are the Same<br />
  4. 4. Shareholders also suffer from other limitations.<br />Free-rider problem. Shareholder actions are expensive. Although all shareholders enjoy the benefits, a few bear the costs. This provides a disincentive to act.<br />Indirect influence. Shareholders do not have direct control over the corporation. They influence the firm by:<br />Communicating their concerns.<br />Withholding votes from directors.<br />Waging a proxy contest to elect an alternative board.<br />Voting against company proxy items.<br />Sponsoring their own proxy items.<br />Selling their shares.<br />Other Limitations<br />
  5. 5. A blockholder is an investor who holds a large ownership position in the company (at least 1 to 5 percent).<br />Because of the size of their holdings, blockholders are in a position to influence the governance of a firm. <br />However, the actions a shareholder will take depend in part on the nature of its relation to the firm. (Corporate partners will not take the same actions as activist hedge funds).<br />Blockholders<br /><ul><li> 68% of publicly traded companies in the U.S. have a 5% blockholder.
  6. 6. Firms that have a blockholder at one point in time tend to have one 5 years later.
  7. 7. No clear evidence that blockholders boost firm value; they might be subject to their own agency problems if their interests are not the same as other investors.
  8. 8. External blockholders have a positive influence on CEO compensation and acquisitions, particularly when they also hold a board seat.</li></ul>Thomson Reuters (2008); Barclay and Holderness (1989); Holderness (2003); Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999); Mikkelson and Partch (1989)<br />
  9. 9. A primary method for shareholders to influence the corporation is through the proxy voting process. <br />Each year, shareholders are asked to vote on a series of corporate matters, either in person at the annual meeting or through the annual proxy.<br />Institutional investors are required by SEC regulation to vote all items on the proxy and to disclose their votes to investors.<br />Proxy Voting<br /><ul><li> Institutional investors vote “for” a proposal 90% of the time when management recommends a vote in favor.
  10. 10. They vote “against” 62% of the time when management is “against.”</li></ul>ISS Voting Analytics (2009)<br />
  11. 11. Management proposals are those sponsored by the company, including the election of directors, ratification of the auditor, approval of equity-compensation plans, say-on-pay, anti-takeover protections, and bylaw changes.<br />Shareholder proposals are those sponsored by investors. They generally relate to compensation, board structure, antitakeover protections, and bylaw changes.<br />Companies may exclude shareholder proposals if they violate the law, deal with management functions, involve dividends, or involve other substantive matters.<br />Proxy Voting<br /><ul><li> 33% of shareholder proposals relate to compensation; 20% are board-related (e.g., proposal to require an independent chairman).
  12. 12. Union funds and individual activists sponsor > 80% of proposals.</li></ul>Gillan and Starks (2007)<br />
  13. 13. Many institutions rely on the recommendations of a third-party advisory firm to assist them in voting the proxy. <br />(+) Proxy firms examine all issues on the proxy.<br />(+) Small investors lack the resources to do this in-house.<br />(+) Large investors might want a second opinion.<br />(-) No evidence that their recommendations increase value.<br />(-) Guidelines tend to apply a one-size-fits-all approach.<br />(-) Proxy firms might not have sufficient staff or expertise.<br />Proxy Advisory Firms<br /><ul><li> The largest proxy advisory firms are Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, whose clients manage $25 trillion and $15 trillion in equities.
  14. 14. An unfavorable recommendation from ISS can reduce support by 14% to 20%.
  15. 15. No evidence that recommendations lead to improved performance. Some evidence that ISS recommendations for option exchanges lead to worse outcomes.</li></ul>Bethel and Gillan (2002); Larcker, McCall and Ormazabal (2011)<br />
  16. 16. An activist investor is a shareholder who uses an ownership position to actively pursue governance changes. Examples might include:<br />Union-backed pension funds.<br />Socially responsible investment funds.<br />Hedge funds that take an active position.<br />Individual investors with strong personal beliefs.<br />Activist investors play a prominent role in the governance process, sometimes for the better and sometimes not.<br />Activist Investors<br />
  17. 17. Public pension funds manage retirement assets on behalf of state, county, and municipal government employees. <br />Private pension funds manage retirement assets on behalf of trade union members.<br />Pensions are active in the proxy voting process. However, their activism has not been shown to have a positive impact on shareholder value or governance outcomes.<br />Pension Funds<br /><ul><li> Companies that are the target of activism by CalPERS experience marginal excess stock price returns following the announcement; no excess returns or improvement in operating performance is discernable over the long term.
  18. 18. The AFL-CIO is likely to vote against directors at companies in the middle of a labor dispute, particularly when the AFL-CIO represents the workers.</li></ul>Barber (2007); Agrawal (2010)<br />
  19. 19. Socially responsibility funds cater to investors who value specific objectives and want to invest only in companies whose practices are consistent with those objectives.<br />Examples include fair labor practices, environmental sustainability, and the promotion of religious or moral values.<br />These funds are visible in the proxy process, although it is only one tool they use to influence corporate behavior; proxy items sponsored by these funds generally do not receive majority support.<br />Socially Responsible Funds<br /><ul><li> Shareholders submitted 410 resolutions relating to social and environmental objectives in 2008. Of these, 202 came to a vote. On average, they received support from 5% to 10% of shareholders.
  20. 20. Research is mixed on whether socially responsible funds succeed in their dual objective of achieving market returns and advocating social mission.</li></ul>ISS (2009); Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2005); and Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008)<br />
  21. 21. Hedge funds are private pools of capital that engage in a variety of trading strategies to generate excess returns.<br />Hedge funds are known for their high fee structure (2% management fee, 20% carry). They face pressure from clients to generate superior performance to justify these fees.<br />Pressure to perform might encourage activism.<br />Activist Hedge Funds<br /><ul><li> Activist hedge funds target companies with high ROA and cash flow, but below market price-to-book ratios and stock price performance.
  22. 22. Activist hedge funds accumulate an initial position of 6.3%; many coordinate their actions with other funds (“wolf pack strategy”).
  23. 23. Target companies realize positive excess returns following the announcement.
  24. 24. A majority of hedge funds achieve the stated objective of their activism (such as replacing the CEO, sale of company, or increased share buybacks); however, target companies do not exhibit superior long-term operating performance.</li></ul>Brav, Jiang, Thomas, and Partnoy (2008); Klein and Zur (2009)<br />
  25. 25. In recent years, there has been a push by Congress, the SEC, and others to increase the influence that shareholders have over governance systems (“shareholder democracy”).<br />Advocates of shareholder democracy believe that it will make board members more accountable to shareholder concerns, such as excessive compensation, risk management, and board accountability.<br />Elements of shareholder democracy include:<br />Majority voting in uncontested elections.<br />Brokers disallowed from voting in uncontested elections.<br />Investor right to nominate directors (“proxy access”).<br />Investor vote on executive compensation (“say on pay”).<br />Shareholder Democracy<br />
  26. 26. Shareholder advocates believe that plurality voting lowers governance quality by insulating directors from investors.<br />They advocate a stricter standard—majority voting—under which directors must receive 50% of the votes to be elected.<br />The impact of majority voting on governance is unclear. Dissenting votes are often issue-driven and not personal to the director (e.g., vote against directors on comp committee to protest CEO compensation levels).<br />This might inadvertently work to remove directors who bring important strategic, operational, or risk qualifications.<br />Majority Voting<br /><ul><li> More than 80% of the largest 100 companies in the U.S. use majority voting. However, only 46% of all U.S. companies use majority voting.</li></ul>Sterling Sherman (2010); NACD (2009)<br />
  27. 27. Shares held at a brokerage firm are registered in the name of the broker, even though they are beneficially owned by individuals.<br />If the broker does not receive proxy instructions from the investor within 10 days of the vote, a “nonvote” occurs.<br />NYSE Rule 452 allows brokers to vote these shares for “routine” matters but not for “nonroutine matters”.<br />Historically, uncontested director elections were considered routine. In 2009, they were reclassified as nonroutine.<br />Broker Nonvotes<br /> An estimated 20% of director elections will be influenced by the change in Rule 452.<br />
  28. 28. Historically, the board of directors has had sole authority to nominate candidates whose names appear on the proxy.<br />Following Dodd-Frank, shareholders or groups of shareholders owning 3% or more of a company’s shares for at least 3 years are eligible to nominate up to 25% of the board.*<br />Proxy access (or the threat of proxy access) is likely to increase the influence of activist investors over boards.<br />Proxy Access<br /><ul><li> The market reacts negatively to proxy access regulation, and the reaction is most negative among companies that are most likely to be affected.
  29. 29. Only 11% of directors believe that proxy access is likely to improve corporate governance.</li></ul>Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (forthcoming); (2010).<br />* This rule has been challenged in court.<br />
  30. 30. Shareholders are given an advisory (nonbinding) vote on executive or director compensation. <br />Variations of “say on pay” have been enacted in the U.S., U.K., Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, Norway and India.<br />Under Dodd-Frank, companies are required to hold a nonbinding say-on-pay vote at least every 3 years.<br />Say on Pay<br /><ul><li> Research indicates that say-on-pay votes outside the U.S. have not reduced executive compensation levels; it has been shown to change the structure of pay contracts.
  31. 31. Evidence in the U.S. suggests that capping or regulating executive pay results in less efficient contracts and negatively affects shareholder wealth.</li></ul>Ferri and Maber (2009); Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (forthcoming)<br />
  32. 32. In theory, shareholders should be in a strong position to influence the structure of governance systems.<br />In practice, shareholders have limited influence, and in some cases they have conflicting agendas. <br />Regulators have attempted to increase the influence of shareholders by mandating elements of “shareholder democracy.”<br />However, shareholders tend to react negatively to these regulations. A positive impact on governance quality has not yet been demonstrated.<br />Conclusion<br />
  33. 33. Bibliography<br />Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) Database. Sample includes 5,857 firms in 2008.<br />Michael J. Barclay and Clifford G. Holderness. Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations. 1989. Journal of Financial Economics.<br />Clifford G. Holderness. A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control. 2003. Economic Policy Review—Federal Reserve Bank of New York.<br />John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker. Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance. 1999. Journal of Financial Economics.<br />Wayne H. Mikkelson and Megan Partch. Managers’ Voting Rights and Corporate Control. 1989. Journal of Financial Economics.<br />ISS Voting Analytics. 2009. <br />Stuart Gillan and Laura Starks. The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States. 2007. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.<br />Jennifer E. Bethel and Stuart L. Gillan. The Impact of Institutional and Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting. 2002. Financial Management.<br />David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall, and Gaizka Ormazabal. Proxy Advisory Firms and Stock Option Exchanges: The Case of Institutional Shareholder Services. 2011. Stanford Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper.<br />Brad Barber. Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS’ Activism. 2007. Journal of Investing.<br />Ashwini K. Agrawal. Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting. 2010. New York University working paper.<br />
  34. 34. Bibliography<br />ISS. 2009 Proxy Season Preview: Environmental and Social Issues. <br />Christopher Charles Geczy, Robert F. Stambaugh, and David Levin. Investing in Socially Responsible Mutual Funds. 2005. Social Science Research Network.<br />Luc Renneboog, JenkeTer Horst, and Chendi Zhang. The Price of Ethics and Stakeholder Governance: The Performance of Socially Responsible Mutual Funds. 2008. Journal of Corporate Finance.<br />AlonBrav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas. Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance. 2008. Journal of Finance.<br />April Klein, and Emanuel Zur. Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors. 2009. Journal of Finance.<br />Sterling Shearman. Eighth Annual Corporate Governance Surveys of the Largest U.S. Public Companies. 2010. <br />NACD. Public Company Governance Survey. 2009. <br />David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal, and Daniel J. Taylor. The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation. Journal of Financial Economics (forthcoming).<br />Laura J. Finn. Directors Vote Best and Worst of Dodd–Frank Act. 2010.<br />FabrizioFerri and D. Maber. Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom. 2009. New York University working paper.<br />