Pendall Ebo National Power


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Leveraging the Nations full range of capabilities is inherent in strategic effects.

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Pendall Ebo National Power

  1. 1. Effects-Based Operations and the Exercise of National Power Major David W. Pendall, U.S. Army Strategic Planner, National Security Agency, Fort Meade, MDT HE WORLD is connected globally in societal, economic, governmental, and infostructuraland infrastructural terms. As the United States faces Glimpsing the Future We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of unglimpsed methods and21st-century adversaries and national security chal- weapons. The next war will be won in the future,lenges, it must acknowledge these threats as being not in the past. We must go on, or we will godistributed, networked, urban, and different from the under. — General Douglas A. MacArthur120th-century, nation-state, and military-power con-structs it has historically organized against. Acting Envision warfare so transformed as to be almostagainst such threats in traditional ways will be too unrecognizable, even by starry-eyed visionaries. Incostly, slow, and destructive. Adversaries will in- the kinetic realm, robots fight robots. In thecreasingly use new forms of warfare, network- nonkinetic realm, our chemicals defeat their chemi-based organizations, and exponentially increased lev- cals, and our electrons overwhelm their electrons.els of destructive effect to wage war. Is this possible or plausible? Effects-based operations, as a core competency of Clearly, future capabilities of combined and stand-future warfare, will leverage allies’ kinetic and non- ing joint task forces (SJTF), coupled with special-kinetic capabilities with global reaching effects. Cur- ized strike elements, will leverage the power of ki-rent and future generations of officers, interagency netic and nonkinetic weapons in future, and the Nation need to understand, en- Some battlespace will be located within sprawlinghance, and embrace existing and emerging technolo- urban environments and some will be against stategies and techniques that enable these capabilities. and nonstate entities or both. Some of the capabili-The military must now establish—in the mainstream ties used to achieve future desired effects might notdefense community—new doctrine, organizations, be classed currently as weapons. Other battlespacestraining, leadership, materiel, and personnel systems might be in the spaces between neurons or ensure the Nation is prepared to execute and de- The cutting, burning, irradiating, poisoning, piercing,fend against emerging forms of warfare. and concussion effects that enlivened combat in the 20th-century will persist, and other forms of engage-The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do ment and effects will be added. Some weapons willnot necessarily reflect the position of the Department of the Army, be nonkinetic and will substitute for some of the firethe Department of Defense, or any other government office oragency. — Editor and maneuver of times past.20 January - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW
  2. 2. EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS Kinetic weapons, as defined here, are weapons uniting principles rooted in common value systems,whose effects are transmitted by the motion of a profit motives, or cultural bonds.substance, such as a projectile, a shock wave, or America’s segmented society, government, mili-heat. Departing from the conventional definition, tary, and economy continue to be the most studiednonkinetic weapons include— in the world. America’s position as the world’s only Sticky foams. superpower guarantees this attention. Because Graphite bombs. Cyber weapons. Microwaves. Are other nations . . . limited in response Directed energy. if no kinetic shots are fired? Would America High-energy radio frequency strikes. be in a global war on terrorism today if on Calmatives. 11 September 2001 al-Qaeda had caused . . . Acoustic weapons. banking system shutdowns and massive Stink bombs. emergency responder service disruptions Antitraction and antireaction chemicals.2 through cyber means? What if these events had These items will be transformational once they occurred over a period of weeks or monthsbecome available, although they are less interesting rather than on a single day?as technologies and more interesting because of theircapacity as surrogates for kinetic fires and traditional America is so strong in developing military capabili-maneuver. ties, its enemies began using asymmetrical strate- The attacks of 11 September 2001 illustrate a glo- gies to avoid U.S. military strength. As long asbal terrorist group’s ability to conduct swarming at- America retains such an overmatch in conventionaltacks using the World Wide Web and E-mail for co- capability, it is unlikely to face opposition from an-ordination and planning. Terrorists used U.S. soil and other conventional force. North Korea and Chinacommercial schools for advanced training, ATM sys- remain as the only conventional military threats totems to access funds, and U.S. airliners as explo- U.S. military conventional force structure in the mid-sive projectiles.3 Print, cyber, and televised media to high-intensity realm.became a real-time dissemination system for imag- Multilateral relationships. Just as happens inery and battle damage assessment, even offering business, political and military partnerships and coa-postoperation-effects analysis for the adversary. litions form, disintegrate, and reform, the issue at Commercial and public goods and services be- stake becoming the organizing and operating con-come the means with which to conduct war as well struct. Today, U.S. forces act as bodyguards for for-as being the targets of war by nonstate actors, eign heads of state and help destroy opposition ele-whether or not they are terrorists, narcotraffickers, ments.4 Nuclear-armed nation-states offer the Unitedorganized crime figures, or eco-activists. The States the use of airspace and limited basing rightsemerging standard is to hide in the open, avoid even as they verbally oppose U.S. actions againstunique signatures, and outsource infrastructure while other nations in their region and carry out their owndenying its benefits to the adversary. war mobilization against nuclear-armed neighbors.5 Some would argue that Taliban and al-Qaeda American and Russian military units, foreign affairsforces operating in Afghanistan massed and orga- departments, scientists, and nongovernmental orga-nized in ways akin to a conventional fighting force. nizations (NGOs) carry out coordinated operationsCertainly, U.S. Armed Forces were innovative in the within nation-states, acting out of mutual interest.6use of new technologies and organizing constructs Every day, foreign hackers attempt cyber attacks orto dominate the battlespace quickly and achieve to emplace viral infections against America’s criti-battlefield success. However, we should not rely on cal infrastructure. Adversaries working within U.S.future adversaries to make the mistake of massing borders continue to plan, plot, and act.organized conventional-like forces and attempting to The battlespaces in which the United States en-fight from fixed positions or from a definable, gages its adversaries are no longer “over there,” andtargetable geographic base of operations. More it can no longer defend its interests and provide itslikely, future adversaries will strive for global disper- citizens security by being “over there.” Defendingsion, operate from networked structures, and avoid the United States is now as much about local law-decisive engagements with conventional forces on enforcement officers patrolling and protecting criti-land, sea, or air. Adversaries will continue to rely on cal infrastructure nodes in Omaha, Nebraska, as itJanuary - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW 21
  3. 3. was during World War II when U.S. servicemen Operations will be overt, covert, and clandestine—stormed Omaha Beach. simultaneously. One can even envision an e-SOF America’s defense must be local, regional, and component conducting specialized high-risk, high-gainglobal. Its economy, workforce, national infrastruc- activities within the virtual world of U.S. adversar-tures, foreign policy, national security, and psyche are ies. Acting within predetermined authority, scale, and commander’s intent, 21st-century task forces will Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has achieve a range of tactical through strategic effectsindicated a desire for special operators to deploy with speed, precision, and from near and far. to countries on demand, achieve results, and A reduced observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) then leave as quickly as they entered. loop at the joint unit-of-action level, enabled by su- This might occur with or without host-nation perbly trained, technology enhanced and empowered assistance or approval. teams will achieve the results the newest national- security strategy envisions.9 The United States will engage adversaries in unexpected ways, leveraginginterlinked and interdependent. The Nation’s nation- new weapons and techniques and deploying forcesally and globally integrated elements are the from existing and future—perhaps even commer-battlespaces and dimensions of 21st-century cial—platforms to reach remote areas of the world.warfare. Although America might be first among The United States will act with effects, rather thanequals, its conscious and unconscious existence weapons, in tightly coupled to experiences shared with its SOF elements will become more specialized. Eliteglobal neighbors. conventional forces will take the role of 20th-cen- Action elements. Like it or not, preemption is tury SOF. Twentieth-century conventional (legacy)recognized as a legitimate form of self-defense. Fu- forces will transform; deploy rapidly; oppose nation-ture engagements are merely the branches and se- state and contrarian forces in politically acceptablequels flowing from what is being executed today. The environs; and ultimately remain technologicallyvariables are the degree of engagement, the meth- and morally dominant.10ods of engagement, and how explicitly engagementsbecome known to those not directly involved. War- New Patterns and Effectsfare can no longer be characterized as the conven- Effects-Based Operations, I believe, [is] ational forces of a nation-state engaging in the deliv- sound concept but needs more refinement. We areery of munitions and destruction in pitched battles not ready to go forward yet. . . .on land, sea, and air. Operations are no longer — General William F. Kernan, Commander,merely focused against an opposing nation-state’s U.S. Joint Forces Command11forces and means to make and sustain the fight. The traditional military terms of maneuver and The U.S. Special Operations Command (SO- fires might be insufficient for use in the 21st cen-COM) is to receive a 50 percent increase in annual tury. Will forces fire and maneuver in the virtualbudget, 4,000 additional operators, and broader re- realm? How does the concept of positional advan-sponsibility to act around the globe. Secretary of De- tage apply against networked, technologically sophis-fense Donald H. Rumsfeld has indicated a desire ticated adversaries (nation-states or nonstate ac-for special operators to deploy to countries on de- tors)? Will the United States achieve dominantmand, achieve results, and then leave as quickly as maneuver and precision engagement against a cyberthey entered.7 This might occur with or without host- or “de-massified,” cellular enemy attacking criticalnation assistance or approval. In testimony on 12 national (governmental and commercial) infrastruc-March 2002, General Charles Holland, former ture and global interests?SOCOM Commander, ensured Congress that the We might have to redefine warfare itself in thespecial operations community could execute must- 21st century. If politics are the resolution of conflictssucceed operations and that such operations would by peaceful means and war is politics by otherbe completed with “absolute certainty and profes- means, how are we to describe events that are de-sionalism.”8 liberately caused by external actors and that result Special Operations Force (SOF) elements, inte- in massive financial losses; influence shifts acrossgrated with Department of State, law-enforcement, sovereign governments and coalitions; major rede-cyberwarriors, host-nation, and even NGO elements finition in internal value systems; and changes inwill engage adversaries within the global landscape. social structures?22 January - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW
  4. 4. Iraqi prisoners being released by the 101st Airborne Division, 18 May 2003.US Army The United States should explore its capability to deconstruct the network properties of [nonstate adversaries] and limit their attractiveness to new players. A range of human-based operations, whether classed as nation building, foreign aid, media campaigns, or PSYOPs, might achieve both. A catch-and-release program for suspected operatives might create reluctance or distrust in such suspects and prevent them from further acts. Are other nations, as well as the United States, it should also envision multiple forms of proactive limited in response if no kinetic shots are fired? defense and defeat mechanisms. Maneuver, or the Would America be in a global war on terrorism to- achievement of positional advantage, takes a multi- day if on 11 September 2001 al-Qaeda had caused tude of forms, limiting the adversary’s ability to func- multiple airliner crashes, banking system shutdowns, tion or act in optimal ways, and in effect, might de- and massive emergency responder service disrup- ter the notion entirely. Employing desired effects on tions through cyber means? What if these events adversaries implies the concept of maneuver itself. had occurred over a period of weeks or months America must begin to think, develop, train, and rather than on a single day? Certainly the 1993 at- advance concepts and techniques for new ap- tack on the World Trade Center; the 1997 bombing proaches within the mainstream defense community. of the U.S. barracks in Saudi Arabia; the 1998 at- The Nation must invest in the strategies and ap- tacks on the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania and Zaire; proaches necessary to attack root causes, impose and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole did not com- will, or commit initiative-based warfare (whatever pel the Nation to act decisively. Yet, al-Qaeda op- that means in the collective future), and find ways eratives also carried out these events. to introduce randomness, ambiguity, and chaos into What are the national thresholds and attack-clas- adversaries’ neural battlespace. America needs to sification schemes that will compel national elements integrate effects-based capabilities as a complement of power to respond in the future? How will the to civil-military-interagency operations as the latest United States implement the newest national secu- national security strategy describes. rity strategy in the broader terms and environments What is critical mass, centers of gravity, or the this century presents rather than those of the 20th new battlespace calculus in the Third Wave envi- century? ronment?12 How does the Nation prevent further If the United States accepts that warfare can take coalescence or collusion of confederated forces multiple, interrelated forms in the 21st century, then against U.S. interests? The Nation should explore January - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW 23
  5. 5. forces employ precise effects, enabled by exquisite [The 9/11] terrorists used U.S. soil intelligence, they can work in advanced ways withinand commercial schools for advanced training, the mental and psychological realm of adversaries.ATM systems to access funds, and U.S. airliners The results might be measured differently in the 21st as explosive projectiles. Print, cyber, and century—different by orders of magnitude. Ulti-televised media became a real-time dissemin- mately, the military will need to achieve an omni- ation system for imagery and battle damage present, persistent effect (like gravity in the physi- assessment, even offering postoperation- cal, terrestrial realm) on the minds and intentions of effects analysis for the adversary. current and future adversaries. Figure 1 frames the various dimensions of 21st-century battlespaces.14the ways and means of increasing replacement Desired Effectscosts for key adversarial leaders. We should attempt Today’s cancer drugs are notorious for kill-to qualify or quantify conditions within an adver- ing healthy cells along with cancerous ones. Asary’s network when the loss of network elements new anticancer approach could offer more of aand the value proposition cause the adversary’s precise option: kill just the tumor by choking offwholesale collapse. The military needs a new lexi- its blood supplies. The first drugs based on thiscon and employment doctrine to describe the tools approach are now in human trials and, if theyand proxies for the tactics needed to achieve full- work, could provide a virtually side-effect-freespectrum dominance.13 means of fighting a host of cancers. What are the effects of fires in the 21st century? — Technology Review15The military certainly seeks advantages in precision, Imagine how the Nation would act if it were de-range, speed, volume, and relative effect to the tar- nied the ability to protect its vital national interestsget. If U.S. forces can effect targets at will, they on foreign soil? We now know that al-Qaeda coor-can change the battlespace calculus for warfare. As dinated the attack on the United States in Hamburg,24 January - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW
  6. 6. A US Marine is immobil- ized during a sticky foam demonstration.Germany. How would we have acted if we hadknown where these plots and commitments werebeing actualized, although host nations were un-aware, unprepared, or unwilling to act? What if ahost nation, characterized as a modern, globally con-nected economy, were to unwittingly harbor a para-sitic threat but refuse to accept proof that cells ex-isted within their borders? How would the UnitedStates eliminate the cells and act without creatinggreat collateral damage in a major urban area andstill create the effect desired on the targeted cells? Envision the construct of effects-based operationsapplied by or to nonstate adversaries. Operating glo-bally and within a loose, confederated-network con-struct, these actors coalesce either for ideologicalreasons or for profit motive (perhaps both). TheUnited States should explore its capability todeconstruct the network properties of its organiza-tions and limit their attractiveness to new players.A range of human-based operations, whetherclassed as nationbuilding, foreign aid, media cam-paigns, or psychological operations (PSYOPs), mightachieve both. A catch-and-release program for sus-pected operatives might create reluctance or distrustin such suspects and prevent them from further actsor, perhaps more important, create distrust in the cellleaders of these individuals in the future.16 The cap- USMCtor would determine when to name names and whento remain silent. Multidisciplined intelligence opera- Combining lethal and nonlethal;tions would help understand and sense adversarial kinetic and nonkinetic strikes; and engagementnetwork operations. strategies creates opportunities and reduces Long-term foreign assistance through SOF and current and future operating costs.U.S. aid can reduce the numbers of disaffected These constructs now allow greater selectivitypeople susceptible to adversaries’ value systems and for physical force employment than at anythe attractiveness of those systems.17 Such opera- other time in history.tions can be goodwill initiatives that might be criti-cal elements in achieving support from new coali-tion partners and, as such, provide secure operating nonkinetic capabilities have the real potential tobases and airspace usage, such as enjoyed in the achieve global pressure, reach, surprise, and perhapsformer Soviet “stan” states north of Afghanistan. most alarming to adversaries, a unilateral ability toThese operations also affect the capabilities and act. Once the United States achieves persistentproperties of the adversary’s network, such as those presence within the neo-cortical layer of anwho would render aid or abet adversaries. As an adversary’s psyche, it might, in fact, achieve the trueanalogy, adversaries’ software would become incom- aim of national power.19patible within U.S. operating systems and servers. To attain the outcomes they are charged to Effects-based operations, incorporating nonkinetic achieve, combatant commanders should be armedtools, perhaps, provide the flexible, scalable options with a greater range of these options. Combining le-needed in future environments. Host nations might thal and nonlethal; kinetic and nonkinetic strikes; andturn a blind eye if we act judiciously and do not engagement strategies creates opportunities and re-cause social or economical disruptions.18 Acting duces current and future operating costs. These con-swiftly and decisively with or without attribution can structs now allow greater selectivity for physicalalso be enhanced using nonkinetic employment. The force employment than at any other time in history.asymmetric options realized through kinetic and Even better, the United States has the conventionalJanuary - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW 25
  7. 7. National Guard troops assist airport security and local law enforcement in San Juan, Puerto Rico, February 2003. Delivering effects. Friendly cyber or virtual op- erations live on the same networks and systems as adversaries’ networks and systems. In most cases, both use the same protocols, infrastructures, and plat- forms. They can quickly turn any space into a battlespace. Operations within this battlespace might attempt to sense, attract, deny, disrupt, and manipu- late the enemy at leadership, foot-soldier, and re- source levels. By virtually maneuvering to seize digi- tal instructions; understanding and then seizing cyber-based financial transactions (roughly equating to virtual fires against logistics); and introducing un- certainty to deny confidence in their distributed op- eration security, can the United States achieve ef- fects comparable to lethal direct action against a handful of cells?21 Within physical-effects operations, both kinetic and nonkinetic, the military must achieve denial, disrup- tion, defeat, and destruction of the functional ele- ments of the network. Doing so can be character- US Army ized as actions against people and materiel. Perhaps these are policy and strategy questions, Defending the United States is now but the answers to such questions will influence as much about local law-enforcement officers changes in tactics, in applying military force, and inpatrolling and protecting critical infrastructure exercising national power. The military needs to nodes in Omaha, Nebraska, as it was change the way it fights and the way it uses weap- during World War II when U.S. servicemen ons systems to create greater options for command- stormed Omaha Beach. ers. Since fighting is the failure strategy, the Armed Forces should at least develop and use methods that do not compound this failure.22 As Forrest Gumpovermatch; the scientific and technologic base; and might say, Transformation is as Transformation does.the global reach to make this work. The motivation for adding powerful new tools has Time is on the Nation’s side—for the moment. never been stronger. For example, the ongoingHowever, America does not have a global monopoly Israeli-Palestinian conflict rages in the streets.on research investment, brainpower, and innovation. Missiles, tanks, rockets, and suicide bombers destroySeventy percent of the world’s research occurs out- everything and everyone around them. In such cir-side of the United States, and 70 percent of U.S. cumstances, would we ask how would we fight?research is commercial. One futures study predicts Perhaps the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF’s) perfor-orders of magnitude increases in weapons effective- mance during the Seven Day War inspired U.S.ness and availability at orders of magnitude reduced General Don Starry to develop AirLand Battle Doc-costs.20 In short, adversaries will soon be able to cre- trine, which created conditions for America’s 100-ate catastrophic effects supporting their intended hour victory over Iraq during the Persian Gulf war.23outcomes at bargain-basement prices. Even so, the IDF is not the model to optimally use The important element to take away from this con- for carrying out strikes against adversaries in thestruct is that the United States does not yet have a 21st-century capabilities-based military using effects-joint, interagency concept of operations to combine based operations. The United States will expand theeffects to achieve desired outcomes. The Nation has application of new tools in warfare.not developed a joint, integrated, full-spectrum Setting conditions. The U.S. Department ofwarfighting doctrine and employment strategy for the Defense might soon announce more definitive stepsfull scope of effects the military can, currently and to create the SJTF as exercised in the Millenniumwithin the near future, bring to bear against adver- Challenge 2002 exercise. SJTFs will bring effects-saries across the scope and spectrum of 21st-cen- based targeting strategy more to the forefront. And,tury conflict. as SJTFs standup under unified commands, the syn-26 January - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW
  8. 8. EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONSergies of each services’ kinetic and nonkinetic war- Effects and their potential. If nonkinetic weap-fare programs might be realized. ons, such as antitraction substances, can deny The continuous feeds from multiple types of sen- bridges from enemy use rather than destroying thesors will provide multidimensional views of the tar- bridge itself, then what is the compelling rationaleget of interest as well as a persistent contact with for destruction? Achieving results through the usethe adversary that will further enable decision su-periority and allow decisionmakers and operators todetermine the optimal timing, tempo, and types of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces oper-effects required to achieve selected outcomes.24 ating in Afghanistan massed and organized inThe military will soon be able to achieve a level of ways akin to a conventional fighting force. . . .predictive battle damage assessment through the use Future adversaries will strive for globalof advanced modeling, allowing ever more precise dispersion, operate from networked structures,effects-based targeting.25 This type of targeting and and avoid decisive engagements. . . .effects delivery will not be characterized by current Adversaries will continue to rely on unitingprecision weapons and modifiers, such as Toma- principles rooted in common value systems,hawk missiles or the joint direct attack munitions, profit motives, or cultural to achieve ballistic-effect delivery within areduced circular probability of error; it will be char- of area denial or countermobility agents, rather thanacterized by a new level of precision based on the artillery-delivered family of scatterable mines or air-influence of the strike or action delivered on target delivered antipersonnel, anti-vehicle, target-activatedwith predetermined and pre-selected second, third, minefield systems, would be even better. If preci-and n-order effects. To be sure, doing so will require sion-directed, high-energy microwave or acousticnonkinetic and kinetic strikes and will continue to weapons can sense, fix, and disable or destroy ur-complement each other for achieving outcomes fa- ban snipers or barricaded enemy squads withinvorable for the Nation. apartment complexes, why should the military focus Influencing adversaries, aided by advanced simu- on attrition-based tactics, albeit with higher technol-lations, such as influence-net modeling, will provide ogy, although still “high-touch,” force employments?even greater insight for preoperational targeting, ef- Graphite dust bombs and high-energy radio fre-fects-based strike analysis, and poststrike assess- quency weapons can destroy enemy command, con-ments.26 These tools will help us select branches or trol, communications, computers, and intelligencesequels or both in near-real time.27 SJTFs with in- (C4I) systems and power-transfer stations.28 Com-teragency and coalition components will have great puter attacks can disrupt a variety of functions ad-resources and capabilities embedded within versaries require across the spectrum of futuredecisionmaking and execution frameworks. Com- war.29 Media broadcast, information operations,manders can act with a broader range of options, host-nation support, and foreign aid can reduce tar-always seeking the best alternative for target effect geted demographic group acceptance of state andand national outcomes. Knowledge is the fuel for nonstate actor anti-American messages and theiroperating in the 21st century. Speed and pervasive- value proposition. If such activities or effects reduceness (global reach on demand) of action is the de- the enemy’s capabilities, support structures, and re-terminate factor in the outcome. source bases, including current manning and future When the decision to employ effects is made, pre- recruits, then employing lethality requires even moreoperational and postoperational cost savings will be selectivity and prejudice.measurable as well. Selecting the effect-and-employ- Few question the capabilities and reach of today’sment method from the widest possible range of po- U.S. military. U.S. forces can execute small-scaletential options reduces vulnerability and the require- contingencies and dominate a conventional theaterment to establish robust secure forward bases and of war on order. Current questions about U.S. strat-retains national agility and initiative. The military can egy are not about the ability to win decisively oract with precise effects, achieve results, and quickly what projected losses are or will be. Today’s ques-change battlespace dimensions from one engagement tions are about the costs of postwar another. In short, truly integrating effects-based Practical applications. Applying force requiresoperations in support of national-security strategy can exquisite intelligence down to the operator levelprevent the Nation from becoming mired in lengthy, provided over a secure, networked C4I structure.costly force deployments in foreign lands. Data and intelligence flow is a key contributor toJanuary - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW 27
  9. 9. the ability to achieve decision superiority and dom- mander’s intent, tactical forces will shoot, move, andinance over adversaries. communicate to achieve effects against adversar- As the military learns more about the capabilities ies without the delays of a staff relaying, filtering,and limitations of the nonkinetic applications of force and interpreting the current battlespace condition. Applying nonkinetic force is scalable and can re- duce risks normally associated with the entry of U.S. Truly integrating effects-based operations in forces. Operational risks are reduced as standoff in-support of national-security strategy can prevent creases (without the corollary loss of precision or the Nation from becoming mired in lengthy, effect). Nonballistic, if not nonkinetic force, solutions costly force deployments in foreign lands. enable—wholly or in part—operators to act in close or standoff operations to achieve desired effects onthrough exercise, simulation, and actual engage- the target entity, denying mobility and employingments, it can expect the coupling of kinetic and countermobility tools across the spectrum of conflictnonkinetic weapons with advanced precision-guided in the physical and the virtual realms. The next stepdelivery systems, man-emplaced systems, and is to explore, define, and develop the proxies for thehuman-delivered effects. Sensor links to delivery physical tactics of warfare that have been so com-platforms, using knowledge-based applications to pletely studied, and then train the force to employspeed information to the point or points of decision, them in the 21st century.will reduce the “D” time in the OODA loop, which Figure 3, a notional example of an execution planin effect, will allow us to cycle through engagements and time line, is a macro look at conducting outcome-and operational Go/No Go criteria with unprec- based, effects-based warfare across multiple dimen-edented speed. Decisions will be enabled at the low- sions and battlespaces. Figure 3 also shows an arti-est levels of operation. Given solid operational frame- ficially compressed timeframe and sequence ofworks; an assured, accessible common relevant effects for descriptive purposes. For a globally net-operating picture; and sufficiently detailed com- worked adversary, forces would necessarily plan28 January - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW
  10. 10. EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONSJanuary - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW 29
  11. 11. Special Forces and 3d Infantry Division personnel establish a checkpoint to combat terrorist acts by Iraqi soldiers dressed as civilians, 23 March 2003. US Army SOF elements will become more specialized. Elite conventional forces will take the role of 20th-century SOF. Twentieth-century conventional (legacy) forces will transform; deploy rapidly; oppose nation-state and contrarian forces in politically acceptable environs; and ultimately remain technologically and morally dominant.and execute this execution plan in the enemy’s world, where new threats emerge suddenly, oftenmatching, mirrored battlespace, and it would be far without warning, to surprise us. We cannot affordless linear in the application of effects and even more not to change, and rapidly, if we hope to live incustomized and decentralized in delivery. that world. — Donald H. Rumsfeld31 What if potential adversaries also have these Perhaps terrorist organizations best understandweapons or tools?30 Will the United States engage effects-based operations. The attacks on 11in mutually assured disruption? How would we do September 2001 had less to do with selected tar-this against nonstate actors? This is the crux of the gets and more to do with the causation of syner-concern over rogue nations and terrorists obtaining gistic effects.32weapons of mass destruction. These issues certainly Applying the notion of unrivaled information avail-affect homeland defense, coalition forming, and mul- ability to the dimensions of the future battlespacetinational support. Is this perhaps the Achilles’ Heel forces us to conclude that future U.S. unified com-of global giants? manders must act locally, regionally, and globally si- The current concept of continuity of operations multaneously. Yet, they might lack frameworks forplanning; mission and information assurance; and understanding these intersections—intersections thatcritical site and infrastructure protection take on criti- global businesses already necessity. The Nation’s systems are, perhaps, the Current stovepipes, also known as doctrinal un-most vulnerable to network and asymmetric attack, derpinnings, present in each of the military depart-given the overwhelming reliance and vast dimen- ments and armed services, act to prevent potentialsions of U.S. governmental and commercial inter- synergies at this time. Effects-based operations re-ests around the globe. quire a full joint doctrine, organization, training, lead- ership, materiel, and systems approach to bring thisImperatives for Transformation concept to full potential. This construct should be We are fighting the first wars of the 21st cen- born and bred under a joint organization; maturedtury with a Defense Department that was fash- over time in joint applied operations; and nurturedioned to meet the challenges of the mid-20th within the service schools. If 21st-century weaponscentury. . . . We have an industrial age organ- are only subsets of the tools for waging offensiveization, yet we are living in an information age and defensive war in the 20th century, then the30 January - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW
  12. 12. EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONSmilitary must develop paths and educational systemsto create the master craftsmen of the future. Some- [Effects-based operations] shouldwhere in the ranks, most likely with 5 to 10 years be born and bred under a joint organization;of service under their belts, are the future unified matured over time in joint applied operations;commanders and senior defense chiefs who will re- and nurtured within the service schools.alize the nature of the capabilities resident in manycurrent prototypes. keep defense capabilities rooted in 20th-century war- What would the average midcareer officer’s an- fare and lethargic in adopting breakthrough capabili-swer be if asked, “How do you conduct war?” ties. The force must not wait until the perfect re-Would the answer reflect 20th-century doctrine, tac- finement is revealed. Spiral development deprives ustics, weapons, and systems based on a service’s pa- of that excuse.rochial view and weapons programs? Or, would the New circumstances require advanced technology;officer respond with an understanding of today’s re- applied doctrine; modified organization; and ex-alities of warfare? Could the Nation, faced with the panded and integrated training. Leadership exposurecircumstances Russia faced in October 2002, deal and development to new art forms and tools, withwith the situation more effectively?33 If the Nation prototypical materiel and technical insertion, musttrains mainstream operators in only narrow stove- make their way into the operation force. A spirallypipes, we will not be able to leverage the total power developed system fielding integrated with inter-of its capabilities. If warriors only receive training agency, homeland defense, and homeland security,in the use of hammers, every situation will look like is imperative in the 21st century.nails. Kinetic-based strikes and the service components The military must be prepared to take new tools employing them will not go away. Effects-based op-and concepts into emerging multidimensional erations are the future. We must continue to developbattlespace. A reluctance to act in new ways and a effects-based operations as a joint-interagency con-hesitation to apply novel tools and techniques will struct from conception to execution. MR NOTES 1. GEN Douglas A. MacArthur, Chief of Staff, 1931. fence Weekly, 8 November 2002, on-line at < 2. Aaron Zitner, “The Best Defense May Be A Good Offensive Stench,” Los Ange- jdw/jdw021108_1_n.shtml>.les Times, 10 November 2002, 1. 19. Richard Szafranski, “Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill,” Military Review 3. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of (November 1994): 41-55.Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 363. 20. NASA-developed futures briefing. See on-line at < 4. John F. Burns with James Brooke, “Threats and Responses: Afghanistan; Karzai bushnell.pdf>. The briefing included the compilation of several futures studies from theUnder Heavy U.S. Guard, Travels to Honor Assassinated Resistance Leader,” New York CIA, DIA, military departments, academia, and other national-level entities. Future ad-Times, 8 September 2002, 23. versaries can hurt the United States swiftly, deeply, and inexpensively with commercial 5. Celia W. Dugger, “The Indian-Pakistan Tension: News Analysis; Seeking a New technologies developed outside of the Nation. United States defense research and de-Ending,” New York Times, 2 January 2002, 1. velopment efforts alone cannot maintain a technological edge in future warfare. We must 6. Joby Warrick, “Risky Stash of Uranium Secured,” Washington Post, 23 August develop and employ new operating constructs and methods of warfare.2002, 1. The article describes an NGO (nuclear threat initiative, a Sam Nunn-Ted Turner 21. Schwartau, “Asymmetrical Adversaries,” ORBIS (Spring 2000). This article pro-nonprofit entity) funding and coordinating an American, Russian, and Serbian operation vides a compilation of information warfare threats to the United States and cybermeanswithin Yugoslavia to secure 100 pounds of weapons-grade uranium. This was an effort of employing asymmetrical ensure nonstate actors or criminal elements could not steal the material. The incident 22. Szafranski, 41-55.illustrates potential interstate agency-NGO operations of the future. 23. Toffler and Toffler, 48-63. 7. Rowan Scarborough, “Rumsfeld Bolsters Special Forces; Expands Powers in War 24. The sensors envisioned for the future will have expanded capacity to sense en-on Terror,” The Washington Times, 6 January 2003, 1. ergy, molecules, digital transactions, and activity patterns from space, cyberspace, land, 8. GEN Charles R. Holland, statement before the Senate Armed Services Commit- sea, and air. Examples are “smart dust,” cyber “sniffers,” advanced remote spectraltee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, on the state of Special Op- sensing, and thermal and seismic sensors, to name a few. Multimodal sensors mighterations Forces, 12 March 2002, on-line at < defeat any one type of camouflage or concealment tactic. These sensors have been writ-2002/March/Holland.pdf>, 6. ten about in a variety of journals, trade publications, and scientific texts. See also a De- 9. The OODA loop concept is attributed to the late Colonel John R. Boyd, U.S. Air fense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) director’s statement to the U.S.Force, Retired. For a discussion on the OODA concept as a strategic enabler, read Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 April 2002, for complementary technologies. On-Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” and related works on-line at <www.d-n- line at <>>; The National Security Strategy, on-line at 25. Julie A. Rosen and Wayne L Smith, “Influence Net Modeling for Strategic Plan-<>. ning: A Structured Approach to Information Operations,” Preprint-Phalanx (December 10. See the Department of Defense’s Transformation Study Report, Executive Sum- 2000), on-line at <>.mary/Transforming Military Operational Capabilities, 27 April 2001, on-line at 26. Ibid.<>. 27. William M. Arkin, “Mapping the Minds in Iraq’s Regime,” Los Angeles Times, 1 11. As quoted by the New York Times following Millennium Challenge 2002. September 2002. For a defense industry contractor’s support of Influence Net Modeling 12. Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the capabilities, see <>.Twenty-first Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993). 28. Jan S. Breemer, “War As We Knew It: The Real Revolution in Military Affairs/Un- 13. Weapons as described in this paper are merely the subsets of capabilities em- derstanding Paralysis in Military Operations,” Occasional Paper 19, Center for Strat-ployed in 21st-century warfare. egy and Technology, Air War College (December 2000), 17. See also Brian Bender, “U.S. 14. Several text references helped to synthesize the thinking and construction of the Soft Bombs Prove NATO’s Point,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 May 1999, used in this article. Texts included Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the 29. Maryann Lawlor, “National Security Tackles Tough Security Issues,” Signal (Au-Future with Nongovernmental Experts (Washington, DC: U.S. National Intelligence gust 2002): 23-26.Council Publication, December 2000); Toffler and Toffler; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, eds., In 30. Vitaliy N. Tsygichko, ed., “Information Weapons as a New Means of Warfare,” chapAthena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 3, “Information Challenges to National and International Security,” Moscow PIR Center,1997); Arquilla and Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars; Winn Schwartau, Informa- Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), (Document ID: CEG20020110000313[100],tion Warfare (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994). entry date 10 January 2001, version 3), 69-109. For a Chinese view of future warfare and 15. Extract: “Choking of Cancer—New drugs kill tumors from inside out,” Technol- capabilities, see Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLAogy Review (July-August 2002). Literature Arts Publishing House, 1999), translation FBIS. 16. David E. Kaplan, “Run and Gun,” U.S. News and World Report (30 September 31. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, address to the House Armed Services2002). This article describes the capture of Ramzi Binalshib and a subsequent press Committee, Washington, D.C., 5 February 2003.release by the Pentagon indicating he is cooperating with the United States. The use of 32. Szafranski, “Fighting Stupid, Defending Smart,” Aerospace Power Journal (Springthe public media to name detainees and articulate levels of cooperation are sure to pre- 2002), on-line at <>.vent reentry into a terrorist cell as a trusted member and most likely limits the further 33. Based on first-hand accounts, the Chechen assault and hostage taking in a Mos-trust and assignments of close cell associates still at large. cow theater could have been a scene from a Hollywood script. What if al-Qaeda had con- 17. Daniel Pipes and Jonathon Schanzer, “Militant Islam’s New Strongholds,” New ducted this operation at the Kennedy Center in Washington, D.C.? Would the Nation haveYork Post, 22 October 2002. had the coordinated defense capability to help local or Federal forces save lives and act 18. Craig Hoyle and Andrew Koch, “Yemen Drone Strike: Just the Start?” Jane’s De- against the terrorists?January - February 2004 MILITARY REVIEW 31