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Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance
s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s ,
Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s ,          300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334)
2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made
b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .




                SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                                                 SPECIAL TERM, 2009




                                                               1071708


                                                     Marcella              Sparks

                                                                    v.

                   T o t a l Body E s s e n t i a l N u t r i t i o n ,                       Inc., e t a l .


                C i n d i Howard, M a r i o n                     Howard, and J o s h u a                      Taylor

                                                                    v.

                   T o t a l Body E s s e n t i a l N u t r i t i o n ,                       Inc., e t a l .

Certified              Question from the U n i t e d States D i s t r i c t                                             Court f o r
                           t h e N o r t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f Alabama

                           (CV-08-PT-1010-E and CV-08-PT-1012-E )

LYONS,           Justice.
1071708

        These cases are                     b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t on       a certified               question

from        the         United        States          District             Court       for       the         Northern

District           of    Alabama.

                                 Facts         and    Procedural               History

        At    various            times         Marcella            Sparks,        Cindi      Howard,           Marion

Howard,           and     Joshua        Taylor        (collectively                 referred           to    as     "the

consumers") purchased                           a    dietary         supplement             known       as     "Total

Body        Formula"             from         St.     John's          Nutrition,             a         health-food

retailer            in    Oxford,             Alabama.        1
                                                                     St.       John's       Nutrition              is     a

retail        seller             of         Total      Body         Formula           and        received               the

supplement               from         the       manufacturer               in      sealed,          prepackaged

containers.               St.     John's N u t r i t i o n s o l d               Total      Body Formula                 to

the    consumers i n the                     same c o n d i t i o n       as     i t was     received         by        St.

John's N u t r i t i o n .             The       consumers          allege         that     after           ingesting

Total        Body         Formula,             they      suffered              serious        and       permanent

physical           injuries           r e s u l t i n g from high               l e v e l s of    selenium              and

chromium c o n t a i n e d             i n the        supplement.

        In    two         separate            actions     2
                                                                  filed     on     April      28,       2008,           the


        The c o n s u m e r s s t a t e t h a t S t . J o h n ' s N u t r i t i o n " a p p a r e n t l y
        1



is    a sole p r o p r i e t o r s h i p . "   C o n s u m e r s ' b r i e f , a t 1.
        2
          S p a r k s was t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t h e f i r s t a c t i o n ( C V - 0 8 - P T -
1 0 1 0 - E ) , and C i n d i Howard, M a r i o n Howard, and T a y l o r were t h e
p l a i n t i f f s i n the second a c t i o n (CV-08-PT-1012-E).

                                                              2
1071708

consumers           sued      Total        Body        Essential         Nutrition,         Inc.;

TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g ,            Inc.; Wright Enrichment,                I n c . ; and

St.    John's N u t r i t i o n     i n the Calhoun            Circuit     Court,      asserting

claims      under      t h e Alabama          Extended      Manufacturer's             Liability

Doctrine        ("AEMLD")          f o r the manufacture              and/or        sale     of    a

defective         and      unreasonably              dangerous      product,           negligent

failure        to     warn,        negligence,           negligent         and/or       reckless

marketing, breach of the implied warranty of                               merchantability,

and    breach of the implied warranty of f i t n e s s                     f o ra p a r t i c u l a r

purpose,        and a s s e r t i n g    a claim        of fraud.        On   June     6,    2008,

TexAmerican          Food     Blending          removed        t h e two    actions         to the

federal district            court       p u r s u a n t t o 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 3 2 ,      asserting

that      the     amount         in      controversy           exceeded       the      threshold

jurisdictional             limit    of the federal             district       court    and     that

diversity        jurisdiction            existed       because    S t . John's        Nutrition,

the     only      named      defendant          with      an    Alabama       residence        for

purposes of determining f e d e r a l d i v e r s i t y j u r i s d i c t i o n ,           s e e 28

U.S.C. § 1 3 3 2 ( c ) ( 1 ) ,      had been         fraudulently        joined.

        Fraudulent          joinder         i s established          "when      there       i s no

possibility         that     the p l a i n t i f f      can prove     a cause         of    action

against     the resident           (non-diverse) defendant."                  Triggs       v. John



                                                   3
1071708

Crump        Toyota,            Inc.,         154       F.3d           1284 ,       1287        (11th.       Cir.      1 998 ) .

"'If    there            i s even a p o s s i b i l i t y                that       a state court              would         find

that    the        complaint states                      a cause of a c t i o n a g a i n s t                  any     one     of

the    resident               defendants,              the     federal court                     must f i n d    that         the

joinder           was        proper        and        remand the              case        to    the     state        court.'"

Triggs,           154        F.3d    at     1287        (quoting             C o k e r v.        Amoco O i l Co.,             709

F.2d    1433,            1440-41           (11th       C i r . 1993)).                "The       p l a i n t i f f need       not

have         a      winning               case         against               the          allegedly             fraudulent

d e f e n d a n t ; he         need o n l y           have a p o s s i b i l i t y               of    stating a         valid

cause        of     action           in    order         for       the       joinder            to    be     legitimate."

Triggs,            154       F.3d     at    1287.            The        removing party                  must    establish

fraudulent                   joinder             by       clear              and          convincing            evidence.

Henderson               v.    Washington               Nat'l           Ins.        Co.,        454    F.3d     1278,         1281

(11th        C i r . 2006).                When f r a u d u l e n t               joinder            is established            by

the     removing                party,            "the       federal               court         must        dismiss          the

n o n - d i v e r s e d e f e n d a n t and              d e n y any          m o t i o n to remand the                matter

back     to        state        court."                Florence              v.     Crescent           Res.,     LLC,         484

F.3d     1293,           1297        (11th        Cir.       2007).

        On        J u l y 2,        2008, the          c o n s u m e r s moved t h e                  federal    district

court        to     remand the              two       actions           to    the     Calhoun C i r c u i t            Court,

arguing that                  St.    J o h n ' s N u t r i t i o n was               not       fraudulently            joined



                                                                   4
1071708

so     as    to       defeat         jurisdiction                    based        on        diversity        of

citizenship.              The     consumers               argued        in     their          motion       that

TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g            had f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h by c l e a r              and

convincing         evidence          that    there             existed       no    possibility             that

causes      of    action        for breach                of    the     implied             warranties       of

merchantability            and f i t n e s s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e c o u l d             be

stated against           S t . John's N u t r i t i o n .             R e l y i n g upon t h e       sealed-

container        doctrine,        TexAmerican              Food B l e n d i n g        argued that         the

consumers         could        not     possibly            establish              causes        of     action

against      St.        John's       Nutrition                 for    breach           of    the     implied

warranties         of    merchantability                  and        fitness       for a particular

purpose          because,        i t    argued,                 there        existed           no      causal

relationship          between        the conduct               of S t . John's              Nutrition       and

the    allegedly defective product.

       Following          a     hearing,         the           federal       district           court,       on

September        8,     2008,    entered         an    order         finding that              TexAmerican

Food   Blending          had    proven      by        a preponderance                  of    the evidence

that   the consumers'            claims      exceeded the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l                  amount

of    $75,000.          However,       the       federal             district          court    concluded

that   i t i s not c l e a r under Alabama law whether c l a i m s                                  alleging

the    breach      of    the    implied       warranties                of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y    and



                                                      5
1071708

fitness      f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose          are subject          to the defense of

the    sealed-container              doctrine.                I f the        consumers'          claims

against      S t . John's       N u t r i t i o n a l l e g i n g breach          of the implied

warranties        of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y       and f i t n e s s    for a         particular

purpose      are barred        as a m a t t e r o f l a w by t h e               sealed-container

doctrine,        then     the joinder                of    S t . John's          Nutrition          as   a

defendant        i n the       actions        would          be    considered               fraudulent.

Therefore,        the federal          district            court,      pursuant         to Rule      18,

Ala.    R.    A p p . P.,     certified          the following                question         to   this

Court:

                 "Whether, under Alabama's U n i f o r m                  Commercial
       C o d e , a r e t a i l s e l l e r who h a s p u r c h a s e d g o o d s f r o m
       a reputable manufacturer i n enclosed,                         pre-packaged
       and s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r s , w i t h a l l e g e d   imperfections
       that        cannot         be   discovered        by   the exercise           of
       reasonable           c a r e by t h e s e l l e r , c a n be h e l d      liable
       f o r any a l l e g e d i m p e r f e c t i o n s i n t h e p r o d u c t under
       an       implied        warranty        of merchantability              and o r
       f i t n e s s f o rp a r t i c u l a r purpose; or whether, i n s t e a d ,
       the       UCC    imposes        strict      liability       upon a r e t a i l
       seller        o f goods t h e r e b y      eradicating the 'lack of
       proximate cause defense' p r o v i d e d t o r e t a i l s e l l e r s
       u n d e r t h e AEMLD, a s s e t f o r t h i n A t k i n s v . A m e r i c a n
       M o t o r s C o r p . , 335 S o . 2 d 134 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) . "

       The    former     United       States         Court        of Appeals         f o r the F i f t h

Circuit,      i n the f i r s t      case     using         the c e r t i f i c a t i o n    procedure

adopted      i n Amendment          No.     328, §           6.02, A l a b a m a      Constitution

1901    (now A r t . V I , § 1 4 0 , O f f . R e c o m p . ) ,            stated:


                                                     6
1071708

                " F i v e q u e s t i o n s were c e r t i f i e d b u t , f o l l o w i n g
        o u r u s u a l p r a c t i c e , we l e f t i t t o t h e A l a b a m a C o u r t
        t o f o r m u l a t e t h e i s s u e s . A s was t h e i r p r e r o g a t i v e ,
        the Alabama C o u r t d i d j u s t t h a t and c o n s i d e r e d           the
        basic issues rather than r e p l y i n g c a t e g o r i c a l l y to
        the c e r t i f i e d     questions."

Barnes      v. A t l a n t i c & P a c i f i c      Life     I n s . Co.       of America,               53 0

F.2d    9 8 , 99     ( 5 t h C i r . 1976)       (footnote           omitted).

        Consistent         with        this      prerogative,             we        note        that     the

question        as   framed      by    the f e d e r a l     district              court    refers        to

"strict        liability"         as    "eradicating             the      'lack       of        proximate

cause     defense.'"           However,         as      the Court         noted       i n Atkins          v.

American        Motors       Corp.,       335        So.    2d      134    ( A l a . 1976),              the

recognition          of a defense          of lack          of causal          relation arising

from a defendant's             activities            i n connection with               handling          the

product        and   i t s defective          condition            " i s n o t t o be            confused

with    t h e b u r d e n w h i c h r e s t s on t h e p l a i n t i f f       to prove          that h i s

injuries        and       damages       were        the     proximate              result         of     the

defective        condition        of the product."                  Atkins,          335        So.    2d a t

143     n.4.       Finally,       Alabama's Uniform                 Commercial             Code        ("the

UCC")      is    equally        attentive            to    the     plaintiff's              burden        of

establishing          proximate         cause.            See,     e.g.,       §     7-2-715(2)(b),

Ala.     Code      1975     ("Consequential                damages        resulting             from     the

seller's        breach     include:           ...         Injury     to person             or     property


                                                    7
1071708

proximately         resulting        from any b r e a c h          of warranty."           (emphasis

added));        § 7-2-314,         A l a . Code          1975, O f f i c i a l     Comment,         5    13

("In    an a c t i o n    based     on b r e a c h       of warranty,            i t i s of course

necessary        t o show n o t o n l y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e w a r r a n t y b u t

the    fact    that      the warranty          was b r o k e n      and t h a t    the breach of

the warranty          was t h e p r o x i m a t e        cause    of the loss sustained."

(emphasis        added)).

       We     therefore rephrase              the q u e s t i o n posed           by t h e f e d e r a l

district       c o u r t as    follows:

                 " W h e t h e r , u n d e r t h e UCC, a r e t a i l s e l l e r who h a s
       purchased             goods from a r e p u t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r e r i n
       enclosed, pre-packaged                     and s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r s , w i t h
       a l l e g e d i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t c a n n o t be d i s c o v e r e d b y
       the e x e r c i s e of r e a s o n a b l e care by t h e s e l l e r , can
       be h e l d l i a b l e f o r a n y a l l e g e d i m p e r f e c t i o n s i n t h e
       p r o d u c t u n d e r an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y
       and/or          fitness          for particular            purpose;         or, put
       a n o t h e r w a y , w h e t h e r t h e UCC i m p o s e s l i a b i l i t y u p o n
       a r e t a i l s e l l e r o f goods w i t h o u t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f
       the defense of 'lack of c a u s a l r e l a t i o n ' p r o v i d e d t o
       retail          s e l l e r s u n d e r t h e AEMLD, a s s e t f o r t h i n
       A t k i n s v. American                Motors    Corp.,      335 S o . 2 d 134
        (Ala.       1976)."

       Only the consumers, TexAmerican                           Food B l e n d i n g , and Wright

Enrichment,         I n c . , have     filed       briefs        with this        Court.

                                           Discussion

       In     B r a d f o r d v. Moore       Brothers            Feed   & Grocery,         268 A l a .

217,     105      So.     2d     825      (1 9 5 8 ) ,     this     Court        recognized             the


                                                    8
1071708

availability           of    the      sealed-container                  doctrine         to      claims

asserting        the breach           of      implied         warranties          against        retail

sellers      arising        under    the Uniform              Sales    Act.   3
                                                                                    The v i e w    that

the   sealed-container defense survived the c r e a t i o n of implied

warranties       under       the Uniform          Sales        A c t has been d e s c r i b e d      as

the m i n o r i t y view.       S e e Sams v . E z y - W a y F o o d l i n e r C o . , 157 Me.

10,   18-19,     170 A . 2 d 1 6 0 , 165 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,           citing     K i r k l a n d v.    Great

Atlantic      & Pacific        T e a C o . , 2 3 3 A l a . 4 0 4 , 171 S o . 735                (1936);

Bradford       v.    Moore      Bros.         Feed       &   Grocery,       supra;       Wilkes      v.

Memphis G r o c e r y     C o . , 23 T e n n . A p p . 5 5 0 , 134 S.W.2d 929                   (1939);

and   Green v. W i l s o n ,        194 A r k . 1 6 5 , 105 S.W.2d 1074 ( 1 9 3 7 ) ,                as

expressing       the minority rule               and d e s c r i b i n g t h e opposing            view

as    supported      by " t h e g r e a t      weight          of authority."             Our     Court

justified       the a v a i l a b i l i t y   of the sealed-container                    d e f e n s e on

the   theory      that      the Uniform         Sales         A c t was d e c l a r a t i v e o f t h e

common l a w .      See B r a d f o r d ,     268 A l a . a t 2 2 0 , 105 S o . 2 d a t 8 2 7 .

Other courts reached              the opposite               conclusion.          S e e , e . g . , Sams

v . E z y - W a y F o o d l i n e r C o . , 157 Me. a t 2 1 , 170 A . 2 d a t 166 ("The

Uniform      Sales      Act i n establishing                    implied      warranties           under

S e c t i o n 15 e n d e d o u r ' s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r ' r u l e a t common         law.").


     The
       3
               Uniform   S a l e s A c t was r e p e a l e d when                     t h e UCC     was
enacted.       See § 7 - 1 0 - 1 0 2 ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 .

                                                     9
1071708

       We   cannot,       however,       view     the enactment           o f t h e UCC         as a

legislative          exercise     that     i s merely declaratory              o f t h e common

law.     See O f f i c i a l   Comment t o § 7 - 1 - 1 0 3 , A l a .         Code 1 9 7 5 :

                 "2.     ... T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e p r i n c i p l e s o f common
       law      a n d e q u i t y may s u p p l e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s       of the
       U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l C o d e , t h e y may n o t b e u s e d t o
       supplant           i t s provisions,             or the purposes                  and
       p o l i c i e s those p r o v i s i o n s r e f l e c t , unless a s p e c i f i c
       p r o v i s i o n o f t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l Code          provides
       otherwise.           In t h e absence of such a p r o v i s i o n , t h e
       Uniform          Commercial           Code    preempts         p r i n c i p l e s of
       common l a w a n d e q u i t y t h a t a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t              with
       e i t h e r i t s p r o v i s i o n s o r i t s purposes and p o l i c i e s . "

Section     7-2-314, A l a .        Code     1975, p r o v i d e s :

              "(1)       Unless    excluded           or modified             (Section
       7-2-316),          a warranty        that       t h e goods         shall      be
       merchantable i s implied i n a contract f o r t h e i r sale
       i f t h e s e l l e r i s a merchant w i t h r e s p e c t t o goods o f
       that kind.          Under t h i s s e c t i o n t h e s e r v i n g f o r v a l u e
       of   food      or drink       t o b e c o n s u m e d e i t h e r on t h e
       premises or elsewhere i s a sale.

            "(2)       Goods     t o be m e r c h a n t a b l e   must be a t l e a s t
       such as:

                       "(a)   Pass w i t h o u t     objection           i n the
              trade      under t h e c o n t r a c t d e s c r i p t i o n ; and

                        "(b)      In t h e case o f f u n g i b l e goods,
              are      of f a i r      average q u a l i t y w i t h i n the
              d e s c r i p t i o n ; and

                       "(c) Are f i t f o r t h e o r d i n a r y purposes
               for    w h i c h such goods a r e used; and

                   "(d)          Run,    within   the   variations
              permitted         by t h e agreement, o f even k i n d ,


                                                10
1071708

                q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y w i t h i n each        u n i t and
                among a l l u n i t s i n v o l v e d ; a n d

                          "(e)       Are         adequately             contained,
                p a c k a g e d , a n d l a b e l e d a s t h e a g r e e m e n t may
                r e q u i r e ; and

                          "(f)        Conform      to   the promises            or
                a f f i r m a t i o n s o f f a c t made o n t h e c o n t a i n e r
                or l a b e l i f any."

No p r o v i s i o n    i s made f o r a d e f e n s e        to a claim        of a breach of

an    implied          warranty        under    §    7-2-314         based     on   the       sealed-

container        doctrine.         We v i e w t h i s     s i l e n c e as an a b r o g a t i o n     of

the     common-law         defense,        rather        than    permission         to carry i t

forward.           Nothing         i n the O f f i c i a l           Comment     to     §    7-2-314

supports the proposition                  that the sealed-container                    d e f e n s e may

be    carried          forward;    t h e Comment          i s silent         on t h e e f f e c t o f

care     on    the part           of    the s e l l e r       once    a   breach       of     implied

warranty       has been e s t a b l i s h e d .          We   applied      F l o r i d a law based

on    analogous p r o v i s i o n s       o f t h e F l o r i d a UCC i n A m S o u t h B a n k v .

Tice,     923 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 0 , 1 0 6 5 ( A l a . 2 0 0 5 ) .           We   there        stated:

        "Thus, Burtman [v. T e c h n i c a l C h e m i c a l s & P r o d u c t s ,
        724 S o . 2 d 672 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) , ] s t a n d s
        f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t d i s p l a c e m e n t o f a common-law
        r u l e u n d e r t h e UCC d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a n u n e q u i v o c a l ,
        explicit         reference         t o t h e common-law r u l e              being
        displaced.          I f t h e UCC p r o v i s i o n c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e
        common l a w i n some w a y , t h e common l a w m u s t b e s a i d
        t o be d i s p l a c e d . "



                                                    11
1071708

(Emphasis          added.)       The     rule       i n Tice       i s sound        a n d due    t o be

a p p l i e d t o t h e i d e n t i c a l p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e A l a b a m a UCC       dealing

with       the     applicability           of       the    common         law       following      the

adoption          o f t h e UCC.       Any o t h e r      r e s u l t would         run counter      to

the p r i n c i p l e s of l i a b i l i t y    e s t a b l i s h e d i n § 7-2-314.           Indeed,

the    availability          of the sealed-container                      defense         to a    claim

based      on a p r o d u c t    that    arrives i n a sealed                  package would         be

irreconcilable            with     the simultaneous                 recognition           of a    claim

arising       from     the sale       of a product           that       does n o t a r r i v e i n a

sealed       package       y e t has      component          parts,        such      as   an     engine

crankcase,          equally      concealed          from view,          that    might      contain    a

defective          piston.       Of c o u r s e ,    under        the l a t t e r    circumstance,

a claim       o f b r e a c h o f an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y w o u l d        unquestionably

exist.

        Recognition          of the sealed-container                    defense       to claims      of

b r e a c h o f i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y u n d e r § 7-2-314 i s a p o l i c y m a t t e r

best       left    t o t h e wisdom        of the l e g i s l a t u r e .           Other        states

have r e s o l v e d    the question           by s t a t u t e    i n favor        o f and
                                                                                      4
                                                                                                against


       4
           S e e N.C. G e n . S t a t . A n n . § 9 9 B - 2 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ("No p r o d u c t
liability          a c t i o n , e x c e p t an a c t i o n f o r b r e a c h o f e x p r e s s
w a r r a n t y , s h a l l be commenced o r m a i n t a i n e d a g a i n s t any s e l l e r
when t h e p r o d u c t was a c q u i r e d       and s o l d by t h e s e l l e r i n a
s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r o r when t h e p r o d u c t was a c q u i r e d a n d s o l d b y
the       seller        under     circumstances         i n which       the s e l l e r     was

                                                    12
1071708

the    availability               of    the        defense.         5




        The     treatment               of     this          identical              issue       in       Georgia     is

especially           instructive.                  In    P i e r c e v.            Liberty Furniture                Co.,

141   Ga.     App.        175,    176,       233    S.E.2d 33,                35    (1977),        superseded         by

statute        on       other          grounds          as        stated           in   Alltrade,            Inc.     v.

M c D o n a l d , 213      Ga.    App.       758,       445       S . E . 2 d 856       (1 9 9 4 ) ,     a furniture

store       sold      a    porch-swing               kit in             a    sealed        container          i t    had

received        from        the        manufacturer                of       the     swing.             The   customer

assembled           the     swing,       sat       i n i t , and             was     i n j u r e d when a       piece

of hardware               failed.            She    sued the            retailer          under the           Georgia


a f f o r d e d no r e a s o n a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n s p e c t t h e p r o d u c t i n
s u c h a manner t h a t w o u l d have or s h o u l d have, i n the e x e r c i s e
of reasonable            care, r e v e a l e d the e x i s t e n c e of the c o n d i t i o n
c o m p l a i n e d o f , u n l e s s t h e s e l l e r damaged or m i s h a n d l e d             the
product w h i l e i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n ; p r o v i d e d , t h a t the p r o v i s i o n s
of t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l not a p p l y i f the m a n u f a c t u r e r of the
p r o d u c t i s not s u b j e c t to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t s of
this         State    or    i f such manufacturer                   has      been    judicially
declared insolvent.").
        5
           S e e , e.g.,         Tenn. Code Ann.                 § 29-28-106(a)(2000)                  ("No
 'product           liability          a c t i o n , ' as d e f i n e d i n § 2 9 - 2 8 - 1 0 2 ( 6 ) ,
s h a l l be c o m m e n c e d o r m a i n t a i n e d a g a i n s t a n y s e l l e r when t h e
product            i s acquired            and      s o l d by    the     seller       in a        sealed
c o n t a i n e r a n d / o r when t h e p r o d u c t i s a c q u i r e d a n d s o l d b y t h e
s e l l e r under circumstances                     i n w h i c h t h e s e l l e r i s a f f o r d e d no
r e a s o n a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n s p e c t the p r o d u c t i n such a manner
which would or s h o u l d , i n the e x e r c i s e of r e a s o n a b l e                          care,
reveal           the    existence             of      the     defective         condition.              The
p r o v i s i o n s of the f i r s t sentence of t h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l not
a p p l y t o : (1) A c t i o n s b a s e d u p o n a b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y ,          express
o r i m p l i e d , as d e f i n e d b y t i t l e 47, c h a p t e r 2                   ").

                                                             13
1071708

version       o f t h e UCC, § 2 - 2 1 4 ,          alleging        breach        of the implied

warranty of merchantability.                        Reversing           a summary j u d g m e n t i n

favor      of    the      retailer,           the        Court    of     Appeals         of   Georgia

concluded        that     there     was e v i d e n c e       indicating          that    the swing

was   unfit      f o r the ordinary            purposes          f o rwhich       such    goods a r e

used and t h a t        the r e t a i l e r   could        be h e l d    liable    f o r breach of

the   implied       warranty        of    merchantability.

        Addressing          the     sealed-container                defense,         the      Georgia

court      stated:

                  " A l l o f t h e p o s t - U . C . C . a u t h o r i t y t h a t we h a v e
        studied           indicates            that      the implied         warranty of
        m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y does n o t base any d i s t i n c t i o n s upon
        whether o r n o t goods a r e s o l d i n t h e i r                         original
        packages.                  S e e , e . g . , R.      Anderson,          1    Uniform
        C o m m e r c i a l C o d e § 2 - 3 1 4 : 7 0 - 7 2 ( 2 d e d . 1970 ) ; G.
        Kock,         Georgia          Commercial          Practice        40-41     (1964);
        White,           'Sales       W a r r a n t i e s Under G e o r g i a ' s    Uniform
        C o m m e r c i a l Code,' 1 Ga. S t a t e B a r J . 1 9 1 , 196-97
         (1964).             The p r o v i s i o n ,      i n fact,        establishes a
        concept f o r r e t a i l e r s s i m i l a r t o that employed i n
        Code A n n . § 105-106, s u p r a , b y w h i c h m a n u f a c t u r e r s
        may b e h e l d s t r i c t l y l i a b l e f o r d e f e c t i v e        products.

                  " P r i o r t o t h e e n a c t m e n t o f t h e U.C.C., G e o r g i a
        adhered to the 'sealed container                            doctrine.'          See
        Wood v . Hub M o t o r C o . , 110 G a . A p p . 1 0 1 ( 2 ) , 137
        S . E . 2 d 674 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; M a r o n e y v . M o n t g o m e r y W a r d & C o . ,
        7 2 G a . A p p . 4 8 5 , 34 S . E . 2 d 302 ( 1 9 4 5 ) ; B e l v . A d l e r ,
        63 G a . A p p . 4 7 3 ( 2 ) , 11 S . E . 2 d 495 ( 1 9 4 0 ) .          According
        t o t h a t d o c t r i n e , no w a r r a n t y o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y
        applied            as t o t h e r e t a i l e r      o f goods          i n their
        original             packages,         manufactured             by       reputable
        m a n u f a c t u r e r s , and i n g e n e r a l     use i n the r e t a i l


                                                    14
1071708

    trade.        I n Wood v . Hub M o t o r C o . , s u p r a , h o w e v e r , i t
    was s p e c i f i c a l l y n o t e d t h a t t h i s l i n e o f d e c i s i o n s
    was b a s e d o n C o d e § 9 6 - 3 0 1 , w h i c h was r e p e a l e d w i t h
    t h e a d v e n t o f t h e U.C.C. i n G e o r g i a .

              "Since         t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e U.C.C.,              several
    G e o r g i a cases have a p p l i e d t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f
    m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y t o r e t a i l e r s o f goods s o l d i n s e a l e d
    packages.              I n F e n d e r v . C o l o n i a l S t o r e s , I n c . , 138
    Ga.       App. 3 1 ( 1 ) ( A ) ,         225 S.E.2d            691     (1976), the
    p l a i n t i f f took a s i x - p a c k carton of Coca-Cola from
    a shelf i n the supermarket.                           She t h e n p r o c e e d e d t o
    the      c h e c k - o u t c o u n t e r , and p l a c e d t h e c a r t o n upon
    the      c o u n t e r , a t which time a b o t t l e e x p l o d e d and
    injured her.                She s u e d t h e s u p e r m a r k e t a n d s u f f e r e d
    a directed verdict.                     T h i s c o u r t h e l d , on p. 35, 225
    S.E.2d p. 695, ' t h a t C o c a - C o l a b o t t l e s w h i c h w o u l d
    break under normal h a n d l i n g a r e not f i t f o r t h e
    o r d i n a r y u s e f o r w h i c h t h e y w e r e i n t e n d e d ... ' a n d
    thus        t h e r e was          a prima          facie       showing      by t h e
    plaintiff             o f a c l a i m u n d e r t h e U.C.C.'s i m p l i e d
    warranty of merchantability.                            T h e c a s e was r e m a n d e d
    for a jury t r i a l .

              " C h a f f i n v . A t l a n t a C o c a C o l a e t c . C o . , 127 G a .
    A p p . 6 1 9 ( 1 ) , 194 S . E . 2 d 5 1 3 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , a l s o d e a l s w i t h
    a b o t t l e d s o f t d r i n k w h i c h was n o t m e r c h a n t a b l e . I n
    t h i s c a s e t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s d a u g h t e r p u r c h a s e d a Coke
    from a vending machine a t a B i gApple g r o c e r y s t o r e .
    The p l a i n t i f f was i n j u r e d w h i l e d r i n k i n g a n i m p u r e
    s u b s t a n c e w h i c h was c o n t a i n e d i n t h e b o t t l e .         The
    p l a i n t i f f s u e d t h e g r o c e r y s t o r e on s e v e r a l g r o u n d s ,
    including             that    of breach            o f t h e U.C.C.           implied
    warranty of merchantability.                           The j u d g e r e f u s e d t o
    c h a r g e t h e j u r y as t o t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y , and t h e
    j u r y found against the p l a i n t i f f .                  This court held
    that the t r i a l court erred i n i t s r e f u s a l to charge.

              "Numerous o t h e r c a s e s f r o m t h i s c o u r t , w h i l e n o t
    d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h goods s o l d i n o r i g i n a l
    c o n t a i n e r s , have used a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y a p p r o a c h t o
    h o l d r e t a i l e r s l i a b l e f o r damage, s u f f e r e d due t o a


                                               15
1071708

      breach         of     the        U.C.C.          implied         warranty       of
      merchantability.                Redfern Meats v. H e r t z ,               134 G a .
      A p p . 3 8 1 , 2 1 5 S . E . 2 d 10 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ( i m p r o p e r l y  operating
      t r u c k ) ; R a y v . D e a s , 112 G a . A p p . 1 9 1 , 144 S . E . 2 d
      468      (1965) ( f o r e i g n s u b s t a n c e i n h a m b u r g e r ) . "

141   Ga. A p p . a t 1 7 6 - 7 8 , 233 S.E.2d a t 35-36                    (emphasis       added).

A subsequent enactment of t h e Georgia L e g i s l a t u r e has d e p r i v e d

Pierce        v. L i b e r t y    Furniture      Co. o f p r e c e d e n t i a l    value       as t o

its   treatment of a separate                   issue     involving strict              liability.

See   Ga. Code A n n . § 5 1 - 1 - 1 1 . 1             (2006).

        When t h e A l a b a m a L e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d t h e UCC, i t        repealed

the   Uniform           Sales     Act.      See § 7 - 1 0 - 1 0 2 ( 1 ) ,    Ala.      Code 1 9 7 5 .

The   now r e p e a l e d        Uniform     Sales     A c t was a c k n o w l e d g e d   by    this

Court     t o be         the basis        f o r the sealed-container                  defense i n

Bradford,            268 A l a .     a t 2 2 0 , 105 S o . 2 d a t 8 2 7 .            On t h e same

rationale           as t h a t   employed by t h e G e o r g i a          appellate        court i n

Pierce         v.     Liberty        Furniture         Co.,      we       conclude      that     the

replacement            of the Uniform          Sales      Act with        t h e UCC    eliminated

the   sealed-container                defense.

        The     recourse         of the r e t a i l e r   under t h e circumstance               here

presented           i s a     claim     against        i t ss e l l e r    on   i t s breach       of

implied         warranty,          not absolution.               See      Pierce      v.    Liberty

Furniture           C o . , 141 G a . A p p . a t 1 7 8 , 2 3 3 S . E . 2 d a t 3 6 , s t a t i n g



                                                  16
1071708

the    correct     result      under     analogous        provisions         of the Georgia

UCC:

                 " I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t u n d e r t h i s h o l d i n g a
       retailer         i s n o t a d e f e n s e l e s s p a r t y who w i l l            be
       c a u g h t w i t h a m o n e t a r y l o s s due t o a n o t h e r ' s f a u l t y
       construction of products.                      The r e t a i l e r ' s r e m e d y i s
       an a c t i o n o v e r a g a i n s t h i s s e l l e r n o t e x c u l p a t i o n .
       The        retailer         may      rely      on     the wholesaler               or
       manufacturer to supply merchantable                               goods, and i f
       t h e y a r e n o t m e r c h a n t a b l e , t h e r e t a i l e r h a s t h e same
       c l a i m f o r b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y as i t s customer had
       against i t . "

       We   answer      the c e r t i f i e d   question i n the affirmative                    and

hold that the s e a l e d - c o n t a i n e r defense          i s not a v a i l a b l e to the

retail      seller    of food products i n claims asserting a breach of

implied      warranty       under     t h e UCC.

       QUESTION ANSWERED.

       Cobb,      C.J.,       and     Woodall,        Parker,        and     Murdock, J J . ,

concur.

       Stuart,       Smith,     Bolin,      a n d Shaw, J J . , d i s s e n t .




                                                17
1071708

BOLIN,    Justice     (dissenting).

     Because       I believe     that    the enactment         of Alabama's         Uniform

Commercial     Code      ("the     UCC")      did    not     abrogate       the      sealed-

container    defense,       I must r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t   from    the    main

opinion.

     Section       7-2-314, A l a . Code         1975,     provides:

          "(1)      Unless    excluded           or      modified         (Section
    7-2-316),        a  warranty       that        the      goods       shall   be
    merchantable i s implied i n a contract f o r t h e i r sale
    i f the s e l l e r i s a merchant w i t h r e s p e c t t o goods of
    that kind.        Under t h i s s e c t i o n the s e r v i n g f o r v a l u e
    of   food or d r i n k      t o be       c o n s u m e d e i t h e r on    the
    premises or elsewhere i s a s a l e .

          "(2)      Goods     t o be    merchantable         m u s t be    at     least
     such as:

                    "(a)   Pass w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n     in     the
            trade     under the c o n t r a c t d e s c r i p t i o n ;    and

                 "(b) In          the case of f u n g i b l e goods,
            are  of f a i r       average  quality within        the
            description;          and

                    "(c) Are f i t f o r the o r d i n a r y purposes
             for   w h i c h s u c h goods a r e u s e d ; and

                      "(d)     Run,      within           the   variations
            p e r m i t t e d by t h e a g r e e m e n t ,   of even k i n d ,
            q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y w i t h i n each u n i t and
            among a l l u n i t s i n v o l v e d ; a n d

                      "(e)        Are        adequately           contained,
            p a c k a g e d , a n d l a b e l e d as t h e a g r e e m e n t may
            r e q u i r e ; and



                                            18
1071708

                         "(f)         Conform       to  the promises            or
                a f f i r m a t i o n s o f f a c t made o n t h e c o n t a i n e r
                or l a b e l i f any."

Section       7-2-315, A l a . Code              1975, p r o v i d e s :

                  "Where t h e s e l l e r a t t h e t i m e o f c o n t r a c t i n g h a s
        r e a s o n t o know a n y p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e f o r w h i c h t h e
        g o o d s a r e r e q u i r e d a n d t h a t t h e b u y e r i s r e l y i n g on
        the s e l l e r ' s s k i l l o r judgment t o s e l e c t o r f u r n i s h
        s u i t a b l e goods, t h e r e i s u n l e s s e x c l u d e d o r m o d i f i e d
        u n d e r S e c t i o n 7-2-316 an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y t h a t t h e
        goods s h a l l be f i t f o r s u c h p u r p o s e . "

        It   i s clear      under      Alabama         law that       i n order to establish

a breach-of-an-implied-warranty claim,                             a plaintiff         must    prove

that     the breach          was    the proximate             cause     of the p l a i n t i f f ' s

injury.        See     C a i n v . S h e r a t o n P e r i m e t e r P a r k S o u t h H o t e l , 592

So. 2 d 2 1 8 , 2 2 1 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ("Under b o t h t h e [ A l a b a m a          Extended

Manufacturer's            Liability         Doctrine]         and § 7-2-314,           the defect

or l a c k o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y ,   o f c o u r s e , must be p r o v e d t o h a v e

been     the proximate            cause      of the p l a i n t i f f ' s       injuries.");      Ex

parte     General Motors             Corp.,       7 6 9 S o . 2 d 903 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ;     Rose

v.    General        Motors      Corp.,          323     F.   Supp.    2d       1244   (N.D.    Ala.

2004);        and Chase          v. Kawasaki             Motors    Corp.,        U.S.A.,      140 F.

S u p p . 2 d 1 2 8 0 , 1 2 8 9 (M.D. A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ("In a n a c t i o n           f o r breach

of    the implied         warranty of fitness                 fora particular            purpose,

the    Plaintiffs         must     prove:         (1) t h e e x i s t e n c e    of the implied



                                                    19
1071708

warranty;         (2) b r e a c h     o f t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y ; and       (3) d a m a g e s

proximately          r e s u l t i n g from         that       breach.       Barrington         Corp.     v.

Patrick       L u m b e r Co.,      I n c . , 447     So.       2d    785,    787     (Ala. Civ.        App.

1984).").

       Alabama          has      historically                  adhered        to    the      common-law

sealed-container                doctrine         as        a   defense        to    the   element         of

causation.                The         sealed-container                      doctrine      was         first

established in this                 s t a t e i n D o t h a n C h e r o - C o l a B o t t l i n g Co.     v.

Weeks,      16    A l a . App.        639,     80     So.      734      (1918).        I n Weeks,       the

plaintiff         sued        the     manufacturer               of     a    bottled      soda      after

ingesting        the     t a i n t e d c o n t e n t s o f t h e b o t t l e and          was    awarded

$10    i n damages.             The     defendant              argued       that    the   plaintiff's

complaint        sounded         in tort       and,        therefore,          that    the      plaintiff

was    a l l o w e d t o r e c o v e r no m o r e c o s t s           t h a n damages p u r s u a n t     to

§ 3 6 6 3 o f t h e 1907         Code.       In a f f i r m i n g the judgment, the                   Court

of    Appeals       stated:

                  " I t i s a w e l l - s e t t l e d r u l e of law t h a t where a
        m a n u f a c t u r e r s e l l s a r t i c l e s o f h i s own make i n t h e
        absence           of    an     express        warranty,           a warranty            by
        i m p l i c a t i o n of law a r i s e s t h a t such a r t i c l e s                 are
        r e a s o n a b l y f i t f o r the p u r p o s e s f o r w h i c h t h e y were
        intended.             So i n t h e a b s e n c e o f an e x p r e s s w a r r a n t y
        the law i m p l i e s t h a t the m a n u f a c t u r e r or p a c k e r of
        f o o d s , b e v e r a g e s , d r u g s , c o n d i m e n t s , and c o n f e c t i o n s
        i n t e n d e d f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n w a r r a n t s t h a t         their
        p r o d u c t s a r e f i t f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n ,           and       that


                                                      20
1071708

    t h e y have u s e d i n t h e s e l e c t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n o f
    such        articles       that       degree        of     care       ordinarily
    e x e r c i s e d by p e r s o n s s k i l l e d      i n the b u s i n e s s of
    p r e p a r i n g and p a c k i n g a r t i c l e s o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r f o r
    d i s t r i b u t i o n or s a l e to the g e n e r a l p u b l i c .

              "This w a r r a n t y i s not f o r the b e n e f i t of the
    retailer           who     purchases          i n large          quantities         for
    resale,          and     such r e t a i l e r       i s not l i a b l e      to the
    consumer of a r t i c l e s of the c h a r a c t e r here i n v o l v e d ,
    if     he      purchases           of a r e p u t a b l e manufacturer                or
    d e a l e r , and t h e g o o d s so p u r c h a s e d and s u p p l i e d by
    h i m a r e s u c h as a r e w i t h o u t i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t         may
    be d i s c o v e r e d b y t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e
    o f a p e r s o n s k i l l e d and e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g i n
    and s u p p l y i n g goods t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c .              'As t o
    h i d d e n i m p e r f e c t i o n s , t h e c o n s u m e r m u s t be d e e m e d t o
    have         relied         on       the     care        of    the      packer        or
    m a n u f a c t u r e r o r t h e w a r r a n t y w h i c h i s h e l d t o be
    i m p l i e d by t h e l a t t e r . '         29 R . C . L . p . 1 1 2 4 , § 2 9 .
    T h i s w a r r a n t y i s r a i s e d by i m p l i c a t i o n of law, f o r
    the        benefit          and       protection           of     the     consumer,
    r e g a r d l e s s of the absence of express                          contractual
    r e l a t i o n s between p a r t i e s ,           and i s e n f o r c e a b l e by
    contract remedies.                    ...

              "The     second        count       of the c o m p l a i n t      clearly
    states         facts      from which            the    law would         imply a
    w a r r a n t y as b e t w e e n t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d t h e p l a i n t i f f
    t h a t the c o n t e n t s of the b o t t l e of C h e r o - C o l a were
    f i t f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n , a n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t
    had u s e d , i n t h e s e l e c t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h i s
    d r i n k , t h a t degree of c a r e o r d i n a r i l y e x e r c i s e d by
    persons s k i l l e d i n the b u s i n e s s of p r e p a r i n g such
    d r i n k s f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n and s a l e t o t h e p u b l i c , and
    further         states        facts         showing     a breach        of       such
    warranty.            We    t h e r e f o r e h o l d that the c o m p l a i n t ,
    when l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d t o s u p p o r t t h e j u d g m e n t ,
    s t a t e s a c a u s e o f a c t i o n ex c o n t r a c t u , and i s i n
    assumpsit f o r a breach of i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y ,                       and
    u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 3662 o f t h e C o d e a s
    a m e n d e d , t h e c o u r t was i n v e s t e d w i t h a d i s c r e t i o n i n


                                              21
1071708

        the        taxation               of    costs        according               to   the     equities             of
        the        case."

Weeks,            16        Ala.         App.     at     640 ,              80    So.     at          735          (citations

omitted).

        In K i r k l a n d v.               Great A t l a n t i c                & Pacific       Tea        Co.,     233        Ala.

404,        171            So.      735        (1936),        this           Court        applied            the      sealed-

container                  doctrine        to    a retail              transaction.               In K i r k l a n d ,           the

plaintiff              p u r c h a s e d from the             defendant, a r e t a i l grocer,                              a    bag

of     flour           that        was     tainted           with           arsenic.            The     plaintiff                was

injured            after            ingesting           the        flour           and     sued       the          defendant,

asserting                  a c l a i m of        negligence.            6
                                                                                 N o t h i n g i n the         plaintiff's

complaint                   alleged         that        the       defendant               had     manufactured                    or

sacked        the            flour;        that        the        arsenic           found       i t s way           into         the

flour        while            the     flour       was        in    the           defendant's           possession;                or

that        the    defendant               had     notice          or        should       have had            notice            that

the    sack            of     flour       was    tainted with                     arsenic.            The     trial         court

entered                a         judgment         of      nonsuit                  against            the          plaintiff.

Kirkland,                   supra.

        In a f f i r m i n g the                judgment i n f a v o r                   of the       defendant,                this

Court        stated:


        6
           This    Court      specifically    noted      i n Kirkland that          the
p l a i n t i f f had not a s s e r t e d a c l a i m u n d e r the U n i f o r m Sales
A c t , the p r e d e c e s s o r to the   UCC.

                                                                  22
1071708

              " I n D o t h a n C h e r o - C o l a B o t t l i n g Co. e t a l . v .
    W e e k s , 16 A l a . A p p . 6 3 9 , 640 , 80 S o . 734 , 735
     [ ( 1 9 1 8 ) ] , s p e a k i n g o f b o t t l e d s o f t d r i n k s , i t was
    s a i d : 'Such r e t a i l e r i s n o t l i a b l e t o t h e consumer
    o f a r t i c l e s o f t h e c h a r a c t e r h e r e i n v o l v e d , i f he
    p u r c h a s e s o f a r e p u t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r e r o r d e a l e r , and
    t h e goods so p u r c h a s e d and s u p p l i e d by h i m a r e s u c h
    a s a r e w i t h o u t i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t may b e d i s c o v e r e d
    by t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e o f a p e r s o n
    s k i l l e d and e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g i n and s u p p l y i n g
    goods t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c .                  B i g e l o w v. Maine
    C e n t r a l R.R. C o . , 110 Me. 1 0 5 , 85 A. 3 9 6 , 43 L.R.A.
     (N.S.) 627 [ ( 1 9 1 2 ) ] ; W i n s o r v . L o m b a r d , 18 P i c k .
     ([35]           Mass.)         57      [(1836)].             "As        to     hidden
    i m p e r f e c t i o n s , t h e c o n s u m e r must be deemed t o have
    r e l i e d on t h e c a r e o f t h e p a c k e r o r m a n u f a c t u r e r o r
    t h e w a r r a n t y w h i c h i s h e l d t o be i m p l i e d by t h e
    l a t t e r . " 29 R . C . L . p . 1 1 2 4 , § 2 9 . '

           "This      case       h a s b e e n d i s a p p r o v e d on     another
    point,         but     not        as    to       the     above    statement.
    Birmingham        C h e r o - C o l a B o t t l i n g Co. v . C l a r k , [205
    Ala.      678 ,     89       So.      64      (1921 ) ] .   We   deem      this
    announcement i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n and
    t h e t r e n d o f m o d e r n a u t h o r i t y on t h e s u b j e c t . ...




              " I n t h i s d a y t h e g r o c e r ' s s t o c k c o n s i s t s i n much
    of canned goods, goods i n b o t t l e s , c a r t o n s , s a c k s ,
    p a c k a g e s o f g r e a t v a r i e t y , p u t up u n d e r p u r e f o o d
    regulations,               and s o l d a t r e t a i l         i n t h e unopened
    package.              I n common r e a s o n t h e g r o c e r c o u l d n o t
    inspect          the contents of every sack of f l o u r                            he
    handles.            No o n e e x p e c t s h i m t o do s o . To i m p o s e a
    l e g a l d u t y s o t o do i s t o o e x a c t i n g .                   The l e g a l
    r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s h o u l d r e s t w h e r e i t b e l o n g s , on h i m
    who        made        the package              and       inclosed          poisonous
    substances therein.                    I n t h e a b s e n c e o f some a v e r m e n t
    d i s c l o s i n g t h a t t h e p o i s o n f o u n d i t s way i n t o t h e
    sack of f l o u r here i n v o l v e d w h i l e under t h e c o n t r o l
    o f t h e r e t a i l e r , o r some f a c t c h a r g i n g h i m w i t h l a c k


                                              23
1071708

        of c a r e i n s e l e c t i n g and s e l l i n g t h a t         particular
        f l o u r , t h e c o m p l a i n t was s u b j e c t t o d e m u r r e r . "

Kirkland,        233 A l a . a t 4 0 6 - 0 7 , 171 S o . a t 7 3 7 .

        T h i s C o u r t , i n B r a d f o r d v. Moore B r o t h e r s Feed & G r o c e r y ,

268     Ala.       217,          105     So.      2d        825    (1958),            reaffirmed           the

application            of        the     sealed-container                   doctrine           to    claims

asserting         a    breach           of     implied        warranties               against       retail

sellers       a r i s i n g under the Uniform                 Sales Act.             In Bradford, the

plaintiff        purchased             from     the defendant               sacks        of   "cow        feed"

that    were     infested          w i t h mold.            The    defendant,            a retailer         in

commercial         feed,         sold     the feed           in original,              unopened           sacks

t h a t had been packed                by t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r .         The p l a i n t i f f    sued

the    defendant,           alleging          a breach        o f an i m p l i e d       warranty,          and

the    trial      court      entered           a directed          verdict           i n favor       of the

defendant.            R e l y i n g upon        Weeks,       supra,         and K i r k l a n d ,     supra,

the    defendant         argued         on     appeal       that    the p l a i n t i f f       c o u l d not

state     a    cause        of    action        f o r breach        of       an     implied         warranty

because       a retail           seller        of commercial           feed         sold      the feed to

the p l a i n t i f f i n o r i g i n a l ,      unopened s a c k s t h a t were packed                      by

the manufacturer.                 This Court stated the f o l l o w i n g w i t h regard

to    the sealed-container doctrine:

                "It    i s true         that    t h e two c a s e s      cited         [Weeks a n d


                                                       24
1071708

    K i r k l a n d ] are a u t h o r i t y f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the
    retailer             who    purchases          in      large     quantities         for
    r e s a l e i s not l i a b l e to the consumer of a r t i c l e s of
    f o o d f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n , i f he p u r c h a s e s o f a
    r e p u t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r e r o r d e a l e r , a n d t h e g o o d s so
    purchased              and     supplied        by     him     are    such    as     are
    w i t h o u t i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t may be d i s c o v e r e d b y t h e
    e x e r c i s e of the r e a s o n a b l e care of a p e r s o n s k i l l e d
    and e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g i n and s u p p l y i n g goods t o
    the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . Cf.            L o l l a r v . J o n e s , 229   Ala.
    329,       157      So. 209        [(1934 ) ] .       We may      note here that
    b o t h c a s e s make t h e r u l e e x p r e s s l y a p p l i c a b l e o n l y
    to       cases           involving         food         intended         for    human
    consumption.               B u t we may a s s u m e f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f
    t h i s case, w i t h o u t d e c i d i n g , t h a t the p r i n c i p l e i s
    e q u a l l y e f f e c t i v e w i t h regard to feed s o l d f o r the
    s u b s i s t e n c e o f l i v e s t o c k and o t h e r d o m e s t i c a n i m a l s .
    I t w o u l d s e e m t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be so a f o r t i o r i .           At
    l e a s t i t h a s b e e n so a p p l i e d i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s .



              " I t may      be a d d e d t h a t t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s t a t e d
    has      n e i t h e r been o v e r r u l e d           nor    modified       in    this
    s t a t e , a l t h o u g h t h e t r e n d i s t o a more l i b e r a l r u l e
    i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s p l a c i n g an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y
    u p o n t h e r e t a i l s a l e o f p a c k a g e d i t e m s as w e l l as
    those          not     packaged.               The      trend      has      apparently
    r e c e i v e d e s p e c i a l impetus s i n c e the almost u n i v e r s a l
    a d o p t i o n of the U n i f o r m S a l e s A c t s .              See t h e n o t e s
    a t 90 A . L . R . 1269 a n d 142 A . L . R . 1 4 3 4 .                 The a d o p t i o n
    of the U n i f o r m Sales                 Act      i n Alabama          (Code     1940,
    Title         57,     §§    1-76)        has     w o r k e d no      change of        the
    general rule.                The r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f t h e r u l e i n t h e
    Kirkland            case,       supra,        occurred         i n 1936,       several
    years subsequent to the passage of the Act i n t h i s
    s t a t e , and t h e c o u r t i n t h a t c a s e e x p r e s s e d t h e i r
    cognizance             of     the      Act      but      dealt      with    the     case
    without            reference            thereto.             This      position         is
    c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e v i e w s t a t e d by t h i s C o u r t             and
    generally recognized                     m o s t e v e r y w h e r e t h a t § 21       of
    the U n i f o r m Sales Act i s o n l y d e c l a r a t i v e of                      the
    common l a w .           M c C a r l e y v . Wood D r u g s , I n c . , 228 A l a .


                                               25
1071708

    2 2 6 , 153 S o . 446 [ ( 1 9 3 4 ) ] ,        77 C . J . S . S a l e s § 3 2 9 , p .
    1186.

              "The g e n e r a l r u l e t o w h i c h r e c o g n i t i o n i s g i v e n
    a b o v e , w o u l d r e q u i r e an a f f i r m a n c e w e r e i t n o t f o r
    t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t h e r e w h i c h we f e e l              s h o u l d be
    t r e a t e d as w i t h i n an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e r u l e .              Here
    the r e t a i l e r h a n d l e d , s t o r e d , o r t r e a t e d t h e goods
    i n a manner w h i c h w o u l d t e n d t o a l t e r t h e o r i g i n a l
    c o n d i t i o n o f t h e goods as t h e y were p r o d u c e d by t h e
    m a n u f a c t u r e r and t h e c l e a r i n f e r e n c e a r i s e s t h a t t h e
    r e t a i l e r had a c t u a l or c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e of the
    d e f e c t i v e s t a t u s of t h e goods.            The K i r k l a n d c a s e ,
    s u p r a [ 2 3 3 A l a . 4 0 4 , 171 S o . 7 3 6 ] , r e c o g n i z e d s u c h
    a s t a t u s t o be an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e
    w h e r e i t was o b s e r v e d :

                     "'The      c o m p l a i n t does n o t charge t h a t
           defendant            manufactured             or       sacked         this
           f l o u r ; n o r t h a t t h e p o i s o n f o u n d i t s way
           into         the       flour         while      in       defendant's
           p o s s e s s i o n ; n o r t h a t a n y t h i n g on t h e s a c k ,
           n o r t h e s o u r c e f r o m w h i c h i t came, g a v e
           notice          to the r e t a i l e r ,         o r p u t h i m on
           inquiry           touching i t s fitness                   f o r human
           consumption.              F o r a u g h t a p p e a r i n g , t h i s was
           an      ordinary          sack        of f l o u r ,     p u t up b y
           reliable            millers,           t o be       sold       by t h e
           retailer           intact,         f o r the convenience of
           b o t h merchant and customer.'

    "And    again:

           "'In          the     absence        of      some         averment
           d i s c l o s i n g t h a t t h e p o i s o n f o u n d i t s way
           i n t o the sack of f l o u r here i n v o l v e d w h i l e
           u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e r e t a i l e r , o r some
           fact charging him with lack of care i n
           selecting           and      selling       that        particular
           flour,           the     complaint        was       subject     to
           demurrer.'"



                                              26
1071708

Bradford,           268   A l a . at         219-20,        105      So.    2d       at       827-28.    In

reversing           the    judgment           of      the     trial        court,         this      Court

c o n c l u d e d t h a t e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d     that created a               question

of   fact      as    t o whether         the buyer            could      rely       on    the implied

warranty        i n the sale            of the feed             based      on       the   defendant's

having      a s u p e r i o r knowledge            of the c o n d i t i o n of the feed                 or a

better      opportunity            f o r i n s p e c t i o n of the feed,                 which     might

h a v e g i v e n t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t u a l o r c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e o f some

defect       in     the     feed     pertaining             to     i t s merchantability                 or

fitness       for a particular               purpose.           Bradford,           supra.

        I n A l l e n v . D e l c h a m p s , I n c . , 624 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 5 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ,

a case      decided       after      the enactment              o f t h e UCC,        the lack of a

distinct        line      between           tort    claims        and      claims         asserting        a

breach      o f an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y         i n tainted-food-product                   cases

was n e v e r m o r e e v i d e n t .       In A l l e n    the p l a i n t i f f    purchased          from

the defendant g r o c e r y          s t o r e two b a g s o f c e l e r y h e a r t s          t h a t had

been     prepackaged           i n cellophane              wrapping        by    the      defendant's

supplier.           The d e f e n d a n t    had i n s p e c t e d     samples        of the c e l e r y

at   i t swarehouse            f o r freshness             and q u a l i t y .        The      plaintiff

ingested        a    piece      of      the     raw      celery       and    had         an     immediate

allergic        anaphylactic reaction.                      I t was l a t e r d e t e r m i n e d       that



                                                    27
1071708

the   c e l e r y c o n t a i n e d sodium b i s u l f a t e , which the p l a i n t i f f ,             an

asthmatic,        was     sensitive to.

       The p l a i n t i f f   s u e d t h e d e f e n d a n t , among o t h e r s ,        asserting

causes      of    action        based       on    negligence           and     wantonness,              the

Alabama Extended M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s L i a b i l i t y           Doctrine         ("AEMLD"),

and   breach       of the implied              warranty of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y           under

§ 7-2-314, A l a . Code             1975.        The t r i a l    court      entered a          summary

judgment       i n favor       of the defendant               as t o a l l t h e        plaintiff's

claims.       Allen,       supra.

       This       Court        stated         the       following           relative          to        the

principles         applicable          to tort          claims     and     breach-of-implied-

warranty       claims      i n tainted-food-product                    cases:

                 " I n r e g a r d t o t h e i r AEMLD c l a i m , t h e p l a i n t i f f s
       must p r o v e           that    Mrs. A l l e n           'suffered        injury       or
       d a m a g e s t o [ h e r s e l f ] o r [ h e r ] p r o p e r t y b y one who
       sold a product i n a defective condition unreasonably
       d a n g e r o u s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f as t h e u l t i m a t e u s e r o r
       c o n s u m e r . ' A t k i n s v . A m e r i c a n M o t o r s C o r p . , 335 S o .
       2 d 1 3 4 , 141 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) .            S i m i l a r l y , the p l a i n t i f f s '
       i m p l i e d warranty of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y c l a i m r e q u i r e s
       that         the p l a i n t i f f s      show        that         t h e goods      were
       unmerchantable or u n f i t f o r the ordinary purposes
       for which they are used.                       A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , § 7-2-314.
       T h e s e t w o s t a n d a r d s 'go h a n d - i n - h a n d , ' a t l e a s t a s
       applied to food products, ' f o r i t i s apparent that
       a      food        product        is       defective              or     unreasonably
       d a n g e r o u s i f i t i s u n m e r c h a n t a b l e o r u n f i t f o r human
       c o n s u m p t i o n . ' C a i n v . S h e r a t o n P e r i m e t e r P a r k S.
       H o t e l , 592 S o . 2 d 218 , 220 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ( q u o t i n g E x
       p a r t e M o r r i s o n ' s C a f e t e r i a o f M o n t g o m e r y , I n c . , 4 31


                                                   28
1071708

        So.     2 d 9 7 5 , 977      (Ala.         1983)).

                 "This         Court       has        adopted          the         'reasonable
       expectations'               test       f o r determining                 i f food i s
       u n m e r c h a n t a b l e o r u n r e a s o n a b l y d a n g e r o u s . C a i n , 592
       So. 2 d a t 2 2 1 ; M o r r i s o n ' s , 4 3 1 S o . 2 d a t 9 7 8 . U n d e r
       t h i s t e s t , t h e p i v o t a l i s s u e i s what i s r e a s o n a b l y
       e x p e c t e d by t h e consumer i n t h e f o o d as s e r v e d , and
       the         '[n]aturalness               of        the     substance              to     any
       i n g r e d i e n t s i n the food served i s important only i n
       determining               whether       t h e c o n s u m e r may             reasonably
       expect t o f i n d such substance i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r type
       of d i s h o r s t y l e of food served.'                         M o r r i s o n ' s , 431
       So. 2 d a t 978 ( q u o t i n g Z a b n e r v . H o w a r d J o h n s o n ' s ,
       Inc.,         2 0 1 S o . 2 d 8 2 4 , 82 6              (Fla. Dist.             C t . App.
       1967)).            Because t h e terms ' d e f e c t , '                 'unreasonably
       dangerous,'              and 'merchantable'                  a l l focus               on t h e
       e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e consumer, t h i s Court has found
       t h e r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s t e s t t o be c o m p a t i b l e
       w i t h b o t h t h e AEMLD a n d t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f
       merchantability.                 C a i n , 592 S o . 2 d a t 2 2 1 . "

Allen,        624 S o . 2 d a t 1 0 6 8 .

        This     Court     reversed        t h e summary j u d g m e n t        i n favor of the

defendant         on t h e p l a i n t i f f s '    AEMLD c l a i m ,    7
                                                                             stating:

                  "Delchamps a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s case i s d i f f e r e n t
        f r o m C a i n b e c a u s e i n C a i n t h e summary j u d g m e n t on
        t h e AEMLD c l a i m was b a s e d o n t h e t r i a l                  court's
        f i n d i n g t h a t t h e AEMLD d i d n o t a p p l y , w h e r e a s i n
        t h i s c a s e , D e l c h a m p s s a y s , t h e summary j u d g m e n t on
        t h e AEMLD c l a i m was b a s e d on e v i d e n c e            establishing
        a lack of causal r e l a t i o n .            To e s t a b l i s h t h e d e f e n s e
        o f a l a c k o f c a u s a l r e l a t i o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t may show
        ' t h a t t h e r e i s no c a u s a l r e l a t i o n i n f a c t b e t w e e n


       7
          The defendant g r o c e r y s t o r e a p p a r e n t l y f a i l e d t o argue
t h e s e a l e d - c o n t a i n e r d o c t r i n e as a d e f e n s e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s '
c l a i m a l l e g i n g b r e a c h o f i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y b e c a u s e t h e summary
j u d g m e n t a s t o t h a t c l a i m was r e v e r s e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s .

                                                     29
1071708

     his  activities               i n connection            with     handling the
     product  and i t             s defective            condition.' Atkins     v.
     American Motors               C o r p . , 335 S o . 2 d 1 3 4 , 143 ( A l a .
     1976).  One way              to e s t a b l i s h t h i s l a c k of a causal
     relation is for              t h e d e f e n d a n t t o show:

             " ' [ T ] h a t he i s i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f e i t h e r
             d i s t r i b u t i n g or p r o c e s s i n g f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n
             finished products;                  he r e c e i v e d a p r o d u c t
             a l r e a d y i n a d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n ; he d i d
             not c o n t r i b u t e t o t h i s d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n ;
             he h a d n e i t h e r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e d e f e c t i v e
             c o n d i t i o n , n o r an o p p o r t u n i t y      to inspect
             the       product        which       was      superior         to the
             knowledge or o p p o r t u n i t y of the consumer.'

     "Id.

               "While        Delchamps          showed     that       i t i s i n the
     business of d i s t r i b u t i n g f i n i s h e d products, that i t
     received a product already i n a defective condition,
     and      that i t d i d not c o n t r i b u t e             to the d e f e c t i v e
     condition,               i t , nevertheless,                 did         not   show
     c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t i t d i d n o t p o s s e s s an       'opportunity
     t o i n s p e c t t h e p r o d u c t w h i c h was s u p e r i o r t o t h e
     k n o w l e d g e o r o p p o r t u n i t y o f t h e c o n s u m e r . ' I d . The
     plaintiffs             showed t h a t Delchamps d i d i n s p e c t f o r
     freshness            and q u a l i t y and d i d have p r o c e d u r e s f o r
     r e q u i r i n g i t s suppliers to c e r t i f y compliance with
     other           regulations             regarding         insecticides          and
     pesticides.                Whether         Delchamps's         opportunity       to
     d i s c o v e r o r t o know o f t h e d e f e c t i s s u p e r i o r t o
     t h a t of the consumer i s a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l
     f a c t ; therefore, the court erroneously                             entered the
     s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t a s t o t h e AEMLD c l a i m .             Delchamps
     i s e n t i t l e d t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e and t o argue t h a t
     t h e r e was no c a u s a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t i t d i d o r
     f a i l e d t o do a n d M r s . A l l e n ' s i n j u r i e s , b u t i t m u s t
     do s o t o t h e f a c t f i n d e r . "

Allen,    624 S o . 2 d a t 1 0 6 8 - 6 9 .       Thus, t h i s       Court d i d not r e j e c t



                                                 30
1071708

the    sealed-container doctrine                   as a d e f e n s e      to the element of

causation; rather,              i tdetermined           that the defendant               had f a i l e d

to present           evidence     establishing           that     defense        as a m a t t e r o f

law.

        It     i s    clear     that      the      sealed-container               doctrine         was

available        to r e t a i l e r s    of food        products          a t common        law and

under t h e Uniform           Sales Act, the predecessor                      t o t h e UCC, a s a

defense       to causation i n both claims sounding                           i n tort    and those

asserting        a breach        o f an i m p l i e d     warranty.            The q u e s t i o n i s

whether       that     defense      i s still      available         to r e t a i l      sellers    of

food products           following        the enactment            o f t h e UCC.

        As    the federal        district       court noted          in i t s certification

order        to this     Court,       the enactment           o f t h e UCC        replaced the

warranty       provisions         of the Uniform            S a l e s A c t (and p r e s u m a b l y

t h o s e o f t h e common l a w ) .         See t h e O f f i c i a l    Comment t o §          7-2¬

314,    A l a . Code      1975, s t a t i n g      as " [ c ] h a n g e s "    that      § 15(2) of

the    Uniform        S a l e s A c t was     "[c]ompletely rewritten";                      and t h e

Official       Comment t o § 7 - 2 - 3 1 5 , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 , s t a t i n g t h a t §§

15(1),        ( 4 ) , and       (5)     of   the       Uniform       Sales       Act      had    been

"[r]ewritten."             S e c t i o n 7-1-103(b),          A l a . Code       1975, p r o v i d e s

that    "[u]nless        d i s p l a c e d by t h e p a r t i c u l a r   provisions         of t h i s



                                                  31
1071708

title,      t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f law and e q u i t y ,           including          the law

merchant         and     the      law     relative         to    capacity          to     contract,

principal          and      agent,       estoppel,          fraud,         misrepresentation,

d u r e s s , c o e r c i o n , m i s t a k e , b a n k r u p t c y , and other   v a l i d a t i n g or

invalidating           cause     supplement         i t s provisions."                 Further,

        " [ t ] h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l C o d e was d r a f t e d     against
        the backdrop o f e x i s t i n g b o d i e s o f law, i n c l u d i n g
        the       common l a w a n d e q u i t y ,            and r e l i e s     on t h o s e
        b o d i e s o f l a w t o s u p p l e m e n t i t s p r o v i s i o n s i n many
        important           ways.        A t t h e same t i m e ,            the Uniform
        C o m m e r c i a l Code i s t h e p r i m a r y s o u r c e o f c o m m e r c i a l
        law r u l e s i n a r e a s t h a t i t g o v e r n s , and i t s r u l e s
        represent           choices         made b y i t s d r a f t e r s         and t h e
        e n a c t i n g l e g i s l a t u r e s about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i c i e s
        t o be f u r t h e r e d          i n the transactions                 i t covers.
        T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e p r i n c i p l e s o f common l a w a n d e q u i t y
        may s u p p l e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l
        Code,          they      may      n o t be        used     to supplant i t s
        provisions,             or the purposes                and p o l i c i e s      those
        provisions r e f l e c t , unless a s p e c i f i c provision of
        t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l Code p r o v i d e s      otherwise. In
        the        absence         o f such         a provision,            the Uniform
        C o m m e r c i a l C o d e p r e e m p t s p r i n c i p l e s o f common l a w
        and      equity that are inconsistent with either i t s
        p r o v i s i o n s or i t s purposes and p o l i c i e s . "

Official       Comment t o § 7 - 1 - 1 0 3 , A l a .          Code 1 9 7 5 .       "Under § 7-1¬

103,     p r i o r e x i s t i n g law supplements the various                    code       sections

'unless      d i s p l a c e d by t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s    title.'

It     i s clear     from    this     that     i f t h e p a r t i c u l a r code       provisions

do   d i s p l a c e p r i o r l a w , t h e code p r e v a i l s . "      Toomey E q u i p . C o .

v.   C o m m e r c i a l C r e d i t E q u i p . C o r p . , 386 S o . 2 d 1 1 5 5 ,    1159 ( A l a .


                                                   32
1071708

Civ.     App.      1980).           In    other       words,       the      UCC        i s   to   be

supplemented          by t h e e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f law and e q u i t y i f

no    precise      provision         of    t h e UCC      applicable         to      the     issues

presented       contradicts         those     principles.           S e e H.C.         Schmieding

Produce     Co. v . C a g l e ,     529 S o . 2 d 2 4 3       ( A l a . 1988).

       Nothing        i n the express provisions                 o f §§ 7-2-314 a n d - 3 1 5

indicate       that    previously         accepted        defenses      were      abrogated       by

the    enactment        o f t h e UCC.        Nor have       the p l a i n t i f f s     directed

this    Court     t o any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n     o f t h e UCC      that       supplants

the    defenses       available        a t common         law.      In fact,         i t appears

from     the     Official        Comment        to    §    7-2-314        that         common-law

defenses       to causation          were     affirmatively left               i n t a c t by t h e

l e g i s l a t u r e when t h e UCC was e n a c t e d .       The O f f i c i a l     Comment t o

§ 7-2-314       states:

       " I n a n a c t i o n b a s e d on b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y , i t i s o f
       c o u r s e n e c e s s a r y t o show n o t o n l y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f
       the warranty but the f a c t that the warranty                                    was
       b r o k e n a n d t h a t t h e b r e a c h o f t h e w a r r a n t y was t h e
       proximate cause of the l o s s s u s t a i n e d .                     I n s u c h an
       a c t i o n an a f f i r m a t i v e s h o w i n g b y t h e s e l l e r t h a t t h e
       l o s s r e s u l t e d f r o m some a c t i o n o r e v e n t f o l l o w i n g
       his       own d e l i v e r y o f t h e g o o d s c a n o p e r a t e a s a
       defense.          Equally,         evidence         i n d i c a t i n g that      the
       s e l l e r exercised care i n the manufacture,                          processing
       or s e l e c t i o n o f t h e goods i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e
       o f w h e t h e r t h e w a r r a n t y was i n f a c t b r o k e n . A c t i o n
       b y t h e b u y e r f o l l o w i n g an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e g o o d s
       which ought t o have i n d i c a t e d t h e d e f e c t                complained


                                                33
1071708

         o f c a n be shown as m a t t e r b e a r i n g         on w h e t h e r t h e
         b r e a c h i t s e l f was t h e c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y . "

         Additionally,           I note that because causation                        i s an e l e m e n t

of    a breach         o f an        implied       warranty,          the abrogation            of the

defenses         available           to r e t a i l    defendants          as t o t h a t      element

would have t h e e f f e c t o f making t h e r e t a i l                   defendant         strictly

liable       and t h e i n s u r e r       o f t h e goods           i t sells.         The i d e a    of

making       a retailer         the insurer            o f t h e goods         i tsells      has been

r e j e c t e d by t h i s    Court.         See Ex p a r t e        Morrison's        Cafeteria of

Montgomery,           I n c . , 4 3 1 S o . 2 d 9 7 5 , 979             (Ala.      1983)      ("Courts

cannot       and must n o t i g n o r e          t h e common        experience          of l i f e   and

allow       rules      to develop           that      would      make      sellers       of food       or

other      consumer          goods      insurers           of the products           they     sell.");

Atkins       v. American             Motors     Corp.,         335 S o . 2 d 1 3 4 , 142              (Ala.

1976)       (rejecting the idea               of s t r i c t    liability         u n d e r t h e AEMLD

and     s t a t i n g " t h a t d e f e n d a n t s who a r e o r d i n a r i l y e n g a g e d i n t h e

business         of    marketing           products           should      be     liable       f o r the

foreseeable             harm         proximately             resulting           from        defective

conditions            in     the     products          which       make      them       unreasonably

dangerous").

         Accordingly,            I     would       hold       that     the        sealed-container

doctrine        as s t a t e d i n K i r k l a n d , s u p r a ,     and B r a d f o r d ,   supra, i s


                                                      34
1071708

available       as   a defense      to the    retail    seller     of   food   products

in     claims   asserting     a breach     o f an   implied       warranty under    the

UCC.

        Stuart,      Smith,   and   Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r .




                                             35

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Supreme Court Decision Totalbody

  • 1. REL: 07/17/2009 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2009 1071708 Marcella Sparks v. T o t a l Body E s s e n t i a l N u t r i t i o n , Inc., e t a l . C i n d i Howard, M a r i o n Howard, and J o s h u a Taylor v. T o t a l Body E s s e n t i a l N u t r i t i o n , Inc., e t a l . Certified Question from the U n i t e d States D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e N o r t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f Alabama (CV-08-PT-1010-E and CV-08-PT-1012-E ) LYONS, Justice.
  • 2. 1071708 These cases are b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t on a certified question from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Facts and Procedural History At various times Marcella Sparks, Cindi Howard, Marion Howard, and Joshua Taylor (collectively referred to as "the consumers") purchased a dietary supplement known as "Total Body Formula" from St. John's Nutrition, a health-food retailer in Oxford, Alabama. 1 St. John's Nutrition is a retail seller of Total Body Formula and received the supplement from the manufacturer in sealed, prepackaged containers. St. John's N u t r i t i o n s o l d Total Body Formula to the consumers i n the same c o n d i t i o n as i t was received by St. John's N u t r i t i o n . The consumers allege that after ingesting Total Body Formula, they suffered serious and permanent physical injuries r e s u l t i n g from high l e v e l s of selenium and chromium c o n t a i n e d i n the supplement. In two separate actions 2 filed on April 28, 2008, the The c o n s u m e r s s t a t e t h a t S t . J o h n ' s N u t r i t i o n " a p p a r e n t l y 1 is a sole p r o p r i e t o r s h i p . " C o n s u m e r s ' b r i e f , a t 1. 2 S p a r k s was t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t h e f i r s t a c t i o n ( C V - 0 8 - P T - 1 0 1 0 - E ) , and C i n d i Howard, M a r i o n Howard, and T a y l o r were t h e p l a i n t i f f s i n the second a c t i o n (CV-08-PT-1012-E). 2
  • 3. 1071708 consumers sued Total Body Essential Nutrition, Inc.; TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g , Inc.; Wright Enrichment, I n c . ; and St. John's N u t r i t i o n i n the Calhoun Circuit Court, asserting claims under t h e Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD") f o r the manufacture and/or sale of a defective and unreasonably dangerous product, negligent failure to warn, negligence, negligent and/or reckless marketing, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of the implied warranty of f i t n e s s f o ra p a r t i c u l a r purpose, and a s s e r t i n g a claim of fraud. On June 6, 2008, TexAmerican Food Blending removed t h e two actions to the federal district court p u r s u a n t t o 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 3 2 , asserting that the amount in controversy exceeded the threshold jurisdictional limit of the federal district court and that diversity jurisdiction existed because S t . John's Nutrition, the only named defendant with an Alabama residence for purposes of determining f e d e r a l d i v e r s i t y j u r i s d i c t i o n , s e e 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 3 2 ( c ) ( 1 ) , had been fraudulently joined. Fraudulent joinder i s established "when there i s no possibility that the p l a i n t i f f can prove a cause of action against the resident (non-diverse) defendant." Triggs v. John 3
  • 4. 1071708 Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284 , 1287 (11th. Cir. 1 998 ) . "'If there i s even a p o s s i b i l i t y that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of a c t i o n a g a i n s t any one of the resident defendants, the federal court must f i n d that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.'" Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287 (quoting C o k e r v. Amoco O i l Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (11th C i r . 1993)). "The p l a i n t i f f need not have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent d e f e n d a n t ; he need o n l y have a p o s s i b i l i t y of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be legitimate." Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287. The removing party must establish fraudulent joinder by clear and convincing evidence. Henderson v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th C i r . 2006). When f r a u d u l e n t joinder is established by the removing party, "the federal court must dismiss the n o n - d i v e r s e d e f e n d a n t and d e n y any m o t i o n to remand the matter back to state court." Florence v. Crescent Res., LLC, 484 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). On J u l y 2, 2008, the c o n s u m e r s moved t h e federal district court to remand the two actions to the Calhoun C i r c u i t Court, arguing that St. J o h n ' s N u t r i t i o n was not fraudulently joined 4
  • 5. 1071708 so as to defeat jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The consumers argued in their motion that TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g had f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h by c l e a r and convincing evidence that there existed no possibility that causes of action for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and f i t n e s s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e c o u l d be stated against S t . John's N u t r i t i o n . R e l y i n g upon t h e sealed- container doctrine, TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g argued that the consumers could not possibly establish causes of action against St. John's Nutrition for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose because, i t argued, there existed no causal relationship between the conduct of S t . John's Nutrition and the allegedly defective product. Following a hearing, the federal district court, on September 8, 2008, entered an order finding that TexAmerican Food Blending had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the consumers' claims exceeded the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l amount of $75,000. However, the federal district court concluded that i t i s not c l e a r under Alabama law whether c l a i m s alleging the breach of the implied warranties of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y and 5
  • 6. 1071708 fitness f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose are subject to the defense of the sealed-container doctrine. I f the consumers' claims against S t . John's N u t r i t i o n a l l e g i n g breach of the implied warranties of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y and f i t n e s s for a particular purpose are barred as a m a t t e r o f l a w by t h e sealed-container doctrine, then the joinder of S t . John's Nutrition as a defendant i n the actions would be considered fraudulent. Therefore, the federal district court, pursuant to Rule 18, Ala. R. A p p . P., certified the following question to this Court: "Whether, under Alabama's U n i f o r m Commercial C o d e , a r e t a i l s e l l e r who h a s p u r c h a s e d g o o d s f r o m a reputable manufacturer i n enclosed, pre-packaged and s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r s , w i t h a l l e g e d imperfections that cannot be discovered by the exercise of reasonable c a r e by t h e s e l l e r , c a n be h e l d liable f o r any a l l e g e d i m p e r f e c t i o n s i n t h e p r o d u c t under an implied warranty of merchantability and o r f i t n e s s f o rp a r t i c u l a r purpose; or whether, i n s t e a d , the UCC imposes strict liability upon a r e t a i l seller o f goods t h e r e b y eradicating the 'lack of proximate cause defense' p r o v i d e d t o r e t a i l s e l l e r s u n d e r t h e AEMLD, a s s e t f o r t h i n A t k i n s v . A m e r i c a n M o t o r s C o r p . , 335 S o . 2 d 134 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) . " The former United States Court of Appeals f o r the F i f t h Circuit, i n the f i r s t case using the c e r t i f i c a t i o n procedure adopted i n Amendment No. 328, § 6.02, A l a b a m a Constitution 1901 (now A r t . V I , § 1 4 0 , O f f . R e c o m p . ) , stated: 6
  • 7. 1071708 " F i v e q u e s t i o n s were c e r t i f i e d b u t , f o l l o w i n g o u r u s u a l p r a c t i c e , we l e f t i t t o t h e A l a b a m a C o u r t t o f o r m u l a t e t h e i s s u e s . A s was t h e i r p r e r o g a t i v e , the Alabama C o u r t d i d j u s t t h a t and c o n s i d e r e d the basic issues rather than r e p l y i n g c a t e g o r i c a l l y to the c e r t i f i e d questions." Barnes v. A t l a n t i c & P a c i f i c Life I n s . Co. of America, 53 0 F.2d 9 8 , 99 ( 5 t h C i r . 1976) (footnote omitted). Consistent with this prerogative, we note that the question as framed by the f e d e r a l district court refers to "strict liability" as "eradicating the 'lack of proximate cause defense.'" However, as the Court noted i n Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 ( A l a . 1976), the recognition of a defense of lack of causal relation arising from a defendant's activities i n connection with handling the product and i t s defective condition " i s n o t t o be confused with t h e b u r d e n w h i c h r e s t s on t h e p l a i n t i f f to prove that h i s injuries and damages were the proximate result of the defective condition of the product." Atkins, 335 So. 2d a t 143 n.4. Finally, Alabama's Uniform Commercial Code ("the UCC") is equally attentive to the plaintiff's burden of establishing proximate cause. See, e.g., § 7-2-715(2)(b), Ala. Code 1975 ("Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include: ... Injury to person or property 7
  • 8. 1071708 proximately resulting from any b r e a c h of warranty." (emphasis added)); § 7-2-314, A l a . Code 1975, O f f i c i a l Comment, 5 13 ("In an a c t i o n based on b r e a c h of warranty, i t i s of course necessary t o show n o t o n l y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e w a r r a n t y b u t the fact that the warranty was b r o k e n and t h a t the breach of the warranty was t h e p r o x i m a t e cause of the loss sustained." (emphasis added)). We therefore rephrase the q u e s t i o n posed by t h e f e d e r a l district c o u r t as follows: " W h e t h e r , u n d e r t h e UCC, a r e t a i l s e l l e r who h a s purchased goods from a r e p u t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r e r i n enclosed, pre-packaged and s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r s , w i t h a l l e g e d i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t c a n n o t be d i s c o v e r e d b y the e x e r c i s e of r e a s o n a b l e care by t h e s e l l e r , can be h e l d l i a b l e f o r a n y a l l e g e d i m p e r f e c t i o n s i n t h e p r o d u c t u n d e r an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y and/or fitness for particular purpose; or, put a n o t h e r w a y , w h e t h e r t h e UCC i m p o s e s l i a b i l i t y u p o n a r e t a i l s e l l e r o f goods w i t h o u t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the defense of 'lack of c a u s a l r e l a t i o n ' p r o v i d e d t o retail s e l l e r s u n d e r t h e AEMLD, a s s e t f o r t h i n A t k i n s v. American Motors Corp., 335 S o . 2 d 134 (Ala. 1976)." Only the consumers, TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g , and Wright Enrichment, I n c . , have filed briefs with this Court. Discussion In B r a d f o r d v. Moore Brothers Feed & Grocery, 268 A l a . 217, 105 So. 2d 825 (1 9 5 8 ) , this Court recognized the 8
  • 9. 1071708 availability of the sealed-container doctrine to claims asserting the breach of implied warranties against retail sellers arising under the Uniform Sales Act. 3 The v i e w that the sealed-container defense survived the c r e a t i o n of implied warranties under the Uniform Sales A c t has been d e s c r i b e d as the m i n o r i t y view. S e e Sams v . E z y - W a y F o o d l i n e r C o . , 157 Me. 10, 18-19, 170 A . 2 d 1 6 0 , 165 ( 1 9 6 1 ) , citing K i r k l a n d v. Great Atlantic & Pacific T e a C o . , 2 3 3 A l a . 4 0 4 , 171 S o . 735 (1936); Bradford v. Moore Bros. Feed & Grocery, supra; Wilkes v. Memphis G r o c e r y C o . , 23 T e n n . A p p . 5 5 0 , 134 S.W.2d 929 (1939); and Green v. W i l s o n , 194 A r k . 1 6 5 , 105 S.W.2d 1074 ( 1 9 3 7 ) , as expressing the minority rule and d e s c r i b i n g t h e opposing view as supported by " t h e g r e a t weight of authority." Our Court justified the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the sealed-container d e f e n s e on the theory that the Uniform Sales A c t was d e c l a r a t i v e o f t h e common l a w . See B r a d f o r d , 268 A l a . a t 2 2 0 , 105 S o . 2 d a t 8 2 7 . Other courts reached the opposite conclusion. S e e , e . g . , Sams v . E z y - W a y F o o d l i n e r C o . , 157 Me. a t 2 1 , 170 A . 2 d a t 166 ("The Uniform Sales Act i n establishing implied warranties under S e c t i o n 15 e n d e d o u r ' s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r ' r u l e a t common law."). The 3 Uniform S a l e s A c t was r e p e a l e d when t h e UCC was enacted. See § 7 - 1 0 - 1 0 2 ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . 9
  • 10. 1071708 We cannot, however, view the enactment o f t h e UCC as a legislative exercise that i s merely declaratory o f t h e common law. See O f f i c i a l Comment t o § 7 - 1 - 1 0 3 , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 : "2. ... T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e p r i n c i p l e s o f common law a n d e q u i t y may s u p p l e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s of the U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l C o d e , t h e y may n o t b e u s e d t o supplant i t s provisions, or the purposes and p o l i c i e s those p r o v i s i o n s r e f l e c t , unless a s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n o f t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l Code provides otherwise. In t h e absence of such a p r o v i s i o n , t h e Uniform Commercial Code preempts p r i n c i p l e s of common l a w a n d e q u i t y t h a t a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t with e i t h e r i t s p r o v i s i o n s o r i t s purposes and p o l i c i e s . " Section 7-2-314, A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s : "(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 7-2-316), a warranty that t h e goods shall be merchantable i s implied i n a contract f o r t h e i r sale i f t h e s e l l e r i s a merchant w i t h r e s p e c t t o goods o f that kind. Under t h i s s e c t i o n t h e s e r v i n g f o r v a l u e of food or drink t o b e c o n s u m e d e i t h e r on t h e premises or elsewhere i s a sale. "(2) Goods t o be m e r c h a n t a b l e must be a t l e a s t such as: "(a) Pass w i t h o u t objection i n the trade under t h e c o n t r a c t d e s c r i p t i o n ; and "(b) In t h e case o f f u n g i b l e goods, are of f a i r average q u a l i t y w i t h i n the d e s c r i p t i o n ; and "(c) Are f i t f o r t h e o r d i n a r y purposes for w h i c h such goods a r e used; and "(d) Run, within the variations permitted by t h e agreement, o f even k i n d , 10
  • 11. 1071708 q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y w i t h i n each u n i t and among a l l u n i t s i n v o l v e d ; a n d "(e) Are adequately contained, p a c k a g e d , a n d l a b e l e d a s t h e a g r e e m e n t may r e q u i r e ; and "(f) Conform to the promises or a f f i r m a t i o n s o f f a c t made o n t h e c o n t a i n e r or l a b e l i f any." No p r o v i s i o n i s made f o r a d e f e n s e to a claim of a breach of an implied warranty under § 7-2-314 based on the sealed- container doctrine. We v i e w t h i s s i l e n c e as an a b r o g a t i o n of the common-law defense, rather than permission to carry i t forward. Nothing i n the O f f i c i a l Comment to § 7-2-314 supports the proposition that the sealed-container d e f e n s e may be carried forward; t h e Comment i s silent on t h e e f f e c t o f care on the part of the s e l l e r once a breach of implied warranty has been e s t a b l i s h e d . We applied F l o r i d a law based on analogous p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e F l o r i d a UCC i n A m S o u t h B a n k v . Tice, 923 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 0 , 1 0 6 5 ( A l a . 2 0 0 5 ) . We there stated: "Thus, Burtman [v. T e c h n i c a l C h e m i c a l s & P r o d u c t s , 724 S o . 2 d 672 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) , ] s t a n d s f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t d i s p l a c e m e n t o f a common-law r u l e u n d e r t h e UCC d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a n u n e q u i v o c a l , explicit reference t o t h e common-law r u l e being displaced. I f t h e UCC p r o v i s i o n c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e common l a w i n some w a y , t h e common l a w m u s t b e s a i d t o be d i s p l a c e d . " 11
  • 12. 1071708 (Emphasis added.) The rule i n Tice i s sound a n d due t o be a p p l i e d t o t h e i d e n t i c a l p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e A l a b a m a UCC dealing with the applicability of the common law following the adoption o f t h e UCC. Any o t h e r r e s u l t would run counter to the p r i n c i p l e s of l i a b i l i t y e s t a b l i s h e d i n § 7-2-314. Indeed, the availability of the sealed-container defense to a claim based on a p r o d u c t that arrives i n a sealed package would be irreconcilable with the simultaneous recognition of a claim arising from the sale of a product that does n o t a r r i v e i n a sealed package y e t has component parts, such as an engine crankcase, equally concealed from view, that might contain a defective piston. Of c o u r s e , under the l a t t e r circumstance, a claim o f b r e a c h o f an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y w o u l d unquestionably exist. Recognition of the sealed-container defense to claims of b r e a c h o f i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y u n d e r § 7-2-314 i s a p o l i c y m a t t e r best left t o t h e wisdom of the l e g i s l a t u r e . Other states have r e s o l v e d the question by s t a t u t e i n favor o f and 4 against 4 S e e N.C. G e n . S t a t . A n n . § 9 9 B - 2 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ("No p r o d u c t liability a c t i o n , e x c e p t an a c t i o n f o r b r e a c h o f e x p r e s s w a r r a n t y , s h a l l be commenced o r m a i n t a i n e d a g a i n s t any s e l l e r when t h e p r o d u c t was a c q u i r e d and s o l d by t h e s e l l e r i n a s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r o r when t h e p r o d u c t was a c q u i r e d a n d s o l d b y the seller under circumstances i n which the s e l l e r was 12
  • 13. 1071708 the availability of the defense. 5 The treatment of this identical issue in Georgia is especially instructive. In P i e r c e v. Liberty Furniture Co., 141 Ga. App. 175, 176, 233 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1977), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Alltrade, Inc. v. M c D o n a l d , 213 Ga. App. 758, 445 S . E . 2 d 856 (1 9 9 4 ) , a furniture store sold a porch-swing kit in a sealed container i t had received from the manufacturer of the swing. The customer assembled the swing, sat i n i t , and was i n j u r e d when a piece of hardware failed. She sued the retailer under the Georgia a f f o r d e d no r e a s o n a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n s p e c t t h e p r o d u c t i n s u c h a manner t h a t w o u l d have or s h o u l d have, i n the e x e r c i s e of reasonable care, r e v e a l e d the e x i s t e n c e of the c o n d i t i o n c o m p l a i n e d o f , u n l e s s t h e s e l l e r damaged or m i s h a n d l e d the product w h i l e i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n ; p r o v i d e d , t h a t the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l not a p p l y i f the m a n u f a c t u r e r of the p r o d u c t i s not s u b j e c t to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t s of this State or i f such manufacturer has been judicially declared insolvent."). 5 S e e , e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-106(a)(2000) ("No 'product liability a c t i o n , ' as d e f i n e d i n § 2 9 - 2 8 - 1 0 2 ( 6 ) , s h a l l be c o m m e n c e d o r m a i n t a i n e d a g a i n s t a n y s e l l e r when t h e product i s acquired and s o l d by the seller in a sealed c o n t a i n e r a n d / o r when t h e p r o d u c t i s a c q u i r e d a n d s o l d b y t h e s e l l e r under circumstances i n w h i c h t h e s e l l e r i s a f f o r d e d no r e a s o n a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n s p e c t the p r o d u c t i n such a manner which would or s h o u l d , i n the e x e r c i s e of r e a s o n a b l e care, reveal the existence of the defective condition. The p r o v i s i o n s of the f i r s t sentence of t h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l not a p p l y t o : (1) A c t i o n s b a s e d u p o n a b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y , express o r i m p l i e d , as d e f i n e d b y t i t l e 47, c h a p t e r 2 "). 13
  • 14. 1071708 version o f t h e UCC, § 2 - 2 1 4 , alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Reversing a summary j u d g m e n t i n favor of the retailer, the Court of Appeals of Georgia concluded that there was e v i d e n c e indicating that the swing was unfit f o r the ordinary purposes f o rwhich such goods a r e used and t h a t the r e t a i l e r could be h e l d liable f o r breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Addressing the sealed-container defense, the Georgia court stated: " A l l o f t h e p o s t - U . C . C . a u t h o r i t y t h a t we h a v e studied indicates that the implied warranty of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y does n o t base any d i s t i n c t i o n s upon whether o r n o t goods a r e s o l d i n t h e i r original packages. S e e , e . g . , R. Anderson, 1 Uniform C o m m e r c i a l C o d e § 2 - 3 1 4 : 7 0 - 7 2 ( 2 d e d . 1970 ) ; G. Kock, Georgia Commercial Practice 40-41 (1964); White, 'Sales W a r r a n t i e s Under G e o r g i a ' s Uniform C o m m e r c i a l Code,' 1 Ga. S t a t e B a r J . 1 9 1 , 196-97 (1964). The p r o v i s i o n , i n fact, establishes a concept f o r r e t a i l e r s s i m i l a r t o that employed i n Code A n n . § 105-106, s u p r a , b y w h i c h m a n u f a c t u r e r s may b e h e l d s t r i c t l y l i a b l e f o r d e f e c t i v e products. " P r i o r t o t h e e n a c t m e n t o f t h e U.C.C., G e o r g i a adhered to the 'sealed container doctrine.' See Wood v . Hub M o t o r C o . , 110 G a . A p p . 1 0 1 ( 2 ) , 137 S . E . 2 d 674 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; M a r o n e y v . M o n t g o m e r y W a r d & C o . , 7 2 G a . A p p . 4 8 5 , 34 S . E . 2 d 302 ( 1 9 4 5 ) ; B e l v . A d l e r , 63 G a . A p p . 4 7 3 ( 2 ) , 11 S . E . 2 d 495 ( 1 9 4 0 ) . According t o t h a t d o c t r i n e , no w a r r a n t y o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y applied as t o t h e r e t a i l e r o f goods i n their original packages, manufactured by reputable m a n u f a c t u r e r s , and i n g e n e r a l use i n the r e t a i l 14
  • 15. 1071708 trade. I n Wood v . Hub M o t o r C o . , s u p r a , h o w e v e r , i t was s p e c i f i c a l l y n o t e d t h a t t h i s l i n e o f d e c i s i o n s was b a s e d o n C o d e § 9 6 - 3 0 1 , w h i c h was r e p e a l e d w i t h t h e a d v e n t o f t h e U.C.C. i n G e o r g i a . "Since t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e U.C.C., several G e o r g i a cases have a p p l i e d t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y t o r e t a i l e r s o f goods s o l d i n s e a l e d packages. I n F e n d e r v . C o l o n i a l S t o r e s , I n c . , 138 Ga. App. 3 1 ( 1 ) ( A ) , 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976), the p l a i n t i f f took a s i x - p a c k carton of Coca-Cola from a shelf i n the supermarket. She t h e n p r o c e e d e d t o the c h e c k - o u t c o u n t e r , and p l a c e d t h e c a r t o n upon the c o u n t e r , a t which time a b o t t l e e x p l o d e d and injured her. She s u e d t h e s u p e r m a r k e t a n d s u f f e r e d a directed verdict. T h i s c o u r t h e l d , on p. 35, 225 S.E.2d p. 695, ' t h a t C o c a - C o l a b o t t l e s w h i c h w o u l d break under normal h a n d l i n g a r e not f i t f o r t h e o r d i n a r y u s e f o r w h i c h t h e y w e r e i n t e n d e d ... ' a n d thus t h e r e was a prima facie showing by t h e plaintiff o f a c l a i m u n d e r t h e U.C.C.'s i m p l i e d warranty of merchantability. T h e c a s e was r e m a n d e d for a jury t r i a l . " C h a f f i n v . A t l a n t a C o c a C o l a e t c . C o . , 127 G a . A p p . 6 1 9 ( 1 ) , 194 S . E . 2 d 5 1 3 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , a l s o d e a l s w i t h a b o t t l e d s o f t d r i n k w h i c h was n o t m e r c h a n t a b l e . I n t h i s c a s e t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s d a u g h t e r p u r c h a s e d a Coke from a vending machine a t a B i gApple g r o c e r y s t o r e . The p l a i n t i f f was i n j u r e d w h i l e d r i n k i n g a n i m p u r e s u b s t a n c e w h i c h was c o n t a i n e d i n t h e b o t t l e . The p l a i n t i f f s u e d t h e g r o c e r y s t o r e on s e v e r a l g r o u n d s , including that of breach o f t h e U.C.C. implied warranty of merchantability. The j u d g e r e f u s e d t o c h a r g e t h e j u r y as t o t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y , and t h e j u r y found against the p l a i n t i f f . This court held that the t r i a l court erred i n i t s r e f u s a l to charge. "Numerous o t h e r c a s e s f r o m t h i s c o u r t , w h i l e n o t d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h goods s o l d i n o r i g i n a l c o n t a i n e r s , have used a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y a p p r o a c h t o h o l d r e t a i l e r s l i a b l e f o r damage, s u f f e r e d due t o a 15
  • 16. 1071708 breach of the U.C.C. implied warranty of merchantability. Redfern Meats v. H e r t z , 134 G a . A p p . 3 8 1 , 2 1 5 S . E . 2 d 10 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ( i m p r o p e r l y operating t r u c k ) ; R a y v . D e a s , 112 G a . A p p . 1 9 1 , 144 S . E . 2 d 468 (1965) ( f o r e i g n s u b s t a n c e i n h a m b u r g e r ) . " 141 Ga. A p p . a t 1 7 6 - 7 8 , 233 S.E.2d a t 35-36 (emphasis added). A subsequent enactment of t h e Georgia L e g i s l a t u r e has d e p r i v e d Pierce v. L i b e r t y Furniture Co. o f p r e c e d e n t i a l value as t o its treatment of a separate issue involving strict liability. See Ga. Code A n n . § 5 1 - 1 - 1 1 . 1 (2006). When t h e A l a b a m a L e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d t h e UCC, i t repealed the Uniform Sales Act. See § 7 - 1 0 - 1 0 2 ( 1 ) , Ala. Code 1 9 7 5 . The now r e p e a l e d Uniform Sales A c t was a c k n o w l e d g e d by this Court t o be the basis f o r the sealed-container defense i n Bradford, 268 A l a . a t 2 2 0 , 105 S o . 2 d a t 8 2 7 . On t h e same rationale as t h a t employed by t h e G e o r g i a appellate court i n Pierce v. Liberty Furniture Co., we conclude that the replacement of the Uniform Sales Act with t h e UCC eliminated the sealed-container defense. The recourse of the r e t a i l e r under t h e circumstance here presented i s a claim against i t ss e l l e r on i t s breach of implied warranty, not absolution. See Pierce v. Liberty Furniture C o . , 141 G a . A p p . a t 1 7 8 , 2 3 3 S . E . 2 d a t 3 6 , s t a t i n g 16
  • 17. 1071708 the correct result under analogous provisions of the Georgia UCC: " I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t u n d e r t h i s h o l d i n g a retailer i s n o t a d e f e n s e l e s s p a r t y who w i l l be c a u g h t w i t h a m o n e t a r y l o s s due t o a n o t h e r ' s f a u l t y construction of products. The r e t a i l e r ' s r e m e d y i s an a c t i o n o v e r a g a i n s t h i s s e l l e r n o t e x c u l p a t i o n . The retailer may rely on the wholesaler or manufacturer to supply merchantable goods, and i f t h e y a r e n o t m e r c h a n t a b l e , t h e r e t a i l e r h a s t h e same c l a i m f o r b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y as i t s customer had against i t . " We answer the c e r t i f i e d question i n the affirmative and hold that the s e a l e d - c o n t a i n e r defense i s not a v a i l a b l e to the retail seller of food products i n claims asserting a breach of implied warranty under t h e UCC. QUESTION ANSWERED. Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Parker, and Murdock, J J . , concur. Stuart, Smith, Bolin, a n d Shaw, J J . , d i s s e n t . 17
  • 18. 1071708 BOLIN, Justice (dissenting). Because I believe that the enactment of Alabama's Uniform Commercial Code ("the UCC") did not abrogate the sealed- container defense, I must r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t from the main opinion. Section 7-2-314, A l a . Code 1975, provides: "(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 7-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable i s implied i n a contract f o r t h e i r sale i f the s e l l e r i s a merchant w i t h r e s p e c t t o goods of that kind. Under t h i s s e c t i o n the s e r v i n g f o r v a l u e of food or d r i n k t o be c o n s u m e d e i t h e r on the premises or elsewhere i s a s a l e . "(2) Goods t o be merchantable m u s t be at least such as: "(a) Pass w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n in the trade under the c o n t r a c t d e s c r i p t i o n ; and "(b) In the case of f u n g i b l e goods, are of f a i r average quality within the description; and "(c) Are f i t f o r the o r d i n a r y purposes for w h i c h s u c h goods a r e u s e d ; and "(d) Run, within the variations p e r m i t t e d by t h e a g r e e m e n t , of even k i n d , q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y w i t h i n each u n i t and among a l l u n i t s i n v o l v e d ; a n d "(e) Are adequately contained, p a c k a g e d , a n d l a b e l e d as t h e a g r e e m e n t may r e q u i r e ; and 18
  • 19. 1071708 "(f) Conform to the promises or a f f i r m a t i o n s o f f a c t made o n t h e c o n t a i n e r or l a b e l i f any." Section 7-2-315, A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s : "Where t h e s e l l e r a t t h e t i m e o f c o n t r a c t i n g h a s r e a s o n t o know a n y p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e f o r w h i c h t h e g o o d s a r e r e q u i r e d a n d t h a t t h e b u y e r i s r e l y i n g on the s e l l e r ' s s k i l l o r judgment t o s e l e c t o r f u r n i s h s u i t a b l e goods, t h e r e i s u n l e s s e x c l u d e d o r m o d i f i e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 7-2-316 an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y t h a t t h e goods s h a l l be f i t f o r s u c h p u r p o s e . " It i s clear under Alabama law that i n order to establish a breach-of-an-implied-warranty claim, a plaintiff must prove that the breach was the proximate cause of the p l a i n t i f f ' s injury. See C a i n v . S h e r a t o n P e r i m e t e r P a r k S o u t h H o t e l , 592 So. 2 d 2 1 8 , 2 2 1 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ("Under b o t h t h e [ A l a b a m a Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine] and § 7-2-314, the defect or l a c k o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y , o f c o u r s e , must be p r o v e d t o h a v e been the proximate cause of the p l a i n t i f f ' s injuries."); Ex parte General Motors Corp., 7 6 9 S o . 2 d 903 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ; Rose v. General Motors Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (N.D. Ala. 2004); and Chase v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 140 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 2 8 0 , 1 2 8 9 (M.D. A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ("In a n a c t i o n f o r breach of the implied warranty of fitness fora particular purpose, the Plaintiffs must prove: (1) t h e e x i s t e n c e of the implied 19
  • 20. 1071708 warranty; (2) b r e a c h o f t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y ; and (3) d a m a g e s proximately r e s u l t i n g from that breach. Barrington Corp. v. Patrick L u m b e r Co., I n c . , 447 So. 2d 785, 787 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984)."). Alabama has historically adhered to the common-law sealed-container doctrine as a defense to the element of causation. The sealed-container doctrine was first established in this s t a t e i n D o t h a n C h e r o - C o l a B o t t l i n g Co. v. Weeks, 16 A l a . App. 639, 80 So. 734 (1918). I n Weeks, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a bottled soda after ingesting the t a i n t e d c o n t e n t s o f t h e b o t t l e and was awarded $10 i n damages. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's complaint sounded in tort and, therefore, that the plaintiff was a l l o w e d t o r e c o v e r no m o r e c o s t s t h a n damages p u r s u a n t to § 3 6 6 3 o f t h e 1907 Code. In a f f i r m i n g the judgment, the Court of Appeals stated: " I t i s a w e l l - s e t t l e d r u l e of law t h a t where a m a n u f a c t u r e r s e l l s a r t i c l e s o f h i s own make i n t h e absence of an express warranty, a warranty by i m p l i c a t i o n of law a r i s e s t h a t such a r t i c l e s are r e a s o n a b l y f i t f o r the p u r p o s e s f o r w h i c h t h e y were intended. So i n t h e a b s e n c e o f an e x p r e s s w a r r a n t y the law i m p l i e s t h a t the m a n u f a c t u r e r or p a c k e r of f o o d s , b e v e r a g e s , d r u g s , c o n d i m e n t s , and c o n f e c t i o n s i n t e n d e d f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n w a r r a n t s t h a t their p r o d u c t s a r e f i t f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n , and that 20
  • 21. 1071708 t h e y have u s e d i n t h e s e l e c t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n o f such articles that degree of care ordinarily e x e r c i s e d by p e r s o n s s k i l l e d i n the b u s i n e s s of p r e p a r i n g and p a c k i n g a r t i c l e s o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n or s a l e to the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . "This w a r r a n t y i s not f o r the b e n e f i t of the retailer who purchases i n large quantities for resale, and such r e t a i l e r i s not l i a b l e to the consumer of a r t i c l e s of the c h a r a c t e r here i n v o l v e d , if he purchases of a r e p u t a b l e manufacturer or d e a l e r , and t h e g o o d s so p u r c h a s e d and s u p p l i e d by h i m a r e s u c h as a r e w i t h o u t i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t may be d i s c o v e r e d b y t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e o f a p e r s o n s k i l l e d and e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g i n and s u p p l y i n g goods t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c . 'As t o h i d d e n i m p e r f e c t i o n s , t h e c o n s u m e r m u s t be d e e m e d t o have relied on the care of the packer or m a n u f a c t u r e r o r t h e w a r r a n t y w h i c h i s h e l d t o be i m p l i e d by t h e l a t t e r . ' 29 R . C . L . p . 1 1 2 4 , § 2 9 . T h i s w a r r a n t y i s r a i s e d by i m p l i c a t i o n of law, f o r the benefit and protection of the consumer, r e g a r d l e s s of the absence of express contractual r e l a t i o n s between p a r t i e s , and i s e n f o r c e a b l e by contract remedies. ... "The second count of the c o m p l a i n t clearly states facts from which the law would imply a w a r r a n t y as b e t w e e n t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d t h e p l a i n t i f f t h a t the c o n t e n t s of the b o t t l e of C h e r o - C o l a were f i t f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n , a n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had u s e d , i n t h e s e l e c t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h i s d r i n k , t h a t degree of c a r e o r d i n a r i l y e x e r c i s e d by persons s k i l l e d i n the b u s i n e s s of p r e p a r i n g such d r i n k s f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n and s a l e t o t h e p u b l i c , and further states facts showing a breach of such warranty. We t h e r e f o r e h o l d that the c o m p l a i n t , when l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d t o s u p p o r t t h e j u d g m e n t , s t a t e s a c a u s e o f a c t i o n ex c o n t r a c t u , and i s i n assumpsit f o r a breach of i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y , and u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 3662 o f t h e C o d e a s a m e n d e d , t h e c o u r t was i n v e s t e d w i t h a d i s c r e t i o n i n 21
  • 22. 1071708 the taxation of costs according to the equities of the case." Weeks, 16 Ala. App. at 640 , 80 So. at 735 (citations omitted). In K i r k l a n d v. Great A t l a n t i c & Pacific Tea Co., 233 Ala. 404, 171 So. 735 (1936), this Court applied the sealed- container doctrine to a retail transaction. In K i r k l a n d , the plaintiff p u r c h a s e d from the defendant, a r e t a i l grocer, a bag of flour that was tainted with arsenic. The plaintiff was injured after ingesting the flour and sued the defendant, asserting a c l a i m of negligence. 6 N o t h i n g i n the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant had manufactured or sacked the flour; that the arsenic found i t s way into the flour while the flour was in the defendant's possession; or that the defendant had notice or should have had notice that the sack of flour was tainted with arsenic. The trial court entered a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff. Kirkland, supra. In a f f i r m i n g the judgment i n f a v o r of the defendant, this Court stated: 6 This Court specifically noted i n Kirkland that the p l a i n t i f f had not a s s e r t e d a c l a i m u n d e r the U n i f o r m Sales A c t , the p r e d e c e s s o r to the UCC. 22
  • 23. 1071708 " I n D o t h a n C h e r o - C o l a B o t t l i n g Co. e t a l . v . W e e k s , 16 A l a . A p p . 6 3 9 , 640 , 80 S o . 734 , 735 [ ( 1 9 1 8 ) ] , s p e a k i n g o f b o t t l e d s o f t d r i n k s , i t was s a i d : 'Such r e t a i l e r i s n o t l i a b l e t o t h e consumer o f a r t i c l e s o f t h e c h a r a c t e r h e r e i n v o l v e d , i f he p u r c h a s e s o f a r e p u t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r e r o r d e a l e r , and t h e goods so p u r c h a s e d and s u p p l i e d by h i m a r e s u c h a s a r e w i t h o u t i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t may b e d i s c o v e r e d by t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e o f a p e r s o n s k i l l e d and e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g i n and s u p p l y i n g goods t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c . B i g e l o w v. Maine C e n t r a l R.R. C o . , 110 Me. 1 0 5 , 85 A. 3 9 6 , 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 627 [ ( 1 9 1 2 ) ] ; W i n s o r v . L o m b a r d , 18 P i c k . ([35] Mass.) 57 [(1836)]. "As to hidden i m p e r f e c t i o n s , t h e c o n s u m e r must be deemed t o have r e l i e d on t h e c a r e o f t h e p a c k e r o r m a n u f a c t u r e r o r t h e w a r r a n t y w h i c h i s h e l d t o be i m p l i e d by t h e l a t t e r . " 29 R . C . L . p . 1 1 2 4 , § 2 9 . ' "This case h a s b e e n d i s a p p r o v e d on another point, but not as to the above statement. Birmingham C h e r o - C o l a B o t t l i n g Co. v . C l a r k , [205 Ala. 678 , 89 So. 64 (1921 ) ] . We deem this announcement i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n and t h e t r e n d o f m o d e r n a u t h o r i t y on t h e s u b j e c t . ... " I n t h i s d a y t h e g r o c e r ' s s t o c k c o n s i s t s i n much of canned goods, goods i n b o t t l e s , c a r t o n s , s a c k s , p a c k a g e s o f g r e a t v a r i e t y , p u t up u n d e r p u r e f o o d regulations, and s o l d a t r e t a i l i n t h e unopened package. I n common r e a s o n t h e g r o c e r c o u l d n o t inspect the contents of every sack of f l o u r he handles. No o n e e x p e c t s h i m t o do s o . To i m p o s e a l e g a l d u t y s o t o do i s t o o e x a c t i n g . The l e g a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s h o u l d r e s t w h e r e i t b e l o n g s , on h i m who made the package and inclosed poisonous substances therein. I n t h e a b s e n c e o f some a v e r m e n t d i s c l o s i n g t h a t t h e p o i s o n f o u n d i t s way i n t o t h e sack of f l o u r here i n v o l v e d w h i l e under t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e r e t a i l e r , o r some f a c t c h a r g i n g h i m w i t h l a c k 23
  • 24. 1071708 of c a r e i n s e l e c t i n g and s e l l i n g t h a t particular f l o u r , t h e c o m p l a i n t was s u b j e c t t o d e m u r r e r . " Kirkland, 233 A l a . a t 4 0 6 - 0 7 , 171 S o . a t 7 3 7 . T h i s C o u r t , i n B r a d f o r d v. Moore B r o t h e r s Feed & G r o c e r y , 268 Ala. 217, 105 So. 2d 825 (1958), reaffirmed the application of the sealed-container doctrine to claims asserting a breach of implied warranties against retail sellers a r i s i n g under the Uniform Sales Act. In Bradford, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant sacks of "cow feed" that were infested w i t h mold. The defendant, a retailer in commercial feed, sold the feed in original, unopened sacks t h a t had been packed by t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r . The p l a i n t i f f sued the defendant, alleging a breach o f an i m p l i e d warranty, and the trial court entered a directed verdict i n favor of the defendant. R e l y i n g upon Weeks, supra, and K i r k l a n d , supra, the defendant argued on appeal that the p l a i n t i f f c o u l d not state a cause of action f o r breach of an implied warranty because a retail seller of commercial feed sold the feed to the p l a i n t i f f i n o r i g i n a l , unopened s a c k s t h a t were packed by the manufacturer. This Court stated the f o l l o w i n g w i t h regard to the sealed-container doctrine: "It i s true that t h e two c a s e s cited [Weeks a n d 24
  • 25. 1071708 K i r k l a n d ] are a u t h o r i t y f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the retailer who purchases in large quantities for r e s a l e i s not l i a b l e to the consumer of a r t i c l e s of f o o d f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n , i f he p u r c h a s e s o f a r e p u t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r e r o r d e a l e r , a n d t h e g o o d s so purchased and supplied by him are such as are w i t h o u t i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t may be d i s c o v e r e d b y t h e e x e r c i s e of the r e a s o n a b l e care of a p e r s o n s k i l l e d and e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g i n and s u p p l y i n g goods t o the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . Cf. L o l l a r v . J o n e s , 229 Ala. 329, 157 So. 209 [(1934 ) ] . We may note here that b o t h c a s e s make t h e r u l e e x p r e s s l y a p p l i c a b l e o n l y to cases involving food intended for human consumption. B u t we may a s s u m e f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s case, w i t h o u t d e c i d i n g , t h a t the p r i n c i p l e i s e q u a l l y e f f e c t i v e w i t h regard to feed s o l d f o r the s u b s i s t e n c e o f l i v e s t o c k and o t h e r d o m e s t i c a n i m a l s . I t w o u l d s e e m t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be so a f o r t i o r i . At l e a s t i t h a s b e e n so a p p l i e d i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s . " I t may be a d d e d t h a t t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s t a t e d has n e i t h e r been o v e r r u l e d nor modified in this s t a t e , a l t h o u g h t h e t r e n d i s t o a more l i b e r a l r u l e i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s p l a c i n g an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y u p o n t h e r e t a i l s a l e o f p a c k a g e d i t e m s as w e l l as those not packaged. The trend has apparently r e c e i v e d e s p e c i a l impetus s i n c e the almost u n i v e r s a l a d o p t i o n of the U n i f o r m S a l e s A c t s . See t h e n o t e s a t 90 A . L . R . 1269 a n d 142 A . L . R . 1 4 3 4 . The a d o p t i o n of the U n i f o r m Sales Act i n Alabama (Code 1940, Title 57, §§ 1-76) has w o r k e d no change of the general rule. The r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f t h e r u l e i n t h e Kirkland case, supra, occurred i n 1936, several years subsequent to the passage of the Act i n t h i s s t a t e , and t h e c o u r t i n t h a t c a s e e x p r e s s e d t h e i r cognizance of the Act but dealt with the case without reference thereto. This position is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e v i e w s t a t e d by t h i s C o u r t and generally recognized m o s t e v e r y w h e r e t h a t § 21 of the U n i f o r m Sales Act i s o n l y d e c l a r a t i v e of the common l a w . M c C a r l e y v . Wood D r u g s , I n c . , 228 A l a . 25
  • 26. 1071708 2 2 6 , 153 S o . 446 [ ( 1 9 3 4 ) ] , 77 C . J . S . S a l e s § 3 2 9 , p . 1186. "The g e n e r a l r u l e t o w h i c h r e c o g n i t i o n i s g i v e n a b o v e , w o u l d r e q u i r e an a f f i r m a n c e w e r e i t n o t f o r t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t h e r e w h i c h we f e e l s h o u l d be t r e a t e d as w i t h i n an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e r u l e . Here the r e t a i l e r h a n d l e d , s t o r e d , o r t r e a t e d t h e goods i n a manner w h i c h w o u l d t e n d t o a l t e r t h e o r i g i n a l c o n d i t i o n o f t h e goods as t h e y were p r o d u c e d by t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r and t h e c l e a r i n f e r e n c e a r i s e s t h a t t h e r e t a i l e r had a c t u a l or c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e of the d e f e c t i v e s t a t u s of t h e goods. The K i r k l a n d c a s e , s u p r a [ 2 3 3 A l a . 4 0 4 , 171 S o . 7 3 6 ] , r e c o g n i z e d s u c h a s t a t u s t o be an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e w h e r e i t was o b s e r v e d : "'The c o m p l a i n t does n o t charge t h a t defendant manufactured or sacked this f l o u r ; n o r t h a t t h e p o i s o n f o u n d i t s way into the flour while in defendant's p o s s e s s i o n ; n o r t h a t a n y t h i n g on t h e s a c k , n o r t h e s o u r c e f r o m w h i c h i t came, g a v e notice to the r e t a i l e r , o r p u t h i m on inquiry touching i t s fitness f o r human consumption. F o r a u g h t a p p e a r i n g , t h i s was an ordinary sack of f l o u r , p u t up b y reliable millers, t o be sold by t h e retailer intact, f o r the convenience of b o t h merchant and customer.' "And again: "'In the absence of some averment d i s c l o s i n g t h a t t h e p o i s o n f o u n d i t s way i n t o the sack of f l o u r here i n v o l v e d w h i l e u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e r e t a i l e r , o r some fact charging him with lack of care i n selecting and selling that particular flour, the complaint was subject to demurrer.'" 26
  • 27. 1071708 Bradford, 268 A l a . at 219-20, 105 So. 2d at 827-28. In reversing the judgment of the trial court, this Court c o n c l u d e d t h a t e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d that created a question of fact as t o whether the buyer could rely on the implied warranty i n the sale of the feed based on the defendant's having a s u p e r i o r knowledge of the c o n d i t i o n of the feed or a better opportunity f o r i n s p e c t i o n of the feed, which might h a v e g i v e n t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t u a l o r c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e o f some defect in the feed pertaining to i t s merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. Bradford, supra. I n A l l e n v . D e l c h a m p s , I n c . , 624 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 5 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , a case decided after the enactment o f t h e UCC, the lack of a distinct line between tort claims and claims asserting a breach o f an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y i n tainted-food-product cases was n e v e r m o r e e v i d e n t . In A l l e n the p l a i n t i f f purchased from the defendant g r o c e r y s t o r e two b a g s o f c e l e r y h e a r t s t h a t had been prepackaged i n cellophane wrapping by the defendant's supplier. The d e f e n d a n t had i n s p e c t e d samples of the c e l e r y at i t swarehouse f o r freshness and q u a l i t y . The plaintiff ingested a piece of the raw celery and had an immediate allergic anaphylactic reaction. I t was l a t e r d e t e r m i n e d that 27
  • 28. 1071708 the c e l e r y c o n t a i n e d sodium b i s u l f a t e , which the p l a i n t i f f , an asthmatic, was sensitive to. The p l a i n t i f f s u e d t h e d e f e n d a n t , among o t h e r s , asserting causes of action based on negligence and wantonness, the Alabama Extended M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s L i a b i l i t y Doctrine ("AEMLD"), and breach of the implied warranty of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y under § 7-2-314, A l a . Code 1975. The t r i a l court entered a summary judgment i n favor of the defendant as t o a l l t h e plaintiff's claims. Allen, supra. This Court stated the following relative to the principles applicable to tort claims and breach-of-implied- warranty claims i n tainted-food-product cases: " I n r e g a r d t o t h e i r AEMLD c l a i m , t h e p l a i n t i f f s must p r o v e that Mrs. A l l e n 'suffered injury or d a m a g e s t o [ h e r s e l f ] o r [ h e r ] p r o p e r t y b y one who sold a product i n a defective condition unreasonably d a n g e r o u s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f as t h e u l t i m a t e u s e r o r c o n s u m e r . ' A t k i n s v . A m e r i c a n M o t o r s C o r p . , 335 S o . 2 d 1 3 4 , 141 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) . S i m i l a r l y , the p l a i n t i f f s ' i m p l i e d warranty of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y c l a i m r e q u i r e s that the p l a i n t i f f s show that t h e goods were unmerchantable or u n f i t f o r the ordinary purposes for which they are used. A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , § 7-2-314. T h e s e t w o s t a n d a r d s 'go h a n d - i n - h a n d , ' a t l e a s t a s applied to food products, ' f o r i t i s apparent that a food product is defective or unreasonably d a n g e r o u s i f i t i s u n m e r c h a n t a b l e o r u n f i t f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n . ' C a i n v . S h e r a t o n P e r i m e t e r P a r k S. H o t e l , 592 S o . 2 d 218 , 220 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ( q u o t i n g E x p a r t e M o r r i s o n ' s C a f e t e r i a o f M o n t g o m e r y , I n c . , 4 31 28
  • 29. 1071708 So. 2 d 9 7 5 , 977 (Ala. 1983)). "This Court has adopted the 'reasonable expectations' test f o r determining i f food i s u n m e r c h a n t a b l e o r u n r e a s o n a b l y d a n g e r o u s . C a i n , 592 So. 2 d a t 2 2 1 ; M o r r i s o n ' s , 4 3 1 S o . 2 d a t 9 7 8 . U n d e r t h i s t e s t , t h e p i v o t a l i s s u e i s what i s r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d by t h e consumer i n t h e f o o d as s e r v e d , and the '[n]aturalness of the substance to any i n g r e d i e n t s i n the food served i s important only i n determining whether t h e c o n s u m e r may reasonably expect t o f i n d such substance i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r type of d i s h o r s t y l e of food served.' M o r r i s o n ' s , 431 So. 2 d a t 978 ( q u o t i n g Z a b n e r v . H o w a r d J o h n s o n ' s , Inc., 2 0 1 S o . 2 d 8 2 4 , 82 6 (Fla. Dist. C t . App. 1967)). Because t h e terms ' d e f e c t , ' 'unreasonably dangerous,' and 'merchantable' a l l focus on t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e consumer, t h i s Court has found t h e r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s t e s t t o be c o m p a t i b l e w i t h b o t h t h e AEMLD a n d t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f merchantability. C a i n , 592 S o . 2 d a t 2 2 1 . " Allen, 624 S o . 2 d a t 1 0 6 8 . This Court reversed t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n favor of the defendant on t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' AEMLD c l a i m , 7 stating: "Delchamps a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s case i s d i f f e r e n t f r o m C a i n b e c a u s e i n C a i n t h e summary j u d g m e n t on t h e AEMLD c l a i m was b a s e d o n t h e t r i a l court's f i n d i n g t h a t t h e AEMLD d i d n o t a p p l y , w h e r e a s i n t h i s c a s e , D e l c h a m p s s a y s , t h e summary j u d g m e n t on t h e AEMLD c l a i m was b a s e d on e v i d e n c e establishing a lack of causal r e l a t i o n . To e s t a b l i s h t h e d e f e n s e o f a l a c k o f c a u s a l r e l a t i o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t may show ' t h a t t h e r e i s no c a u s a l r e l a t i o n i n f a c t b e t w e e n 7 The defendant g r o c e r y s t o r e a p p a r e n t l y f a i l e d t o argue t h e s e a l e d - c o n t a i n e r d o c t r i n e as a d e f e n s e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m a l l e g i n g b r e a c h o f i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y b e c a u s e t h e summary j u d g m e n t a s t o t h a t c l a i m was r e v e r s e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s . 29
  • 30. 1071708 his activities i n connection with handling the product and i t s defective condition.' Atkins v. American Motors C o r p . , 335 S o . 2 d 1 3 4 , 143 ( A l a . 1976). One way to e s t a b l i s h t h i s l a c k of a causal relation is for t h e d e f e n d a n t t o show: " ' [ T ] h a t he i s i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f e i t h e r d i s t r i b u t i n g or p r o c e s s i n g f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n finished products; he r e c e i v e d a p r o d u c t a l r e a d y i n a d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n ; he d i d not c o n t r i b u t e t o t h i s d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n ; he h a d n e i t h e r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n , n o r an o p p o r t u n i t y to inspect the product which was superior to the knowledge or o p p o r t u n i t y of the consumer.' "Id. "While Delchamps showed that i t i s i n the business of d i s t r i b u t i n g f i n i s h e d products, that i t received a product already i n a defective condition, and that i t d i d not c o n t r i b u t e to the d e f e c t i v e condition, i t , nevertheless, did not show c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t i t d i d n o t p o s s e s s an 'opportunity t o i n s p e c t t h e p r o d u c t w h i c h was s u p e r i o r t o t h e k n o w l e d g e o r o p p o r t u n i t y o f t h e c o n s u m e r . ' I d . The plaintiffs showed t h a t Delchamps d i d i n s p e c t f o r freshness and q u a l i t y and d i d have p r o c e d u r e s f o r r e q u i r i n g i t s suppliers to c e r t i f y compliance with other regulations regarding insecticides and pesticides. Whether Delchamps's opportunity to d i s c o v e r o r t o know o f t h e d e f e c t i s s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of the consumer i s a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t ; therefore, the court erroneously entered the s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t a s t o t h e AEMLD c l a i m . Delchamps i s e n t i t l e d t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e and t o argue t h a t t h e r e was no c a u s a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t i t d i d o r f a i l e d t o do a n d M r s . A l l e n ' s i n j u r i e s , b u t i t m u s t do s o t o t h e f a c t f i n d e r . " Allen, 624 S o . 2 d a t 1 0 6 8 - 6 9 . Thus, t h i s Court d i d not r e j e c t 30
  • 31. 1071708 the sealed-container doctrine as a d e f e n s e to the element of causation; rather, i tdetermined that the defendant had f a i l e d to present evidence establishing that defense as a m a t t e r o f law. It i s clear that the sealed-container doctrine was available to r e t a i l e r s of food products a t common law and under t h e Uniform Sales Act, the predecessor t o t h e UCC, a s a defense to causation i n both claims sounding i n tort and those asserting a breach o f an i m p l i e d warranty. The q u e s t i o n i s whether that defense i s still available to r e t a i l sellers of food products following the enactment o f t h e UCC. As the federal district court noted in i t s certification order to this Court, the enactment o f t h e UCC replaced the warranty provisions of the Uniform S a l e s A c t (and p r e s u m a b l y t h o s e o f t h e common l a w ) . See t h e O f f i c i a l Comment t o § 7-2¬ 314, A l a . Code 1975, s t a t i n g as " [ c ] h a n g e s " that § 15(2) of the Uniform S a l e s A c t was "[c]ompletely rewritten"; and t h e Official Comment t o § 7 - 2 - 3 1 5 , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 , s t a t i n g t h a t §§ 15(1), ( 4 ) , and (5) of the Uniform Sales Act had been "[r]ewritten." S e c t i o n 7-1-103(b), A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s that "[u]nless d i s p l a c e d by t h e p a r t i c u l a r provisions of t h i s 31
  • 32. 1071708 title, t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f law and e q u i t y , including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, d u r e s s , c o e r c i o n , m i s t a k e , b a n k r u p t c y , and other v a l i d a t i n g or invalidating cause supplement i t s provisions." Further, " [ t ] h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l C o d e was d r a f t e d against the backdrop o f e x i s t i n g b o d i e s o f law, i n c l u d i n g the common l a w a n d e q u i t y , and r e l i e s on t h o s e b o d i e s o f l a w t o s u p p l e m e n t i t s p r o v i s i o n s i n many important ways. A t t h e same t i m e , the Uniform C o m m e r c i a l Code i s t h e p r i m a r y s o u r c e o f c o m m e r c i a l law r u l e s i n a r e a s t h a t i t g o v e r n s , and i t s r u l e s represent choices made b y i t s d r a f t e r s and t h e e n a c t i n g l e g i s l a t u r e s about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i c i e s t o be f u r t h e r e d i n the transactions i t covers. T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e p r i n c i p l e s o f common l a w a n d e q u i t y may s u p p l e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l Code, they may n o t be used to supplant i t s provisions, or the purposes and p o l i c i e s those provisions r e f l e c t , unless a s p e c i f i c provision of t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l Code p r o v i d e s otherwise. In the absence o f such a provision, the Uniform C o m m e r c i a l C o d e p r e e m p t s p r i n c i p l e s o f common l a w and equity that are inconsistent with either i t s p r o v i s i o n s or i t s purposes and p o l i c i e s . " Official Comment t o § 7 - 1 - 1 0 3 , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . "Under § 7-1¬ 103, p r i o r e x i s t i n g law supplements the various code sections 'unless d i s p l a c e d by t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s title.' It i s clear from this that i f t h e p a r t i c u l a r code provisions do d i s p l a c e p r i o r l a w , t h e code p r e v a i l s . " Toomey E q u i p . C o . v. C o m m e r c i a l C r e d i t E q u i p . C o r p . , 386 S o . 2 d 1 1 5 5 , 1159 ( A l a . 32
  • 33. 1071708 Civ. App. 1980). In other words, the UCC i s to be supplemented by t h e e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f law and e q u i t y i f no precise provision of t h e UCC applicable to the issues presented contradicts those principles. S e e H.C. Schmieding Produce Co. v . C a g l e , 529 S o . 2 d 2 4 3 ( A l a . 1988). Nothing i n the express provisions o f §§ 7-2-314 a n d - 3 1 5 indicate that previously accepted defenses were abrogated by the enactment o f t h e UCC. Nor have the p l a i n t i f f s directed this Court t o any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n o f t h e UCC that supplants the defenses available a t common law. In fact, i t appears from the Official Comment to § 7-2-314 that common-law defenses to causation were affirmatively left i n t a c t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e when t h e UCC was e n a c t e d . The O f f i c i a l Comment t o § 7-2-314 states: " I n a n a c t i o n b a s e d on b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y , i t i s o f c o u r s e n e c e s s a r y t o show n o t o n l y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f the warranty but the f a c t that the warranty was b r o k e n a n d t h a t t h e b r e a c h o f t h e w a r r a n t y was t h e proximate cause of the l o s s s u s t a i n e d . I n s u c h an a c t i o n an a f f i r m a t i v e s h o w i n g b y t h e s e l l e r t h a t t h e l o s s r e s u l t e d f r o m some a c t i o n o r e v e n t f o l l o w i n g his own d e l i v e r y o f t h e g o o d s c a n o p e r a t e a s a defense. Equally, evidence i n d i c a t i n g that the s e l l e r exercised care i n the manufacture, processing or s e l e c t i o n o f t h e goods i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r t h e w a r r a n t y was i n f a c t b r o k e n . A c t i o n b y t h e b u y e r f o l l o w i n g an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e g o o d s which ought t o have i n d i c a t e d t h e d e f e c t complained 33
  • 34. 1071708 o f c a n be shown as m a t t e r b e a r i n g on w h e t h e r t h e b r e a c h i t s e l f was t h e c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y . " Additionally, I note that because causation i s an e l e m e n t of a breach o f an implied warranty, the abrogation of the defenses available to r e t a i l defendants as t o t h a t element would have t h e e f f e c t o f making t h e r e t a i l defendant strictly liable and t h e i n s u r e r o f t h e goods i t sells. The i d e a of making a retailer the insurer o f t h e goods i tsells has been r e j e c t e d by t h i s Court. See Ex p a r t e Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, I n c . , 4 3 1 S o . 2 d 9 7 5 , 979 (Ala. 1983) ("Courts cannot and must n o t i g n o r e t h e common experience of l i f e and allow rules to develop that would make sellers of food or other consumer goods insurers of the products they sell."); Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 S o . 2 d 1 3 4 , 142 (Ala. 1976) (rejecting the idea of s t r i c t liability u n d e r t h e AEMLD and s t a t i n g " t h a t d e f e n d a n t s who a r e o r d i n a r i l y e n g a g e d i n t h e business of marketing products should be liable f o r the foreseeable harm proximately resulting from defective conditions in the products which make them unreasonably dangerous"). Accordingly, I would hold that the sealed-container doctrine as s t a t e d i n K i r k l a n d , s u p r a , and B r a d f o r d , supra, i s 34
  • 35. 1071708 available as a defense to the retail seller of food products in claims asserting a breach o f an implied warranty under the UCC. Stuart, Smith, and Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r . 35