<ul>ChaosVPN </ul><ul><li>openfly  </li></ul>
<ul>The Mission </ul><ul><li>Establish a free and open communications network for any hackerspace or lab to collaborate ov...
Ensure the network is reliable.
The network must be fully open source, and well documented.
All nodes on the network must be excellent to each other.
Endeavor to do no harm. </li></ul>“ Governments and citizens must have confidence that the networks at the core of their n...
<ul>Tech </ul><ul>ChaosVPN – VPN mesh agent deployed to nodes to manage connections and certificates TINC – Many to Many V...
<ul>ChaosVPN Application </ul><ul>“ I once killed a man with a belt sander.” – Hannah Montana </ul><ul><li>ChaosVPN origin...
ChaosVPN 1.0 ( HHH only US H space)
ChaosVPN 2.0 planned at HAR 2009
ChaosVPN 2.0 released last year
Packages for Debian / OpenWRT
Images for Fonera 2.0n
60 or so registered nodes
NYC Resistor is fully integrated
Services are being added daily
DNS service was added last year
Multiple Servers now in use </li></ul>
<ul>Key Distribution </ul><ul>Key Distribution / Authoritative Node Registry List </ul>
<ul>The VPN to rule them all </ul><ul>TINC Network Topology </ul>
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ChaosVPN 5mof

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This was from a talk I gave at 5 minutes of fame in San Francisco. The event was hosted at Noisebridge hackspace. This was kind of a last minute presentation to help fill a gap in presenters. Could have been better.

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ChaosVPN 5mof

  1. 1. <ul>ChaosVPN </ul><ul><li>openfly </li></ul>
  2. 2. <ul>The Mission </ul><ul><li>Establish a free and open communications network for any hackerspace or lab to collaborate over.
  3. 3. Ensure the network is reliable.
  4. 4. The network must be fully open source, and well documented.
  5. 5. All nodes on the network must be excellent to each other.
  6. 6. Endeavor to do no harm. </li></ul>“ Governments and citizens must have confidence that the networks at the core of their national security and economic prosperity are safe and resilient. Now this is about more than petty hackers who deface websites.” - Hillary “Secretary of State” Clinton
  7. 7. <ul>Tech </ul><ul>ChaosVPN – VPN mesh agent deployed to nodes to manage connections and certificates TINC – Many to Many VPN software. Free and open source. Developers working with us to meet our needs <li>Fonera – OpenWRT based wifi units. Embedded device ChaosVPN support . </li></ul>
  8. 8. <ul>ChaosVPN Application </ul><ul>“ I once killed a man with a belt sander.” – Hannah Montana </ul><ul><li>ChaosVPN originally CCC VPN
  9. 9. ChaosVPN 1.0 ( HHH only US H space)
  10. 10. ChaosVPN 2.0 planned at HAR 2009
  11. 11. ChaosVPN 2.0 released last year
  12. 12. Packages for Debian / OpenWRT
  13. 13. Images for Fonera 2.0n
  14. 14. 60 or so registered nodes
  15. 15. NYC Resistor is fully integrated
  16. 16. Services are being added daily
  17. 17. DNS service was added last year
  18. 18. Multiple Servers now in use </li></ul>
  19. 19. <ul>Key Distribution </ul><ul>Key Distribution / Authoritative Node Registry List </ul>
  20. 20. <ul>The VPN to rule them all </ul><ul>TINC Network Topology </ul>
  21. 21. <ul>Node Locations </ul><ul><li>Public Access Permanent Locations ( Tied to authoritative data sets and people )
  22. 22. Single Access Permanent Locations ( Tied to one person with some authoritative datasets )
  23. 23. Mobile Access Points ( Tied to a person or group of persons )
  24. 24. MANETS? ( Conference / Camp deployments ) </li></ul>
  25. 25. <ul>Node Targets </ul><ul><li>Server / Routing Infrastructure Deployments
  26. 26. Embedded Routing Device Deployments
  27. 27. Soft Client Deployments
  28. 28. Embedded Soft Client Deployments </li></ul>
  29. 29. <ul>The Warzone </ul><ul><li>Separate logical network from ChaosVPN
  30. 30. Isolated network, no direct internet link
  31. 31. Opt in network that requires a minimum level of complexity when accessing
  32. 32. Hazardous projects expected, but general being excellent to each other rules apply
  33. 33. CTF competition field, and infosec training ground </li></ul>“ Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron.” - Rainbow Bright
  34. 34. <ul>Threat Model </ul>
  35. 35. <ul>Trust Models “The tactical war hare is a key component in the defense of the British Isles.” - RAF Field Manual </ul>
  36. 36. <ul>Function versus Form </ul><ul><li>PKI with the web of trust </li></ul><ul><li>Diffie-Hellman P2P Trust Architecture </li></ul><ul><li>Affiliation-Hiding Key Exchange AH-AKE / LAH-AKE </li></ul>
  37. 37. <ul>Social Factors </ul><ul><li>CCC is older, far larger an organization, and originated in a very different environment.
  38. 38. Hacker spaces are community organized and managed with little to no commonality.
  39. 39. Organizational Models are very different.
  40. 40. All organizations, and users have different goals and concerns. </li></ul>
  41. 41. <ul>Logistical Factors </ul><ul><li>Spaces tend not to have large bandwidth throughput available to them on premises.
  42. 42. Compute resources are usually hand me down systems, or embedded systems.
  43. 43. On site human resources are ever changing and of diverse skill sets.
  44. 44. Environmental factors are diverse.
  45. 45. Nodes are dispersed globally. </li></ul>
  46. 46. <ul>PKI Topology </ul>
  47. 47. <ul>PKI Web of Trust </ul><ul>Benefits </ul><ul><li>Web of Trust relies on existing sociological factors that form the basis for cooperative development
  48. 48. Cheap in terms of CPU costs, faster throughputs on embedded devices.
  49. 49. Simple architecture, simple diagnostics and support for a small operations team
  50. 50. All communications are point A to B. </li></ul><ul>Costs </ul><ul><li>Single Point / Few Points of Failure
  51. 51. Keys are more vulnerable to interception
  52. 52. Privacy is non existent </li></ul>
  53. 53. <ul>Diffie-Hellman P2P Topology </ul>
  54. 54. <ul>Affiliated-Hiding Key Exchange Topology </ul>
  55. 55. <ul>Affiliation-Hiding Key Exchange </ul><ul>Benefits </ul><ul><li>Protection of keys at an affiliated organization level
  56. 56. Reduced reliance on higher risk keys in core routing infrastructure
  57. 57. Privacy can be guaranteed within groups </li></ul><ul>Costs </ul><ul><li>Costly in CPU, and in transmission
  58. 58. Requires multiple group controllers
  59. 59. Resiliency is now dependent on reliability of authorities </li></ul>
  60. 60. <ul>Special Notes </ul><ul><li>Robust methodology of the LAH-AKE model by Stanis law Jarecki, Jihye Kim, and Gene Tsudik http://www.ics.uci.edu/~gts/paps/jkt08.pdf
  61. 61. Upcoming Geekend in Hamburg </li></ul>https://wiki.hamburg.ccc.de/index.php/ChaosVPN::geekend1

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