1. REL: 07/17/2009
Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance
s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s ,
Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334)
2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made
b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r .
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2009
1071708
Marcella Sparks
v.
T o t a l Body E s s e n t i a l N u t r i t i o n , Inc., e t a l .
C i n d i Howard, M a r i o n Howard, and J o s h u a Taylor
v.
T o t a l Body E s s e n t i a l N u t r i t i o n , Inc., e t a l .
Certified Question from the U n i t e d States D i s t r i c t Court f o r
t h e N o r t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f Alabama
(CV-08-PT-1010-E and CV-08-PT-1012-E )
LYONS, Justice.
2. 1071708
These cases are b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t on a certified question
from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama.
Facts and Procedural History
At various times Marcella Sparks, Cindi Howard, Marion
Howard, and Joshua Taylor (collectively referred to as "the
consumers") purchased a dietary supplement known as "Total
Body Formula" from St. John's Nutrition, a health-food
retailer in Oxford, Alabama. 1
St. John's Nutrition is a
retail seller of Total Body Formula and received the
supplement from the manufacturer in sealed, prepackaged
containers. St. John's N u t r i t i o n s o l d Total Body Formula to
the consumers i n the same c o n d i t i o n as i t was received by St.
John's N u t r i t i o n . The consumers allege that after ingesting
Total Body Formula, they suffered serious and permanent
physical injuries r e s u l t i n g from high l e v e l s of selenium and
chromium c o n t a i n e d i n the supplement.
In two separate actions 2
filed on April 28, 2008, the
The c o n s u m e r s s t a t e t h a t S t . J o h n ' s N u t r i t i o n " a p p a r e n t l y
1
is a sole p r o p r i e t o r s h i p . " C o n s u m e r s ' b r i e f , a t 1.
2
S p a r k s was t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t h e f i r s t a c t i o n ( C V - 0 8 - P T -
1 0 1 0 - E ) , and C i n d i Howard, M a r i o n Howard, and T a y l o r were t h e
p l a i n t i f f s i n the second a c t i o n (CV-08-PT-1012-E).
2
3. 1071708
consumers sued Total Body Essential Nutrition, Inc.;
TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g , Inc.; Wright Enrichment, I n c . ; and
St. John's N u t r i t i o n i n the Calhoun Circuit Court, asserting
claims under t h e Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine ("AEMLD") f o r the manufacture and/or sale of a
defective and unreasonably dangerous product, negligent
failure to warn, negligence, negligent and/or reckless
marketing, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,
and breach of the implied warranty of f i t n e s s f o ra p a r t i c u l a r
purpose, and a s s e r t i n g a claim of fraud. On June 6, 2008,
TexAmerican Food Blending removed t h e two actions to the
federal district court p u r s u a n t t o 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 3 2 , asserting
that the amount in controversy exceeded the threshold
jurisdictional limit of the federal district court and that
diversity jurisdiction existed because S t . John's Nutrition,
the only named defendant with an Alabama residence for
purposes of determining f e d e r a l d i v e r s i t y j u r i s d i c t i o n , s e e 28
U.S.C. § 1 3 3 2 ( c ) ( 1 ) , had been fraudulently joined.
Fraudulent joinder i s established "when there i s no
possibility that the p l a i n t i f f can prove a cause of action
against the resident (non-diverse) defendant." Triggs v. John
3
4. 1071708
Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284 , 1287 (11th. Cir. 1 998 ) .
"'If there i s even a p o s s i b i l i t y that a state court would find
that the complaint states a cause of a c t i o n a g a i n s t any one of
the resident defendants, the federal court must f i n d that the
joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.'"
Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287 (quoting C o k e r v. Amoco O i l Co., 709
F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (11th C i r . 1993)). "The p l a i n t i f f need not
have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent
d e f e n d a n t ; he need o n l y have a p o s s i b i l i t y of stating a valid
cause of action in order for the joinder to be legitimate."
Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287. The removing party must establish
fraudulent joinder by clear and convincing evidence.
Henderson v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281
(11th C i r . 2006). When f r a u d u l e n t joinder is established by
the removing party, "the federal court must dismiss the
n o n - d i v e r s e d e f e n d a n t and d e n y any m o t i o n to remand the matter
back to state court." Florence v. Crescent Res., LLC, 484
F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007).
On J u l y 2, 2008, the c o n s u m e r s moved t h e federal district
court to remand the two actions to the Calhoun C i r c u i t Court,
arguing that St. J o h n ' s N u t r i t i o n was not fraudulently joined
4
5. 1071708
so as to defeat jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship. The consumers argued in their motion that
TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g had f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h by c l e a r and
convincing evidence that there existed no possibility that
causes of action for breach of the implied warranties of
merchantability and f i t n e s s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e c o u l d be
stated against S t . John's N u t r i t i o n . R e l y i n g upon t h e sealed-
container doctrine, TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g argued that the
consumers could not possibly establish causes of action
against St. John's Nutrition for breach of the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose because, i t argued, there existed no causal
relationship between the conduct of S t . John's Nutrition and
the allegedly defective product.
Following a hearing, the federal district court, on
September 8, 2008, entered an order finding that TexAmerican
Food Blending had proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that the consumers' claims exceeded the j u r i s d i c t i o n a l amount
of $75,000. However, the federal district court concluded
that i t i s not c l e a r under Alabama law whether c l a i m s alleging
the breach of the implied warranties of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y and
5
6. 1071708
fitness f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose are subject to the defense of
the sealed-container doctrine. I f the consumers' claims
against S t . John's N u t r i t i o n a l l e g i n g breach of the implied
warranties of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y and f i t n e s s for a particular
purpose are barred as a m a t t e r o f l a w by t h e sealed-container
doctrine, then the joinder of S t . John's Nutrition as a
defendant i n the actions would be considered fraudulent.
Therefore, the federal district court, pursuant to Rule 18,
Ala. R. A p p . P., certified the following question to this
Court:
"Whether, under Alabama's U n i f o r m Commercial
C o d e , a r e t a i l s e l l e r who h a s p u r c h a s e d g o o d s f r o m
a reputable manufacturer i n enclosed, pre-packaged
and s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r s , w i t h a l l e g e d imperfections
that cannot be discovered by the exercise of
reasonable c a r e by t h e s e l l e r , c a n be h e l d liable
f o r any a l l e g e d i m p e r f e c t i o n s i n t h e p r o d u c t under
an implied warranty of merchantability and o r
f i t n e s s f o rp a r t i c u l a r purpose; or whether, i n s t e a d ,
the UCC imposes strict liability upon a r e t a i l
seller o f goods t h e r e b y eradicating the 'lack of
proximate cause defense' p r o v i d e d t o r e t a i l s e l l e r s
u n d e r t h e AEMLD, a s s e t f o r t h i n A t k i n s v . A m e r i c a n
M o t o r s C o r p . , 335 S o . 2 d 134 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) . "
The former United States Court of Appeals f o r the F i f t h
Circuit, i n the f i r s t case using the c e r t i f i c a t i o n procedure
adopted i n Amendment No. 328, § 6.02, A l a b a m a Constitution
1901 (now A r t . V I , § 1 4 0 , O f f . R e c o m p . ) , stated:
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7. 1071708
" F i v e q u e s t i o n s were c e r t i f i e d b u t , f o l l o w i n g
o u r u s u a l p r a c t i c e , we l e f t i t t o t h e A l a b a m a C o u r t
t o f o r m u l a t e t h e i s s u e s . A s was t h e i r p r e r o g a t i v e ,
the Alabama C o u r t d i d j u s t t h a t and c o n s i d e r e d the
basic issues rather than r e p l y i n g c a t e g o r i c a l l y to
the c e r t i f i e d questions."
Barnes v. A t l a n t i c & P a c i f i c Life I n s . Co. of America, 53 0
F.2d 9 8 , 99 ( 5 t h C i r . 1976) (footnote omitted).
Consistent with this prerogative, we note that the
question as framed by the f e d e r a l district court refers to
"strict liability" as "eradicating the 'lack of proximate
cause defense.'" However, as the Court noted i n Atkins v.
American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 ( A l a . 1976), the
recognition of a defense of lack of causal relation arising
from a defendant's activities i n connection with handling the
product and i t s defective condition " i s n o t t o be confused
with t h e b u r d e n w h i c h r e s t s on t h e p l a i n t i f f to prove that h i s
injuries and damages were the proximate result of the
defective condition of the product." Atkins, 335 So. 2d a t
143 n.4. Finally, Alabama's Uniform Commercial Code ("the
UCC") is equally attentive to the plaintiff's burden of
establishing proximate cause. See, e.g., § 7-2-715(2)(b),
Ala. Code 1975 ("Consequential damages resulting from the
seller's breach include: ... Injury to person or property
7
8. 1071708
proximately resulting from any b r e a c h of warranty." (emphasis
added)); § 7-2-314, A l a . Code 1975, O f f i c i a l Comment, 5 13
("In an a c t i o n based on b r e a c h of warranty, i t i s of course
necessary t o show n o t o n l y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e w a r r a n t y b u t
the fact that the warranty was b r o k e n and t h a t the breach of
the warranty was t h e p r o x i m a t e cause of the loss sustained."
(emphasis added)).
We therefore rephrase the q u e s t i o n posed by t h e f e d e r a l
district c o u r t as follows:
" W h e t h e r , u n d e r t h e UCC, a r e t a i l s e l l e r who h a s
purchased goods from a r e p u t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r e r i n
enclosed, pre-packaged and s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r s , w i t h
a l l e g e d i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t c a n n o t be d i s c o v e r e d b y
the e x e r c i s e of r e a s o n a b l e care by t h e s e l l e r , can
be h e l d l i a b l e f o r a n y a l l e g e d i m p e r f e c t i o n s i n t h e
p r o d u c t u n d e r an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y
and/or fitness for particular purpose; or, put
a n o t h e r w a y , w h e t h e r t h e UCC i m p o s e s l i a b i l i t y u p o n
a r e t a i l s e l l e r o f goods w i t h o u t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f
the defense of 'lack of c a u s a l r e l a t i o n ' p r o v i d e d t o
retail s e l l e r s u n d e r t h e AEMLD, a s s e t f o r t h i n
A t k i n s v. American Motors Corp., 335 S o . 2 d 134
(Ala. 1976)."
Only the consumers, TexAmerican Food B l e n d i n g , and Wright
Enrichment, I n c . , have filed briefs with this Court.
Discussion
In B r a d f o r d v. Moore Brothers Feed & Grocery, 268 A l a .
217, 105 So. 2d 825 (1 9 5 8 ) , this Court recognized the
8
9. 1071708
availability of the sealed-container doctrine to claims
asserting the breach of implied warranties against retail
sellers arising under the Uniform Sales Act. 3
The v i e w that
the sealed-container defense survived the c r e a t i o n of implied
warranties under the Uniform Sales A c t has been d e s c r i b e d as
the m i n o r i t y view. S e e Sams v . E z y - W a y F o o d l i n e r C o . , 157 Me.
10, 18-19, 170 A . 2 d 1 6 0 , 165 ( 1 9 6 1 ) , citing K i r k l a n d v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific T e a C o . , 2 3 3 A l a . 4 0 4 , 171 S o . 735 (1936);
Bradford v. Moore Bros. Feed & Grocery, supra; Wilkes v.
Memphis G r o c e r y C o . , 23 T e n n . A p p . 5 5 0 , 134 S.W.2d 929 (1939);
and Green v. W i l s o n , 194 A r k . 1 6 5 , 105 S.W.2d 1074 ( 1 9 3 7 ) , as
expressing the minority rule and d e s c r i b i n g t h e opposing view
as supported by " t h e g r e a t weight of authority." Our Court
justified the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the sealed-container d e f e n s e on
the theory that the Uniform Sales A c t was d e c l a r a t i v e o f t h e
common l a w . See B r a d f o r d , 268 A l a . a t 2 2 0 , 105 S o . 2 d a t 8 2 7 .
Other courts reached the opposite conclusion. S e e , e . g . , Sams
v . E z y - W a y F o o d l i n e r C o . , 157 Me. a t 2 1 , 170 A . 2 d a t 166 ("The
Uniform Sales Act i n establishing implied warranties under
S e c t i o n 15 e n d e d o u r ' s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r ' r u l e a t common law.").
The
3
Uniform S a l e s A c t was r e p e a l e d when t h e UCC was
enacted. See § 7 - 1 0 - 1 0 2 ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 .
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10. 1071708
We cannot, however, view the enactment o f t h e UCC as a
legislative exercise that i s merely declaratory o f t h e common
law. See O f f i c i a l Comment t o § 7 - 1 - 1 0 3 , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 :
"2. ... T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e p r i n c i p l e s o f common
law a n d e q u i t y may s u p p l e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s of the
U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l C o d e , t h e y may n o t b e u s e d t o
supplant i t s provisions, or the purposes and
p o l i c i e s those p r o v i s i o n s r e f l e c t , unless a s p e c i f i c
p r o v i s i o n o f t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l Code provides
otherwise. In t h e absence of such a p r o v i s i o n , t h e
Uniform Commercial Code preempts p r i n c i p l e s of
common l a w a n d e q u i t y t h a t a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t with
e i t h e r i t s p r o v i s i o n s o r i t s purposes and p o l i c i e s . "
Section 7-2-314, A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s :
"(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section
7-2-316), a warranty that t h e goods shall be
merchantable i s implied i n a contract f o r t h e i r sale
i f t h e s e l l e r i s a merchant w i t h r e s p e c t t o goods o f
that kind. Under t h i s s e c t i o n t h e s e r v i n g f o r v a l u e
of food or drink t o b e c o n s u m e d e i t h e r on t h e
premises or elsewhere i s a sale.
"(2) Goods t o be m e r c h a n t a b l e must be a t l e a s t
such as:
"(a) Pass w i t h o u t objection i n the
trade under t h e c o n t r a c t d e s c r i p t i o n ; and
"(b) In t h e case o f f u n g i b l e goods,
are of f a i r average q u a l i t y w i t h i n the
d e s c r i p t i o n ; and
"(c) Are f i t f o r t h e o r d i n a r y purposes
for w h i c h such goods a r e used; and
"(d) Run, within the variations
permitted by t h e agreement, o f even k i n d ,
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11. 1071708
q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y w i t h i n each u n i t and
among a l l u n i t s i n v o l v e d ; a n d
"(e) Are adequately contained,
p a c k a g e d , a n d l a b e l e d a s t h e a g r e e m e n t may
r e q u i r e ; and
"(f) Conform to the promises or
a f f i r m a t i o n s o f f a c t made o n t h e c o n t a i n e r
or l a b e l i f any."
No p r o v i s i o n i s made f o r a d e f e n s e to a claim of a breach of
an implied warranty under § 7-2-314 based on the sealed-
container doctrine. We v i e w t h i s s i l e n c e as an a b r o g a t i o n of
the common-law defense, rather than permission to carry i t
forward. Nothing i n the O f f i c i a l Comment to § 7-2-314
supports the proposition that the sealed-container d e f e n s e may
be carried forward; t h e Comment i s silent on t h e e f f e c t o f
care on the part of the s e l l e r once a breach of implied
warranty has been e s t a b l i s h e d . We applied F l o r i d a law based
on analogous p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e F l o r i d a UCC i n A m S o u t h B a n k v .
Tice, 923 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 0 , 1 0 6 5 ( A l a . 2 0 0 5 ) . We there stated:
"Thus, Burtman [v. T e c h n i c a l C h e m i c a l s & P r o d u c t s ,
724 S o . 2 d 672 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . A p p . 1 9 9 9 ) , ] s t a n d s
f o r t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t d i s p l a c e m e n t o f a common-law
r u l e u n d e r t h e UCC d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a n u n e q u i v o c a l ,
explicit reference t o t h e common-law r u l e being
displaced. I f t h e UCC p r o v i s i o n c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e
common l a w i n some w a y , t h e common l a w m u s t b e s a i d
t o be d i s p l a c e d . "
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12. 1071708
(Emphasis added.) The rule i n Tice i s sound a n d due t o be
a p p l i e d t o t h e i d e n t i c a l p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e A l a b a m a UCC dealing
with the applicability of the common law following the
adoption o f t h e UCC. Any o t h e r r e s u l t would run counter to
the p r i n c i p l e s of l i a b i l i t y e s t a b l i s h e d i n § 7-2-314. Indeed,
the availability of the sealed-container defense to a claim
based on a p r o d u c t that arrives i n a sealed package would be
irreconcilable with the simultaneous recognition of a claim
arising from the sale of a product that does n o t a r r i v e i n a
sealed package y e t has component parts, such as an engine
crankcase, equally concealed from view, that might contain a
defective piston. Of c o u r s e , under the l a t t e r circumstance,
a claim o f b r e a c h o f an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y w o u l d unquestionably
exist.
Recognition of the sealed-container defense to claims of
b r e a c h o f i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y u n d e r § 7-2-314 i s a p o l i c y m a t t e r
best left t o t h e wisdom of the l e g i s l a t u r e . Other states
have r e s o l v e d the question by s t a t u t e i n favor o f and
4
against
4
S e e N.C. G e n . S t a t . A n n . § 9 9 B - 2 ( a ) ( 2 0 0 7 ) ("No p r o d u c t
liability a c t i o n , e x c e p t an a c t i o n f o r b r e a c h o f e x p r e s s
w a r r a n t y , s h a l l be commenced o r m a i n t a i n e d a g a i n s t any s e l l e r
when t h e p r o d u c t was a c q u i r e d and s o l d by t h e s e l l e r i n a
s e a l e d c o n t a i n e r o r when t h e p r o d u c t was a c q u i r e d a n d s o l d b y
the seller under circumstances i n which the s e l l e r was
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13. 1071708
the availability of the defense. 5
The treatment of this identical issue in Georgia is
especially instructive. In P i e r c e v. Liberty Furniture Co.,
141 Ga. App. 175, 176, 233 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1977), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Alltrade, Inc. v.
M c D o n a l d , 213 Ga. App. 758, 445 S . E . 2 d 856 (1 9 9 4 ) , a furniture
store sold a porch-swing kit in a sealed container i t had
received from the manufacturer of the swing. The customer
assembled the swing, sat i n i t , and was i n j u r e d when a piece
of hardware failed. She sued the retailer under the Georgia
a f f o r d e d no r e a s o n a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n s p e c t t h e p r o d u c t i n
s u c h a manner t h a t w o u l d have or s h o u l d have, i n the e x e r c i s e
of reasonable care, r e v e a l e d the e x i s t e n c e of the c o n d i t i o n
c o m p l a i n e d o f , u n l e s s t h e s e l l e r damaged or m i s h a n d l e d the
product w h i l e i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n ; p r o v i d e d , t h a t the p r o v i s i o n s
of t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l not a p p l y i f the m a n u f a c t u r e r of the
p r o d u c t i s not s u b j e c t to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the c o u r t s of
this State or i f such manufacturer has been judicially
declared insolvent.").
5
S e e , e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-106(a)(2000) ("No
'product liability a c t i o n , ' as d e f i n e d i n § 2 9 - 2 8 - 1 0 2 ( 6 ) ,
s h a l l be c o m m e n c e d o r m a i n t a i n e d a g a i n s t a n y s e l l e r when t h e
product i s acquired and s o l d by the seller in a sealed
c o n t a i n e r a n d / o r when t h e p r o d u c t i s a c q u i r e d a n d s o l d b y t h e
s e l l e r under circumstances i n w h i c h t h e s e l l e r i s a f f o r d e d no
r e a s o n a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n s p e c t the p r o d u c t i n such a manner
which would or s h o u l d , i n the e x e r c i s e of r e a s o n a b l e care,
reveal the existence of the defective condition. The
p r o v i s i o n s of the f i r s t sentence of t h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l not
a p p l y t o : (1) A c t i o n s b a s e d u p o n a b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y , express
o r i m p l i e d , as d e f i n e d b y t i t l e 47, c h a p t e r 2 ").
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14. 1071708
version o f t h e UCC, § 2 - 2 1 4 , alleging breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability. Reversing a summary j u d g m e n t i n
favor of the retailer, the Court of Appeals of Georgia
concluded that there was e v i d e n c e indicating that the swing
was unfit f o r the ordinary purposes f o rwhich such goods a r e
used and t h a t the r e t a i l e r could be h e l d liable f o r breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability.
Addressing the sealed-container defense, the Georgia
court stated:
" A l l o f t h e p o s t - U . C . C . a u t h o r i t y t h a t we h a v e
studied indicates that the implied warranty of
m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y does n o t base any d i s t i n c t i o n s upon
whether o r n o t goods a r e s o l d i n t h e i r original
packages. S e e , e . g . , R. Anderson, 1 Uniform
C o m m e r c i a l C o d e § 2 - 3 1 4 : 7 0 - 7 2 ( 2 d e d . 1970 ) ; G.
Kock, Georgia Commercial Practice 40-41 (1964);
White, 'Sales W a r r a n t i e s Under G e o r g i a ' s Uniform
C o m m e r c i a l Code,' 1 Ga. S t a t e B a r J . 1 9 1 , 196-97
(1964). The p r o v i s i o n , i n fact, establishes a
concept f o r r e t a i l e r s s i m i l a r t o that employed i n
Code A n n . § 105-106, s u p r a , b y w h i c h m a n u f a c t u r e r s
may b e h e l d s t r i c t l y l i a b l e f o r d e f e c t i v e products.
" P r i o r t o t h e e n a c t m e n t o f t h e U.C.C., G e o r g i a
adhered to the 'sealed container doctrine.' See
Wood v . Hub M o t o r C o . , 110 G a . A p p . 1 0 1 ( 2 ) , 137
S . E . 2 d 674 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; M a r o n e y v . M o n t g o m e r y W a r d & C o . ,
7 2 G a . A p p . 4 8 5 , 34 S . E . 2 d 302 ( 1 9 4 5 ) ; B e l v . A d l e r ,
63 G a . A p p . 4 7 3 ( 2 ) , 11 S . E . 2 d 495 ( 1 9 4 0 ) . According
t o t h a t d o c t r i n e , no w a r r a n t y o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y
applied as t o t h e r e t a i l e r o f goods i n their
original packages, manufactured by reputable
m a n u f a c t u r e r s , and i n g e n e r a l use i n the r e t a i l
14
15. 1071708
trade. I n Wood v . Hub M o t o r C o . , s u p r a , h o w e v e r , i t
was s p e c i f i c a l l y n o t e d t h a t t h i s l i n e o f d e c i s i o n s
was b a s e d o n C o d e § 9 6 - 3 0 1 , w h i c h was r e p e a l e d w i t h
t h e a d v e n t o f t h e U.C.C. i n G e o r g i a .
"Since t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e U.C.C., several
G e o r g i a cases have a p p l i e d t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f
m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y t o r e t a i l e r s o f goods s o l d i n s e a l e d
packages. I n F e n d e r v . C o l o n i a l S t o r e s , I n c . , 138
Ga. App. 3 1 ( 1 ) ( A ) , 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976), the
p l a i n t i f f took a s i x - p a c k carton of Coca-Cola from
a shelf i n the supermarket. She t h e n p r o c e e d e d t o
the c h e c k - o u t c o u n t e r , and p l a c e d t h e c a r t o n upon
the c o u n t e r , a t which time a b o t t l e e x p l o d e d and
injured her. She s u e d t h e s u p e r m a r k e t a n d s u f f e r e d
a directed verdict. T h i s c o u r t h e l d , on p. 35, 225
S.E.2d p. 695, ' t h a t C o c a - C o l a b o t t l e s w h i c h w o u l d
break under normal h a n d l i n g a r e not f i t f o r t h e
o r d i n a r y u s e f o r w h i c h t h e y w e r e i n t e n d e d ... ' a n d
thus t h e r e was a prima facie showing by t h e
plaintiff o f a c l a i m u n d e r t h e U.C.C.'s i m p l i e d
warranty of merchantability. T h e c a s e was r e m a n d e d
for a jury t r i a l .
" C h a f f i n v . A t l a n t a C o c a C o l a e t c . C o . , 127 G a .
A p p . 6 1 9 ( 1 ) , 194 S . E . 2 d 5 1 3 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , a l s o d e a l s w i t h
a b o t t l e d s o f t d r i n k w h i c h was n o t m e r c h a n t a b l e . I n
t h i s c a s e t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s d a u g h t e r p u r c h a s e d a Coke
from a vending machine a t a B i gApple g r o c e r y s t o r e .
The p l a i n t i f f was i n j u r e d w h i l e d r i n k i n g a n i m p u r e
s u b s t a n c e w h i c h was c o n t a i n e d i n t h e b o t t l e . The
p l a i n t i f f s u e d t h e g r o c e r y s t o r e on s e v e r a l g r o u n d s ,
including that of breach o f t h e U.C.C. implied
warranty of merchantability. The j u d g e r e f u s e d t o
c h a r g e t h e j u r y as t o t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y , and t h e
j u r y found against the p l a i n t i f f . This court held
that the t r i a l court erred i n i t s r e f u s a l to charge.
"Numerous o t h e r c a s e s f r o m t h i s c o u r t , w h i l e n o t
d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h goods s o l d i n o r i g i n a l
c o n t a i n e r s , have used a s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y a p p r o a c h t o
h o l d r e t a i l e r s l i a b l e f o r damage, s u f f e r e d due t o a
15
16. 1071708
breach of the U.C.C. implied warranty of
merchantability. Redfern Meats v. H e r t z , 134 G a .
A p p . 3 8 1 , 2 1 5 S . E . 2 d 10 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ( i m p r o p e r l y operating
t r u c k ) ; R a y v . D e a s , 112 G a . A p p . 1 9 1 , 144 S . E . 2 d
468 (1965) ( f o r e i g n s u b s t a n c e i n h a m b u r g e r ) . "
141 Ga. A p p . a t 1 7 6 - 7 8 , 233 S.E.2d a t 35-36 (emphasis added).
A subsequent enactment of t h e Georgia L e g i s l a t u r e has d e p r i v e d
Pierce v. L i b e r t y Furniture Co. o f p r e c e d e n t i a l value as t o
its treatment of a separate issue involving strict liability.
See Ga. Code A n n . § 5 1 - 1 - 1 1 . 1 (2006).
When t h e A l a b a m a L e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d t h e UCC, i t repealed
the Uniform Sales Act. See § 7 - 1 0 - 1 0 2 ( 1 ) , Ala. Code 1 9 7 5 .
The now r e p e a l e d Uniform Sales A c t was a c k n o w l e d g e d by this
Court t o be the basis f o r the sealed-container defense i n
Bradford, 268 A l a . a t 2 2 0 , 105 S o . 2 d a t 8 2 7 . On t h e same
rationale as t h a t employed by t h e G e o r g i a appellate court i n
Pierce v. Liberty Furniture Co., we conclude that the
replacement of the Uniform Sales Act with t h e UCC eliminated
the sealed-container defense.
The recourse of the r e t a i l e r under t h e circumstance here
presented i s a claim against i t ss e l l e r on i t s breach of
implied warranty, not absolution. See Pierce v. Liberty
Furniture C o . , 141 G a . A p p . a t 1 7 8 , 2 3 3 S . E . 2 d a t 3 6 , s t a t i n g
16
17. 1071708
the correct result under analogous provisions of the Georgia
UCC:
" I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t u n d e r t h i s h o l d i n g a
retailer i s n o t a d e f e n s e l e s s p a r t y who w i l l be
c a u g h t w i t h a m o n e t a r y l o s s due t o a n o t h e r ' s f a u l t y
construction of products. The r e t a i l e r ' s r e m e d y i s
an a c t i o n o v e r a g a i n s t h i s s e l l e r n o t e x c u l p a t i o n .
The retailer may rely on the wholesaler or
manufacturer to supply merchantable goods, and i f
t h e y a r e n o t m e r c h a n t a b l e , t h e r e t a i l e r h a s t h e same
c l a i m f o r b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y as i t s customer had
against i t . "
We answer the c e r t i f i e d question i n the affirmative and
hold that the s e a l e d - c o n t a i n e r defense i s not a v a i l a b l e to the
retail seller of food products i n claims asserting a breach of
implied warranty under t h e UCC.
QUESTION ANSWERED.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall, Parker, and Murdock, J J . ,
concur.
Stuart, Smith, Bolin, a n d Shaw, J J . , d i s s e n t .
17
18. 1071708
BOLIN, Justice (dissenting).
Because I believe that the enactment of Alabama's Uniform
Commercial Code ("the UCC") did not abrogate the sealed-
container defense, I must r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t from the main
opinion.
Section 7-2-314, A l a . Code 1975, provides:
"(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section
7-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable i s implied i n a contract f o r t h e i r sale
i f the s e l l e r i s a merchant w i t h r e s p e c t t o goods of
that kind. Under t h i s s e c t i o n the s e r v i n g f o r v a l u e
of food or d r i n k t o be c o n s u m e d e i t h e r on the
premises or elsewhere i s a s a l e .
"(2) Goods t o be merchantable m u s t be at least
such as:
"(a) Pass w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n in the
trade under the c o n t r a c t d e s c r i p t i o n ; and
"(b) In the case of f u n g i b l e goods,
are of f a i r average quality within the
description; and
"(c) Are f i t f o r the o r d i n a r y purposes
for w h i c h s u c h goods a r e u s e d ; and
"(d) Run, within the variations
p e r m i t t e d by t h e a g r e e m e n t , of even k i n d ,
q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y w i t h i n each u n i t and
among a l l u n i t s i n v o l v e d ; a n d
"(e) Are adequately contained,
p a c k a g e d , a n d l a b e l e d as t h e a g r e e m e n t may
r e q u i r e ; and
18
19. 1071708
"(f) Conform to the promises or
a f f i r m a t i o n s o f f a c t made o n t h e c o n t a i n e r
or l a b e l i f any."
Section 7-2-315, A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s :
"Where t h e s e l l e r a t t h e t i m e o f c o n t r a c t i n g h a s
r e a s o n t o know a n y p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e f o r w h i c h t h e
g o o d s a r e r e q u i r e d a n d t h a t t h e b u y e r i s r e l y i n g on
the s e l l e r ' s s k i l l o r judgment t o s e l e c t o r f u r n i s h
s u i t a b l e goods, t h e r e i s u n l e s s e x c l u d e d o r m o d i f i e d
u n d e r S e c t i o n 7-2-316 an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y t h a t t h e
goods s h a l l be f i t f o r s u c h p u r p o s e . "
It i s clear under Alabama law that i n order to establish
a breach-of-an-implied-warranty claim, a plaintiff must prove
that the breach was the proximate cause of the p l a i n t i f f ' s
injury. See C a i n v . S h e r a t o n P e r i m e t e r P a r k S o u t h H o t e l , 592
So. 2 d 2 1 8 , 2 2 1 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ("Under b o t h t h e [ A l a b a m a Extended
Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine] and § 7-2-314, the defect
or l a c k o f m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y , o f c o u r s e , must be p r o v e d t o h a v e
been the proximate cause of the p l a i n t i f f ' s injuries."); Ex
parte General Motors Corp., 7 6 9 S o . 2 d 903 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ; Rose
v. General Motors Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (N.D. Ala.
2004); and Chase v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 140 F.
S u p p . 2 d 1 2 8 0 , 1 2 8 9 (M.D. A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ("In a n a c t i o n f o r breach
of the implied warranty of fitness fora particular purpose,
the Plaintiffs must prove: (1) t h e e x i s t e n c e of the implied
19
20. 1071708
warranty; (2) b r e a c h o f t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y ; and (3) d a m a g e s
proximately r e s u l t i n g from that breach. Barrington Corp. v.
Patrick L u m b e r Co., I n c . , 447 So. 2d 785, 787 (Ala. Civ. App.
1984).").
Alabama has historically adhered to the common-law
sealed-container doctrine as a defense to the element of
causation. The sealed-container doctrine was first
established in this s t a t e i n D o t h a n C h e r o - C o l a B o t t l i n g Co. v.
Weeks, 16 A l a . App. 639, 80 So. 734 (1918). I n Weeks, the
plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a bottled soda after
ingesting the t a i n t e d c o n t e n t s o f t h e b o t t l e and was awarded
$10 i n damages. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's
complaint sounded in tort and, therefore, that the plaintiff
was a l l o w e d t o r e c o v e r no m o r e c o s t s t h a n damages p u r s u a n t to
§ 3 6 6 3 o f t h e 1907 Code. In a f f i r m i n g the judgment, the Court
of Appeals stated:
" I t i s a w e l l - s e t t l e d r u l e of law t h a t where a
m a n u f a c t u r e r s e l l s a r t i c l e s o f h i s own make i n t h e
absence of an express warranty, a warranty by
i m p l i c a t i o n of law a r i s e s t h a t such a r t i c l e s are
r e a s o n a b l y f i t f o r the p u r p o s e s f o r w h i c h t h e y were
intended. So i n t h e a b s e n c e o f an e x p r e s s w a r r a n t y
the law i m p l i e s t h a t the m a n u f a c t u r e r or p a c k e r of
f o o d s , b e v e r a g e s , d r u g s , c o n d i m e n t s , and c o n f e c t i o n s
i n t e n d e d f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n w a r r a n t s t h a t their
p r o d u c t s a r e f i t f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n , and that
20
21. 1071708
t h e y have u s e d i n t h e s e l e c t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n o f
such articles that degree of care ordinarily
e x e r c i s e d by p e r s o n s s k i l l e d i n the b u s i n e s s of
p r e p a r i n g and p a c k i n g a r t i c l e s o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r f o r
d i s t r i b u t i o n or s a l e to the g e n e r a l p u b l i c .
"This w a r r a n t y i s not f o r the b e n e f i t of the
retailer who purchases i n large quantities for
resale, and such r e t a i l e r i s not l i a b l e to the
consumer of a r t i c l e s of the c h a r a c t e r here i n v o l v e d ,
if he purchases of a r e p u t a b l e manufacturer or
d e a l e r , and t h e g o o d s so p u r c h a s e d and s u p p l i e d by
h i m a r e s u c h as a r e w i t h o u t i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t may
be d i s c o v e r e d b y t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e
o f a p e r s o n s k i l l e d and e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g i n
and s u p p l y i n g goods t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c . 'As t o
h i d d e n i m p e r f e c t i o n s , t h e c o n s u m e r m u s t be d e e m e d t o
have relied on the care of the packer or
m a n u f a c t u r e r o r t h e w a r r a n t y w h i c h i s h e l d t o be
i m p l i e d by t h e l a t t e r . ' 29 R . C . L . p . 1 1 2 4 , § 2 9 .
T h i s w a r r a n t y i s r a i s e d by i m p l i c a t i o n of law, f o r
the benefit and protection of the consumer,
r e g a r d l e s s of the absence of express contractual
r e l a t i o n s between p a r t i e s , and i s e n f o r c e a b l e by
contract remedies. ...
"The second count of the c o m p l a i n t clearly
states facts from which the law would imply a
w a r r a n t y as b e t w e e n t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d t h e p l a i n t i f f
t h a t the c o n t e n t s of the b o t t l e of C h e r o - C o l a were
f i t f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n , a n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t
had u s e d , i n t h e s e l e c t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h i s
d r i n k , t h a t degree of c a r e o r d i n a r i l y e x e r c i s e d by
persons s k i l l e d i n the b u s i n e s s of p r e p a r i n g such
d r i n k s f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n and s a l e t o t h e p u b l i c , and
further states facts showing a breach of such
warranty. We t h e r e f o r e h o l d that the c o m p l a i n t ,
when l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d t o s u p p o r t t h e j u d g m e n t ,
s t a t e s a c a u s e o f a c t i o n ex c o n t r a c t u , and i s i n
assumpsit f o r a breach of i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y , and
u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 3662 o f t h e C o d e a s
a m e n d e d , t h e c o u r t was i n v e s t e d w i t h a d i s c r e t i o n i n
21
22. 1071708
the taxation of costs according to the equities of
the case."
Weeks, 16 Ala. App. at 640 , 80 So. at 735 (citations
omitted).
In K i r k l a n d v. Great A t l a n t i c & Pacific Tea Co., 233 Ala.
404, 171 So. 735 (1936), this Court applied the sealed-
container doctrine to a retail transaction. In K i r k l a n d , the
plaintiff p u r c h a s e d from the defendant, a r e t a i l grocer, a bag
of flour that was tainted with arsenic. The plaintiff was
injured after ingesting the flour and sued the defendant,
asserting a c l a i m of negligence. 6
N o t h i n g i n the plaintiff's
complaint alleged that the defendant had manufactured or
sacked the flour; that the arsenic found i t s way into the
flour while the flour was in the defendant's possession; or
that the defendant had notice or should have had notice that
the sack of flour was tainted with arsenic. The trial court
entered a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff.
Kirkland, supra.
In a f f i r m i n g the judgment i n f a v o r of the defendant, this
Court stated:
6
This Court specifically noted i n Kirkland that the
p l a i n t i f f had not a s s e r t e d a c l a i m u n d e r the U n i f o r m Sales
A c t , the p r e d e c e s s o r to the UCC.
22
23. 1071708
" I n D o t h a n C h e r o - C o l a B o t t l i n g Co. e t a l . v .
W e e k s , 16 A l a . A p p . 6 3 9 , 640 , 80 S o . 734 , 735
[ ( 1 9 1 8 ) ] , s p e a k i n g o f b o t t l e d s o f t d r i n k s , i t was
s a i d : 'Such r e t a i l e r i s n o t l i a b l e t o t h e consumer
o f a r t i c l e s o f t h e c h a r a c t e r h e r e i n v o l v e d , i f he
p u r c h a s e s o f a r e p u t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r e r o r d e a l e r , and
t h e goods so p u r c h a s e d and s u p p l i e d by h i m a r e s u c h
a s a r e w i t h o u t i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t may b e d i s c o v e r e d
by t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e c a r e o f a p e r s o n
s k i l l e d and e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g i n and s u p p l y i n g
goods t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c . B i g e l o w v. Maine
C e n t r a l R.R. C o . , 110 Me. 1 0 5 , 85 A. 3 9 6 , 43 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 627 [ ( 1 9 1 2 ) ] ; W i n s o r v . L o m b a r d , 18 P i c k .
([35] Mass.) 57 [(1836)]. "As to hidden
i m p e r f e c t i o n s , t h e c o n s u m e r must be deemed t o have
r e l i e d on t h e c a r e o f t h e p a c k e r o r m a n u f a c t u r e r o r
t h e w a r r a n t y w h i c h i s h e l d t o be i m p l i e d by t h e
l a t t e r . " 29 R . C . L . p . 1 1 2 4 , § 2 9 . '
"This case h a s b e e n d i s a p p r o v e d on another
point, but not as to the above statement.
Birmingham C h e r o - C o l a B o t t l i n g Co. v . C l a r k , [205
Ala. 678 , 89 So. 64 (1921 ) ] . We deem this
announcement i n k e e p i n g w i t h t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n and
t h e t r e n d o f m o d e r n a u t h o r i t y on t h e s u b j e c t . ...
" I n t h i s d a y t h e g r o c e r ' s s t o c k c o n s i s t s i n much
of canned goods, goods i n b o t t l e s , c a r t o n s , s a c k s ,
p a c k a g e s o f g r e a t v a r i e t y , p u t up u n d e r p u r e f o o d
regulations, and s o l d a t r e t a i l i n t h e unopened
package. I n common r e a s o n t h e g r o c e r c o u l d n o t
inspect the contents of every sack of f l o u r he
handles. No o n e e x p e c t s h i m t o do s o . To i m p o s e a
l e g a l d u t y s o t o do i s t o o e x a c t i n g . The l e g a l
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y s h o u l d r e s t w h e r e i t b e l o n g s , on h i m
who made the package and inclosed poisonous
substances therein. I n t h e a b s e n c e o f some a v e r m e n t
d i s c l o s i n g t h a t t h e p o i s o n f o u n d i t s way i n t o t h e
sack of f l o u r here i n v o l v e d w h i l e under t h e c o n t r o l
o f t h e r e t a i l e r , o r some f a c t c h a r g i n g h i m w i t h l a c k
23
24. 1071708
of c a r e i n s e l e c t i n g and s e l l i n g t h a t particular
f l o u r , t h e c o m p l a i n t was s u b j e c t t o d e m u r r e r . "
Kirkland, 233 A l a . a t 4 0 6 - 0 7 , 171 S o . a t 7 3 7 .
T h i s C o u r t , i n B r a d f o r d v. Moore B r o t h e r s Feed & G r o c e r y ,
268 Ala. 217, 105 So. 2d 825 (1958), reaffirmed the
application of the sealed-container doctrine to claims
asserting a breach of implied warranties against retail
sellers a r i s i n g under the Uniform Sales Act. In Bradford, the
plaintiff purchased from the defendant sacks of "cow feed"
that were infested w i t h mold. The defendant, a retailer in
commercial feed, sold the feed in original, unopened sacks
t h a t had been packed by t h e m a n u f a c t u r e r . The p l a i n t i f f sued
the defendant, alleging a breach o f an i m p l i e d warranty, and
the trial court entered a directed verdict i n favor of the
defendant. R e l y i n g upon Weeks, supra, and K i r k l a n d , supra,
the defendant argued on appeal that the p l a i n t i f f c o u l d not
state a cause of action f o r breach of an implied warranty
because a retail seller of commercial feed sold the feed to
the p l a i n t i f f i n o r i g i n a l , unopened s a c k s t h a t were packed by
the manufacturer. This Court stated the f o l l o w i n g w i t h regard
to the sealed-container doctrine:
"It i s true that t h e two c a s e s cited [Weeks a n d
24
25. 1071708
K i r k l a n d ] are a u t h o r i t y f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the
retailer who purchases in large quantities for
r e s a l e i s not l i a b l e to the consumer of a r t i c l e s of
f o o d f o r human c o n s u m p t i o n , i f he p u r c h a s e s o f a
r e p u t a b l e m a n u f a c t u r e r o r d e a l e r , a n d t h e g o o d s so
purchased and supplied by him are such as are
w i t h o u t i m p e r f e c t i o n s t h a t may be d i s c o v e r e d b y t h e
e x e r c i s e of the r e a s o n a b l e care of a p e r s o n s k i l l e d
and e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e a l i n g i n and s u p p l y i n g goods t o
the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . Cf. L o l l a r v . J o n e s , 229 Ala.
329, 157 So. 209 [(1934 ) ] . We may note here that
b o t h c a s e s make t h e r u l e e x p r e s s l y a p p l i c a b l e o n l y
to cases involving food intended for human
consumption. B u t we may a s s u m e f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f
t h i s case, w i t h o u t d e c i d i n g , t h a t the p r i n c i p l e i s
e q u a l l y e f f e c t i v e w i t h regard to feed s o l d f o r the
s u b s i s t e n c e o f l i v e s t o c k and o t h e r d o m e s t i c a n i m a l s .
I t w o u l d s e e m t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be so a f o r t i o r i . At
l e a s t i t h a s b e e n so a p p l i e d i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
" I t may be a d d e d t h a t t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s t a t e d
has n e i t h e r been o v e r r u l e d nor modified in this
s t a t e , a l t h o u g h t h e t r e n d i s t o a more l i b e r a l r u l e
i n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s p l a c i n g an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y
u p o n t h e r e t a i l s a l e o f p a c k a g e d i t e m s as w e l l as
those not packaged. The trend has apparently
r e c e i v e d e s p e c i a l impetus s i n c e the almost u n i v e r s a l
a d o p t i o n of the U n i f o r m S a l e s A c t s . See t h e n o t e s
a t 90 A . L . R . 1269 a n d 142 A . L . R . 1 4 3 4 . The a d o p t i o n
of the U n i f o r m Sales Act i n Alabama (Code 1940,
Title 57, §§ 1-76) has w o r k e d no change of the
general rule. The r e a f f i r m a t i o n o f t h e r u l e i n t h e
Kirkland case, supra, occurred i n 1936, several
years subsequent to the passage of the Act i n t h i s
s t a t e , and t h e c o u r t i n t h a t c a s e e x p r e s s e d t h e i r
cognizance of the Act but dealt with the case
without reference thereto. This position is
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e v i e w s t a t e d by t h i s C o u r t and
generally recognized m o s t e v e r y w h e r e t h a t § 21 of
the U n i f o r m Sales Act i s o n l y d e c l a r a t i v e of the
common l a w . M c C a r l e y v . Wood D r u g s , I n c . , 228 A l a .
25
26. 1071708
2 2 6 , 153 S o . 446 [ ( 1 9 3 4 ) ] , 77 C . J . S . S a l e s § 3 2 9 , p .
1186.
"The g e n e r a l r u l e t o w h i c h r e c o g n i t i o n i s g i v e n
a b o v e , w o u l d r e q u i r e an a f f i r m a n c e w e r e i t n o t f o r
t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t h e r e w h i c h we f e e l s h o u l d be
t r e a t e d as w i t h i n an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e r u l e . Here
the r e t a i l e r h a n d l e d , s t o r e d , o r t r e a t e d t h e goods
i n a manner w h i c h w o u l d t e n d t o a l t e r t h e o r i g i n a l
c o n d i t i o n o f t h e goods as t h e y were p r o d u c e d by t h e
m a n u f a c t u r e r and t h e c l e a r i n f e r e n c e a r i s e s t h a t t h e
r e t a i l e r had a c t u a l or c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e of the
d e f e c t i v e s t a t u s of t h e goods. The K i r k l a n d c a s e ,
s u p r a [ 2 3 3 A l a . 4 0 4 , 171 S o . 7 3 6 ] , r e c o g n i z e d s u c h
a s t a t u s t o be an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e
w h e r e i t was o b s e r v e d :
"'The c o m p l a i n t does n o t charge t h a t
defendant manufactured or sacked this
f l o u r ; n o r t h a t t h e p o i s o n f o u n d i t s way
into the flour while in defendant's
p o s s e s s i o n ; n o r t h a t a n y t h i n g on t h e s a c k ,
n o r t h e s o u r c e f r o m w h i c h i t came, g a v e
notice to the r e t a i l e r , o r p u t h i m on
inquiry touching i t s fitness f o r human
consumption. F o r a u g h t a p p e a r i n g , t h i s was
an ordinary sack of f l o u r , p u t up b y
reliable millers, t o be sold by t h e
retailer intact, f o r the convenience of
b o t h merchant and customer.'
"And again:
"'In the absence of some averment
d i s c l o s i n g t h a t t h e p o i s o n f o u n d i t s way
i n t o the sack of f l o u r here i n v o l v e d w h i l e
u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e r e t a i l e r , o r some
fact charging him with lack of care i n
selecting and selling that particular
flour, the complaint was subject to
demurrer.'"
26
27. 1071708
Bradford, 268 A l a . at 219-20, 105 So. 2d at 827-28. In
reversing the judgment of the trial court, this Court
c o n c l u d e d t h a t e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d that created a question
of fact as t o whether the buyer could rely on the implied
warranty i n the sale of the feed based on the defendant's
having a s u p e r i o r knowledge of the c o n d i t i o n of the feed or a
better opportunity f o r i n s p e c t i o n of the feed, which might
h a v e g i v e n t h e d e f e n d a n t a c t u a l o r c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e o f some
defect in the feed pertaining to i t s merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose. Bradford, supra.
I n A l l e n v . D e l c h a m p s , I n c . , 624 S o . 2 d 1 0 6 5 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ,
a case decided after the enactment o f t h e UCC, the lack of a
distinct line between tort claims and claims asserting a
breach o f an i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y i n tainted-food-product cases
was n e v e r m o r e e v i d e n t . In A l l e n the p l a i n t i f f purchased from
the defendant g r o c e r y s t o r e two b a g s o f c e l e r y h e a r t s t h a t had
been prepackaged i n cellophane wrapping by the defendant's
supplier. The d e f e n d a n t had i n s p e c t e d samples of the c e l e r y
at i t swarehouse f o r freshness and q u a l i t y . The plaintiff
ingested a piece of the raw celery and had an immediate
allergic anaphylactic reaction. I t was l a t e r d e t e r m i n e d that
27
28. 1071708
the c e l e r y c o n t a i n e d sodium b i s u l f a t e , which the p l a i n t i f f , an
asthmatic, was sensitive to.
The p l a i n t i f f s u e d t h e d e f e n d a n t , among o t h e r s , asserting
causes of action based on negligence and wantonness, the
Alabama Extended M a n u f a c t u r e r ' s L i a b i l i t y Doctrine ("AEMLD"),
and breach of the implied warranty of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y under
§ 7-2-314, A l a . Code 1975. The t r i a l court entered a summary
judgment i n favor of the defendant as t o a l l t h e plaintiff's
claims. Allen, supra.
This Court stated the following relative to the
principles applicable to tort claims and breach-of-implied-
warranty claims i n tainted-food-product cases:
" I n r e g a r d t o t h e i r AEMLD c l a i m , t h e p l a i n t i f f s
must p r o v e that Mrs. A l l e n 'suffered injury or
d a m a g e s t o [ h e r s e l f ] o r [ h e r ] p r o p e r t y b y one who
sold a product i n a defective condition unreasonably
d a n g e r o u s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f as t h e u l t i m a t e u s e r o r
c o n s u m e r . ' A t k i n s v . A m e r i c a n M o t o r s C o r p . , 335 S o .
2 d 1 3 4 , 141 ( A l a . 1 9 7 6 ) . S i m i l a r l y , the p l a i n t i f f s '
i m p l i e d warranty of m e r c h a n t a b i l i t y c l a i m r e q u i r e s
that the p l a i n t i f f s show that t h e goods were
unmerchantable or u n f i t f o r the ordinary purposes
for which they are used. A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , § 7-2-314.
T h e s e t w o s t a n d a r d s 'go h a n d - i n - h a n d , ' a t l e a s t a s
applied to food products, ' f o r i t i s apparent that
a food product is defective or unreasonably
d a n g e r o u s i f i t i s u n m e r c h a n t a b l e o r u n f i t f o r human
c o n s u m p t i o n . ' C a i n v . S h e r a t o n P e r i m e t e r P a r k S.
H o t e l , 592 S o . 2 d 218 , 220 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ( q u o t i n g E x
p a r t e M o r r i s o n ' s C a f e t e r i a o f M o n t g o m e r y , I n c . , 4 31
28
29. 1071708
So. 2 d 9 7 5 , 977 (Ala. 1983)).
"This Court has adopted the 'reasonable
expectations' test f o r determining i f food i s
u n m e r c h a n t a b l e o r u n r e a s o n a b l y d a n g e r o u s . C a i n , 592
So. 2 d a t 2 2 1 ; M o r r i s o n ' s , 4 3 1 S o . 2 d a t 9 7 8 . U n d e r
t h i s t e s t , t h e p i v o t a l i s s u e i s what i s r e a s o n a b l y
e x p e c t e d by t h e consumer i n t h e f o o d as s e r v e d , and
the '[n]aturalness of the substance to any
i n g r e d i e n t s i n the food served i s important only i n
determining whether t h e c o n s u m e r may reasonably
expect t o f i n d such substance i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r type
of d i s h o r s t y l e of food served.' M o r r i s o n ' s , 431
So. 2 d a t 978 ( q u o t i n g Z a b n e r v . H o w a r d J o h n s o n ' s ,
Inc., 2 0 1 S o . 2 d 8 2 4 , 82 6 (Fla. Dist. C t . App.
1967)). Because t h e terms ' d e f e c t , ' 'unreasonably
dangerous,' and 'merchantable' a l l focus on t h e
e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e consumer, t h i s Court has found
t h e r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s t e s t t o be c o m p a t i b l e
w i t h b o t h t h e AEMLD a n d t h e i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y o f
merchantability. C a i n , 592 S o . 2 d a t 2 2 1 . "
Allen, 624 S o . 2 d a t 1 0 6 8 .
This Court reversed t h e summary j u d g m e n t i n favor of the
defendant on t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' AEMLD c l a i m , 7
stating:
"Delchamps a s s e r t s t h a t t h i s case i s d i f f e r e n t
f r o m C a i n b e c a u s e i n C a i n t h e summary j u d g m e n t on
t h e AEMLD c l a i m was b a s e d o n t h e t r i a l court's
f i n d i n g t h a t t h e AEMLD d i d n o t a p p l y , w h e r e a s i n
t h i s c a s e , D e l c h a m p s s a y s , t h e summary j u d g m e n t on
t h e AEMLD c l a i m was b a s e d on e v i d e n c e establishing
a lack of causal r e l a t i o n . To e s t a b l i s h t h e d e f e n s e
o f a l a c k o f c a u s a l r e l a t i o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t may show
' t h a t t h e r e i s no c a u s a l r e l a t i o n i n f a c t b e t w e e n
7
The defendant g r o c e r y s t o r e a p p a r e n t l y f a i l e d t o argue
t h e s e a l e d - c o n t a i n e r d o c t r i n e as a d e f e n s e t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s '
c l a i m a l l e g i n g b r e a c h o f i m p l i e d w a r r a n t y b e c a u s e t h e summary
j u d g m e n t a s t o t h a t c l a i m was r e v e r s e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s .
29
30. 1071708
his activities i n connection with handling the
product and i t s defective condition.' Atkins v.
American Motors C o r p . , 335 S o . 2 d 1 3 4 , 143 ( A l a .
1976). One way to e s t a b l i s h t h i s l a c k of a causal
relation is for t h e d e f e n d a n t t o show:
" ' [ T ] h a t he i s i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f e i t h e r
d i s t r i b u t i n g or p r o c e s s i n g f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n
finished products; he r e c e i v e d a p r o d u c t
a l r e a d y i n a d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n ; he d i d
not c o n t r i b u t e t o t h i s d e f e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n ;
he h a d n e i t h e r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e d e f e c t i v e
c o n d i t i o n , n o r an o p p o r t u n i t y to inspect
the product which was superior to the
knowledge or o p p o r t u n i t y of the consumer.'
"Id.
"While Delchamps showed that i t i s i n the
business of d i s t r i b u t i n g f i n i s h e d products, that i t
received a product already i n a defective condition,
and that i t d i d not c o n t r i b u t e to the d e f e c t i v e
condition, i t , nevertheless, did not show
c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t i t d i d n o t p o s s e s s an 'opportunity
t o i n s p e c t t h e p r o d u c t w h i c h was s u p e r i o r t o t h e
k n o w l e d g e o r o p p o r t u n i t y o f t h e c o n s u m e r . ' I d . The
plaintiffs showed t h a t Delchamps d i d i n s p e c t f o r
freshness and q u a l i t y and d i d have p r o c e d u r e s f o r
r e q u i r i n g i t s suppliers to c e r t i f y compliance with
other regulations regarding insecticides and
pesticides. Whether Delchamps's opportunity to
d i s c o v e r o r t o know o f t h e d e f e c t i s s u p e r i o r t o
t h a t of the consumer i s a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l
f a c t ; therefore, the court erroneously entered the
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t a s t o t h e AEMLD c l a i m . Delchamps
i s e n t i t l e d t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e and t o argue t h a t
t h e r e was no c a u s a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t i t d i d o r
f a i l e d t o do a n d M r s . A l l e n ' s i n j u r i e s , b u t i t m u s t
do s o t o t h e f a c t f i n d e r . "
Allen, 624 S o . 2 d a t 1 0 6 8 - 6 9 . Thus, t h i s Court d i d not r e j e c t
30
31. 1071708
the sealed-container doctrine as a d e f e n s e to the element of
causation; rather, i tdetermined that the defendant had f a i l e d
to present evidence establishing that defense as a m a t t e r o f
law.
It i s clear that the sealed-container doctrine was
available to r e t a i l e r s of food products a t common law and
under t h e Uniform Sales Act, the predecessor t o t h e UCC, a s a
defense to causation i n both claims sounding i n tort and those
asserting a breach o f an i m p l i e d warranty. The q u e s t i o n i s
whether that defense i s still available to r e t a i l sellers of
food products following the enactment o f t h e UCC.
As the federal district court noted in i t s certification
order to this Court, the enactment o f t h e UCC replaced the
warranty provisions of the Uniform S a l e s A c t (and p r e s u m a b l y
t h o s e o f t h e common l a w ) . See t h e O f f i c i a l Comment t o § 7-2¬
314, A l a . Code 1975, s t a t i n g as " [ c ] h a n g e s " that § 15(2) of
the Uniform S a l e s A c t was "[c]ompletely rewritten"; and t h e
Official Comment t o § 7 - 2 - 3 1 5 , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 , s t a t i n g t h a t §§
15(1), ( 4 ) , and (5) of the Uniform Sales Act had been
"[r]ewritten." S e c t i o n 7-1-103(b), A l a . Code 1975, p r o v i d e s
that "[u]nless d i s p l a c e d by t h e p a r t i c u l a r provisions of t h i s
31
32. 1071708
title, t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f law and e q u i t y , including the law
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation,
d u r e s s , c o e r c i o n , m i s t a k e , b a n k r u p t c y , and other v a l i d a t i n g or
invalidating cause supplement i t s provisions." Further,
" [ t ] h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l C o d e was d r a f t e d against
the backdrop o f e x i s t i n g b o d i e s o f law, i n c l u d i n g
the common l a w a n d e q u i t y , and r e l i e s on t h o s e
b o d i e s o f l a w t o s u p p l e m e n t i t s p r o v i s i o n s i n many
important ways. A t t h e same t i m e , the Uniform
C o m m e r c i a l Code i s t h e p r i m a r y s o u r c e o f c o m m e r c i a l
law r u l e s i n a r e a s t h a t i t g o v e r n s , and i t s r u l e s
represent choices made b y i t s d r a f t e r s and t h e
e n a c t i n g l e g i s l a t u r e s about t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p o l i c i e s
t o be f u r t h e r e d i n the transactions i t covers.
T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e p r i n c i p l e s o f common l a w a n d e q u i t y
may s u p p l e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l
Code, they may n o t be used to supplant i t s
provisions, or the purposes and p o l i c i e s those
provisions r e f l e c t , unless a s p e c i f i c provision of
t h e U n i f o r m C o m m e r c i a l Code p r o v i d e s otherwise. In
the absence o f such a provision, the Uniform
C o m m e r c i a l C o d e p r e e m p t s p r i n c i p l e s o f common l a w
and equity that are inconsistent with either i t s
p r o v i s i o n s or i t s purposes and p o l i c i e s . "
Official Comment t o § 7 - 1 - 1 0 3 , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . "Under § 7-1¬
103, p r i o r e x i s t i n g law supplements the various code sections
'unless d i s p l a c e d by t h e p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s title.'
It i s clear from this that i f t h e p a r t i c u l a r code provisions
do d i s p l a c e p r i o r l a w , t h e code p r e v a i l s . " Toomey E q u i p . C o .
v. C o m m e r c i a l C r e d i t E q u i p . C o r p . , 386 S o . 2 d 1 1 5 5 , 1159 ( A l a .
32
33. 1071708
Civ. App. 1980). In other words, the UCC i s to be
supplemented by t h e e x i s t i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f law and e q u i t y i f
no precise provision of t h e UCC applicable to the issues
presented contradicts those principles. S e e H.C. Schmieding
Produce Co. v . C a g l e , 529 S o . 2 d 2 4 3 ( A l a . 1988).
Nothing i n the express provisions o f §§ 7-2-314 a n d - 3 1 5
indicate that previously accepted defenses were abrogated by
the enactment o f t h e UCC. Nor have the p l a i n t i f f s directed
this Court t o any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n o f t h e UCC that supplants
the defenses available a t common law. In fact, i t appears
from the Official Comment to § 7-2-314 that common-law
defenses to causation were affirmatively left i n t a c t by t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e when t h e UCC was e n a c t e d . The O f f i c i a l Comment t o
§ 7-2-314 states:
" I n a n a c t i o n b a s e d on b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y , i t i s o f
c o u r s e n e c e s s a r y t o show n o t o n l y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f
the warranty but the f a c t that the warranty was
b r o k e n a n d t h a t t h e b r e a c h o f t h e w a r r a n t y was t h e
proximate cause of the l o s s s u s t a i n e d . I n s u c h an
a c t i o n an a f f i r m a t i v e s h o w i n g b y t h e s e l l e r t h a t t h e
l o s s r e s u l t e d f r o m some a c t i o n o r e v e n t f o l l o w i n g
his own d e l i v e r y o f t h e g o o d s c a n o p e r a t e a s a
defense. Equally, evidence i n d i c a t i n g that the
s e l l e r exercised care i n the manufacture, processing
or s e l e c t i o n o f t h e goods i s r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e
o f w h e t h e r t h e w a r r a n t y was i n f a c t b r o k e n . A c t i o n
b y t h e b u y e r f o l l o w i n g an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e g o o d s
which ought t o have i n d i c a t e d t h e d e f e c t complained
33
34. 1071708
o f c a n be shown as m a t t e r b e a r i n g on w h e t h e r t h e
b r e a c h i t s e l f was t h e c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y . "
Additionally, I note that because causation i s an e l e m e n t
of a breach o f an implied warranty, the abrogation of the
defenses available to r e t a i l defendants as t o t h a t element
would have t h e e f f e c t o f making t h e r e t a i l defendant strictly
liable and t h e i n s u r e r o f t h e goods i t sells. The i d e a of
making a retailer the insurer o f t h e goods i tsells has been
r e j e c t e d by t h i s Court. See Ex p a r t e Morrison's Cafeteria of
Montgomery, I n c . , 4 3 1 S o . 2 d 9 7 5 , 979 (Ala. 1983) ("Courts
cannot and must n o t i g n o r e t h e common experience of l i f e and
allow rules to develop that would make sellers of food or
other consumer goods insurers of the products they sell.");
Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 S o . 2 d 1 3 4 , 142 (Ala.
1976) (rejecting the idea of s t r i c t liability u n d e r t h e AEMLD
and s t a t i n g " t h a t d e f e n d a n t s who a r e o r d i n a r i l y e n g a g e d i n t h e
business of marketing products should be liable f o r the
foreseeable harm proximately resulting from defective
conditions in the products which make them unreasonably
dangerous").
Accordingly, I would hold that the sealed-container
doctrine as s t a t e d i n K i r k l a n d , s u p r a , and B r a d f o r d , supra, i s
34
35. 1071708
available as a defense to the retail seller of food products
in claims asserting a breach o f an implied warranty under the
UCC.
Stuart, Smith, and Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r .
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