"We used to leak kilobytes,then megs, then even gigs. Cloud ComputingNow, we leak EC2 instances.Someday, well leakentire datacenters." - @Dymaxion This term means absolutely nothing. $variable + vague generic term
Not getting into hypervisor security.OpenStack supports many hypervisors.Some supported hypervisors: KVM Xen / XCP HyperV VMWare Physical Provisioning ( in Grizzly ) etc, etc, etc. skys the limit, bobs your uncle.
Keystone – Identity Manager REST API, Admin API Service Catalog Backend to sqlite by default Supports MySQL, LDAP, Active Directory ( with patches ). Token generation and shared authentication endpoint in OpenStack software.
Nova – Elastic Compute ( EC2 ) REST API, Metadata API, EC2 API Integrates with many hypervisors Defaults to libvirt Integrated volume and network orchestration in Folsom ( deprecated ) Security Groups, Quotas, Zones, Flavors.. Config Drive Ugliest, oldest, most complex code in project.
Glance – Image Store REST API Backed my MySQL Stores to local volumes Optionally stores to object storage
Quantum – SDN Replaces nova-network REST API Can interact directly with hardware Pluggable networking extensions MySQL backend
Cinder – Volumes Replaces nova-volume REST API MySQL backend LVM management on nova-volume nodes Direct hardware interaction with NAS Direct interaction with soft block stores
Swift – Object Storage ( S3 ) REST API HA-Proxy Load balancer Block Manipulation on Nodes Soft Replication between Nodes
Horizon – Web GUI ( Django ) Integrates with REST APIs Integrates with Client APIs Uses standard Keystone token authentication Django based Does not use EC2 APIs, solely OpenStack
Development Workflows Continuous Integration Gerrit Jenkins Launchpad GitHub Packaging
Packaging Core packages are built from release tarballs Client packages are built from pypi tarballs Git releases are PGP signed Efforts are being made to ensure all dependencies are PGP signed properly Ubuntu / RedHat / SuSE among many vendors with signed releases
Good ReadingChina GitHub and Man in the Middlehttps://en.greatfire.org/blog/2013/jan/china-github-and-man-middle
The ZeroMQ Message Bus Fuzzing attacks in 2.1 “ØMQ does not deal with security by design but concentrates on getting your bytes over the network as fast as possible.” The question of encrypting 0mq communications is difficult in cloud environments. Message Signing
Good ReadingStatus of Secure Messaginghttp://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack-dev/2013- February/005614.html
The RabbitMQ Message Bus Supports SSL Supports Authentication ( SASL ) Public / Private Queues No encryption at rest ( who cares? ) Not as horizontally scalable
The REST APIs and other HTTP Targets Backend ( wsgi ) Admin ( wsgi ) Client ( requests ) SDKs ( there are many ) Horizon ( django )
Config Drive CVE-2012-3447 https://blueprints.launchpad.net/nova/+spec/config-drive-v2 Compromise of Compute Hosts WITHOUT hypervisor escape possible
Volumes, Block Storage, and Memory Volume zeroing is a recurring vulnerability Volume encryption coming Shared Memory space presents the possibility for attackers to sniff memory allocated to other virtual hosts DMA access is a continual source of hypervisor escape attacks
Authentication Auth Tokens – UUID v4 / dev urandom PKI Certs – Grizzly* Multifactor Auth – Grizzly* Token Sizes... Enormous 40bytes to 3k. Potential for DDOS and Failure in Horizon Authn/z – Grizzly*
Intrusion Detection Security APIs ( ceilometer, marconi? ) - event logging Precursor Indicators – Homogeneity makes anomalies easy to spot. Standard methods as well. External Reporting Security Services ( SaaS ) Infrastructure Knowledge ( This Preso )
Intrusion ResponseYou guys know this better than I Have a plan. Consumers must have a workflow that is known and supported for response. Disclosure of breach and other issues should be planned for ahead of time. Dont Panic.
Forensics ( Chain of Custody ) Ephemeral Design means interruption is usually expected as part of SLA OpenStack has no mechanism for migrating instances between tenants. You may want to provide SOC teams tenant access to monitor compromised instances. Instances can be snapshotted and exported for controlled testing in sandbox. Logs should be isolated in one way DMZ
Reporting to OpenStack Open a bug in Launchpad and mark it as a security bug. This will make the bug Private and only accessible to the Vulnerability Management Team. If the issue is extremely sensitive, please send an encrypted email to one of the Team’s members. Their GPG keys can be found below, and are also available from popular public GPG key servers.http://www.openstack.org/projects/openstack-security/
Good Reads on Inc ResponseHandling Compromised Components in an IaaS Cloud InstallationAryan TaheriMonfared (firstname.lastname@example.org)Martin G Jaatun (Martin.G.Jaatun@sintef.no)http://www.journalofcloudcomputing.com/content/1/1/16/abstract
Object Storage Pain Points Overwriting Data is Difficult, no stock methods. In event of aggressive evidence collection, difficulty in identifying physical resources. Potential loss of data in evidence collection.
Zoned by Exposed Surface Area SaaS is most secure PaaS less so IaaS least secureDuh
Good ReadingTrusted Computing Poolshttp://wiki.openstack.org/TrustedComputingPoolsPutting Trust in OpenStackhttp://www.openstack.org/summit/san-diego-2012/openstack-summit- sessions/presentation/putting-trust-in-openstack
Parting thoughtConsider public cloud vendors as you would a Chinese fabrication supply chain. They are cheap. They are untrusted. They are probably going to be around for the foreseeable future.
Good ReadingA multi-level security model for partitioning workflows over federated cloudshttp://www.journalofcloudcomputing.com/content/1/1/15