25th August  2011<br />Professor Peter ED Love PhD FRICS<br />
Anticipating What Might Go Wrong<br />1. Introduction<br />2. Introspection<br />3. Nature of Rework<br />4. Costs<br />5....
Research Process<br />Case Studies<br />Construction<br />Offshore<br />Mining<br />Engineering<br />
A<br />Budget (Bt)<br />Bt<br />ACV<br />OCV<br />B<br />C<br />Appraisal (Briefing)<br />Difference from Bt<br />D<br />S...
Construction Projects<br />Cost Overrun<br />12.6%<br />52%<br />Rework contributes to:<br />20.7%<br />Schedule Overrun<b...
Civil Engineering Projects<br />
Offshore Projects<br />Mean cost overrun for offshore construction programs 35%<br />Mean schedule overrun 7 months<br />T...
Unnecessary effort of re-doing a process or activity that was incorrectly implemented the first time<br />
Structure of Rework<br />Errors<br />Economic, environmental & social impacts<br />Non-compliance<br />Rework<br />Mistake...
Pathogens <br />Pathogens are latentconditionsand lay dormant    within a system until an error comes to light<br />People...
Qualities of Pathogens<br />Stable phenomena and have been in existence for a substantial time before the error occurs<br ...
Learned Behavior<br />Individuals may repeat practices such as taking short cuts and not follow due processes. <br />When ...
Types of Error<br />Mistake  - rule or knowledge based<br />Non-compliance – decides not to carry out a task<br />Slips an...
Total Rework Costs<br />
Mean Rework Costs<br />
Rework and Contract Value<br />
Goodness of Fit Test<br />Compatibility of a random sample with a theoretical probability distribution. <br />Kolmogorov-S...
Pareto Distribution<br />
Probability Distribution<br />Cumulative probability distribution (CDF)<br />Probability density distribution: Histogram<b...
Probability by Point<br />Probability > 5% rework is 34%<br />Probability < 10% rework is 85%<br />
Probability by Contract Range<br />Construction projects > $A101m (M=6.81%) the probability of rework is:<br />P(X < X1) =...
Fixed Platform<br />Spar<br />FPSO<br />Semi-Submersible<br />Tension Leg Platform<br />
Offshore: Rework Costs<br />Con. FPSO: 55%<br />New Build FPSO: 10 -15%<br />TLP: 20 – 25%<br />Expected and ‘norm’: 10%<b...
Pathogen and Omission Errors<br />Construct<br />(n=31)<br />Mining<br />(n=26)<br />Oil /Gas <br />(n=28)<br />Failure Ty...
Distribution of tentative design documents</li></ul>Pathogens arising from people’s deliberate practices<br />Practice<br ...
Schedule pressure resulted in disproportionate time allocation for tasks </li></ul>Pathogens arising from the nature of ta...
Schedule pressure result in some tasks not being recalled at the appropriate time</li></ul>Pathogen arising from the situa...
Failure to adhere to new company polices </li></ul>Pathogens arising from standards and routines<br />Convention<br />3<br...
Simplification of tasks and neglect for other aspects of design</li></ul>Pathogens arising from a characteristic of a tech...
Causal Chain: Example<br />Pathogen<br />Practice of designing work on tentative information<br />Extract<br />Practice of...
What an Engineer Said<br />“There’s always going to be figures that don’t match up. It’s a fact of life, and we normally s...
What an Architect Said<br />“It’s cut throat out there.  Fees are very tight and clients are not willing to pay us what we...
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Rework: Anticipating What May Go Wrong

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Rework: Anticipating What May Go Wrong

  1. 1. 25th August 2011<br />Professor Peter ED Love PhD FRICS<br />
  2. 2. Anticipating What Might Go Wrong<br />1. Introduction<br />2. Introspection<br />3. Nature of Rework<br />4. Costs<br />5. Causes <br />6. Rework Reduction<br />
  3. 3.
  4. 4. Research Process<br />Case Studies<br />Construction<br />Offshore<br />Mining<br />Engineering<br />
  5. 5.
  6. 6. A<br />Budget (Bt)<br />Bt<br />ACV<br />OCV<br />B<br />C<br />Appraisal (Briefing)<br />Difference from Bt<br />D<br />Strategic Brief<br />Overrun<br />E<br />Original Contract Value (OCV)<br />Outline Proposal<br />Preparation<br />F<br />Detailed Deign<br />G<br />Scheme Design and Planning<br />Actual Contract Value (ACv)<br />H<br />Production of Information<br />Difference from OCV<br />Tender Documentation<br />J<br />Tender Action<br />K<br />L<br />Operations to Practical Completion<br />Project Planning and Mobilization<br />Design<br />M<br />Practical Completion<br />Feedback<br />Use<br />Construct<br />
  7. 7. Construction Projects<br />Cost Overrun<br />12.6%<br />52%<br />Rework contributes to:<br />20.7%<br />Schedule Overrun<br />
  8. 8. Civil Engineering Projects<br />
  9. 9. Offshore Projects<br />Mean cost overrun for offshore construction programs 35%<br />Mean schedule overrun 7 months<br />The International Energy Agency (IEA) has indicated worldwide energy infrastructure is projected to reach US$17 trillion by 2039. <br />Source: DNV 2011<br />
  10. 10. Unnecessary effort of re-doing a process or activity that was incorrectly implemented the first time<br />
  11. 11. Structure of Rework<br />Errors<br />Economic, environmental & social impacts<br />Non-compliance<br />Rework<br />Mistakes<br />Incubation Period<br />Failure<br />Accidents<br />Latent Conditions<br />Slips<br />Lapses<br />Cognitive Failure<br />
  12. 12.
  13. 13. Pathogens <br />Pathogens are latentconditionsand lay dormant within a system until an error comes to light<br />People are unawareof the impact of decisions, practices or procedures can have<br />
  14. 14. Qualities of Pathogens<br />Stable phenomena and have been in existence for a substantial time before the error occurs<br />Before the error occurs they would not have been seen as obvious stages in an identifiable sequence failure<br />
  15. 15. Learned Behavior<br />Individuals may repeat practices such as taking short cuts and not follow due processes. <br />When a practice provides an outcome that is satisfactory, then this practice is used again, even it is unsuitable for that task/process.<br />
  16. 16. Types of Error<br />Mistake - rule or knowledge based<br />Non-compliance – decides not to carry out a task<br />Slips and lapses of attention – forgetfulness, habit, etc<br />
  17. 17. Total Rework Costs<br />
  18. 18. Mean Rework Costs<br />
  19. 19. Rework and Contract Value<br />
  20. 20. Goodness of Fit Test<br />Compatibility of a random sample with a theoretical probability distribution. <br />Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (D) expressed as (Eq.1): <br />Anderson-Darling statistic (A2) (Eq.2): <br />
  21. 21. Pareto Distribution<br />
  22. 22. Probability Distribution<br />Cumulative probability distribution (CDF)<br />Probability density distribution: Histogram<br />79% (n=218) < 16% Ocv<br />Probability density distribution (PDF)<br />k = 0.173 σ = 9.132, μ = 0.250<br />CDF expressed as (Eq.3):<br />PDF expressed as (Eq.4):<br />
  23. 23. Probability by Point<br />Probability > 5% rework is 34%<br />Probability < 10% rework is 85%<br />
  24. 24. Probability by Contract Range<br />Construction projects > $A101m (M=6.81%) the probability of rework is:<br />P(X < X1) = 0.85, P(X >X1) = 0.15. <br />Civil engineering projects with a contract value in the range of $A11-50m (M= 10.99%) the probability of rework is:<br />P(X < X1) = 0.66, P(X >X1) = 0.34. <br />
  25. 25. Fixed Platform<br />Spar<br />FPSO<br />Semi-Submersible<br />Tension Leg Platform<br />
  26. 26. Offshore: Rework Costs<br />Con. FPSO: 55%<br />New Build FPSO: 10 -15%<br />TLP: 20 – 25%<br />Expected and ‘norm’: 10%<br />
  27. 27. Pathogen and Omission Errors<br />Construct<br />(n=31)<br />Mining<br />(n=26)<br />Oil /Gas <br />(n=28)<br />Failure Type (e.g)<br />Omission Error <br />Cause Examples<br />Description<br />Pathogen Category<br />17<br />17<br />19<br />Violation<br />Violation<br /><ul><li>Failure to undertake design reviews
  28. 28. Distribution of tentative design documents</li></ul>Pathogens arising from people’s deliberate practices<br />Practice<br />4<br />5<br />2<br />Slip<br />Violation<br /><ul><li>Engineer failed to detect and corrects an omission in design documentation
  29. 29. Schedule pressure resulted in disproportionate time allocation for tasks </li></ul>Pathogens arising from the nature of task being performed<br />Task<br />2<br />1<br />2<br />Violation<br />Lapse<br /><ul><li>Low design fees meant tasks were deliberately left out
  30. 30. Schedule pressure result in some tasks not being recalled at the appropriate time</li></ul>Pathogen arising from the situation or environment the project is operating in<br />Circumstance<br />5<br />2<br />4<br />Violation<br />Violation<br /><ul><li>Re-use of existing specification and design solutions
  31. 31. Failure to adhere to new company polices </li></ul>Pathogens arising from standards and routines<br />Convention<br />3<br />1<br />1<br />Violation<br />Slip<br /><ul><li>Inoperability with CAD software applications (no checking for inconsistencies)
  32. 32. Simplification of tasks and neglect for other aspects of design</li></ul>Pathogens arising from a characteristic of a technical tool<br />Tool<br />
  33. 33. Causal Chain: Example<br />Pathogen<br />Practice of designing work on tentative information<br />Extract<br />Practice of departing from project protocols<br />Omission Error<br />Example: “……….The electrical engineers simply went ahead with designing the cable tray without talking to us and explaining their problem. It cost us hundreds of thousands of dollars to rectify this problem”.<br />Information overloadand higher demands based on electrical engineer –design check step missed<br />Planned departurefrom standard operating procedures<br />Practice of under estimating the time required for design<br />Effect<br />↑ Conflict etc<br />↑ Stress<br />↑ Cost<br />
  34. 34. What an Engineer Said<br />“There’s always going to be figures that don’t match up. It’s a fact of life, and we normally sort out any problems that arise with the contractor”. <br />
  35. 35. What an Architect Said<br />“It’s cut throat out there. Fees are very tight and clients are not willing to pay us what we require. I understand that documentation is sometimes poor, but we also don’t have enough time to prepare it. Client’s expectations have increased, but fees have not. They think that we can design overnight sometimes”.<br />
  36. 36. View From the Field<br />Observation 1: “No one had a clue, they had different understandings of the same event”Observation 2: “People filter out most of the information around them”Observation 3: “Cultural differences increase the likelihood of different interpretations of the same event”Observation 4: “Problems arise when the goals of people in the same organisation start to diverge”<br />
  37. 37. View From the Field<br />Observation 6: “People’s decisions are a trade-off between the available information and the available time”.<br />Observation 5: “People break rules to make work more efficient”.<br />Observation 7: “People make mistakes. Organisations make it possible for them to be really serious”.<br />
  38. 38. Dynamics of Rework<br />Alliances between engineering contractors and offshore fabricators can improve interfaces. The client/operator can reduce costs and interparty claims between engineering contractors and fabricators. <br />Uncertainty in scope may arise when a clients perceptions of market conditions change or when capital is required to push ahead with a project even when a reservoir has not been fully defined<br />If rework is required then activities and processes may be subjected to acceleration<br />The ‘+’, and ‘-’, respectively, classifies positive and negative consequences of an increase of the original variable on the relying variable. <br />
  39. 39. Rework Reduction<br />Measures designed to limit the occurrence of errors<br />
  40. 40. Learning to reduce <br />

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